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Abstract 
This work aims to assess the development of competition in the electricity industry of England and 
Wales, emphasising one of the key elements of the restructured industry, the pool -a centralised day- 
ahead electricity spot market. 
The pool's structure is examined, along with the relationship that the pool has with the market for 
electricity forward contracts. However, the key to this work is the relationship between the major 
electricity generators and the industry's regulator. This is introduced through two theoretical models, 
and undertaken through a series of econometric models using pool prices, forward prices, electricity 
demand, and the share prices of the major generators: National Power and Powergen. 
The work tests the hypotheses put forward by Green (1992) and Helm & Powell (1992) of an inverse 
relationship between the volume of output that a generator sells forward through contracts and the 
general level of pool prices. The break-up of the first and second sets of forward contracts - which 
expired in 1991 and 1993 - and their impact on pool prices are assessed. 
By using the market model, this work examines the impact of a series of both regulatory and non- 
regulatory events on the share returns of National Power and Powergen. 
Given the existence of spot and forward markets for electricity, one would expect a relationship 
between the prices in these markets The relationship is examined for England and Wales by a 
synthetic data set that approximates the prices at which the contracts were sold. The relationship is 
then examined using actual and forecast electricity prices for California, this latter analysis forming 
part of an overview of electricity deregulation in America. 
Ultimately, this research hopes to add to the growing amount of material on energy privatisation -a 
topic that continues to promote interest and controversy in academic and industrial circles. 
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CHAPTER I- Introduction. 
The privatisation programme undertaken by the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major has 
been a source of considerable debate in industry and academia ever since the process was first 
proposed. The programme was founded on the virtues of private ownership and on extending the role 
of competition in the economy, as well as limiting the interfering nature of central and local 
government in economic decision-making. Such arguments as the need for appropriate efficiency 
incentives and the need for a more laissez-faire approach were at the forefront of the demands for the 
massive process of privatisation and deregulation which the Conservative government began shortly 
after their election victory in 1979. 
The privatisation programme implemented in the UK was on a scale unparalleled at the time, and as 
such, it represented a very difficult and precarious path for the government to undertake. One could 
not argue that the programme has been either a true success or a total failure - the leaming process that 
began with the first privatisations is far from complete. As the government continued its privatisation 
process, it learnt from each of the industries that it has sold to the private sector. In particular, the 
electricity industry was the beneficiary of the experience learned in privatising the gas industry, which 
was privatised as an integrated monopoly. As a consequence, British Gas was in almost continued 
conflict with its regulator throughout much of its life. In contrast to the integrated monopoly of British 
Gas, the electricity industry was vertically separated and competition introduced into those areas 
where it was feasible to do so. in the case of this work, the key area of interest is electricity generation. 
Each of the newly privatised industries faced its own regulator, charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that consumers' interests were championed, as well as maintaining the spread of competition 
in those areas of the industry where such policies could be implemented. Although there are four main 
areas in the electricity industry: generation, transmission, distribution and supply, the potential for 
competition is greatest in generation, and to a lesser extent in supply. It was this sector of the industry 
that was the most drastically altered as a consequence of privatisation. The transmission grid and 
regional distribution companies were ahnost completely unaltered, while the generation sector was 
broken up into thive generating companies, and the regulator actively encouraged new entry in 
generation. However, the degree of regulatory activity in the industry since privatisation has been 
indicative of the fact that competition has not developed to the extent anticipated by either the 
government or the regulator. It is this relationship between the regulator and the electricity generators 
which is at the heart of this thesis. 
Privatisation brought with it the creation of a spot market for electricity - the pool - into which all 
I 
generators must bid the prices of their generating plant. It was hoped that competition would develop 
in this market as generators attempted to get their plants called upon to generate. However, the 
generators created at privatisation possessed market shares which gave them considerable power in 
this market, and although new entry did occur, it did not occur on the scale needed to erode this 
market power. Tbus regulation took the place of competition on a broader and broader scale. 
This increased level of regulatory intervention served to make the relationship between the regulator 
and the generators more and more adversarial, as the generators began to operate in the pool in ways 
that maximised their profits, but which did not necessarily benefit consumers. This type of conduct led 
to investigations by the regulator into the structure of the industry and the conduct of the firms in the 
generating sector - reviews into generator strategy, pool prices, and the possibility of restructuring the 
generation sector. 
In addition to the spot market for electricity, there is also a forward market, in which financial-type 
forward contracts are bought and sold. The spot and forward markets inter-react in such a way that the 
incentives of the generators can be altered, and the potential for spot market competition can be 
restricted by the role of the contract market. 
Although all sections of the industry are regulated, there is a great deal of practical concern that the 
regulator does not possess full powers required to prevent the generators from making their strength 
felt in the spot and forward markets. In addition, there is the complication that, although regulation is a 
surrogate for competition, it can never truly take the place of competition. Typically, regulation serves 
to create a form of hybrid market, based upon discretionary intervention resulting from those activities 
that have attracted the regulator's attention. 
Fears that the regulator does not possess either sufficient power or sufficient information to perform an 
adequate job are at the heart of theories of regulation. The best example of this in the regulated 
electricity industry was the controversial decision taken by the regulator to review the distribution 
price controls in the light of the defence package offered to shareholders of Northern Electric after it 
faced a hostile take-over bid by Trafalgar House (discussed below). Furthermore, if the generators are 
aware of the regulator's limited arsenal, they may choose to operate in such a way that their true 
intentions and su-dtegies cannot be directly inferred. This implies either that they do not believe that 
their true actions will be detected, or that the regulator will undertake the actions needed to stop them. 
The credibility of regulation is also an important element of this thesis, as it forms the basis for many 
of the conclusions of the empirical studies. It is important, for regulation to be successful, that the 
2 
regulator maintains credibility, and that the generators be aware that he will act in a manner that will 
restrict their potential operations. 
It is therefore the objective of this thesis to attempt to ascertain precisely how the electricity generators 
have responded over time to the continuing threat of regulation, and whether they believe this threat to 
be a clear and present danger to their operations. This issue will be examined by means of a number of 
empirical studies, including analyses on pool prices and their components, share prices of the 
electricity generators, and by examining the potential relationships between the electricity spot and 
forward market. It is also possible to view this analysis in the light of continuing electricity 
deregulation in America, where the electricity industry remains one of the last great monopolies, and 
where the UK experience could be seen as a valuable guide for possible strategies of deregulation. 
Chapters 11 and III introduce the key terms and structures to be used throughout this thesis. These 
include the history and the structure of the pool, the history of electricity privatisation in the UK and 
the role of the spot and contract markets for electricity. 
Chapter IV introduces the theoretical foundation for the empirical studies of the later chapters by 
examining two theoretical models of the pool: the Folk Theorem and the supply function model of 
Green & Newbery (1992). The former is a dynamic model that permits the dynamics of the pool to be 
examined by using either price or quantity schedules, while the latter is primarily a static model that 
allows price-quantity schedules to be evaluated. Therefore, while the former examines the repeated 
dynamics of the pool, the latter examines the true price-quantity bidding nature of the pool. 
Having introduced the theoretical basis, Chapter V contains a range of studies based around the 
hypothesis that regulatory announcements would have a considerable effect on how the generators set 
pool prices. Such events are assessed using dummy variables to represent these events in a series of 
regressions, and to use the coefficients on the dummy variables to assess the consequences of these 
events. 
Chapter VI focuses upon the role of the contract market in determining the pool price through an 
assessment of the impact of the break-up of the two major sets of electricity forward contracts in 
March 1991 and March 1993. It is therefore anticipated that the validation of these hypotheses will 
indicate the importance that the contract market has on the pool, and therefore the possible need for 
regulatory action in the contract market. This work is based upon and develops fin-ther the work of 
Heim & Powell (1992). 
3 
Chapter VII assesses how certain events have impacted upon the share returns of the two main 
generators - National Power and Powergen - through use of the market model. Chapter VIII 
incorporates a more in-depth examination of the forward contracts that initially governed the 
electricity industry following privatisation. The relationship of the prices of these contracts and the 
actual ourturn pool prices is assessed in order to examine the actual strength of the contracts. This 
chapter also includes an examination of the progress of electricity deregulation in California - one of 
the most notable locations in which the UK experience of electricity deregulation is being used as a 
guide. Chapter IX concludes. 
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Introduction - Privatisation and Beyond. 
This chapter will assess the development of the electricity industry both before and after its 
privatisation in 1990. Specifically, it will examine the impact of privatisation upon the industry and 
how the industry has developed - for better or for worse - as deregulation has proceeded. 
Electricity was restructured with the objective of increasing competition in those sections of the 
industry where such a transition was feasible, and maintaining prices and services for consumers in 
those sections where natm2l monopoly elements prevented the use of competition. Those parts of the 
industry where competition was deemed possible were generation -a move made possible by the 
division of the CEGB's generating capacity into three companies - and domestic supply, through the 
twelve regional distribution and supply companies. The introduction of supply competition was made 
possible by the use of a three-stage programme. In the first stage, beginning at privatisation, 
consumers with an annual electricity demand in excess of I MW were allowed to choose their own 
electricity supplier. As of April 1994, consumers with an annual demand in excess of 100 kW could 
choose their own supplier, and from April 1998 full domestic supply competition will be phased in 
over a six-month period. 
Despite the vertical separation of the industry at privatisation, generators have undertaken supply and 
distribution contracts and regional suppliers have acquired generating assets. Therefore, the degree of 
inter-relationships between sectors represents an important aspect of the continuing deregulation of the 
industry. This is especially true given the mergers and acquisitions boom that gripped the industry in 
the summer of 1995 and has continued through a wave of rationalisations; and horizontal and vertical 
integration. 
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Section I- Privatisation and industrial restructuring. 
1.1. The UK Ekaricity Industty before and after PrIvadsation. 
ne UK electricity supply industry was perhaps the most radical of the privatisations carried out by 
the Conservative government as part of its commitment to private ownership. Privatised in 1990, the 
electricity industry was the beneficiary of the wisdom acquired from the earlier privatisations, notably 
of British Telecom (1982) and British Gas (1986). What made the privatisation of the electricity 
industry stand out from its predecessors was the considerable restructuring which accompanied the 
now customary share offers. 
British Telecom had been privatised with BT itself retaining a highly dominant position within the 
industry. The then small Mercury was its only competitor, protected by the government's duopoly 
policy. British Gas, by contrast, had been privatised as a fully integrated monopoly, a move that was 
seen by many as a mistake. This viewpoint was quickly vindicated as the concerns about abuses of 
market power increased. 
The privatisation of the nationalised Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was first put 
forward in a 1988 White Paper, "Privatising Electricity", and followed attempts made earlier in the 
1980s to introduce competition into the industry. (The systems were different in England and Wales 
than in Scotland. Only the former is discussed here). The pre-privatisation structure consisted of the 
CEGB that owned and operated all of the generating capacity in the country as well as the grid, and 
distributed power in bulk to the twelve Area Electricity Boards for sale to customers. In addition, there 
were electricity imports fi-om the Scottish electricity companies and Electricite de France via 
interconnector relay systems linked directly to the national grid. 
Unlike both British Telecom and British Gas, the electricity supply industry was to be vertically 
separated upon privatisation. This separation ultimately happened in the gas industry with the creation 
of Transco and Centrica from British Gas over the period from 1995 to 1997. Although it has yet to 
occur fiilly in telecommunications, BT is required to grant its competitors equal, non-discriminatory 
access to its network. 
Ile company made responsible for all of the industry's high voltage transmission facilities was the 
National Grid Company (NGC), which would be co-owned by the twelve Regional Electricity 
Companies (RECs, the former Area Boards). 
The RECs themselves were largely unchanged by privatisation - they remained primarily (low 
voltage) distribution and supply companies, each of which possessed a local monopoly fimchise with 
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distribution charges regulated by an Offer price cap. As with generation, there has been a notable 
spread of competition in supply following privatisation. Those consumers with an annual electricity 
demand greater than IMW were free to choose their own supplier as of privatisation, with the 
threshold lowered to lOOkW in April 1994, and with fidl competition phased-in from April 1998. In 
this deregulated market, the RECs also face competition from wholesalers (second-tier suppliers) for 
consumer business. The RECs now face competition from independent compýnies, the three main 
generators, and several large electricity users, as customers have the option of bypassing their local 
REC completely. 
The most challenging early feature of privatisation was to be found in the generating sector, where it 
was anticipated that competition could truly be made the driving force. The initial plans would have 
had the CEGB's generating capacity divided between two firms: National Power and Powergen. This 
plan was seen as doomed to failure, through the production of a system highly conducive to the 
exploitation of monopoly power and, inevitably, fiu-ther restructuring in the future. 
The structure was intended to be an asymmetric duopoly, with National Power being given control of 
all of the CEGB's nuclear plant and the majority of the fossil fuel plant (two-thirds of the industry's 
generating capacity), while the remaining fossil fuel plant would go to Powergen (the remaining third). 
The rationale behind this structure was to encourage the private sector to invest in nuclear power by 
grouping it with such a large proportion of the fossil-fired capacity. However, the private sector did 
not consider nuclear power to be a safe investment, due to increasing concerns about the 
environmental consequences of nuclear power and the potential level of decommissioning costs. 
Consequently, the govemment was forced to re-evaluate this facet of its privatisation programme. 
Faced with an opportunity to re-evaluate its plans for the privatisation of the generating sector, the 
government made little substantive changes to the planned restructuring, with government retaining 
National Power and Powergen as the two principal generators with their aforementioned shares of the 
fossil ftiel plant. The nuclear capacity became the publicly owned Nuclear Electric, itself ultimately 
floated as British Energy in 1996. British Energy comprises Nuclear Electric's Advanced Gas-cooled 
Reactors (AGRs), its Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), and Scottish Nucleaes AGR facilities. 
Nuclear Electric's Magnox facilities are still in public ownership as Magnox Electric. 
The NGC, with responsibility for distribution and supply to the RECs, was originally co-owned by the 
12 RECs, but was floated as a separate company in late 1995, with the RECs relinquishing their 
ownership shares. In addition to the grid, NGC also owned the pumped storage businesses - the Welsh 
hydroelectric plants at Dinorwig and Ffestiniog used to meet peaks in demand. The floatation of the 
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grid was planned for the summer of 1995, but the regulator delayed this until the end of the year. 
Shortly after its floatation, the grid's pumped storage businesses (now known as First Hydro) were 
purchased by the Mission Energy group, part of the US company Edison International. 
Exports continue from Scotland (Scottish Nuclear, Scottish Hydro Electric, and Scottish Power) and 
France (Electricite de France). Although designed for both export from and import to the English grid, 
the flow through the interconnectors is typically to, rather than from, England and Wales. 
The structure of the Scottish electricity supply industry was largely unchanged after its privatisation. 
The assets of the former North of Scotland HydroElectric Board (NSHEB) were transferred to 
Scottish HydroElectric, and those of the former South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) went to 
Scottish Power. The exception to this agreement was the SSEB's nuclear capacity, which was 
tramferTed to Scottish Nuclear Limited. All three companies remain vertically integrated. 
Since privatisation in England and Wales, there has also been a substantial increase in the number of 
small, independent power producers (IPPs), who are commonly linked to the RECs in some manner, 
be it in the form of joint ownership or equity shares. In the event of joint ownership, the RECs may 
contract out to the IPPs for up to 15% of their total power needs. The RECs have utilised this limit to 
varying degrees, with some contracting for over 80% of their total power requirements, others for less 
than 10%. 
The modifications to the generating sector corresponded to modifications to the market for electricity, 
which became a spot market (actually a day-ahead market), called the pool. The electricity pool is 
effectively a spot market for bulk power that is owned and operated by NGC, through which the vast 
majority of all transactions for electricity must flow. (The role of the pool is outlined in depth in 
subsequent chapters). 
There are four specific licences that can be issued to the companies who trade in the pool. These are 
for generation (held by generators), transmission (held only by the NGQ, a second-tier supply licence 
(held by any company seeking to supply in the second-tier market), and a PES licence (held by the 
RECs, which covers both distribution and supply). 
As with all privatised industries, the industry has a regulator: the Office of Electricity Regulation 
(Offer), headed by the Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES), Professor Stephen Littlechild, 
who has held the position since privatisation. The DGES holds regulatory authority over the industry 
with the President of the Board of Trade and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). The 
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three main activities of the DGES are to ensure that licensees are able to finance their licensed 
activities, that all reasonable demands for electricity are met, and that competition in generation and 
supply (but not transmission and distribution, as these are monopoly elements) is promoted. 
The DGES has an obligation to act in the manner which he perceives the most appropriate, given the 
interests of consumers, the promotion of efficiency and economy on the part of licence holders, and 
the promotion of the efficient use of electricity. The DGES possesses a variety of functions, such as 
the provision of new licences, the monitoring and enforcement of the licence conditions, the 
investigation of complaints, and the provision of advice to the Secretary of State. 
Of potential interest to this analysis are the following conditions. Firstly, Condition 5 of the PIES 
licence contains the REC obligation on economic purchasing, which requires a supplier to purchase 
electricity at the most effective price having weighed up all alternative sources. The purchasing 
conditions of the PESs are dependent upon such factors as the duration of the appropriate forward 
contract, expected movements in pool and contract prices, and the predictability and variability of 
electricity demand. Secondly, Condition 6 of the PES licence concerns the own-generation limits 
imposed upon the RECs. It states that the own-generation capacity of the licensee and the appropriate 
share of declared capacity should not exceed the limit of 15% of the total demand in the PES's area. 
Amendments may be made to the licences as appropriate, at the discretion of the DGES. 
The other major change brought about as a consequence of privatisation was the introduction of the 
Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL) and the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO). The former of these conditions 
requires the RECs to contract a certain percentage of their demand from plants powered by non-fossil 
(including nuclear) fuels. The goal is to ensure a continued diversity of fuel supply. Those generators 
who have NFFO contracts are paid a premium for the electricity generated. This premium is financed 
by the FFL, paid by licensed electricity suppliers, and reflected in consumers' bills. The FFL is 
currently set at 10%, and is to be discontinued at an unspecified future date. 
L2 Industrial reformn made since privatisadon. 
In addition to the restructining at privatisation, it was hoped that competition would develop in the 
generating sector by the availability of public electricity supply (PES) licences. Subject to 
authorisation, any company can obtain a licence to act as a generator and to build and operate power 
stations. In the first three years after privatisation, over twenty of these licences were issued, mainly 
for the newly developed, high efficiency combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generating equipment. 
The IPPs, many of whom are partially owned by the RECs, have constructed plants and have been 
able to secure contracts for gas supplies, supplying fifteen year contracts with their parent companies. 
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(The issue of REC ownership of IPP plants will be examined with below). 
In the first year after vesting, National Power and Powergen together accounted for 74% of the 
electricity sold into the pool, with Nuclear Electric and the other generators (mainly the Scottish 
companies) comprising the remaining 26%. The balance has continually shifted away from the 
incumbent duopolists towards the nuclear industry and the IPPs. This is due to increased investment in 
new plant and also legislation from the DGES with regard to plant closures. Consequently, by late 
1994, Nuclear Electric was facing the prospect of overtaking Powergen as the second largest generator 
in the industry. Although Nuclear Electric has little direct influence on prices, its plants play an 
important role in setting prices. Nuclear Electric's plant is baseload capacity, i. e. it operates twenty- 
four hours a day, and if its supply is interrupted, then electricity prices will increase sharply in a 
relatively predictable manner. This facet of the industry was illustrated in early 1995 when Nuclear 
Electric's Dungeness and Heysham reactors were shut down on maintenance grounds - the resulting 
price spikes were well reported. 
In the longer term, yet more capacity could be added both through more independent generators, who 
continue to enter at an increasing rate, and through the Scottish and French companies, who have 
increased the load capacity of the interconnector. Further competition has come in the form of Open 
Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT) plants and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) facilities. 
The main concern regarding the generation sector is that it is uncompetitively and inefficiently 
structured as a triopoly. Although Nuclear Electric is one of the largest generators in terms of 
available capacity, it has no direct influence on how prices in the pool are set. Prices are in fact set by 
National Power and Powergen over 85% of the time, with the pumped storage businesses (later First 
Hydro, see above) setting prices the remaining 15% of the time. 
Even if the generators behave non-collusively in the spot market, they still possess a high degree of 
market power that is constrained only by the threat of new entry. If entry deterrence can occur without 
lowering prices, then there are dead-weight welfare losses from operating at too high a price with too 
low an output. If entry deterrence should prove unsuccessful, then inefficiency will result from excess 
entry, investment, and the unnecessary duplication of resources. Such conditions could be exacerbated 
due to the cost pass-through condition of the RECs' supply licences. 
Theoretically, given the highly concentrated industrial structure, the inelastic nature of electricity 
demand, and the fact that National Power is effectively a resident monopolist (given the MMC's 
definition of a monopoly), it is unlikely that competition in the spot market will result in marginal cost 
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pricing. The indusbys highly concentrated structure, combined with the repeated interaction of the 
generators within the pool's bidding structure, could result in collusive behaviour and high prices. if 
this were to occur on a large scale, this could lead to excessive investment in new capacity within the 
industry. 
It is therefore the role of the regulator to prevent such an outcome, and the conclusion as to whether 
regulation has been successfW is a highly debated one. This is increasingly relevant following the 
revised distribution price review of 1995 and the increasing number of take-over and merger offers for 
RECs in the period which occurred in and after the summer of 1995. 
An important regulatory consideration, especially fi-om. the viewpoint of the large incumbent 
generators, is whether it is socially desirable to allow the RECs to own a share in the IPPs, Given the 
cost pass-through of the RECs, it has been argued that the RECS may simply purchase electricity from 
the plants in which they have an equity stake regardless of the cost, then pass these inflated costs on to 
the consumers. The revenue lost by uncompetitive purchasing will be compensated for by revenue 
gained from electricity sales, with a minimum of risk for the RECs - representing a serious violation of 
the efficient purchasing condition of the PES licence. This was such a concern voiced by the larger 
generators that the DGES was forced to undertake an inquiry into the issue. (Offer, Review of 
Economic Purchasing, 1992,1993). 
The RECs argued that, given the lack of long term contracts being offered by the incumbent 
generators, the contracts being offered by the IPPs represented the least cost way of making future 
electricity purchases. The evidence compiled on CCGT plants is that they have higher total costs than 
the variable costs of existing coal fired plants and new coal fired plants burning imported coal. 
One of the solutions put forward for the problems with the contract market was a tendering system 
whereby all generators would bid for contracts to supply the RECs, with competition being ensured by 
all of the bids going through the DGES. Alternatively, some modified form of benchmark pricing 
could be used, which would permit only a partial cost passthrough. This would be some fraction of the 
excess cost of any long-term contract relative to the average costs of purchase faced by the other 
RECs. However, such a proposal would increase the degree of risk faced by the RECs, as they would 
no longer be fully insulated from unanticipated price increases, requiring them to seek a higher return 
on their activities. 
If the RECs were required to bear a higher proportion of the risks, then it would 
discourage them from 
investing in the IPPs. Such an occurrence would limit new entry into the industry, thereby 
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strengthening the power of the incumbents. The review carried out by the DGES into this matter 
concluded that there were no detrimental effects on prices caused by the practice of allowing RECs to 
invest in the IPPs. Weed, the DGES found that; by encouraging new entry into the industry, the RECs 
were promoting efficiency rather than harming it. 
In February 1994, following months of concern regarding price setting within the pool, and repeated 
threats of an NMC reference for National Power and Powergen, an agreement was reached between 
the regulator and the generators on conditions for price control and the sale of generating plant. 
Although this will be covered in a subsequent section, it is important to note that the generators 
initially did not have a great deal of success complying with the terms of this agreement, experiencing 
problems with both the price control element and the sale of plant. Ultimately, the main beneficiary of 
the forced sale of plant was the Eastern Group. 
Some of the remaining reforms have already been referred to in passing. However, it is appropriate to 
re-state some of them. Firstly, following the sale of the government's residual forty percent stake in the 
electricity companies in March 1995, a series of REC take-overs resulted. These were pre-empted by 
the bid for Northern Electric made by Trafalgar House in December 1994, but the remaining take- 
overs occurred after the government's sale, notably in the sununer of 1995. Many of the acquiring 
companies have generation interests or experience (notably the American companies), and it is 
anticipated that fin-ther moves into generation may be made over time. 
The forced sale by the RECs of their shares in the National Grid occurred in late 1995, and shortly 
after the pumped storage businesses (First Hydro) were purchased by Mission Energy. The most 
notable point of this move was the price paid by Mission - E650 million, well in excess of the prices 
anticipated by both the City and the NGC itself This move led many to believe that Mission intended 
to expand its role in the generation market. 
Of course, the main take-over plans that failed are those of National Power and Powergen, and their 
attempts to take over Southern Electricity and Midlands Electricity respectively. These moves were 
approved by the MMC, subject to certain conditions concerning the divestiture of generating plant. 
However, in a move that led to widespread controversy, the Trade and Industry Secretary Ian Lang 
opposed them and the take-overs were blocked. In addition, there was the move by Southern 
International (US) to acquire National Power, a move blocked by the government by the retention of 
its golden share. 
1.3. Research into the electricity induspy's post-privathadon structure. 
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Prior to privatisation, a number of commentators examined the consequences for efficiency of a 
number of different potential structures for the industry. Suggestions ranged from the establishment of 
nine or ten separate companies, none of whom could grow to supply in excess of 20% of the market, 
to strategies that simply advocated extensive regulation in all sectors of the newly privatised industry. 
This section examines the work of several noted authors and their conclusions regarding the structure 
of the generating sector and the conduct of the generators. 
Green & Newbery (1992) attempt to model the electricity spot market by means of the following 
methodology derived from Klemperer and Meyer's (199 1) supply function approach to oligopoly. It is 
assumed that each firm submits a smooth supply schedule for its generating output, relating output to 
marginal price, and that a price is also submitted for each time that their generating unit is started. In 
addition, payments are made for a nonzero LOLP (loss of load probability - the risk of a power 
shortage - see below for additional information) as demand approaches the available capacity. These 
simpliýýing assumptions are designed to limit the market power of the firms, and therefore provide an 
optimistic assessment of the true condition of the generating sector, 
The only equilibrium sought are non co-operative Nash equilibrium in the spot market, analysed as a 
one-shot game, in which there is assumed to be no learning process. (Theoretically, this is an ideal 
situation in which the duopolists; could maintain a collusive equilibrium in a repeated game). The 
demand function used is the load duration curve, which gives the number of hours in a day in which 
demand exceeds a certain level. 
Demand is given as a function of price and time, where time is the number of hours in which demand 
exceeds a certain level. The demand curve for a particular firm in a symmetric duopoly is the total 
demand minus the supply of its competitor. Because generators supply both price and quantity to the 
market, neither conventional Bertrand nor Cournot oligopoly methodology may be utilised. This 
problem was eliminated in general terms by Klemperer and Meyer's (199 1) technique of supply 
function equilibrium in oligopoly. By using this methodology, it is discovered that there is a range of 
potential equilibrium, lying between the Bertrand (marginal cost pricing) and Coumot solutions. There 
is only a unique solution in the event that the demand schedule is arbitrarily high. 
The use of a shadow price to incorporate supply constraints into the analysis narrows the range of 
potential equilibrium has been narrowed. The range of equilibrium will no longer include the Bertrand 
point and some of the more competitive solutions. There is only a unique equilibrium in the event that 
maximum demand intersects with full capacity to generate the Cournot solution, or if demand is 
capacity constrained (insufficient capacity to meet demand) at the Cournot point. By subsequent 
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modifications to the analysis, it is shown that if incumbents and potential entrants all have access to 
the same technology, and the incumbents can credibly commit to a supply schedule, then the 
incumbents can earn higher long nm profits by co-ordinating on a high-output low-price strategy. 
In examining the more realistic case of an asymmetric duopoly, the results indicated that the cost 
functions for the two firms were not dissimilar at the industry level (this was not true at the firm level) 
than in the symmetric case. in the asymmetric case the larger firm (National Power) will gain more 
from a price increase and will therefore choose a steeper supply function, relative to marginal cost, 
than in the symmetric case. This gives the smaller firm (Powergen) a less elastic residual demand 
curve and a greater incentive to raise price. The combined effect will make the industry supply curve 
steeper. In the asymmetric case, Powergen is actuafly seen to be better off than National Power, due to 
NP's steeper supply function (relative to marginal cost) which means that it does most of the work in 
terms of keeping prices high. NP produces a greater output but the greater surplus it earns over its 
fuel costs is more than offset by its higher fixed costs. In the asymmetric case, less output will be sold 
at a higher price, and industry operating costs will be finther raised for any level of output since the 
stations will no longer be operating in merit order. (This technique is discussed further in Chapter IV). 
From Green & Newbery's (1992) empirical analysis, in the short run the strategies followed by 
National Power and Powergen have little effect on entry. During this period they will have 
considerable market power and can offer supply schedules with price considerably above marginal 
cost - even in the event of a non-collusive strategy. There are also additional methods of manipulating 
the market by exploiting constraints in the grid's transmission capacity and by altering different bid 
components, in addition to being able to support collusive outcomes in the repeated game. 
In the medium term, considerable entry would be likely in response to the high level of prices, but the 
expansion of capacity is not justified on cost benefit grounds. If the incumbents can successfully 
commit to a competitive strategy after entry, they will deter more entry and earn higher long run 
profits than by a collusive strategy. However, total dead-weight loss caused by the industry is far 
greater in the current structure than if the industry had been broken up into five equal-sized firms, 
which is found to be the optimal structure. However, Green & Newbery (1992) also argue that there is 
the potential for considerable social welfare loss caused by excessive and unnecessary entry. 
Furthermore, the authors suggest that the potential for the exercise of market power was considerably 
underestimated by the government at the time of privatisation, perhaps misled by the degree of 
competition in concentrated Bertrand markets. The potential dead-weight losses are high, both on the 
demand side and the cost side due to deviations fi-om the merit order. The extent of these losses is 
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dependent upon the degree to which the incumbents attempt to raise prices and short run profits in the 
period before entry. Almost all of these losses are seen to be potentially avoidable, had the industry 
been divided into five equal-sized firms at vesting. It is also seen that the logistical complications of 
such a structure would not have been great, and it can therefore be concluded that a major opportunity 
was lost to introduce greater competition into the generating sector. 
Wolfram (1995) undertakes an extensive study into the UK electricity industry in an effort to ascertain 
the nature of price-cost mark-ups and the extent to which generators exercise their market power. 
Utilising pool purchase price as the dependent variable, the study incorporates many independent 
variables and assesses their responsiveness to such events as the ending of the vesting contracts and 
the announcement and publication of the regulatory reviews. The data set in use consists of half-hourly 
pool price information from every day in sixth months (January, February, March, April, July and 
November) from 1992,1993 and 1994. The following factors were used as independent variables: 
electricity demand, weather conditions (temperature, wind speed, cloud cover, and the time of day), 
GDP (to incorporate the effect of industrial production), fuel prices (coal, gas, heavy fuel oil, light fuel 
oil), and plant additions and closings. 
In measuring the extent of the generators' price-cost mark-ups, the generators' marginal costs had to be 
estimated. These estimates were based around the generators' plants, their output, their fuel sources 
and the cost of that fuel, and the plant's thermal efficiency levels (the rate at which the plant converts 
fuel to electricity). The study indicated that the price-cost mark-ups were 20%, although estimates of 
generators' market power (as provided by the NEIO, Bresnahan (1989)) did not support this 
conclusion. The estimates of market power derived from the data indicated that the optimal industry 
structure was in fact a twenty-firm symmetric Cournot oligopoly, far from its current structure. it was 
hypothesised that the indicated level of market power was a consequence of the inelastic nature of the 
demand for electricity. indeed, despite the relatively high level of the price-cost mark-up, further 
analysis showed that the two large generators exploited far less of their dominant position than was 
actually possible - an outcome attributed to the threats of entry and tighter regulation, and the 
existence of the vesting contracts. However, it was shown that it was the possibility of entry and 
regulation that were exhibiting the highest constraint on the mark-ups. If this conclusion is valid, then 
the threat of entry constraining prices is of course one of the characteristics of a contestable market, 
making the generating sector contestable rather than competitive. The possibility of contestability in 
generation is examined below in conjunction with the role of the contract market. However, it is noted 
that as the pool price is the main signal given out to potential entrants, pricing to deter entry means 
that the pool price should be held as low as possible -a goal which the generators may achieve 
through the use of the contract market. 
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Newbery (1994) examines the development of electricity supply industries in several industrialised 
nations, focusing primarily on those that have been privatised and examining those industries from a 
pricing and regulatory standpoint. For the industry in England & Wales, both the NGC and Offer have 
determined that marginal cost pricing is infeasible as marginal cost is consistently below average 
costs. Given that the industry has retained many of its natural monopoly characteristics despite 
privatisation, this should not be too surprising. 
Newbery views the key determinant to consider when examining the possibility of industrial 
restructuring is the extent to which subsequent reforms may be allowed given what has gone before, it 
was anticipated that in England and Wales, given the vertical separation of the industry, the pool was 
to operate in a manner that induced competitive behaviour by the generators. However, as has been 
illustrated, such operations raise questions regarding the financing of investment. 
In terms of general efficiency, the electricity industry has seen its workforce halved and greater cost 
controls implemented. Despite increased competition and investment in the generating sector, the 
RECs have essentially retained their regional (franchise) monopoly structure. The extent to which this 
will remain so has already been questioned, given the continued deregulation of the RECs ability to 
obtain customers beyond their franchise area. The fiaure is more questionable with the opening up of 
the franchise market in 1998 leading to full competition between the RECs. 
In terms of operating efficiency, the evidence is mixed. Newbery suggests that the merit order has 
been compromised by the asymmetrical structure of the industiys generating sector, and that the dead- 
weight losses could be considerable, given the incumbents' ability to raise the marginal cost-price 
margin. Privatisation has seen a considerable reduction in staffing levels and limitations in research. 
There are strong incentives to premature retirement of the older, labour-intensive coal-fired stations, to 
be replaced by the less labour-intensive CCGT plants. 
Although the retention of the transmission monopoly elements in public ownership is a possibility, it is 
one that would bring its own problems. The only feasible alternative to REC ownership of the grid 
was generator ownership of the grid, but such a move would have provided an obvious means to 
collusion through vertical integration. The last alternative, realised in 1995, is that of a wholly 
independent transmission company, but this could raise questions as to the neutrality of the owners. 
The final question concerns the distribution network and whether it should be an exclusive monopoly 
or whether generators should be allowed to construct their own lines. However, such a move would 
doubtless bring questions regarding inefficiencies resulting from an unnecessary duplication of 
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investment. 
The dominant regulatory question since privatisation is whether generators require explicit regulation, 
or whether the market can be safely left to competition. With National Power and Powergen 
dominating the setting of pool prices, the pumped storage businesses account for the remaining time 
that pool prices are set. However, the pumped storage businesses behave reactively based upon the 
actions of the other generators, and therefore cannot be said to be determining prices in the same way 
as National Power and Powergen. 
It is indeed possible that the regulator may, in the future, prevent the RECs from passing through the 
costs of these contracts to their customers. Such a move would act as a disincentive to the signing of 
long-term contracts, and in doing so this would reduce the IPPs security (assuming risk-aversion) and 
deter entry - clearly indicating that there is a fine balance between these two concerns. The large 
generators did little to oppose this switch made by the RECs to the IPPs, possibly because increased 
contract cover would limit their market power, or possibly because they did not wish to limit entry for 
fear of accusations of limit pricing behaviour or some other anti-competitive practice. The outcome 
was an increase in the rate of entry leading to contracts that could not be over7-uled in a privatised 
electricity market. 
One could argue that the lack of true price competition in generation has been responsible for high 
pool prices, which themselves induce excess entry. However, given that this entry was in the form of 
baseload power, it has therefore had little effect on the market power of the incumbents who own the 
majority of non-baseload plant. This has been at least partially rectified by the February 1994 
undertaking. 
This undertaking also had the distinction of imposing direct regulation on prices for the first time in 
the pool's history for the years 1994-5 and 1995-6. If the caps had been extended beyond 1995-6, it 
would have been an admission of failure on the part of the regulator in his efforts to allow competition 
to rule the submission of prices to the pool. Paradoxically, the price cap also meant that the generators 
had to collude in order to meet the cap, thus reversing another of the goals of privatisation. However, 
it is anticipated that with the removal of the caps and the required divestiture of plant from National 
Power and Powergen, the pool should begin to operate as it was intended to do so from the beginning. 
However, even if the generating sector can be sufficiently fragmented to encourage competition, 
transmission constraints may serve to make effective market areas small and allow market dominance 
within those areas. Further problems include the extent to which entry is free, or whether it should be 
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controlled to prevent excess entry, as some fear has already occurred. Another )ong-run issue is 
whether generation can actually develop as a competitive sector. 
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Section Il - Develooments in generation and the future of the sector. 
2. L Competition in Generation: The Importance ofREC own-generadon. 
All RECs face limits on the amount of electricity that may be supplied by own-generation interests, as 
dictated under their public electricity supply (PES) licences. In addition, they must not own or have an 
interest in plant beyond a specified limit of 25% of their required capacity. The total limits faced by 
the RECs sum to 8.2GW, with present total interests being approximately 4GW, including capacity 
currently under construction. Different RECs have used their limits to different degrees: some RECs 
are very active in own-generation interests while others have little or no apparent interest in even using 
their own-generation limits. The pivotal aspect of the own-generation limits is the desire to increase 
competition into the generation sector. At present RECs have an interest in generation plant which 
produces approximately 8% of total output, with their share of total capacity being around 5%. it is 
anticipated that these figures will increase correspondingly as capacity under construction comes on 
line. 
In order to deter an MMC reference, in February 1994 both National Power and Powergen agreed to 
undertakings on prices and to the sale or disposal of some of their generating plant: 400OMW and 
200OMW of plant respectively. Following this agreement, a number of RECs contacted Offer 
requesting the possibility of increasing their own-generation limits, their objective being to purchase 
plant from either National Power or Powergen. It was anticipated that this would be operated as part 
of a consortium of interests, but eventually it was Eastern Electricity that was successful in purchasing 
this plant. This move raises a number of concerns for the regulator and the industry. Firstly, the 
regulator has made it clear that a competitive market in generation remains a top priority for the 
industry, and this move goes some way to improving the current situation. Secondly, the rationale 
behind this undertaking was to encourage new entrants into the industry, not encourage the expansion 
of existing participants. Finally, as the nuclear sector continues to increase its generating output, the 
spread of competition in generation may become increasingly important, and the need for the sale of 
these plants may gain an added impetus. 
The key question mark hanging over the decision to expand the RECs' own-generation limits is the 
extension of the competitive market in 1998. The RECS will still retain a great deal of market power 
over their (ex-) fhanchise customers who may be hesitant or have no great desire to change their 
supplier after the onset of full competition. Indeed, even the regulator has admitted that the spread of 
competition will take some time in the post-1998 environment. The argument essentially reverts back 
to that of whether allowing a REC to purchase electricity from a plant in which it has a share or a 
controlling interest represents a potential violation of the PES licence. 
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Under ideal circumstances, RECs could undertake the purchase of plant and not exploit their franchise 
while simultaneously contributing to competition. In order to achieve this scenario, it is possible that 
modifications to the current regulatory system regarding efficient purchasing could be introduced 
which would prohibit excessive contracting from such plants. However, perhaps an alternative 
rationale should be considered. It is illogical to expect that RECs have undertaken their operations 
into the generation sector solely to increase competition. On many occasions, the RECs have voiced 
their dissatisfaction with the generators and their bargaining power. In addition, as part of their PES 
licences, RECs must ensure stability and security of supply. T'herefore, it may be the case that the 
desire to increase competition into the generation sector is a secondary concern for the RECs when 
considering their own-gener-ation interests. Indeed, encouraging competition in generation may have 
no bearing on RECs' strategies: their primary motivation is in fact securing long-term reliable supplies 
in order to meet the demands of their customer base. 
The major generators did not favour modifications to the own-generation limits in order to permit 
vertical integration. They perceived it as a threat to consumers under the captive franchise and a 
potential distortion to the spread of competition. However, any such modifications would increase the 
RECs' independence from the generators, and therefore the generators can hardly be considered 
impartial in this argument. The RECs themselves were anxious to obtain the relaxation or even 
abolition of the own-generation limits, citing the abolition of the direct sales limits as their motivation. 
The direct sales limits by National Power and Powergen were abolished as a means of facilitating 
competition, and thereby damaging REC market shares. The alteration of the own-generation limits is 
therefore seen by the RECs as a means reconciling the imbalance which the RECs perceive as 
resulting from the legislation, while allowing them to experience the benefits of linking supply and 
generation. 
Despite support for this move, consumer groups echoed the concerns of the regulator: whether there 
would be sufficient reswaffit on the RECs to purchase in accordance with the PES licences, both now 
and after 1998 were the own-generation limits to be expanded. The RECs have maintained that the 
existing regulation will be adequate to restrain any and all attempts to violate the PES licence and 
exploit consumers. In order to consider the validity of this claim, certain factors need to be considered. 
Firstly, as competition has become more widespread since privatisation, the RECs should be allowed 
the opportunity to expand their opportunities in the dynamic marketplace, just as the generators were 
following the abolition of the direct sales limits. Secondly, in order to protect consumers' interests, 
perhaps only marginal or conditional relaxation of the limits could be made, or any modifications to 
the limits could be accompanied by modifications and strengthening of existing regulation. Thirdly, 
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rather than undertake an across-the-board relaxation of the generation limits, as the RECs approach 
their current limits they could petition the regulator for relaxation, with all requests being treated on a 
case-by-case basis. Finally, the limits could remain in force until 1998, and then be modified as the 
competitive market develops. 
At the present time, it appears that the own-generation limits will remain fimnly in place, reflecting the 
regulator's concerns about the inadequacy of the economic purchasing condition and the supply price 
control were the limits to be relaxed. The only exception to this rule would seem to be Eastern, a 
company anxious to make its mark in the generating sector through the purchasing of the 
aforementioned divested plant from National Power and Powergen. In this instance, Eastern has been 
allowed to purchase such high quantities of generating facilities in the interests of price competition - 
particularly in the non-baseload sector. 
A fin-ther alternative method of protecting consumers has been put forward in the form of a tendering 
process for contr-acts. It is claimed that the tendering process would act as a surrogate for competition, 
especially if transparent and guaranteed by regulatory oversight, and linked to special conditions 
regarding RECs' owm plant. Unfortunately, the tendering process has already been put forward by 
Nuclear Electric and largely dismissed as inappropriate. Tbe final alternative is that of loosening the 
limits while imposing restrictions which prohibit the RECs from signing contracts for the franchise 
markets from their own plant. If imposed, these restrictions would doubtless have to re-evaluated in 
the light of the success (or lack thereof) of the events of 1998. At the present time, these appear to be 
the only circumstances under which a relaxation of the limits will be considered. 
The nature of this argument is an important indication of the nature of the regulatory process in the 
electricity industry. The regulator's mandate requires the encouragement of competition in all aspects 
of the industry, while protecting the best interests of consumers. However, in this situation, the two 
goals appear to be in direct conflict with no apparent means of reconciliation. The only means of 
doing so is to allow competition but temper it with more regulation in order to protect consumers. 
However, this again violates the regulator's own personal belief in allowing the competitive process to 
run the industry while allowing regulation to take a backseat in order to 'guide' the industry. A suitable 
compromise would be to encourage new entrants into the industry to purchase plant from National 
Power and Powergen while retaining the own-generation limits. This would run parallel with an 
undertaking that the own-generation limits would be re-evaluated in the light of the 1998 programme 
and the RECs ability to undertake second-tier supply from domestic consumers. 
Before concluding, consideration should be made of the links between the Scottish electricity industry 
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and that in England and Wales. RECs have the right to seek out second-tier contracts in Scotland, but 
few have attempted to do so, and those who have met with limited success. This may be because of the 
vertically integrated nature of the Scottish industry, which may serve to limit an entrant's profit 
margins on the supply activity. Alternatively, it may be because the vertically integrated structure in 
Scotland may make the incumbent companies more willing to defend their market share by offering 
more competitive terms. Indeed, it should be noted that prices in the Scottish electricity market are 
lower than in England and Wales. 
The difference between the structures of the two markets makes it difficult to draw any accurate 
parallels. However, if the Scottish companies offer more competitive second-tier terms because they 
are anxious to protect their profit margins in generation, then it is theoretically possible that the same 
may apply to RECs if their generating capacity were increased. If this were the case, then an 
expansion of the RECs' generating capacity may lead to an increased competitive impetus in the 
second-tier market as a consequence of vertical integration. 
A finther point may be drawn from the Scottish industry. Given the vertically integrated nature of the 
industry, the companies as electricity suppliers are contracted primarily from their own generating 
plants. As in England and Wales this is subject to an economic purchasing condition which prohibits 
exploitation of a captive fi-anchise. However, the vertically integrated nature means that an additional 
provision has been built into the Scottish PES licences which imposes a direct limit on the prices that 
suppliers may charge themselves for electricity under contract from their own plants. In theory, the 
same principle could be applied to the RECs if they were allowed an expansion in their own 
generation limits. 
22 Competition in Supply. The Consequencefor Generation. 
As previously examined, as part of the electricity Privatisation programme established in England and 
Wales, competition was to be encouraged not only in generation but also in supply. To that end, 
customers would be allowed to choose their own electricity supplier from the RECs (and indeed the 
generators) in a phased programme of introduction. This began at the time of privatisation with those 
customers whose demand was greater than I MW per year being allowed to choose their own supplier, 
a scheme extended to those customers with a demand greater than lOOkW in 1994, and will be 
extended to open competition in 1998. The importance of this experiment for the generation sector is 
that - as will be explained - the two are linked by the effects of the regulator's decision in 1994 
regarding an MMC reference for National Power and Powergen. 
Since the opening of the supply market, approximately 50% of the I MW customers have chosen to 
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participate by choosing a different second-tier supplier (i. e. one other than their local REQ. Of these 
customers, 30% buy electricity at pool related prices in a move that effectively increases their risk 
exposure to pool price fluctuations. In the greater-than-100M market, over 20% of the customers 
have chosen a different second-tier supplier, 7% of which have chosen to purchase at pool-related 
prices. Offer has maintained that all customers have experienced the benefits of greater competition 
have been felt by all customers, not just those that have elected to change suppliers. However, the 
figures may also indicate the fact that there is a limited interest in seeking to change suppliers. This 
may be reflected in figures for the post-1998 competitive market, especially if the spread of 
competition is unaccompanied by efforts to increase consumer awareness in the opportunity. 
However, with the initial immediate introduction having been replaced with a six-month phasing-in 
period beginning April 1998, it is difficult to determine precisely how successM the programme will 
be. In order to ascertain the potential for competition, it is necessary to look at the average consumer's 
bill. 
In the I OOkW market, approximately 2% of the average bill is made up of the supply business margin, 
while 65% of the bill is the cost of purchasing electricity firom the generators. Therefore, the key area 
for competitive pressure is the electricity purchase costs, in which inefficient purchasing of electricity 
will not be tolerated as customers will seek to change suppliers. Because the reduction of generation 
costs is a key aspect of the programme, competition in generation is pivotal to the continuing success 
of competition in supply. In the less than IOOkW market, the supply margin generation component 
represents approximately 60% of the average consurner's bill. The spread of competition in supply 
therefore relies on a 'domino effect! in competition: initial competition in the industry was intra-fuel; 
then competition in generation was established and encouraged; then competition in supply. In terms 
of examining the success of each of these schemes, perhaps we should consider their most notable 
characteristics. Intra-fuel competition was dominated by, and is synonymous with, the 'dash for gas'. 
Competition in generation is still associated with baseload entry and repeated threats of an MMC 
reference for the big generators. Finally, it is probably too early to comment on the nature of 
competition in supply. 
While it is clear that domestic consumers will become the focus of the spread of competition after 
1998, perhaps a more important question is how many consumers will actually want to change 
suppliers. For the suppliers themselves, the issue is the extent to which it is worthwhile actually 
pursuing consumers, as there will doubtless be some consumers for whom changing suppliers is 
undesirable. If suppliers can isolate these consumers, then they will leave them within their fi-anchise 
sector, with the most profitable consumers becoming the object of attention. It is the customers within 
the ft-anchise who will still rely on regulation to protect their interests, and hope that the potential 
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benefits if competition in supply still reach them. In contemplating whether to change supplier, 
consumers will have to weigh up the following considerations: relative prices, terms of supply, costs 
of metering, settlement costs, availability and accuracy of information, and the search costs of finding 
a suitable alternative supplier. For example, the present customers in the I OOkW market have a variety 
of available schemes to assist them in seeking and establishing contracts with their chosen supplier -a 
suitable system would have to be in place and operation by 1998 if their is to be any opportunity for 
success. 
At presentý for those larger consumers seeking to change supplier, the cost of an appropriate electricity 
meter with the network interface is between E150 and E200, plus an average annual charge for 
settlement and the communication links. For the year 1995/6, the pool is proposing an annual charge 
per metering system of L299. Considering the cost of the average domestic consumer's bill is between 
L300 and f4OO per year, this current scheme is clearly inappropriate for the domestic market, and will 
require considerable modification if it is to prove successful. Under the current situation, those 
consumers seeking to choose a second-tier supplier would have to install half-hourly metering systems 
and the associated communication links, while customers remaining on first-tier supply (i. e. their 
current local REC) would be metered as present. Tberefore, in order to encourage second-tier supply, 
Offer has proposed two possible schemes: a metering solution and a load profiling solution. 
Under the metering solution, it would first be necessary to cut the production costs of the meters by 
simplifying their technical requirements, while the benefits of scale economies would be felt through 
the increased production runs. it is anticipated that larger production runs would cut the costs of the 
meters to M to M, still double the cost of the average ordinary domestic meter, Alternatively, it 
may be possible to modify the existing domestic meters to allow them meet the required specifications 
- this would be at a cost of E 15 per meter. A further alternative would be the development of modular 
meters with the capability of half-hourly metering at a cost of E40 to L60. Similar options exist for the 
meter communication systems and meter reading, but the question which dominates this debate is 
whether the current state of technology is both efficient enough and inexpensive enough to actually 
encourage the average domestic consumer contemplate joining in the 1998 competitive process. 
Based on these figures, there must be considerable doubts as to the success of the plan. 
The load profiling solution would rely upon a series of load profiles covering each consumer group, 
which would probably vary slightly across REC areas, but which would be uniform for all first-tier 
and second-tier suppliers. All supplies of electricity and the settlement thereof would be based on 
these profiles. Under the scheme, customers would be able to choose between first-tier and second-tier 
supply on the basis of their existing meter plus a load profile. Customers would also retain the option 
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of installing a new metering and communications system based upon half-hourly metering or other 
agreed frequency. The key points of contention in this situation are the nature of the profiles and the 
exact frequency of the meter readings. If a series of global profiles were adopted, then profiles would 
be assigned to all consumers without half-hourly metering. By contrast, difference profiling assigns 
profiles only to second-tier customers without half-hourly meters, and calculates first-tier consumption 
based on a similar differencing mechanism as under the present situation. The two approaches have 
their differences in the consequences for suppliers and customers, as well as data analysis and pricing 
concerns. The frequency of the meter readings is important for the degree of estimation associated 
with the billing of consumers, and will therefore have important consequences for both suppliers and 
consumers. 
In any competitive situation, there is scope for winners and losers. In the case of the post-1998 
environment, a commercial study by MarketLine International (Utility Week 06/12/96) determined 
that those RECs most at risk from competition were those with a high percentage of sales to domestic 
consumers. The companies fitting this profile were Seeboard, SWEB and Eastern as they all have 
domestic electricity sales representing in excess of forty percent of total sales with high levels of 
demand per consumer. As such, these consumers are deemed to represent a profitable market for 
alternative suppliers. 
This may seem to have little to do with the nature of competition in generation, apart from the obvious 
requirement that generators will have to supply RECs on more competitive terms than at present if full 
competition is to be a success. However, the spread of competition in supply is heavily linked to 
requests that the some of the RECs have made to the regulator regarding their own-generation limits, 
which has also precipitated the efforts of RECs to purchase plant from the generators. 
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Section III - Conclusions. 
The electricity supply industry in England and Wales has been subject to one of the most 
revolutionary privatisations observed in the UY, and its format has been used as the model for the 
privatisation of the electricity industries in other countries. However, more than five years after 
privatisation, the future of the industry remains unclear. The only thing that can be stated categorically 
about the UK electricity industry is that it has yet to emerge from its transitional post-privatisation 
status. 
The current status of the generation market may be assessed either by generator output or plant 
capacity, and may therefore be utilised to examine the principal changes in the industry since 
privatisation. The main changes are the decline of National Power and Powergen's combined market 
share of output from 73% to 57%, Nuclear Electric's expansion of market share of output from 17% to 
22% and the establishment of the IPPs and their capture of 10% of the market by output. In addition, 
there is the closure or mothballing of 12GW of old (mainly coal-fired plant) and a 25% reduction in 
the share of output produced by coal. Furthermore, the intention of constructing 103GW of new 
generating capacity, 8.8GW of it in the form of CCGT plant. 
Electricity generation in England and Wales can be classified as either baseload, peak, or mid-merit. 
Baseload plant operates for 24 hours a day, as the costs of not generating are small and therefore 
activating and deactivating the plant can be uneconomic. As stated, baseload plant is typically nuclear 
capacity and the newer, thermally-efficient CCGT plant, which has served to push the older coal-fired 
plant fin-ther up the merit order into the mid-merit range. Mid-merit plant and peak plant combine to 
make up non-baseload plant. Peak generation operates for short periods of time as required, and plant 
that falls between baseload and peak is classified as being mid-merit. 
The newer CCGT plants possess the capability to operate at either baseload or mid-merit, with the 
latter operations becoming increasingly commercially attractive due to the widening differential 
between baseload and mid-merit prices. However, the gas supply contracts that provide CCGT plants 
with their fuel make baseload operations more practical. It is therefore hoped that these events should 
facilitate the development of the price competition that is seen as being pivotal to the future of the 
industry. 
However, the merger and take-over boom that gripped the industry from late 1994 onwards has the 
capacity to reform the industry fundamentally in terms of price competition, structure, conduct and 
regulation. (HMSO. a and HMSO. b, 1996). What has been observed as a consequence of the mergers 
28 
boom is the establishment of companies with cross-utility interests (e. g. United Utilities), vertically 
integrated companies (e. g. Scottish Power/Manweb), and (most notably) transatlantic companies. The 
role of American companies in the development of the UK industry should not be downplayed 
(especially after the failed take-over bid for National Power by the Atlanta-based Southern 
International), as the UK industry is still seen as a blueprint for US electricity deregulation. 
The main issues in the industry to be determined or at least partially resolved by the end of the century 
include the following. The continued development of new capacity into the industry will include the 
commissioning in 1996 of 3.5GW of capacity, incorporating LI GW of CCGT technology owned by 
IPPs, and 2.2GW of CCGT technology owned by National Power and Powergen. The sale of the 
6GW of plant by National Power (4GW) and Powergen (2GW) to Eastem Electricity under the terms 
of the 1994 undeftaking, and the consequences of that sale for the future of the industry. The sale of 
First Hydro's pumped stor-age businesses to the Edison Intemational (US) subsidiary Mission Energy 
at a price higher than the NGC's own estimates implies a long-term commitment to the industry. 
Finally, the future of the nuclear sector must also be determined. 
Perhaps most importantly, the intentions of the new owners of the RECs are to be ascertained. Many 
have sought to expand their role in generation, while any strategies must of course incorporate the 
total deregulation of the industry to incorporate all consumers in March 1998. This is a ftuther area 
whose effects are difficult to predict. Deregulation to date has witnessed over seventy percent of 
consumers with an annual electricity demand greater than I MW shopping around for their power, 
while almost fifty percent of consumers with an annual demand of greater than 100kW have done 
likewise. Other major factors such as the ending of the Fossil Fuel Levy and the expiration of the five- 
year coal contracts in 1998 must also be considered. There are also of course, ftirther possibilities for 
new entry, and the interactions between the electricity industry and its various fuel suppliers, in 
addition to the environmental issues associated with these fuels. Further, there are political concerns to 
be considered in the form of the Labour Party's windfall tax on utilities, and the changes to the tax 
treatment of long-life assets announced in the Conservative's November 1996 budget. How these 
changes will influence the industry is uncertain, although their will be greater risk attached to 
investment projects regardless of which party is in government 
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Section I- The electriKLq pool and the contract market 
LL The electricity pool, 
The restructuring of the generating sector discussed above was matched by a similar restructuring of 
the actual market for electricity, which became a spot market called the pool. The electricity pool is 
owned and operated by NGC for bulk power trades, through which the vast majority of all transactions 
for electricity flow. There is a very small minority of transactions that occur outside of the pool, 
generally involving large users purchasing directly from generators. The current operating structure of 
the pool is as follows. 
The pool operates a day in advance, with generators having to submit bids - offer prices - for the 
following day, speciýýing the availability and price of power for each of its generating sets which are 
subject to 'central despatch'. Prices must be submitted no later than 10.00 a. m. on the preceding day, 
and are set for periods of half-hour duration, of which there are forty-eight in a day. 
These offers from the generators, which effectively constitute the industry supply curve, are combined 
with a forecast of demand made by the NGC. These data are used to establish a plant schedule, termed 
a merit order, by means of a computer algorithm called GOAL. Within the merit order, plant is ranked 
in ascending order of price in order to generate the current market clearing price, known as the system 
marginal price (SMP). The SMIP fluctuates considerably during the day to reflect both the cycle of 
demand and the differences in bid prices, which themselves reflect the differences in the operating 
costs of the various generating stations. 
Given that the SMP is calculated in advance, using anticipated supply and forecasted demand, there is 
an inherent degree of uncertainty attached to the pool's operations, which is reflected in the loss Of 
load probability (LOLP), which calculates the risk of power failures. The estimated value to the 
consumer of a power loss is termed the value of lost load (VOLL) which was set at the time of 
privatisation at L2/kwh and represents an indexed component, rather than being determined by market 
forces (Review of Economic Purchasing, Offer 1993). 
The LOLP, VOLL and SMP are combined to form the capacity payment; which is designed to 
influence the incentive to invest (see below). If (declared) capacity is large relative to demand then the 
LOLP will be low. However, if the reverse is true, then capacity may be put under pressure and the 
LOLP could significantly increase prices. This mechanism has a tendency to produce stability in the 
market (Bunn & Larsen, 1994). 
The interaction of capacity payments with the SMP is illustrated in the pool purchase price (PPP), 
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which is received by all generators whose plant is called upon to generate. The PPP is given as: 
PPP = SMP + LOLP(VOLL - SMP) 
The second term on the right hand side of the above equation is termed the capacity payment. A 
similar payment, which is dependent on bids, is made to those generators who declare availability but 
who are not called upon to generate. 
The pool selling price (PSP) is paid by the RECs, and those customers who are able to purchase direct 
from the pool is given as: 
PSP = PPP +, Uplift' 
The uplift component is dependent upon the levels of payments for reserve capacity, unscheduled 
availability, ancillary services, and the costs of transmission constraints. The importance of each of 
these components is detailed as follows. 
Firstly, reserve plant is held by the NGC in case of unforeseen circumstances. These plants are paid 
the PPP minus the incremental price of the generating unit. 
Secondly, transmission constraints result in the payment of additional sums into the pool as the actual 
operating schedule may differ from the unconstrained schedule submitted previously, Generating units 
which do not operate according to the unconstrained schedule receive additional revenue as a 
consequence of being constrained-on or constrained-off the schedule. A plant that is constrained-on is 
one that is dispatched even though it is not scheduled to do so is paid its offer price. A plant which is 
constrained-off is one which is not dispatched even though it is scheduled to do so, and is paid PPP 
minus its offer price. 
Thirdly, generators also receive payments for ancillary services, which are services used to maintain 
the appropriate standard of quality within the system in terms of voltage, fi-equency, and constancy of 
supply. Ancillary payments are made for the following purposes. Firstly, black-start capability, namely 
those stations with the capacity to start up rapidly in the event of an emergency. Secondly, reactive 
power, which is used to stabilise voltage levels. Thirdly, frequency response, which is based upon the 
ability of generating units to alter output based upon changes in total system frequency, itself 
dependent upon changes in demand, and fourthly miscellaneous payments that are made for a variety 
of other services. 
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The inherent price instability present in the pool may be limited by the two possible methods that will 
be examined in detail: contracts for differences (CFD) and electricity forward agreements (EFA). The 
structure of each of these markets will be examined fully, but it is now appropriate to examine the role 
of forward contracts in general. 
1.2 Electrichy contracts: The use offmanciat instruments wifhin the electricifY in u Ir dsY. 
Contracts for differences (CFDs) fimction on the basis that two parties enter into an agreement over 
the forward price of a commodity. To consider a general example, suppose that we have a consumer 
who knows that he will require 1000 units of a commodity at some point in the future. The use of a 
CFD allows this consumer to reach an arrangement with a supplier, whereby both parties agree on the 
future purchase price of this commodity. For example, the two parties could agree upon a CFD for 
1000 units at flOO per unitý with the mutually agreed price known as the strike price, payable on 
delivery at the appropriate future date. 
If the market price of the commodity on the future date is more than the strike price, the supplier pays 
the difference to the consumer on the 1000 units (in addition to the normal cash flows that occur in the 
sale of the commodity). By contrast, if the market price is less than the strike price, the consumer pays 
the difference to the supplier. In this simple case, there is no upfront cash payment when the contract 
is agreed - the only cash flow on the contract is the difference once the actual price is known. This 
type of arrangement is known as a two-way CFD. 
The use of CFDs therefore allows hedging, given that the supplier actually wants to sell the physical 
commodity, and that the buyer actually wishes to purchase it, If the buyer of a CFD has no intention of 
actually purchasing the commodity, then the contract will increase risk as opposed to reducing it, as 
the buyer is now vulnerable to fluctuations in the commodity price. CFDs have been used as 
successful tools in many markets, due to the following advantages. 
Firstly, CFDs allow the trader to manage price risk independently of the delivery of the physical 
commodity. Therefore, a CFD could be agreed with a counterparty for which delivery would be 
impractical. Secondly, the buyer and seller in a forward agreement are both aware of one another's 
identity, which could lead to problems or an unwillingness to trade. By contrast, markets for CFDs 
generally utilise brokers, thus ensuring anonymity for those involved in trades and avoiding any 
embarrassing confrontations or refusals to trade. Thirdly, CFDs often provide a focus for liquidity, 
with fine prices and low transactions costs. This is partly due to the traders, who have precise 
requirements for the type and grade of a commodity for physical delivery, being willing to trade a 
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standard benchmark CFD. By using benchmark instruments, there is a focus upon liquidity and a 
lowering of transaction costs. This enhances the attractiveness of the market to other traders, and 
ftuther aids liquidity. 
In addition to the use of two-way CFDs, there are also one-way CFDs, of which there are two types - 
'caps'and 'floors'. In'cap'an-angements, the buyer pays an upfront premium to the seller, and in return 
receives a compensatory payment if the market price exceeds the strike price. No payment is received 
if the market price exceeds the strike price. Buying caps protects the consumer against high prices 
without foregoing the benefits resulting from potential low prices, as well as giving the seller 
guaranteed revenue. 
A similar arrangement is that of a Tooe, suitable for purchase by a producer. Here, in exchange for 
the upfront premium, the buyer of the floor receives a compensatory payment if the market price is 
below the strike price, and the consumer receives the security of a set price. 
L3. Electricilyforward qgreements. ý An Overvkw. 
To allow the hedging of forward electricity prices, two types of CFD are available for electricity. 
Firstly, the long term vesting contracts that were negotiated by the generators and the regional 
electricity companies (RECs). Over the three year period after vesting, these contracts - many of 
which were cap agreements - covered an average estimated 80% of annual electricity sales were of 
between one and three years duration. Secondly, the EFA market has been developed to allow 
participants to tailor their cover using two-way CFDs- In this market, Gerrard & National 
Intercommodities (GNI) Ltd. acts as a broker, initiating tr-ansactions by matching potential buyers and 
sellers. Although initially the sole broker in the market GNI was joined by Tradition Financial 
Services and Euro Brokers in 1995. 
The EFA market was effectively established to provide an additional means by which the electricity 
industry could hedge its exposure to pool price risk. The EFA market represents the natural market for 
not just RECs and generators, but for anyone else involved in the electricity market, or other energy 
traders who wish to take on exposure to electricity. Anyone may join the EFA market, but trade is 
clearly dependent on finding a suitable counterparty. All trade in the EFA market is screen-based, but 
smaller transactions may be carried out by telephone. 
Despite the lack of standardisation of CFDs - in principle, any structure could be traded - liquidity in 
the EFA market has tended to focus on particular types of trade. Consequently, standard 
documentation emerges, and trading interest centres on benchmark instruments which are of general 
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interest to the market participants. 
The fi-amework which has been constructed for trade should be flexible enough to permit a fbil variety 
of structures for trading and hedging purposes, whilst retaining simplicity. Each day is divided into six 
four-hour periods, numbered 1-6. These are given as: Period 1: 23.00 - 3.00; Period 2: 3.00 - 7.00; 
Period 3: 7.00 - 11.00; Period 4: 11.00 - 15.00; Period 5: 15.00 - 19.00; and Period 6: 19.00 - 23.00. 
Trades cover one of these contract periods for either both days of a weekend, WEI-6, or all five 
weekdays of a week, WD 1 -6. These contract periods can be traded for a single week, a strip of weeks 
(e. g. for a month or a quarter), or a fifty-two week strip to cover a whole year. It was found by 
consultation with the potential market participants that the four-hour period was the most conducive to 
investment in the market, and was therefore chosen to encourage liquidity. 
Although most interest in the market is in the pool purchase price (PPP), it is also possible to trade the 
pool selling price (PSP), the system marginal price (SMP), or the spreads between them. It should be 
apparent that the PSP - SMIP spread represents the level of capacity payments, and the PSP - PPP 
spread indicates uplift levels. 
Once the transactions have occurred, all contracts contain Obe following standard information: Me 
name of the buyer/seller, the actual variable being traded, the time period involved, the contract 
week(s), the number of MW being traded, and the agreed strike price. 
Although there are any number of possible trades, the standard trades are bilateral trades, REC-REC 
trades, and REC-financial institution trades, all of which are governed by the standard EFA terms and 
conditions. The most conunon types of contracts traded are baseload power and the "A4" load shape, 
i. e. Baseload+WD3+WD4+WDS. 
Trades are conducted based upon each company's requirements, although there are standard trading 
rounds in Apffl, July and October of each year. There are no set price forecasts (as with the Horton IV 
estimates), but all trades are based upon the market's perceptions of the appropriate price. 
The nature of the electricity market makes it likely to attract both hedgers and traders. When 
discussing price volatility, it is important to remember that this volatility is not based on the difference 
in pool prices in different periods, but rather the difference between the EFA price and the pool prices 
during the period of consumption covered by the contract itself 
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Since EFA prices ultimately fix on the average pool price for the appropriate period, one expects 
some fonn of relationship between pool prices and forward prices to exist. Obviously, different 
market participants will have different expectations of pool prices, and there will invariably be 
exogenous shocks to the system. Unless the pool price is hedged, both the RECs and the generators 
are exposed to price risk. However, at low pool prices, this risk is somewhat asymmetric: if the 
expected pool price is L15, then the lowest it can fall is to zero, but there is nothing to prevent prices 
from rising exponentially. Consequently, there may be more incentives for buyers to hedge than for 
sellers, a fact that may tend to increase EFA prices. 
The EFA market also integrates the existing CFDs held by pool members, as one would expect the 
willingness of parties to trade in EFAs to be determined by their existing contract cover. As all 
generators receive PPP regardless of what price their electricity is offered at, and depending on their 
level of contract cover, generators may become indifferent to the pool price. As a result a generator's 
main concern - if it has covered a sufficiently high proportion of its output - is to offer this output to 
the pool at prices low enough to ensure that it reaches its projected power generation. If this 
hypothesis is valid, then pool prices will have been significantly lower than expected (as was observed 
in the post-privatisation period and is outlined fiu-ther below), while the CFDs between generators and 
RECs have allowed the generators to guarantee their revenue. However, this factor does not preclude 
increases in pool prices as circumstances change. 
The use of spread trades involves buying one instrument at the same time as selling another, related 
instrument. By doing this, the trader takes on exposure to the difference between two prices, while 
remaining indifferent to the overall level of prices. 
The most common form of spreads are those involving the uplift and capacity payments, but other 
forms of spread may also be of interest. For example, the spread between corresponding weekend and 
weekday prices, the spread between different contract periods, or the spread between different weeks, 
Such spreads must be undertaken by trading the two appropriate EFA contracts as separate entities. 
The significance of spread trading arises when the difference between two periods is less volatile than 
the prices observed in these periods. Spread trading has become an important feature of many 
markets, and there are several reasons to expect it to play a similar role in the EFA market. 
Firstly, many companies are expected to be exposed to spread risk as part of their everyday pool 
operations. For example, a pumped storage business (PSB) is exposed to the spread between cheap 
night-time electricity and expensive peak period electricity, or an amount equal to their expected 
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turnover of power. Therefore, a company such as a PSB which expects to buy electricity during WD2, 
then sell it during WD3, WD4, and WD5, is exposed to the WD2/3, WD2/4, and the WD2/5 spreads. 
Secondly, spread trading is important given the large number of different contracts that can be traded. 
A trader may bid to buy week 40 WD3 at L22.00 as a means of hedging exposure. There may be no 
response to this bid, but the trader notices that week 40 WD4 is offered at L20.00. By buying WD4 
rather than WD3 to cover his exposure, the trader is taking on a spread position - not by actually 
executing a spread trade, but by buying one contract instead of another - this is a 'soft' spread. 
Effectively, the trader is now short "3 and long WD4 at a spread of f2.00, 
In executing a spread, a trader can not only make a profit, but can also reduce his risk. For example, if 
finding no interest in his WD3 bid, the trader had simply left his bid in and not looked for spread 
opportunities, he could have been unhedged for some considerable period and exposed to fluctuations 
in WD3 prices. By trading WD4 instead, the outright WD3 exposure has been converted to a less 
risky spread exposure. The attraction of a spread trade against that of an outright trade is that not only 
does it reduce risk, but the trader might have a view on the WD3/4 spread even if he has no view on 
the overall direction of prices. In addition, spread trading also benefits the market as a whole by 
increasing liquidity. 
I'lie nature of the EFA market is more conducive to short run than to long run trading, as most long- 
run contracts are met by CFDs rather than EFAs. This may have accounted for the increased 
popularity of the EFA market as can be observed by an examination of the RECs' contract portfolios 
which clearly indicates an increase in the usage of short run contracts (MMC 1996a, 1996b). This is in 
addition to RECs being increasingly willing to purchase unhedged firom the pool, doubtless due to 
increased uncertainty regarding future pool prices. In the period since the EFA market became 
operational, EFAs have captured only 3% of the contract market. However, the trading volume had 
increased from 0.1 TWh in 1992/3 to 8TWh in 1995/6, clearly indicating their growing importance. 
Newbery (1995) criticises the EFA market for not utilising its full potential, arguing that the flaws in 
the EFA market are its low liquidity (relative to a conventional futures market) and its difficulty in the 
pricing and liquidation of specific EFA contracts. It is also argued that the advancement of the EFA 
market would be best served by the increased trading of baseload strips, as these represent a 
homogenous commodity which faces a level of demand conducive to the creation of an appropriate 
level of liquidity. In addition, the trading of such strips is also seen as permitting RECs to re-trade 
depending upon unexpected fluctuations in their consumer demand, as well as permitting arbitrage 
between the contract market and the pool. 
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1.4. Contractsfor differences: An Overview. 
On a fundamental level, financial markets theory indicates that the spot price in a market for a 
commodity is determined by the forward market price for that commodity. In the case of the electricity 
industry, this means that the markets for electricity forward agreements (EFAs) and contracts for 
differences (CFDs) should lead the pool in terms of pricing. This is conditional upon the assumption 
of rationality and the available information set when the contract is agreed. In financial markets 
theory, if the futures/forward price is above the spot price, it is assumed that the futures price will fall 
over time (contango), while if, by contrast, the futures price is below the spot price then the futures 
price will rise over time (backwardation). 
However, given that information on the spot price is readily available, whereas that on the strike prices 
of contracts for differences is not, some proxy is required for the strike price as a whole. There have 
been several official price estimates carried out by Offer, as well as those developed by the RECs, the 
generators, and independent institutions. The initial vesting contracts signed at the time of 
privatisation were based on the Horton IV price estimates generated by Offer. However, these 
estimates were well below the actual prices for the pool's first level of operation, which doubtless 
proved to be a contributing factor in the RECs decision to terminate some of the vesting contracts in 
March 199 1. It can therefore be surmised that, even if the Horton estimates were used on only a partial 
level to determine the strike prices of contracts, then the forward price was not an accurate predictor 
of the spot price. However, such an inequality could be due to several factors exogenous to the models 
of price determination (see below). 
Before continuing, it is important to note how the RECs contracting strategies have changed since 
privatisation. Initially, the bulk of electricity traded in the pool was done so under contract - 
approximately 95%. However, with the introduction of more independent power producers (IPPs) into 
the generating sector, and increased uncertainty regarding pool prices, contracted output fell, and has 
continued to do so. The duration of these contracts has also become an important issue, with contracts 
ranging from 15 years to less than a year in length. The longest contracts have typically been offered 
by the IPPs, in whom the RECs tend to have some kind of equity share. As a rule of thumb, general 
classifications of contract length are: 15 years, 10 years, 2-6 years, I year, and less than a year. 
Most contracts and contract offers differ in form, but some are relatively easy to compare, while others 
necessitate restrictive assumptions before any comparisons, The contracts are highly complex and 
contain several different prices and terms. In general, these concern the effects of different forms of 
indexation of the prices in the contract (both in terms of the rate of inflation and the relevant fuel 
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price) and restrictions on when the contract can be exercised. it is also possible to include cost pass 
through of transmission charges, or the sharing of benefits if pool prices are high, as well as 
restrictions on calling to a particular plant's availability 
Contract comparisons and availability can be based on load factors, i. e. the percentage of hours in the 
year covered by the contract. Baseload contracts feature prices based on an average of all contract 
hours during a year (8760 hours, or 17560 half hour periods), while the call on lower load factors is 
concentrated towards peak periods. This makes lower load contracts more valuable, and they therefore 
command a higher price in the market. Ilie extent to which this is the case depends upon how much 
higher pool prices are at peak than at baseload periods of low demand. 
There are essentially diree types of contracts: baseload RPI indexed contracts, as offered by Nuclear 
Electric; coal-fired sculpted load contracts, as offered by National Power and Powergen; and variable 
load contracts with indexed prices, as offered by the IPPs. 
The contracts offered by National Power and Powergen offered in late- 1992 were based on October 
1992 prices, offering a price of 3.2op/kwh, declining to 3.1 p/kwh in 1997/8 - making an average of 
3.17p/kwh. The present value of these contracts would be higher after adjustments, because a higher 
quantity is sold in the early years at higher prices. The contracts also take into account the expected 
costs of the installation and operation of future capacity. If an 8% discount rate is assumed, along with 
an even decline in volume by 18%, the contract price becomes a discounted weighted average of 
3.19p. 
Nuclear Electric's contract auction had a reserve price of 2.75p covering the same period as the 
National Power/Powergen contracts plus 1992/3. 'Me price during the subsequent five years of the 
contract was dependent upon the price applied during the contract's first year. These prices were 
typically lower than 2.75p, with Nuclear Electric's auction price for a one year contract being 2.63p, 
producing a price of 2.78p for the next five years. Given the concerns raised by the RECs that the 
appropriate price was 2.45p, the subsequent price was 2.825p. The Nuclear Electric contracts were 
expressed in 1991 money terms and need to be raised to 1992 prices to make a comparison. Adding 
3.6% inflation produces between 2.88p and 2.93p depending on the initial price assumption. 
The load factor for the National Power/Powergen offer is approximately 52-54%, making the 
difference between the nuclear contracts and the coal-fired contracts as a result of the peak premium 
equal to the difference between the peak premium divided by 8760 and the same premium divided by 
53% of 8760. If the contracts were to be equalised solely on this basis, the capacity premium of new 
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investment would have to be in the order of f31 /kw. If one were anticipating a high price of capacity 
(high cost of new plant), the coal-fired offer would be preferred, while a low price of capacity would 
lead to a preference for the nuclear contracts. 
Similar analyses may be undertaken to compare baseload contracts and variable load contracts with 
indexed prices, and indexed near baseload contracts with sculpted load contracts. Comparisons 
involving the first pairing are difficult due to the considerable differences in contract lengths, but a 
proxy for the nuclear price is 2.9p for an RPI indexed contract. Based on current fuel prices, IPP 
contracts are in the range 2.3-2.7p. Taking into account a rise in fuel prices, this becomes 2.6-3.0p, 
where typical, gas fired contracts are indexed up to 20% against coal or electricity prices. 
The second pairing shows that IPPs allow a lower load factor, making comparison with the National 
Power/Powergen contracts easier. In one instance, using a 65% contract load factor results in a gas 
fired price of around 2.85p. Differences in both load factor and indexation must be considered along 
with prices. Under gas fired contracts, prices range from 2.6-3. Op based on a load factor of 90%. 
Some contract prices are in the public domain, for example. Nuclear Electric's basic 1992 contract 
price is 2.75p/kwh, which adjusted to the period 1993/8 becomes 2.78p. The coal fired offer made for 
the same period is 3.26p, adjusting to 3.19p. The IPP contracts are offered in the range 2.6p-3.0p, 
which can be adjusted to 2.5p-2.9p. 
In theory, the estimated pool price should equal the contract price. However, there are several reasons 
why it may not, the most important being possible inaccuracies in the assumptions used to develop the 
contract strike price. Assumptions conceming the level of electricity demand would have been made 
by the generators in constructing their original contract offers, for example Offer assumes that peak 
electricity demand rises by 1% per year. Any major regulatory changes, such as the February 1994 
price cap would also be considered, as would the forced sale or retirement of plant. Furthermore, the 
continuing decline of contracted output over time would also be a factor to consider. 
Given the potential in the contracts market and the EFA market, there are two fundamental reasons for 
the equality, or lack thereof, between the contracts' strike price and the pool price. If the estimated 
strike price does not equal the actual pool price - specifically if it is below it - then this could be due to 
generators attempting to keep prices low as a means of increasing their profits from the contracts. This 
is a highly probable outcome based upon the possibility of strategic forward market trading. However, 
it may also be due to the fact that the market is imperfect. Alternatively, if the contract price does 
equal the pool price, then this could be based on a pre-meditated attempt to keep the pool price at 
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some desired level, again indicating the use of strategic behaviour. The fact that there are two possible 
reasons for pool prices below the strike price, deterniining which is responsible could prove difficult. 
L 5. Forward Markets with an Imperfectly Compefifive Spot Market, 
As in the electricity pool, there has been general concern that futures trading could be compromised 
when the underlying market is imperfectly competitive. The reason is that small traders would be 
hesitant to enter into a contract if they were aware that non-market forces could manipulate the 
contract. However, this is not always the general case, as the oil market demonstrates. 
Lucas & Taylor (1993) utilise a game theoretic approach to analyse the current imperfectly 
competitive structure within the pool. They conclude that there is no reason to expect competitive 
behaviour from the generators in the pool and foresee several complicating aspects that will prevent 
competitive bidding. Firstly, that in the presence of an asymmetric game, a situations which exists in 
the pool, smaller generators will bid nearer to marginal cost in games without contracts. Secondly, 
mixed strategies by generators are possible, so there is no reason to expect the empirical evidence to 
converge to a single constant behavioural form. Thirdly, contracts exert a calming effect on the pool 
as generators bid against one another to obtain favourable combinations of bid generation and contract 
cover - this is the main factor reducing pool prices. 
The conclusions that they derive firorn an empirical standpoint are as follows. Firstly, the pool cannot 
be expected to produce prices that provide transparency to customers or appropriate signals to 
investors. Secondly, contracts are crucial determinants of pool prices, so the regulator should pay 
more attention to them and information on them should be made publicly available. Thirdly, the UK 
experience in its present form should not be taken as a model for deregulation in other countries. The 
empirical consequences of these conclusions will be returned to below, as will the model itself 
It can therefore be claimed that imperfect competition and futures trading are incompatible, because 
market power limits the degree of futures trading. At the same time, there may be other circumstances 
in which this is not true. Anderson (1991) investigated this in depth. 
Under imperfect competition, the participation of small traders may be discouraged, which in the case 
of the pool would manifest itself in the larger generators trying to restrict the market share of the IPPs. 
In addition, powerful firmts may wish to discourage futures trading, and may also have the ability to 
suppress it. Again, this may be true, given the RECs accusations regarding the incumbent generators' 
attitudes towards negotiations for contracts for differences. 
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Efforts to manipulate the futures market (comers or squeezes) are seen as different to exercising 
market power in the cash market, which in this case represents the manipulation of the pool price. It is 
often the case that those accused of manipulating the futures market are powerful hedgers who are in a 
position to influence prices in the cash market at least in the short run. 
In focusing on the behaviour of prices in these markets, the question is whether the actions of powerful 
producers generate greater biases in the futures price than in the case for competitively produced 
goods. Particularly, do powerful firms have a desire to alter the bias to their advantage? 
Participants in a futures market are either hedgers or speculators. Related to these types of traders are 
the two functions of futures markets: risk shifting or price discovery. Agents who face unwanted cash 
market risk seek to transfer that risk by trading forward through futures contracts. Any imbalance 
between short or long hedging (having insufficient amounts or having an excess) is met by 
speculators. However, in order to be willing to absorb this risk, speculators must expect a price change 
that will be beneficial to their position. However, the problem in utilising conventional theory in the 
pool is that there are no speculators - the only participants are hedgers. However, as the volume of 
trade within the EFA markets continues, there is no reason to believe that this will continue to be the 
case. 
This general view is founded on the assumption that there is no market power to exploit, and therefore 
requires some modifications to function in the presence of market power, where the participants may 
have more complex motives for their actions. By definition, a futures contract is an unconditional 
commitment to buy or sell a good at some point in the future. If agents do not hold their contracts to 
maturity, they must engage in a closing out transaction that offsets their position. In theory, there is no 
reason to prevent this from occurring within the EFA market as offsetting transactions may not be 
uncommon. Indeed, this may be one of the principal advantages of the EFA market, namely that it 
may eventually adopt many of the characteristics of a true financial futures market which will only 
contribute to its efficiency. 
If an agent's profits depend upon the cash price and some choice of action, then his actions in the 
event that he possesses market power will clearly influence the cash price. The existence of strategic 
futures trading results if the price in the future when the contract matures depends upon the price 
which the agent can influence. The futures position can therefore change the behaviour that the agent 
finds most profitable. In general, the larger the futures position, or the closer the relationship between 
the cash and the futures prices, the more the action will be influenced by the futures position. Strategic 
trading occurs because the fiitures position can be selected at an earlier point in time. As will be seen 
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as the analysis continues, it can be argued that this is exactly what has occurred within the pool with 
the large incumbent generators keeping prices low when the RECs were heavily contracted. Such a 
move would considerably increase the difference payments made by the RECs to the generators. 
A starting point for the analysis is to assume a situation in which futures trading is being undertaken 
by imperfectly competitive firms and that there are no strategic motives for trading - as defined above. 
If a monopolist has sold futures, then its profits will clearly depend on the situation in the cash market 
and the futures market. If the monopolist has previously sold futures, then any actions that decrease 
the price in the spot market will increase its profits fi-om the futures market - as is the case in the pool. 
From the viewpoint of welfare analysis, whether futures trading in an imperfectly competitive market 
is beneficial relies upon an undemanding of the determinants of the monopolist's futures position. 
Anderson (199 1) develops a sequence of propositions, as well as utilising those of others, to examine 
the nature of interrelationships between the two markets. 
Firstly, if futures traders are competitive, risk averse speculators which operate in a domain of public 
information with a risk-neutral monopolist, then there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium. 
This will be a situation in which the futures price is unbiased and all agents retain zero fi=es 
positions. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that a risk-neutral monopolist will only hold futures 
if a profit is anticipated. Given perfect information, the only occasion on which the futures market will 
clear is if the futures price is an unbiased predictor of the spot price. Were this to be the case, there 
would be no risk and therefore no motive for retaining futures positions. In other words, RECs would 
not buy CFDs if they had perfect foresight. 
Secondly, a risk averse monopolist will hold long (having assets in the contract for sale) or short (net 
indebtedness of the assets) futures in equilibrium. The actual position will depend upon the nature of 
the market and the existence of technological uncertainty. Hedging depends upon the agent's 
correlation of output and demand. In the presence of non-stochastic costs or uncorrelated demand 
uncertainty and costs, the monopolist will not sell futures. Given that all competitive agents are pure 
speculators, the equilibrium price must be biased downwards to encourage speculators to bear risk 
(the futures price must be expected to rise). This illustrates the importance of the dominant firm's 
attitude to risk. 
If the competitive agents are also hedgers, then the outcome is based upon the balance of hedging 
interests, as in a competitive market. For example, if the competitive agents are consumers who 
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operate long futures positions, then the balance of hedging would generate a positive bias to the 
futures price. 
This would therefore induce the monopolist to reduce his short positions. It is therefore theoretically 
possible that this incentive could be strong enough to induce the monopolist to go long in the futures' 
market. 7bis could potentially exacerbate the misallocation of resources in the spot market. 
Extending these propositions, Anderson proceeds to expand the model to an oligopolistic structure. 
Eldor & Zilcha (1986) conclude that spot-futures interaction is most likely when there is a static 
oligopoly in which futures and spot decisions are made simultaneously. The model generated is a 
variation on the Coumot model, adapted for demand uncertainty and futures trading. Here, an N-fwn 
oligopoly with homogenous products and identical cost functions is used, with price and output 
decisions in both markets being made simultaneously. After one time period, the uncertainty is 
removed and spot and forward positions are resolved. The similarities between this structure and the 
pool are apparent, but the difference is that the spot and futures positions are not resolved 
simultaneously. The model relies on the assumption of risk-aversion of non-competitiveness - this 
allows for a Nash equilibrium in the spot market. 
Tbe proposition derived from this model is that an imperfectly competitive firm will, if futures are 
unbiased, only seek to hedge, thereby causing the producer to sell his entire output forward. If the 
futures price were biased, then the speculative motive leads to overhedging. Clearly, if the generators 
anticipated high prices in the future, they would seek to sell output forward at that price in order to 
ensure a healthy revenue stream. Conversely, when the futures price is biased downwards, the 
speculative motive leads to underhedging. 
A second proposition derived from the model is that if the futures price is unbiased, the producer is 
able to eliminate all risk by selling his output forward. Given risk aversion, firms would be willing to 
increase output above normal levels in order to eliminate risk. 
Despite their validity, these propositions do not indicate that the existence of a futures market 
integrated into an oligopolistic market structure generates an improvement in the allocation of 
resources. The reason for this is an absence of the determinants of the futures price. It is logical to 
expect that in the presence of rational expectations the futures price will be unbiased, given public 
information and at least one risk-neutral speculator trading futures. However, because if risk-averse 
oligopolists dominate the marketý it is likely that output will increase and price will fall because of 
futures trading. 
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A further extension can alter the analysis such that the demand curve faced by the industry becomes 
the demand curve net of sales by spot market price-taking producers. This extends the analysis to a 
competitive ffinge, but only on the assumption that the fringe does not trade futures. This is the 
approach adopted by Newbery (1984), who permits feedback between futures trading and competitive 
supply. In this model, a perishable good is produced by a single powerful producer and a large number 
of small, identical price-taking firms. Output is uncertain and is conditional upon a single random 
variable that affects all firms. 
The futures market exists and meets at the same time that agents make their production decisions, for 
which there is no risk. The similarities between this structure and the electricity industry should be 
apparent, with electricity as a non-storable good, the incumbent generators as the single producer, and 
the IPPs as the competitive firinge. 'Me participants in the futures market are the dominant producer 
(risk-neutral with no hedging motive), the competitive fringe (risk averse with a clear hedging motive) 
and a number of price taking, risk-averse speculators. 
If the competitive fringe and the competitive speculators trade futures but the dominant firm does not, 
and if all agents accept the given cash price distribution, the ftinge wfll sell futures. Here, the expected 
supply by the fringe is greater than would have been the case in the absence of fiitures. This is due to 
the risk-aversion of the participants. 
T'he framework is altered to allow for the structure of Cournot duopolists who can choose their futures 
decisions prior to their output decisions. This imparts an advantage equivalent to that of a Stackelberg 
leader, which represents an incentive to trade futures for both fmns. Allaz (1987,1989) made these 
modifications to the model to derive the following conclusion. If quantity-setting oligopolists can 
trade futures prior to selecting their output levels, then with perfect foresight, a Nash equilibrium will 
occur where each oligopolist will sell firtures. Tbis will result in a greater output and lower cash price 
than would have occurred in the Nash equilibrium in the absence of futures - thus indicating a clear 
improvement in resources. 
If the futures choice is made when either demand or cost in the cash market are uncertain, then 
decisions may be altered for risk-averse powerful producers. This has been examined for a linear 
demand curve with an uncertain intercept, constant marginal costs across all fmm, expected utility 
maximisation and an unbiased futures price. In this scenario, the optimal futures position of the 
producers has two additional components that result in the hedging motive reinforcing the speculative 
motive. Consequently, the risk averse oligopolist increases futures sales above the level required for 
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solely strategic purposes, thereby increasing the aggregate cash market output accordingly. 
These cases are only applicable to situations where oligopolists meet to trade futures on one occasion 
prior to the cash market decision. 7his is clearly a limiting case, as participants would meet several 
times prior to cash market resolution, thus allowing traders to revise their positions. Although this 
cannot be said to be true with certainty for the CFD marketý it is highly likely to be true for the EFA 
market. This permutation was analysed by Allaz & Villa (1986), who allowed for successive meetings 
in the futures market and revision of futures positions. 
This generates the final proposition under examination, namely that under perfect foresight, as the 
number of meetings in the futures market grows infinitely, and the accumulated futures position 
immediately prior to cash resolution grows, marginal cost pricing will occur. This indicates that 
futures trading will generate a competitive outcome, even for Cournot duopolists, It can be argued that 
this is the situation which existed initially post-vesting, with a near total contract coverage of output 
accompanied by (an approximation of) marginal cost pricing. 
Despite the difference in forward and fiitures markets, there is a sufficiently strong theoretical 
foundation to transfer these propositions across to the electricity industry, as did Powell (1991). Not 
all of these propositions are relevant, nor can they all be applied to the UK electricity industry. 
Specifically the absence of speculation in the pool, the fact that all monopolists (generators) have sold 
more futures than they have bought generating costs are not identical, the competitive fiinge does 
trade futures, and firms trade futures on several occasions prior to the pool meeting. However, they 
clearly indicate the importance of the interrelationships between the spot and forward markets for 
commodities in general and the electricity industry in particular. In addition, it is also clear that firms 
with market power could be able to alter their decisions in such a way as to manipulate the spot market 
to their advantage. 
Despite the key problem in applying these propositions to the electricity industry, namely the absence 
of speculators, they have formed the basis for the key works in this field, including Green (1992), 
Green & Newbery (1992), Helm & Powell (1992) and Gray & Helm & Powell (1996). 
1.6 Evahiation of the Contract Market. 
Despite the lack of empirical research into the market for contracts for electricity, there are several key 
studies. Helm & Powell (1992) and Gray & Helm & Powell (1996) draw heavily on generator 
behaviour in the contract market as a means of explaining the behaviour of generators. There were two 
types of CFDs detailed above: one-way CFDs and two-way CFDs. The nature of a two-way CFD 
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serves to isolate generator revenue from pool prices, as the generators receive a fixed price for their 
power. As explained, RECs benefit from having hedged their risks to achieve a fixed price in their 
franchise markets. Generators also receive premiums and gain added security, allowing them to hedge 
their investment costs. 
REC contract portfolios were described above, with the initial vesting contracts being signed as a 
means of providing security to the LJK coal industry. With the vast majority of electricity purchases 
covered by CFDs, it is almost impossible to ascertain either generator revenue or generator incentives 
from pool prices. 
Utilising the work of Anderson (1991) and others, Powell (1993) successfully developed and adapted 
traditional financial markets theory for the electricity industry. He concludes that, in the absence of 
collusion, forward or forward-type contracts serve to increase the degree of competition within the 
market. This is because contracts represent an additional step towards price competition, thus pushing 
the market closer to a perfectly competitive structure. 
By contrast, it may also be concluded that contracts may also make collusive behaviour more likely, 
given that the structure of the industry is already highly conducive to collusion. However, CFDs may 
also be sold in such a manner the removes all incentives to depart from an agreed price. This could 
occur if the generators select a desired price level and utilise contracts to adapt their own incentives to 
maintain this price. 7bis possibility increases the likelihood of strategic behaviour by generators 
within the marketplace. 
In the first year after vesting, with over 95% of total generator output covered by CFDs, generator 
revenue had effectively been made independent of the pool price. This allowed generators to 
manipulate the pool price to any desired level within the bounds of the regulatory fi*amework. Given 
the potential for considerable new entry in the post-vesting environment, the incumbent generators had 
a vested interest in keeping prices low. As will be seen, pool prices after vesting were below official 
estimates, and given that the pool price is the most important piece of information available for 
potential entrants, manipulation to deter entry is possible. Clearly, one would expect high prices to 
encourage entry, not low prices. As a consequence, one would anticipate that pool prices would 
remain high after entry and not decline, in order to sustain profits for entrants. 
The importance of accurate information in capacity investment is illustrated in Bunn & Larsen (1994). 
Given the lead time of at least three years to commission new generating plants, the uncertainty in 
plant retirements and the non-linearity of using the LOLP to signal capacity needs, the pool is likely to 
48 
produce cycles of under- and over-capacity. Ideally, in the short run, new investors will wish to bring 
in new capacity if they expect it to operate at a level below SMP. This in turn depends on the 
variabilities in expected fuel prices and hence on generation costs. In its simplest form, basing 
investments solely on capacity payments would mean discounting the capital cost per kWh of new 
plant at the desired rate of return and comparing this with the expected stream of capacity payments 
from the pool. However, such a move could be inappropriate due to other potentially critical factors, 
such as those outlined below. 
The extent to which serious capacity cycles will occur depends upon the uncertainty in demand, the 
foresight of planners (how far ahead LOLP is forecast), the degree of knowledge about the 
competition and competitive behaviour in the industry. In the simplest "market signal" case of 
generating companies' responding to the recent annual average value of LOLP, Bunn & Larsen (1994) 
showed that severe cycles of the reserve margin resulted. However, if the regulator were able to 
encourage and information exchange with respect to planned construction and retirement over a three 
year period, and better demand forecasts, then the capacity payments approach appears to be capable 
of maintaining the reserve margin at a desired level (24% is the industry target). 
However, in practice, investment in capacity can occur for various financial and strategic reasons 
based on corporate decision making. In order for the regulator to be able to influence the reserve 
margin by influencing the VOLL, it is essential that reliable information on the demand-supply 
balance be made public at least three years in advance, and that the regulator should have some ability 
to smooth out plant retirement. Achieving this will require a more formal assessment procedure, by the 
regulator or an independent body, to approve new construction and retirement plans. Under these 
circumstances the system can work and be well regulated. Without them, severe cycles of over and 
under capacity could result firom using only market signals. However, the resultant fluctuations in a 
utility's prices would be politically unacceptable and would doubtless result in regulatory intervention. 
Such controls on plant would represent a considerable shift in regulatory policy. However, the current 
market is too prone to uncertainty and dynamic instability due to political and economic reasons, e. g. 
the'dash for gas', the closure of the coal mines, and REC contracting strategies. In order to limit this 
uncertainty, REC-IPP arrangements are an obvious outcome. Less uncertainty, and therefore less 
business risk, in the market brought about by tighter regulation would help to encourage the system to 
work. Much of this uncertainty is due to the strategic power of the large generators and the limitations 
of the market system to promote an efficient allocation of resources and prices. 
The system of capacity payments has been the subject of much consideration by the DGES, especially 
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given his findings in the 1991 price review (Offer, 1991) that the duopolists (notably Powergen) were 
altering their available plant schedule in order to profit from the capacity payments scheme. The 
review led to an alteration in the generators' licences, whereby old plant could not be tactically 
mothballed, and any retired plant had to be offered for sale to an independent power producer. This 
policy was backed up by the 1994 agreement (made as part of a deal to deter a referral to the MMQ 
whereby National Power and Powergen agreed to dispose of 15% of their capacity before the end of 
1996. Tbe regulatoes dissatisfaction with the lack of haste of the generators in selling plant led him to 
consider relaxing the REC's own generation limits, as several of the RECs expressed an interest in 
purchasing plant from the larger generators. This move to be backed up by a modification to the RECs 
contracting arrangements prevented excessive contracting from a station in which they had a 
controlling equity share. 
Basing investment solely on current market price signals will generate extreme swings in capacity, 
with an anticipated reserve margin almost double the desired level by the end of the century, and a 
subsequent sharp decline to half the desired level by the early 21st century. Concerns have been 
voiced recently regarding the sharp rise in pool prices in January 1995 following the shutdown of 
Nuclear Electric's Dungeness and Heysham reactors as a result of routine safety inspections. This sent 
pool prices to record levels, shattering the imposed price cap of 2.4p/kWh. ne corresponding rise in 
capacity payments led to questions regarding the level of current generating capacity, although some 
commentators believe that the pool pricing system operated just as it should have done. 
Improvements in information exchange between generators should smooth out the capacity levels in 
the early 21 st century, as should improvement in foresight, the shortening of construction times, and 
the smoothing of the generators' retirement profile. However, all of the scenarios postulated by Bunn 
& Larsen ( 1994) exhibit a sharp increase in the reserve margin at the end of the century, 
In considering the potential future developments in capacity in the industry, accurate information is 
vital. Powell (199 1) concludes that a large proportion of forward contracts will encourage generators 
to operate a high output/low price strategy. Thus, the contracts will result in exploitation of the 
dominant monopoly position as a means of deterring entry. However, with the dissolution of the first 
tranche of vesting contracts in March 199 1, the incentives of the generators would have been altered. 
As a consequence, any efforts made by the RECs to purchase additional contracts would effectively 
represent the purchase of a means of controlling the generators' exploitation of their position within 
the industry. 
From an empirical viewpoint, it would clearly not be in the generators' best interests to issue an 
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excessive number of these contracts. This may be done by limiting the actual number of contracts 
made available and/or making those contracts that are offered unattractive to the RECs who wish to 
purchase them. A possible empirical foundation for this viewpoint may be found in Offer's Review of 
Economic Purchasing (1993). 
In the review, it is stated that many of the RECs who attempt to undertake contract negotiations with 
the incumbent generators do so with little or no bargaining power. The RECs also complain of an 
unwillingness to negotiate on the part of the National Power and Powergen, an attitude that they use to 
attribute the attractiveness of the longer-term contracts offered by the IPPs. In their defence, the 
generators complain that the RECs make little or no effort to seek contracts from them. 
The nature of the purchase of contracts by the RECs is highly conducive to a Prisoner's Dilemma 
structure. A single REC will want the other regional suppliers to purchase the contracts as a means of 
controlling the generators. If taken to its logical conclusion, this will generate a free-rider problem 
with very few of the RECs actually purchasing contracts. 
Despite the transparency of the pool, the contract market remains almost untouched by regulatory 
intervention. The confidentiality between REC and generator allows for near-perfect price 
discrimination by the generator through the contract market. Coincidentally, the same may be said of 
REC contracts to larger customers in the greater than lOOkw market. An additional complication 
concerns the amount of information contained in the pool price, with the importance of accurate 
information to the efficient development of the industry having already been illustrated. 
However, as will be shown, when the general level of pool prices increased in March 1991 with the 
dissolution of the first set of vesting contracts, there were no fundamental changes to the underlying 
structure of the industry. This was also the case in March 1993 following the break-up of the second 
set of contracts for differences. Tberefore, one must consider what form of signal this would give to 
potential entrants to the generation sector. Given the high capital expenditure required for new 
capacity, one must consider firms to be risk-averse, with such price fluctuations representing a cause 
for concern. 
Despite the fact that the market for CFDs is both confidential and characterised by non-standardised 
contracts, the latter is not true of the EFA market. The conclusions to be drawn from this outcome are 
unclear, but it may indicate that it may be conducive to greater efficiency within the EFA market. The 
lack of transparency and standardisation in the contract market will clearly have an adverse effect on 
the efficiency of the pool. This could well damage the industry's operating signals, deter entry, and 
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harm the prospects for long-term efficiency. 
1. Z Contracts and the PooL 
Following on from his previous research, Green (1992) utilises the methodology established in Green 
& Newbery (1992) to examine behaviour in the contract market for duopolistic generators. As has 
been shown, when contracts cover the majority of a generatoes output the incentive to raise prices is 
lower, a supposition backed up by the low prices observed in the initial period of the pool's operation. 
When a generator sells electricity forward under a contract, it is effectively 'reserving' part of the spot 
market for its own supplies, since it could sell that amount of electricity at the going spot market price, 
but instead earns profits based upon the contract price. The 'residual', uncovered market will be 
smaller, and since the generatoes optimal mark-up rises with their uncovered sales, the pool price will 
be lower. This reduces the generatoes profits from the uncovered spot market. 
With rational expectations, the price that the generator can obtain for its contracts will also be lower, 
but the extra sales that can be reserved by the contract will not often outweigh this effect. This means 
that for some parameter values, a generator would wish to sell contracts even if its rivals were not 
involved in the contract market. 
Because the rival will generally follow the same stance, both generators would sell electricity under 
contract giving a lower pool price and a somewhat higher output than in the absence of the contract 
market. However, for some parameter values, the generators would not wish to be the first to enter the 
contract market because the act of reserving sales in the contract market will drive the price down in 
the residual pool to the extent that the generators profits would fall. 
If a generator expects its rival to base its contracting strategy on the price for which contracts can be 
sold, the analysis becomes more complex. If the generator increases its own sales in the contract 
market, its rival will typically sell fewer contracts as the price falls. This means that the residual pool 
does not shrink by the full amount of the generators extra sales, and so the price will not fall by as 
much, making additional contract sales more profitable than if the rival was not expected to respond. 
In the limitý the generator might expect its rival to aim to keep the contract price, and hence the total 
contract sales, constant, expanding or contracting its own sales to offset any change in the other firms. 
Under these conditions, the generator would want to reserve as large a part of the market as it could, 
since its rival would be expected to reserve the remainder, and so both generators would end up My 
contracted, and selling at marginal cost in the spot market. 
52 
It therefore follows that the regulator should do as much as possible to encourage competition in the 
contract market and to encourage generators to sell electricity through both contracts and the pool. 
Although it is possible that the generators could refuse to participate in the contract market and earn 
large profits in the spot markeý it is unlikely that they would choose the highest prices that they are 
capable of achieving. If they did, they would effectively be inviting new entry and/or regulatory 
intervention. The generators may wish to operate in a manner analogous to limit pricing, which the 
contract market may help them to achieve if they behave competitively in the pool, given that they 
have sold sufficient electricity under contract. 
This becomes important when considering the effects of entry. In the short run, the residual demand 
curve facing the two generators is fixed. It could be hard for the generators to commit to entry 
deterrence, given that the price schedules are changing every day. Facing a fixed demand curve in the 
medium term, they might be tempted to deviate from a limit pricing strategy to obtain higher short-run 
profits. If potential entrants were aware of this, they could enter until they had shifted the residual 
demand curve so far to the left that the generators could not obtain a price above the entrants'costs. 
However, few potential entrants have been willing to enter without the security of long term contracts 
to hedge pool revenues. This means that the residual demand curve in the contract market could be 
very elastic at the level of the entrants' average costs. The generators would be unable to obtain a 
higher price in the contract market and if they did not sell many contracts, thus signalling a high pool 
price. Consequently, the RECs could buy additional contract cover from entrants, who would be 
fmancially secure, and force the pool price down. Since the limit price for entry is above the marginal 
running costs of almost all the generators' present capacity, they would want to sell as much as 
possible at that price. 
This would imply that the generators would do best to sell a large number of contracts, ensuring that 
price in the pool would equal that price that would exist if no entry occurred. Any attempts made by 
the generators to raise the price by selling fewer contracts would simply result in a lower market share 
at the limit price. Entry would force the price below this level and would be unprofitable until new 
capacity was required. This could well be an optimal outcome, giving prices at long run marginal cost 
without incurring the costs of unnecessary entry. 
A pivotal study into the effects that the contract market can have upon the pool is that of Helm & 
Powell (1992). By an analysis of Pool Prices from vesting until August 1991, it is shown that there 
was a large increase in prices without any apparent underlying structural foundation. The increase 
occurred on or around the 22 March 1991, which coincides with the dissolution of the first set of 
53 
vesting contracts. Prior to this event there had also been a close relationship between pool purchase 
prices (PPP) and electricity demand, which was severely disrupted after this event. 
Hehn & Powell conclude that there was a structural break that distorted the relationship, which they 
determine to be a long-run relationship. In order to test the validity of this hypothesis, long-ran 
stability of that relationship was tested for. Having verified that both PPP and demand exhibit 
stationarity, the variables are examined to confirm the existence of a relationship. The initial test is 
indicative of some uncertainty, but a subsequent test utilises a dummy variable that takes a value of 
zero until 22 March 1991 and a value of one thereafter. In the case of this latter test, there is very 
strong evidence of cointegration. It is therefore concluded that there is a relationship between these 
two variables which was altered in late March 199 1. 
A subsequent approach utilises a dynamic model of PPP and demand with an error correction format. 
This model should, and does, illustrate the same conclusions as the initial test by utilising a lagged 
format for both variables and the dummy variable. An important point that was noted was the 
statistical significance of the dummy variable, indicating the change to the long-run relationship. I'he 
final approach used was that of general to specific modelling to develop a model which would 
essentially have an error correction format. The dummy variable retained its statistical significance in 
this model, and the error correction format was validated as accurate, despite some statistical 
problems. 
In order to ascertain the reasons behind these conclusions, bid data obtained from the NGC was 
studied as a means of estimating electricity supply curves for several time periods before and after 
April 1991. The conclusions derived from these supply schedules appeared to indicate that the curves 
had been shifted upwards and to the left. The only possible reason (barring increases in LOLP, which 
were ruled out) is that the bids that comprise the supply fimction had been increased beyond 
competitive levels. 
The essential conclusion derived from this analysis is that the contract market can play a pivotal role 
in determining behaviour in the pool. This conclusion is important because of the lack of regulation 
for the contract which, in theory, could allow for perfect price discrimination. This analysis was 
extended to incorporate several of the events included in this study (with similar conclusions) in Gray 
& Helm & Powell (1996). 
The importance of the work of Green & Newbery cannot be overlooked, as they are regarded as the 
key authors in this field. However, some questions have been raised from their work. Firstly, their 
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pivotal article in J. P. E. (1992) has its conclusions derived from methodologies focusing upon the 
existence of a symmetric duopoly. This industry (at that time) was definitely an asymmetric duopoly, a 
factor that limits the accuracy of the conclusions. This factor was noted in their conclusions. A further 
assumption, the implications of which are noted, is the use of'typical'days in assessments - this clearly 
ignores the extremes that may influence prices. 
A second point linked to the work of both Green & Newbery and Helm & Powell (1992) is that 
nuclear power is ignored in their conclusions. The justification made is that because nuclear power is 
baseload power, Nuclear Electric has no role in setting prices. However, the shutdown of two key 
nuclear plants in January 1995 (Dungeness and Heysham) sent pool prices to record levels. This must 
indicate that nuclear power does have a role in setting prices. This point has been noted on more than 
one occasion by Offer, who also indicated the importance of Nuclear Electric in the contract market. 
Perhaps the most interesting component lacking from these studies is the lack of any real empirical 
evaluation of the contract market. Although this is due primarily to a lack of relevant data, it may be 
possible to establish proxies for certain key variables and, having increased their accuracy, utilise 
them as key data sets, 
1.8. Potential methodsfor increasingpool competition and the role of the regulator. 
It is almost generally accepted that, in most industries, entry implies competition. However, in the case 
of the generating sector, this is far from the case. it is Offer's responsibility to judge requests for 
generating licenses by those firms that see themselves as being able to effectively provide a service to 
the public in a manner governed by Offer's mandate to encourage competition and protect consumer 
interests. However, with in excess of 20 licenses to generate having been granted since privatisation, 
one must consider how successful this policy has been, and perhaps more importantly, has Offer 
granted too many or too few licenses and if so what have the consequences of that action be ? 
It is a well-known fact that in the period since privatisation, National Power and Powergen have 
dominated the industry, with Nuclear Electric becoming an increasingly larger player in the market 
over the last few years. In that time, National Power and Powergen have seen their market shares 
eroded, both through the rise of Nuclear Electric, but also through the increasing number of small 
generators (IPPs) which have entered the industry. In that time, there has been little in terms of a 
downward influence on prices, and indeed, many of the larger electricity consumers have alleged that 
the opposite has been occurring. Therefore, we must consider the possibility that none of the new 
entrants have either the plant facilities or the resources to enter the uncompetitive core of the 
generating sector. If this were the case, then if the number of new entrants continues to increase, then 
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it may well serve to damage all of those firms in the competitive fiinge. In order to enter the core, a 
company would need sufficient mid-merit plant to have an influence on setting prices. Although it is 
true that as more plant enters at baseload, some of the curTent baseload plant will be pushed into mid- 
merit, it is uncertain as to the ultimate effects of these actions, or the length of time such a shift could 
take. 
It is apparent that the market share of the generators must also be compared with the shares that the 
generators possess of baseload and non-baseload plants - an important issue in the MMC reports into 
the aborted National Power and Powergen take-over bids (HMSO. a and HMSO-b, April 1996). As 
discussed above, this is because plant that operates at baseload does not set price, while non-baseload 
plant has a far greater role in setting prices. Therefore, if a generator has a high proportion of non- 
baseload plant, then that firm will have the ability to influence price to an extent that its competitors 
may not have. The estimates developed by the MMC showed that for the year 1995/6 National Power 
possessed 57% of the non-baseload market, Powergen possessed 41%, and the pumped storage 
businesses possessed 2%. As such, no other fm had any ability to influence prices. It was also 
estimated that if the plant divestiture plans went ahead as scheduled, then the company (companies) 
which acquired that plant would have an approximate 20% share of the non-baseload market, thus 
increasing competition in the generating sector. 
While the policy of encouraging entry cannot be denied, one must consider the broader picture. The 
increased number of entrants has certainly led to a more rapid acceptance and usage of combined 
cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology, aided by a change in the European Community directives 
permitting the wider use of gas for power generation. Indeed, prior to privatisation, gas was 
considered to be one of the most uneconomic fuel sources available, with only coal and nuclear plants 
being considered for any new investment in generating capacity. The decline in construction of new 
coal plants has been well documented in the aftermath of the Conservative government's pit closure 
scheme. Further, the decision to privatise the nuclear industry was accompanied with concerns that 
there would be no new nuclear plants constructed or developed after privatisation, unless of course 
they were nuclear fusion reactors, an area which is largely still in the experimental stages. 
The spread of new entry in generation was largely the cause of the 'dash for gas', and its associated 
effects on the gas industry. This was accompanied by a considerable plan of workforce cuts and 
restructuring carried out by all of the newly-privatised companies, and a focus on improving customer 
service standards. These were not only in order to comply with Offer's demands, but also to attract 
business in the market for those customers with an electricity demand greater than I MW. At the same 
time, there was a conscious effort made to diversify away from regulated areas into non-regulated 
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areas. In the case of the RECs, this coincided with the majority of their number expanding into 
generation. Throughout this time, the relationship between the regulator and the larger generators 
became increasingly hostile and adversarial, with the threat of MMC referral being made on several 
occasions. 
This came to a head in the 1993 price review, and the subsequent agreement made in February 1994. 
As a consequence of these investigations, National Power, Powergen and Offer established an 
undertaking which resulted in them agreeing to dispose of plant and subjecting themselves to a price 
cap. Since then, the regulator has been concerned that the generators have not made sufficient effort to 
sell some of their capacity, and has reconsidered the possibility of an MMC referral, as well as 
allowing the RECs to buy plant from the generators as a means of increasing their own generation 
limits. 
In examining the potential for the regulator to increase competition in generation, it has a number of 
limited options. The importance of the price undertaking and the corresponding sale of plant 
agreement is shown in Green (1996a). This examines the three main regulatory possibilities available 
in order to increase competition in electricity generation: partial divestiture (the policy in use), 
breaking up of the dominant firms, and encouraging entry. 
Given the pool's "merit order" system, the optimal profit maximising strategy for any firm is to bid its 
generating units at marginal cost. High bids will reduce the amount of time for which the generator is 
called upon to submit to the pool, and as there is such a high number of plants in the generation 
network, any effect on prices will be negligible. At leastý this is how the pool should function in 
theory. 
However, given the market dominance of the two duopolists, this solution becomes invalid. Given the 
magnitude of the holdings of either of these companies, if one of the companies increased the bid 
prices of their plants, then these stations would still be called upon less. Nevertheless, these stations 
would still be called upon to generate, but by virtue of the monopoly position, the system marginal 
price will increase and those stations that remain on the merit order will earn more. In this scenario, 
bidding above marginal cost will raise profits. 
The pool price undertaking of 1994 was set as a means of controlling this problem after concerns were 
voiced by the regulator, consumer groups, and large energy users. in addition, the generators were 
required to sell a certain amount of their generating plant (4 GW by National Power, 2 GW by 
Powergen). The key aspect of this sale was that the plant was mid-merit, thereby introducing true 
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competition into generation, rather than the continued addition of baseload sets. In order to assess the 
validity of this approach, the following model is used. 
In this model, there are n generators which compete through the submission of linear supply functions 
of the form: (qj(p): R+ _ý R+, i=L.. n). These functions state the amount that each 
firms is willing to 
produce at any given price, where the supply functions are non-decreasing in order of price Oust as the 
merit order ranks plants in order of increasing bids). 
Electricity demand is given by: D(pl), where dDIdp < 0, d2 Dldp 2=0. Demand is variable both over 
time and also as a consequence of random shocks. However, in this analysis, it is impossible to 
distinguish between the two causes of demand variation. With the price determined by a market 
clearing condition where supply must equal demand at all points in time: 
D(p* (t), t) q, (p* (O. a) 
The equilibrium is established through the set of supply functions, one submitted by each generator, 
where each firm is maximising its proffts given the supply functions of the other firtns at each point in 
time. Profits may be presented as a fimction of price, assuming that the residual demand is produced 
(total demand less the other firms' supply at that price) in order to clear the market: 
; r, (p, t) = p(D(p, t) - F, qj (p)) - C, 
(D(p, t) -Z qj (p)) 
Differentiating with respect to price: 
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Equating the derivative with zero yields the profit maximising price at a particular time, and also the 
corresponding profit maximising output (the residual demand). If it is assumed that d2DIdpdt = 0, then 
this price cannot be optimal. The given (price, quantity) pair will then yield a point on the profit 
maximising supply ftinction. Manipulating the first order condition: 
dqj] 
(O. d) (p) 
[p 
(p»] 
[- dD 
dp j*I DP 
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It is optimal to utilise the equation in a linear format in order to establish demand and marginal cost, 
where it is assumed that dDIdp is a constant. Each firm has a quadratic cost function, from which 
marginal costs increase linearly and are normalised at zero output: 
Ci (q, ) = c, q 2, Ci, (q, ) = c, qj 2 
(O. e) 
As there are many solutions to (O. e), it is easier to concentrate on the unique linear solution, in which 
each fums' supply function is q, ýp) = 13ip, therefore dqldp =. 8j. Inserting these supply functions into 
(O. e) and dividing both sides byp yields: 
dD 
+Ep, 
) 
i=l 
dp j7 
(0-0 
Each firm acting in a strategic manner will possess one of these functions, thereby permitting the use 
of simultaneous equations to solve for the model and to yield the slopes of the supply functions. If this 
function is chosen by all but one of the firms, the remaining firm's best option is to follow suit, making 
it an equilibrium. 
Rather than being absolute, the model establishes relative results that were designed to fit the industry. 
As a result, the outcomes of the model in fact represent indexes of policy effectiveness. Average price 
and output are therefore measured relative to those values which would occur if the generators were 
bidding at marginal cost where welfare is given as the sum of consumer welfare and profit, and is 
maximised when generators bid at marginal cost. Deadweight losses are measured relative to the 
maximum, with losses resulting from the base case normalised to equal unity. 
National Power is given a cost parameter of one-and-two-thirds (f-/GW of output), and Powergen a 
parameter of two-and-a-half, thus ensuring consistency with the fact that Powergen is two-thirds the 
size of National Power. The duopolists can generate a joint total output of 10 GW at a marginal cost 
of f lO/MWh (6 GW fi-orn National Power, 4 GW from Powergen), while an output of 30 GW would 
have a marginal cost of f30/MWh, a range in which most mid-merit prices lie. With baseload power 
from Nuclear Electric, the IPPs and imported electricity adding a fiu-ther 15 GW, this power is treated 
as a constant to be subtracted from demand as by definition these stations run continuously. 
Demand varies over time, operating in the interval from zero to one. The ftinction's intercept is a cubic 
function of time, to yield a reasonable approximation of the industrys load curve, i. e. 
D(P, t) = 30 +120 (0.5 - t)'- 0.5p (0-9) 
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Bidding at marginal cost the generators' output will vary between 10 GW and 30 GW, implying a 
total industry output of between 25 GW and 45 GW at prices between LIO/MWh and f 30/MWh. The 
slope of the demand curve (-0.5 GW per; E/MWh) gives an average elasticity of about -0.25. 
With this framework established, the three outlined methods of increasing competition are examined. 
In examining forced partial plant divestiture, the model operates such that if a firm is required to sell 
off ten percent of its capacity, its marginal cost parameter will change from unity to cjO. 9, while the 
new company will have a cost parameter of tI= clO. I. If this new company bids at marginal cost, its 
output will be equal to plit, -a formulation that is linear in p, and is compatible with the duopolists 
choosing linear supply functions. This output is subtracted from the residual demand to be met by the 
duopolists, so that they now face a demand curve with a slope of (Mldp - Md. 
Working from this formulation, it is shown that selling off an increasing proportion of the duopolists' 
plant will lead to increased competition in generation. Specifically, if National Power gave up one- 
sixth of its capacity, and Powergen one-eighth, then a significant decline in prices would result, 
Corresponding to an increase in output and a reduction in deadweight losses of about 40%. As 
subsequent divestitures are undertaken, the deadweight losses are reduced, but only a certain degree of 
divestitures can be voluntary. It is also shown that, unlike the prices and output levels, the extent of the 
deadweight losses are insensitive to the elasticity of demand. 
There is no guarantee that the newly created companies will bid at marginal cost, as strategic bidding 
could be undertaken to increase profits. It is assumed that the divested capacity of each generator is 
put into a new, separate company, and that these four companies then adopt the equilibrium in linear 
supply functions. There is no logic in forcing the incumbents to divest more than half of their capacity, 
as the new firms would then have a greater market share than the initial incumbents. 
Prices are higher than if the new capacity bids at marginal cost and output is lower. Deadweight 
losses are slightly lower until about 40% of the duopoly's capacity has been divested, a fact due to a 
reduction in the industrys costs. A firm that is bidding strategically will have a marginal cost below 
the market price, while a non-strategic firm will bid at marginal cost. Its marginal cost will therefore 
exceed that of the strategic firms and switching output from strategic to non-strategic bidders could 
reduce the industry's total costs. This is exactly what happens to the firms that had been bidding at 
marginal cost switch to strategic bids - their output will fall and that of the 
duopolists will rise. The 
finns' marginal costs will not be equal (unless the firms are symmetric), but the reduction in costs 
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more than outweighs the reduction in consumer surplus from a higher price. 
The second alternative is to break up the duopolists completely. 'niree ways of doing this are 
suggested: National Power could be split into two equal halves; both firms could be split in half, or 
National Power could be split into three while Powergen was split into two. This would produce five 
firms of approximately equal size, each owning three or four large power stations. The industry could 
in fact be broken up into a number of smaller firms, but the resultant firms would jeopardise their 
company-level economies of scale. 
It is estimated that this would reduce any deadweight losses to zero. However, these estimates do not 
consider the costs of such a reorganisation, which could be considerable, especially given that any 
reorganisation could only come about as a result of a (generally protracted) MMC inquiry. 
The final option is the encouragement of bntry, which would have to be in the form of CCGT plant, as 
it is the continually chosen viable option for new generating capacity. However, as this is 
predominantly baseload plantý it would have virtually no influence on mid-merit competition or prices. 
Such entry is modelled by an autonomous leftwards shift of the incumbents' demand curve for 
electricity by an amount comparable to the new entry. Their supply functions will remain unaffected, 
and therefore the equilibrium price will fall and output will rise. This will cause a decline in the 
deadweight losses, but the costs of constructing the CCGT plant must also be considered. 
If the new stations replace older stations with higher avoidable costs, or there is a need for new 
capacity to meet demand growth, then CCGT construction carries no penalty. If there is no need for 
new capacity, and the new stations have higher avoidable costs than those they replace, then their 
additional costs must be added to the deadweight losses before the net effects of the policy are 
evaluated. 
It is assumed that the entrants have an average cost of JE20/MWh that, until entry, is avoidable. The 
duopolists' marginal costs vary between LI O/MWh and L30/MWh, their average costs are L20/MWh, 
and their fixed costs are sunk. Based upon these assumptions, it is shown that no entry can be justified 
by relative costs - the avoidable costs of existing plant which would be saved over the course of a year 
will exactly equal the cost of new capacity. 
The construction of power stations by the IPPs has been based upon a number of determinants, 
including the current and future prices of electricity, the regulatory environment, government policy 
and corporate strategy - in addition to considering the amount of output sold under contract. Indeed, 
61 
the majority of entrants have been backed by long-term contracts. Newbery (1995) suggests that an 
entrant could sell a long-term contract and enter without risk whenever spot prices rose too far above 
the entrant's costs. The presence of a contestable contract market (since it costs very little to bring a 
project to the stage where contracts are signed) therefore restrains the average spot price. In practice, 
long-term predictions of demand relative to capacity are likely to have more impact on long-term 
contracts than short-term movements in spot prices, although the fi-equent exercise of market power 
might increase the "insurance premium" that buyers were willing to pay for an alternative supply. 
Given the importance of long-term considerations, it is unlikely that entry will continue until the 
average spot price is driven down to the level of entrants' costs. As entry occurs and the duopolists 
demand curve shifts inwards, the average price fails and total output rises. At first, welfare gains from 
lower prices outweigh the excess costs of the new stations and entry raises welfare. As more of the 
duopolists' output is displaced, however, their marginal cost falls, raising the cost penalty incurred by 
the entrants. This cost penalty soon outweighs the benefits to consumers and so entry reduces welfare. 
When additional capacity is needed, it would be preferable if the duopolists did not build it, but there 
is no case for promoting competition without need. 
In considering the nature of the regulator and the regulatory process in general, one must look in detail 
at the nature of the regulator and how their decision-making process operates. Firstly, one must 
remember that it was the government's objectives that were at the heart of the privatisation 
programme. In the case of the gas industry, the industry was privatised with the goal of increasing 
revenue, whereas the electricity industry relied upon the more altruistic goal of increasing competition 
into the industry by the experimental process of inter-generator competition. The regulator, despite its 
close links with the MMC and the President of the Board of Trade, is largely in control of the 
industry, with no firm having any great desire to go beyond the regulator. 
Integrating the responsibilities of encouraging entry and ensuring customer protection is at the heart of 
the regulator's mandate. To do this, any and all monopoly components must be identified and their 
possibility for competition examined. In the electricity industry, it is the (natural monopoly) 
transmission system, which is the responsibility of the now-privatised National Grid Company. All 
other components are seen to be competitive, as witnessed by the spread of competition from those 
customers whose demand is greater than IMW per year, to those customers whose demand is greater 
than I OOkW per year in 1994, to the eventual opening up of competition in 1998. Given the concerns 
regarding monopoly power, one must consider why the regulator has not made stronger efforts to 
prevent the dominance of National Power and Powergen. it could be argued that the continued threat 
of an MMC reference is the regulator's deterrent against National Power and Powergen abusing their 
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dominant position. However, given the number of times that this threat has been made, one must 
consider whether a continued reliance on this policy is misguided (see below). 
Under ideal conditions, the regulator would be both independent and unaccountable to any body or 
institution, be it governmental, industrial or academic. This would guarantee impartiality and the 
removal of the possibility of any external influences affecting the regulator. These two characteristics 
are highly unlikely to occur, principally because of the nature of the regulator-government 
relationship. The regulator shares power with the MMC and the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, and therefore it cannot be seen to be independent from them. In addition, the degree of 
independence between the government and the regulator has become an important issue. This is 
largely due the coincident timing of the decision to re-evaluate the 1994 distribution price review 
being made on the day after the sale of the government's residual electricity holdings. 
One of the regulators rights should be that of total access to any and all information which it may 
desire from the firms which it regulates, and it must also possess the right to do as it wishes with that 
information. However, the firms in question tend to classify certain information as 'commercially 
sensitive' and maintain that it cannot be released into the public domain without representing a 
possible violation of their duty to their shareholders. This is often at the core of the lack of co- 
operation between the regulator and the regulated firms, as it prevents the regulator from doing their 
job properly and distorts information for any potential entrants. 
Entry was seen as a vital part of the privatisation and restructuring process in the electricity industry, 
but as the dominance of National Power and Powergen has barely been affected in the period since 
privatisation, one must consider the wisdom of that decision. According to the privatisation 'plan', 
entry in the form of new capacity will be encouraged based on the level of capacity payments 
generated in the pool and thus the actual need for new plants. However, one cannot base entry on 
these decisions alone, and therefore we must examine other factors such as profitability. The 
electricity industry cannot plausibly be seen as a target for hit-and-run entry, and therefore we must 
conclude that those firms that have entered the industry have done so based on a long-term plan. 
It would be an intriguing experiment if one could ascertain the motives behind new plant construction 
and determine how many plants were constructed based upon anticipated levels of capacity payments 
and how many (if any) were constructed because of regulatory encouragement and the 'dash for gas'. 
Most (all) new entry into the generating sector has been low- or mid-merit baseload plants. However, 
the most profitable plants are the non-baseload sites owned and operated by National Power and 
Powergen (and later Eastern), as well as the reserve and reactive Pumped Storage Businesses. 
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Almost all entry has been in the form of plants constructed with the financial support and/or 
guaranteed contracts from the RECs, as few firms have been willing to bear the risk of entering 
without the security of backing from some source. Since over 20 licenses have been granted, there is a 
conscious desire to prove that competition is possible, that it exists, and that it actually works. 
There are some interesting parallels between the current situation in the electricity generating sector 
and the gas supply industry in its' post-privatisation, post-entry scenario. In the gas industry, over 30 
fmns were encouraged to enter the gas supply industry by a combination of government and 
regulatory incentives, and a variety of favourable terms of gas prices. However, as a consequence of 
declining gas prices and alleged over-contracting of gas purchases through high priced take-or-pay 
contracts, there are concerns that a 'bubble' has developed in the gas market, which will eventually 
burst and wipe out many of the smaller firms which the regulator itself encouraged to enter. If this 
eventuality occurs, then it will severely damage long-ran competition in the industry as well as 
harming the structure of the industry itself 
The equally problematic situation in the electricity industry is that which has arisen because of the 
high number of entrants. The electricity pool operates on a system which requires that there be a 
reserve margin of 21% of capacity at all times in case of station outages, malfunctions, power surges, 
or other unforeseen eventualities. This helps to determine capacity payment levels and therefore new 
entry as mentioned above. There has been considerable concern voiced by the NGC that, because of 
the high level of new entry encouraged by the 'dash for gas', the capacity margin will rise to almost 
50% before the end of the century if efforts are not made to stabilise it. In the short-term, this 
eventuality would probably lead to some short-term changes in plant deferment and retirement. In the 
long run however, this could precipitate considerable cycles of instability in plant capacity, which 
could lead to problems in guaranteeing adequate capacity in the future. This is especially probable if 
no efforts are made to stabilise the system through information exchange between generators as to 
their future investment plans. 
In conclusion therefore, we must consider the possibility that the regulatory stance that has been either 
adopted by the regulator or forced upon it by the government has had potentially detrimental long-run 
effects upon the industry. In addition, it is apparent that entry does definitely not equal competition, 
and perhaps the regulator should focus his efforts upon what would generate competition in the 
electricity industry's generating sector. 
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Section 11 - Provosed empirical modelling and the methodologies to be used. 
2. L Pool Price Analyses Performed using MuhWariate Regression Analyses (Chapter P). 
It is not an unreasonable hypothesis to expect that certain events relating to the electricity industry 
would influence the genera) level of pool prices. Specifically, one would anticipate that regulatory 
announcements would have a considerable effect on how the generators set pool prices, given the 
terms of their licences. Such events as the announcements of the intention to undertake pool price 
reviews, the publishing of those reviews, the February 1994 price undertaking, and others could be 
examined to assess how (if at all) they have influenced prices. In addition, given the statements above 
concerning the contract market, one could hypothesise that the break-up of the forward contracts in 
March of 1991 and 1993 would increase pool prices. Finally, one could hypothesise that the occasions 
on which the generators have been threatened with an MMC reference to influence prices. 
It may therefore be possible to utilise dummy variables to represent these events in a series of 
regressions, and to use the coefficients on the dummy variables to assess the consequences of these 
events. 
The dependent variable in these regressions is to be pool purchase prices (PPP), or some variant 
thereof It can also be shown that simflar analyses can be performed using uplift levels, partially on 
their own merit, and partially as an alternative to the (unavailable) generator bid prices. Each of these 
data sets has been obtained in a half-hourly format for the period October 1990 to November 1995. 
The independent variable(s) include electricity demand, uplift, pool prices and/or lagged dependent 
variables (naturally, depending upon the equations under examination). It may therefore be possible to 
establish a sequence of regressions, such as: univariate price analyses, univariate uplift analyses, 
uplift-price, and uplift-demand. (Price-demand analyses are retained exclusively for the second 
empirical chapter). 
Conventional regression analysis will allow each of these regression sequences to be modelled over an 
appropriate time period, with the dummy variables representing the relevant events. 
In terms of the possible hypotheses, the pool price reviews remain the most obvious choice but the 
threats of an MMC reference make an intriguing option. The dissolution of the two sets of vesting 
contracts will also be examined as a prelude to the second main analysis. The analysis of pool price 
reviews and their outcomes is a relatively straightforward matter, with an examination of the variables' 
changing structure over time. 
As a general rule, it is assumed that the dummies will only have a short run effect, based upon the 
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assumption of regulation being a repeated game between the generators and the regulator. This short 
run factor is reflected in the length of the analysis period. The only problem that this may introduce 
the interaction of two distinct dummies. However, the events selected are deemed to be sufficiently far 
apart to prevent this from occurring, and feedback between the events is not anticipated. 
22 Pool Prices and Ekariciry Demand Analysed by Muftivariate Regression Analysis (Chapter 
VI). 
The pool-based data sets have been obtained in a half-hourly frequency for the period October 1990 to 
November 1995. The relationship may take the form of an examination over the entire period or some 
section thereof The variables in question are pool purchase price and gross electricity demand. 
The objective of this analysis is to test for the presence of two anticipated disruptions to the 
relationship. These are anticipated in March 1991 and March 1993 and may be tested for using 
structural break and dummy variable analysis. These dates correspond to the dissolution of the first 
and second sets of contracts for differences between the RECs and the generators. It is therefore 
anticipated that the validation of these hypotheses will indicate the importance that the contract market 
has on the pool, and therefore the possible need for regulatory action in the contract market. This work 
is based upon and develops fiu-ther the work of Helm & Powell (1992). 
The same considerations that apply to Part I are also relevant here in terms of establishing the format 
and structure of the model. 
Z3. Generator Share Prkes and the InjZvence of Regulatory Announcements (Chapter VII). 
This section will attempt to assess how the events which are chosen as a means of assessing the 
linkages between electricity prices and regulation are compatible with the results yielded when an 
assessment of the links between regulation and share prices are made. The data set is shorter for these 
analyses, existing from March 1991 to November 1995 due to the floatation date of the generators. 
The share prices under assessment will be those of National Power and Powergen, and will be 
analysed by means of the standard market model with dummy variables inserted to represent the 
relevant events. As this analysis will essentially be identical to that of the first section, the same 
potential advantages and difficulties again apply. 
24. Analysis of the Ekarichy Spot and Forward Markets (ChaPler VIA)- 
The Horton IV estimates are seen as the nearest commercially available approximation to the strike 
prices for the contracts for differences established at vesting, but any extension of them will require 
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the incorporation of any events which may have affected the assumptions underlying them. This will 
require an identification of the key events in the electricity industry, and their possible effects on the 
Horton IV. It is possible to obtain an idea of certain contract terms by examining Offer publications 
and applying the same reasoning to the contract market in order to construct a synthetic load profile 
utilising the estimates and all published information on pool prices. The Horton IV estimates are 
themselves readily available from the Department of Trade and Industry. 
In undertaking any examination of the market for contracts for differences and REC contract 
portfolios, one must consider the actual load factor of the contracts. The load factor (or load shape) is 
the ratio of kWh consumed by customers to the peak consumption, multiplied by the number of hours 
under examination. 
Although baseload contracts were made available to the RECs (i. e. contracts with a 100% load factor), 
these are not as valuable as contracts with a lower load factor, and are consequently worth less in the 
contract market. Electricity consumption in England and Wales is around the 64% load factor mark, 
while that in the franchise market is nearer to 52-54% because of sharper peaks in demand. As defined 
above, the load factor of a contract is the ratio of kWh covered by the contract to its peak cover 
multiplied by the number of hours in the year (8760). 
It can therefore be concluded that if it is assumed that the Horton IV estimates were derived on 
assumptions regarding the expected level of demand and capacity, then it should be possible to 
construct an approximation of a sculpted contract schedule. In assessing the relationships that can be 
assessed using this data set one would anticipate a relationship to exist between pool prices and 
estimates of contract prices. 
The full details of the process utilised to generate the data set based on the Horton IV estimates is 
contained in the relevant chapter. However, the data set will terminate with March 1994, one year 
after the vesting contracts expired. This is because the estimates will be highly inaccurate in the year 
1993-4, and expansion beyond this date is inappropriate. 
The situation in the UK is also to be contrasted with an overview of the Californian electricity industry 
and that industry's forward market. This is being undertaken by means of a similar series of empirical 
models using actual and forecast electricity prices to develop the spot-forward models beyond those of 
the commercially sensitive UK situation which precludes the release of contract data. 
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Section III - Conclusions. 
The inter-relationships between the pool and the contract market lie at the heart of the post- 
privatisation structure of the electricity industry. The work of Green, Newbery, Helm and Powell has 
shown the importance of the ties between the industry, and although the degree of contract cover faced 
by the generators has declined, it may be concluded that the contract market remains a pivotal element 
of generating strategy. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the generators possess a high degree of market power in setting 
pool prices. However, based upon the RECs' comments in the Review of Economic Purchasing 
(1992), it may be concluded that they also possess considerable market power in the contract market. 
Although the RECs have diversified their contract portfolios away from National Power and 
Powergen, these generators remain a key element of any REC's contracting strategy. While the RECs 
have moved away from the major generators and towards the Independent Power Producers, the IPPs 
fail to damage the main generators role in the contract market, although it has been discussed that the 
IPPs have made the generating sector more contestable, if not more competitive. 
The major concern regarding the contract market is that the confidentiality of contract strike prices 
allows for possible perfect price discrimination by the generators. The ideal situation for the 
generators' contract buyers (RECs and large consumers alike) would be disclosure of contract details 
and prices in particular. However, the highly diversified nature of contracts makes this outcome of 
limited usefulness. The contract market would benefit from a degree of homogeneity of contracts -a 
characteristic that is possessed by the EFA market. Transparent prices and contract homogeneity 
would allow companies to more easily compare contract terms and ensure that efficient contracting 
was being undertaken. 
The extent of the importance of the contract market will be clearly demonstrated in 1998 when the 
fmal set of coal contracts expires. There is not, at present, a commercial system capable of replacing 
the government-enforced contract market that has existed since vesting, and as such there is concern in 
the industry as to the potential for future developments. Furthermore, the contracts will expire just as 
full domestic competition is set to become a reality, allowing the demand for and supply of electricity 
to become more responsive to each other. Given that the pool has, to date, operated on demand 
forecasts, the inter-reactions of the demand and supply sides of the industry will take deregulation to 
its next stage, rather than the pseudo-market that currently exists. 
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SECTION I- Introduction. 
While it should be apparent that the threat of regulation should influence the behaviour of the firms 
that face this regulation, the fact that this preposition forms the key to the majority of the empirical 
work in this thesis requires an examination of its theoretical basis. To that end, this chapter will 
contain an evaluation of two models of the pool: the Folk Theorem and Klemperer & Meyer's supply 
function analysis as applied to the UK electricity generating sector by Green & Newbery (1992). 
The Folk Theorem (Friedman, 197 1) is based around the existence of an infinitely repeated n-person 
game within which the combinations of players actions that have been chosen are observable 
producing the possibility an infinite co-operation or punishment strategy. This is most commonly 
based around a dynamic approach to the simple static Prisoner's Dilemma game. The Prisoner's 
Dilemma game is based around the principle of co-operation between the players and the pursuit of 
certain payoffs. For a fWl and concise explanation, see Clarke (1990). 
However, as will be discussed, the Folk Theorem can be adapted to allow for price or quantity bidding 
within a model of the electricity pool - dependent upon several assumptions 
discussed below. The key 
to this analysis is an assessment of the probability of the game ending - in this case through regulation. 
This is vital given the econometric analysis that follows in the later chapters. A breakdown and 
simplification of the structure of pool prices and the way in which regulation can influence certain key 
components of prices develops the study of the Folk Theorem finther. 
What the Folk Theorem is unable to do is assess the actual price-quantity bidding structure of the 
pool. This is undertaken through an examination of the supply function approach to oligopoly as 
developed by Klemperer & Meyer (1989) and applied to the electricity industry by Green & Newbery 
(1992). This approach has already been introduced (See Chapter 11, Section 1-3) and is structured as a 
one-shot game with no learning process. As such, it does not have the inherent dynamics of the Folk 
Theorem. 
In undertaking these studies, it is hoped that this chapter will provide a key theoretical insight to the 
econometric studies that follow in later chapters. 
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SECTION 11 - Pool Bidding and the Folk Theorem. 
1.1. The Folk TheorenL 
As discussed in Section 1, this study is designed to provide a theoretical basis for the empirical studies 
that are to follow. With this objective in mind, let us make a few general simplifications. The structure 
of the electricity pool may be simplified to a sealed and simultaneous bid auction, where both price 
and quantity levels are contained in the bid. Generators then receive payoffs based upon the 
interactions of their bids and those of the other players. Because a generators bids contains both price 
(the price at which their facilities will generate) and quantity (the amount of electricity that can be 
generated), they cannot be fully modelled by standard price (Bertrand) or quantity (Counnot) models. 
However, the value of the Folk Theorem - despite this limitation - will be evaluated, with the supply 
function approach to oligopoly discussed in Section 111. 
The electricity pool can be seen as a repeated dynamic oligopoly game comprised of a sequence of 
individual discrete time periods. As such, the conduct of the firms in each individual period serves 
to develop a rivalry according to the rules of some static game, with the resulting supergame 
composed of repeated plays of the single period games. 
Let us establish some definitions. A subgame is a node that is a singleton in every player's 
information partition, that node's successors, and the payoffs at associated end nodes. A strategy 
combination is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium for the entire game 
and its relevant action rules are a Nash equilibrium for every subgame. A strategy combination is a 
perfect outcome if it remains an equilibrium on all possible paths that branch off into different 
subgames (Gibbons, 1992). 
In modelling the Prisoner's Dilemma (see above) as a repeated game, the issue is whether sustained 
collusion is feasible. As such, the stability of collusion within a dynamic environment is dependent 
upon whether or not the present value of lost future profits from colluding exceeds the present 
value of short-term gains from cheating. Therefore, the discount factor employed by the players is 
of critical importance. This variable may be defined as follows. 
The discount rate, r, is the extra fraction of a payoff unit needed to compensate the player for 
delaying receipt by one period, and is analogous to the interest rate. The discount factor, 6, is the 
value in present payoff units of one payoff unit to be received from one period to the present. The 
discount factor is analogous to the discount rate, and given that the simple form of 6 is defined as 
l/(I + r), models using either the discount rate or discount factor may be used depending upon 
notational convenience. The discount factor will be used in this model. 
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Discounting has two important sources: time preference (p) and a probability that the game might 
end (0). It is usually assumed that these two variables are constant. If they both take the value of 
zero, a player is indifferent between whether payments are scheduled now or are scheduled ten 
years from now. Otherwise a player is indifferent between xl(l + p) and x guaranteed to be paid a 
period later. 
With probability (I - 0) the game continues and the payment guaranteed to made in a period's time 
is made, so the player is indifferent between (I - 0) xl(l + p) and the promise of x guaranteed to be 
paid a period later, contingent upon the game continuing. 
The discount factor is therefore: 3= 1/(l + r) = (I - 0)/(l + 
This generates the potential for the game to incorporate the impact of regulation. In this case, 0 can 
represent the probability of the game ending through regulatory intervention. As stated, in 
simple forms of the game, tl is a constant, although a more complex form of the game would have 0 
given as a function of the historical payoffs to date. For simplicity, 0 is treated as a constant. 
In this environment it is possible to find a simple equilibrium for the infinitely repeated Prisoner's 
Dilemma in which both players co-operate through adoption of the "grim" strategy, defined as 
follows. 
With the grim strategy, a player starts chooses to co-operate, and will continue to co-operate 
thereafter until the other player cheats, in which case cheat thereafter. If this is modelled as a 
simple 2x2 matrix, then if player I uses the grim strategy, then the grim strategy is weakly the best 
response of player 2. If player 2 co-operates then he will continue to receive the high (co-operate, 
co-operate) payoff forever. If player I cheats, he will receive the high (cheat, co-operate) payoff 
once, but then the lower (cheat, cheat) payoff thereafter (Gibbons, 1992) 
Although eternal co-operation is a perfect outcome in the infinite game, so is practically anything 
else - including eternal cheating. It is this multiplicity of equilibria that may be summarised by the 
Folk Theorem. 
In an infinitely repeated game with finite action sets, any combination of actions observed in a 
finite number of repetitions is the unique outcome of some subgame perfect equilibrium, provided 
that the following conditions are met. Firstly, that the rate of time preference is zero, or at least 
positive and sufficiently small. Secondly, the probability that the game ends is zero, or at least 
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positive and sufficiently small, i. e. the probability of the regulator intervening is minimal. 
Thirdly, that the set of payoff combinations that strictly Pareto-dominate the minimax payoff 
combinations in the mixed extension of the one-shot game is n-dimensional (the Dimensionality 
condition) (Gibbons, 1992). 
The Folk Theorem helps answer whether discounting serves to limit the impact of a possible last 
period. In the presence of discounting, the present gains from cheating are weighted more heavily and 
the future gains from co-operation are weighted more lightly. If the discount rate is very high, the 
game is ahnost one-shot - any model that has a high number of repetitions relies upon the discount 
rate not being too high. 
Allowing a little discounting is nonetheless important to show that there is no discontinuity at the 
discount rate of zero. If we come across an undiscounted infinitely repeated game with many 
equilibria, the folk theorem tells us that adding a small discount rate will not reduce the number of 
equilibria. This contrasts with the effect of changing the model by making the number of 
repetitions large but finite. This often eliminates all but one outcome. the chainstore paradox, i. e. 
solving a finite incumbent-potential entrant model by backwards induction, the potential entrant 
will always join and the incumbent will always collude. 
A discount rate of zero supports many perfect equilibria, but if the rate is large enough, the only 
equilibrium outcome is eternal cheating. 
Time preference is straightforward, but what is surprising is that assuming that the game ends with 
probability 0 does not make a drastic difference. 
It is possible to allow 0 to vary over time, so long as it does not become too large. If 0>0, the 
game ends with probability one, or rather the expected number of repetitions is finite, it still 
behaves like a discounted infinite garne, because the expected number of repetitions is always large 
- no matter how many have already occurred. The game still has no last period, and it is true that 
imposing one, no matter how far beyond the expected number of repetitions, would radically 
change the results. 
Allowing the game to end at some uncertain date prior to T is not the same as establishing that the 
game has a constant probability of ending. In the former, the game is like a finite game, because as 
time passes the maximum amount of time remaining will shrink to zero. In the latter, even though 
the game will probably end by T, if it lasts until T the game looks exactly the same as at time zero. 
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In this situation, the Folk Theorem can be used to model the pool but only if one simplifies the 
structure to focus upon either price or quantity bids, i. e. players face a high price, low price or 
high output, low output strategy set and corresponding payoffs. In this environment, the (high 
price, high price) or (low output, low output) combinations would equate to the (collude, collude) 
options discussed above. Furthermore, the impact of regulation can be incorporated through the 
component 0, the probability of the game ending. Given this, the collusive equilibrium of the grim 
strategy will hold if the discount factor is sufficiently low: i. e. if the probability of regulatory 
intervention increases sharply, then the collusive equilibrium will not hold. This will be 
incorporated into the discount factor and hence impact upon the bidding strategies of the players. 
Having introduced the terminology, the stage game may be presented using the following notation: 
Si : strategy set, player i 
Sý (SI 'S29 ........ 9 Sx): strategy set for the game 
MýS): payoff, player i 
17 ý (7r] ý mg ....... ý 70: payoff vector for the game 
G= (S, J7): single period or stage game 
If Si is the range of outputs open to firm 1 and 7*ýý is the profit gained by firm i, the stage game is 
a Cournot quantity setting oligopoly. if Si is the range of prices open to firm / and 7uM is the 
profit gained by firm i, the stage game is a Bertrand price setting oligopoly with product 
differentiation. In both cases, each firm has a constant marginal cost, no fixed costs, and quantities 
(prices) are chosen simultaneously. 
In order to evaluate the resulting infinite supergame, suppose a game is repeated T times and that 
player i seeks to maximise the present discounted suin of the stage game payoffs: 
3f ia (Sd 
(O. a) 
where X is from t =I to t=T, S, is the vector of strategies of the n players in period t. and a<I is 
the factor used to discount future income. In this sense, 3= II(I + r) 0- 0)/(l + p) as defined 
above. 
The T-period supergwne is then described by the vector G' = (S, 11,3,7). 
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In this T-period game, a pure strategy for player i is a T-element vector cr j. The first period ofa, a 
, (I) is an element of Sj and gives player i's move in the first period. The second element of a, (T 
, f2) is a function mapping S to Si . cr 42) gives player i's move 
in the second period as a function of 
the moves of all players in the first period. 
The third element of a, a, (3) is a function mapping 1ý (a Cartesian product of S and itself) to Si. 
Here, cr K3) gives player i's move in the third period as a function of the moves of all players in the 
first two periods. 
In like manner, a 41) gives player i's move in the period t as a function of all of the previous moves 
of all of the players. 
It may be stated that: 
a(, r) = (a ,, a2-r 9 a., ) 
For the vector of actions taken in period r. The history of the game to time I is then: 
Ht = [a(l), a(2) . ...... a(t - 1)] 
(O. b) 
(O. C) 
H, shows the actions of all players in all periods. It is a vector of n(I - 1) elements, a point in S", 
the (I- I) fold Cartesian product of S with itself S' 1 is the set of all possible histories of the game 
prior to period 1. 
With this notation, the elements of player i's strategy ai are 
cri (1) C- Si 
ai (t): St- 
I 
--+ Si t=2,3 
(O. d(i)) 
(O. d(ii)) 
The action taken by player i in period t is the realised value of a i(t) ai, . Thus player i's 
action in period t depends on the choices of all players in all previous periods. 
76 
Cr = (a I, C72 ......... cin) 
is a strategy vector for the t-period game. A non co-operative 
equilibrium for the supergame is defmed in the usual way. or is a non co-operative equilibrium for 
GT= (S, I-,, & 7) if, for all i, element i of a maximises player i's payoff, taking all other elements 
of a as given. 
Consider an infinitely repeated supergame: T= ao. Let acý.,.., be the strategy vector if all players 
play their stage game Cournot output period by period. For crc. u,. ýt the supergame is simply a 
repetition of the stage game period after period. 
Playing the Coumot strategy from the stage game in every period is a non co-operative equilibrium 
for the supergame. If all other players play their Coumot strategy in every period, the best a single 
player can do is play his Coumot strategy in each period. The question is whether there are 
equilibrium strategies for the supergame that yield a higher payoff than simply repeating the stage 
game equilibrium strategy. 
In order to assess the role of a trigger strategy, consider any stage game strategy Scollude that yields 
each player at least as great a single period as the Coumot strategy. If all firms have the same 
constant marginal and average cost, the joint profit maximising strategy is one example of such a 
strategy. Following Friedman (197 1), define a trigger strategy for the supergame as follows: 
I. Each player begins by playing his or her part Of Scollude and continues to do so as long as all 
other players continue to do the same. 
2. Revert to SCournot in the period following any defection from Scollude and continue to play sc.,,,,,. t 
thereafter. 
Formally the trigger strategy is defined as: 
ai (1) =Si,,. Ild,, 
(O. e(i)) 
CFi (t) ý (Si, collude if CFj (X) " Si, collude 9i # i; X=1, .., t-1; t=2,3, ..: SCournot 
otherwise) 
(O. e(ii)) 
Whether or not a player prefers to produce his or her part of sc ...... 
depends upon a comparison of 
the payoff from defecting and the payoff from adhering to the cartel strategy. If defection has not 
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yet taken place, payoff streams following defection or adherence in period I are the same as payoff 
streams following defection or adherence in period 1. it follows that the initial period need only be 
considered. 
Beginning from period 1, let m,,., Id, be player i's per period profit if all firms adhere to the 
collusive strategy, ; &ýdf.,, be firm i's best response one period profit if it defects from the trigger 
strategy and 74c.. be firm i's per-period profit after rivals revert to the Coumot strategy. 
Assume that: 
7r i, defect> 7r 4 collude > Ir i, Cournot 
(0-0 
The first inequality means that it is tempting to defect from the collusive strategy. The second 
inequality means that reversion to the Coumot strategy is costly compared to with adhering to the 
collusive strategy. Such inequalities hold, for example, if the stage game is Cournot n-firm quantity 
setting oligopoly with a linear demand curve and marginal cost constant and identical across firms 
and the collusive strategy is to have each firm produce a fraction lln of the joint-profit-maximising 
Output. 
Finn i's payoff if it adheres to the collusive agreement is: 
PDVi, wijude ý Lj7ZIcollude + 45 
27UCoflude . ...... 
PDVi,, oilude ý Mcollude 2: 6 
t 
PDVi, conude ý (681 - 45) Mcollude 
Firm i's payoff if it cheats for one period and triggers retaliation thereafter is: 
PDVi, defect ý 6Mdefect +62 MCournot + 45 
3 
M, Cournot . ....... 
PDVI, defect ý &Vdefect + (6 
2 /1 - 6) MCournot 
(0-9) 
(O. h) 
For the trigger strategy to be a non co-operative equilibrium, the payoff from adhering to the 
trigger strategy must exceed the payoff from defection. 
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Using (O. g) and (O. h), PDVicollude ýt PDVi, defect if. 
45 ýt (7Udefect - 7Uceflude) / (7Udefect - 7UCournot) 
(O. i) 
This condition (OA) is always satisfied if the discount rate is sufficiently small and hence the discount 
rate remains close to unity. Thus the trigger strategy is a non co-operative equilibrium if firms' 
discount rates are sufficiently small. 
If (O. g), (O. h), (O-i) are satisfied, the trigger strategy is a subgame perfect non co-operative 
equilibrium. Suppose first that all firms have produced the collusive output from period I through 
period t-1. Then from period t onward, firm i faces the alternative income streams generated by 
the defection and collusion strategies. if the trigger condition is satisfied, firm i prefers to follow 
the trigger strategy from period t onward. 
In contrast, suppose that some firm defected from the trigger strategy in a period before t. Then 
when firm i arrives at period t, it fmds all other firms playing their stage game Cournot strategies, 
The Cournot strategy is a best response if all other firms play their Cournot strategies, so the best it 
can do is play its own stage game Courriot strategy. This is what the trigger strategy calls for, and 
as such, it defines a perfect equilibrium from any period onward - no matter what the history of the 
game. This is the defining characteristic of subgame perfection. 
The result is that the trigger strategy, (O. e), sustains output paths that allow each player to earn 
more than the Coumot payoff. This is an example of the Folk Theorem (Friedman, 1971), which 
holds that non co-operative behaviour can sustain any strategy producing individual payoffs that 
exceed Cournot payoffs if the interest rate is small enough, i. e. if the discount factor defined 
above remains close enough to unity. 
The model may also be adapted slightly to incorporate the issues of structure, conduct and the 
stability of collusion in the presence of a trigger strategy. 
For simplicity, consider the case in which firms are symmetric, so that concentration is inversely 
related to the number of firms present, Examine an n-firm oligopoly with linear inverse demand 
curve, i. e. p=a- bQ in which all fuTns enjoy the same constant marginal cost, c, per unit. 
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If n firms settle on a collusive output q per firm, then: 
m, mw, = b(S - nq)q 
7u, d, f,, t = bf(S - (n - I)q / 2] 
2 
We know that for this model, Cournot profit per firm is: 
MICOU". t = (S /n+ 1) 
Utilising (O. j(i)) and (O. j(ii)), this may be re-arranged to yield: 
(Mdefect - Mcollude) /b= [(S - (n -I )q / 212 /4 
(040) 
(0400) 
(O. i(iii)) 
(O. k) 
Equations (O. j(ii)) and (O. j(iii)) yield: 
(7u, defect - m,,,, Ild, ) /b= [(n - 1) [S - (n + I)q]. [n+ 3) S- (n2 - I)q] 4(n + 1)2 
(0-1) 
If 
45 -" (Mdefect - Mcollude) / (Mdefect - IUCournot) 
("(0) 
and substituting (O. k) and (0-1): 
q= yn + ])2 - 3(n - 1)(n + 3) [(n + 1)2 _ 45 (n _ 1)2 S1 (n + 1) 1 
(O. m) 
which is valid so long as q ý! S12n. This is the case if- 
6 :5+ (11 + 1)2 + 4m 
(O. n) 
These conditions can be given three interpretations: if the interest rate is too high, Y'the discount 
factor is too much below unity, Y'the rate of time preferencefor profit is too great, then a cartel is 
unable to sustain joint profd maximisation with a trigger price strategy. 
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On the other hand, if the above condition is not met, then use of a trigger price strategy allows an 
n-firm cartel to maximise joint profits. If the above inequality is satisfied, then q= S12n and the 
cartel is able to maximise joint profits. Therefore, as market concentration rises (as n falls), the 
range of interest rates over which tacit collusion is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy forjoint 
profit maximisation increases. 
However, as the pool requires price-quantity bids to effectively model generation, it is uncertain 
whether the folk theorem can successfully be applied to an extent beyond the price or quantity 
bidding. Instead, the supply function approach to equilibria developed by Klemperer and Meyer 
(1989) and applied to electricity generation by Green & Newbery (1992). These elements will be 
discussed in depth in Section 11. 
Section 1.2. Assessing the impact of regulation on components ofpoolprices. 
Before moving on to examine the work of Green & Newbery (1992), let us consider further the 
feasibility of actually applying the Folk Theorem to the pool. Given that the most important factor 
in the pool on a day-to-day basis is the level of system marginal price (SMP), a price-setting game 
will be considered. 
Given that the impact of regulation lies at the core of this work, the role of the regulator (through 
the factor 0) in determining (either directly or indirectly) generators' bids. To do this, it is 
necessary to develop assumptions about the bid structure. 
To assess the impact of regulation on tile generators' bids, consider the following structure of the 
generators' bids. First, let us assume that bids are bounded on the lower level by the competitive bid 
price and on the upper level by the monopoly bid price. Second, let us assume that the bid price for 
electricity can be broken up into specific components that can vary in each half-hour period. Third, let 
us assume that regulation - either in the form of a credible regulatory threat or a specific course of 
action has the potential to influence certain components of the electricity bid price, and hence the 
payoffs of the game. Fourth, that the players can witness the outcomes of all of the preceding plays of 
the game, I=I...... t- 1, before choosing their strategies in period t. The first assumption can be stated 
as follows: 
P, !ý ph! ý Pm 
(0-0) 
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where: Pý = competitive ("cheating") bid price 
A= electricity bid price 
P. = monopoly ("collusive") bid price 
This assumption is made purely as a simplification. The price of electricity in any half-hour is 
potentially bounded on the lower level by the marginal price of the last genset. As baseload stations 
are often bid in at zero to ensure their presence in the merit order - conceivably the lowest price for 
electricity is zero. Similarly the highest price for electricity in any half-hour is the marginal cost of the 
most expensive genset. The peak electricity price to date is f836MWh; thus representing a price 
distribution that is both skewed and truncated. 
However, let us return to the second assumption. On a day-to-day basis in the pool, there is a price 
below which electricity cannot fall assuming that a zero price for electricity does not result (this has 
never occurred in the history of the pool). Such factors as fuel costs, thermal efficiency levels, 
minimum safe generation (MSG) levels, and other technical and engineering constraints determine this 
minfinum price for electricity. These factors are broadly fixed in the short to mediurn term and could 
therefore be seen as a constant term in prices. These factors will vary dependent upon which plant 
actually sets price in a given half-hour, but for simplicity it is assumed that a general "minimum" level 
can be reached. 
In addition, there are other factors that will represent non-constant determinants of the bid price. These 
factors can be given as: intra-day and inter-day price fluctuations; seasonal price variations; climatic 
determinants; industrial growth; GDP levels; and the level of the price-cost mark-up. The price cost 
mark-up can be indicative of the level of market power possessed by the firms in the industry, and thus 
directly determined by the strength and extent of regulation in the industry. Within this component, 
there lies the variation caused by the specific generating stations and individual generating units that 
are called upon to generate by NGC. 
There is also an additional element to electricity prices: the potential for anomalous, extremely high 
but extremely brief (at most two half-hour periods) price spikes. These spikes have occurred on only a 
handful of instances in the post-privatisation environment, but their existence is a distinct possibility. 
Therefore, the bid price of electricity can be broken down into three components: a "permanent" 
component, a "drift" component and a "jump" component, which will be present in each generator's 
bid. In order to retain the simplistic nature of this model, there will still be only two symmetric 
generators, i andj. These components may be given as follows. 
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- The permanent component (Aj, ) which will be composed of engineering (Ei, ) and technical (Kj, ) 
factors. 
- The drift component (Di, ) which will be composed of seasonal and temporal factors (Si, ), climatic 
variations (Wi, ), GDP levels and industrial growth (Ii'), the price-cost mark-up (Cit). 
The generating order (or stack) component (Gi, ). 
The junnp component which will be the result of random variations and scheduling anomalies (Rit). 
Each of the components will exist in each of the time periods, t=T, and for each generator 1j. 
- Permanent component: (A&) = (Ei, ) + (Ki, ) 
- Drift component: (Di, ) = (S&) + (W&) + (Ii, ) 
- Price-cost mark-up component: (Q 
- Stack component: (Gj, ) 
- Jump component: (R;, ) 
Therefore, the bid price in any half-hour will be given as: 
Pb = Ait + Dit + Cit + Git+ Rit:! ý Pm 
(0-P) 
Let us now consider the actual pricing structure. This will be variable both on an intra-day and an 
inter-day basis, although certain patterns will emerge. For example, in low demand periods the 
permanent component will dominate, but in high demand periods, the drift component will dominate. 
The jump component will - to all intents and purposes - be minimal. The market power component is 
the key issue, as it will be directly influenced by the probability of the game ending (0). 
The bid price of electricity can therefore be stated as: 
Pb =a1 Air +a At +a 3Cit +a 40ii +a skt:! ý P. 
(O. q) 
where (C,, ) = f(e). 
It can therefore be seen that if the existence or possibility of tighter regulation is apparent, there would 
be a higher probability of the garne ending (0) if the threat is credible. This would have a strong 
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(inverse) influence on 
If the price-cost mark-up is the sole facet of market power, a competitive and efficient (from a 
scheduling perspective) bid would when (Ci, ) equals zero and there is no jump component: 
Pb =ai Ait +a At +a 3Cit +a At 
(0-0 
where (Ck) = 0. Likewise, a monopoly price bid (which possessed the jump component) would occur 
when (Cit) was maximised, i. e.: 
P& =a Ail + a2Dit+ a3maxCft+ +a4Git+ a -5Rit 
(O. S) 
Therefore, the payoff space in the game is a function of the value of (Ci, ) - the extent to which the 
generators attempt to exploit their market power - itself a function of 0. 
This therefore returns us to the issue of 0. Given that this represents the probability of the game ending 
through regulatory action, in a practical context this would be though breaking up the two main 
generators, While the history of the pool indicates that this has always been an option, the regulator 
has been unwilling to undertake such a course of action. 
At the same time, regulation must always seem credible so as to prevent the generators firom simply 
behaving as they please. Tberefore, 0 must possess a value between zero and unity but must also 
possess a value that allows the grim strategy to hold. 
In practice, the decision whether or not to bring the game to end through regulatory intervention will 
depend upon the current and past bidding behaviour of the generators. This means that 0 is not a 
constant factor and that it is dependent upon the current payoffs and the history of payoffs to date. 
Therefore the game is circular throughout the playoff history and it is in the players' interests to 
behave in such a manner that the game continues. Consider the following broad rules: 
"IfPbýýPm, 0-> I 
"If Pbý! Pc, O >0 
This therefore implies threshold values to 0, with the lower threshold given as 0, and the upper 
threshold given as 0.. Therefore: 
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If 0<A, regulation is not credible. 
If 0>0., the game is likely, but not certain, to end. 
Therefore: 
1 
(0-0 
represent the upper and lower bandwidths represent the tolerances within which the game. 
In the light of this approach, consider the following conclusions that can be derived from these 
assumptions. First, the bid price of electricity is composed of a series of components, one of which 
is the extent of market power held by the generators and is represented by the price cost mark-up, 
(Cil). Second, the price cost mark-up (Q, is influenced by the probability of the game ending, 0, 
which is itself a function of C& and the payoff history to date. This provides the game with its 
circular element as it is played on a day-to-day basis. Third, the value of 0 will - through Ci, - 
influence the bid price, Pb, and therefore the equilibrium that results in payoff space. Fourth, 
celeris paribus, if Cit tends to zero, Pb will tend to the competitive price, P, , and if C& is 
maximised, Pj. will tend to the monopoly price, P.. Fifth, in order for the game to continue on a 
daily basis, 0 will remain within upper and lower bandwidths where regulatory action remains 
credible and there is a distinct non-zero probability of the game ending. In this environment, the 
grim strategy will hold. 
1.3. Price uncertainty. 
In light of this analysis, one can conclude that as pool prices contain a permanent component, they 
should be predictable within certain degrees of confidence. However, this is dependent upon the 
time frames in question and the actual periods for which one is forecasting prices. While this 
should be a simple question of market efficiency and the construction of a forward curve for prices, 
there are two key complicating factors stack and drift components of prices outlined above. 
The stack component combined with the drift and (to a lesser extent) the jump component produce 
the uncertainty associated with electricity prices. The generating stack represents the order in which 
plants are scheduled and given the almost infinite number of permutations of generating units and 
generating plants, there is an inherently high degree of uncertainty associated with pool prices. In 
the light of this, one must also consider the integrated effects of the stack component with the drift 
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component - which will compound the uncertainty described above. In theory, there is a floor 
below which pool prices cannot fall, as defined by the permanent component of prices. However, 
on any day at random, the nature of the permanent component is such that it may be outweighed by 
the other components of price on any given day. This will reduce prices to a composite of a range 
of variables that are determined by random and unpredictable inter-day and intra-day changes such 
as the weather. The other major practical flaw with the permanent component of prices is that it is 
inconsistent with generators bidding their plant in at a zero price. 
There is another factor that is of note from this analysis before one begins the empirical analysis, 
and that concerns the distribution of prices, This model is capable of producing extreme positive 
prices, but not negative prices. Furthermore, the consistent impact of certain factors will in practice 
produce a clustering of prices. This may sound inconsistent with the above statement concerning 
the randomness of prices, but it is simply a question of the time frame in question. 
If one chose a given day at random, then the uncertainty associated with the variable components 
of pool prices could result in pool prices that were random and unpredictable. This is because 
while one would be able to estimate that pool prices would exist within certain tolerances, specific 
within-day and within-week uncertainty would make any forward curve little more than a 
seasonally dictated estimate. However, if one were observing a given series of prices in a specific 
time period, e. g. a week in winter, then similar factors over the chosen time period would induce a 
consistency in prices within that time frame. 
Consider the L378/MWh price spike of I Ib February 1998 from the perspective of a forecaster in 
late 1997. One could quote an estimate of Q1 1998 prices based upon a forward curve 
(approximately f 25/MWh) , but it would be difficult to quote a price 
for a specific day in February. 
As such, while prices within a specific period will gravitate to an average, prices for specific days 
can be little more than random. If one were to extend this rationale to a long-term data set for 
prices, then the distribution of prices would be skewed towards the most common price within that 
distribution, but prices within that distribution could be viewed as a collection of random variables. 
Empirically, given that the price for electricity in a given half-hour has ranged from less than less 
than fI O/MWh to almost f 1000/MWh with an average of around L22/MWh, it is unlikely that any 
distribution of prices viewed over a long time period would be normally distributed. Volatility in 
energy prices is not restricted to electricity, as the example of the gas market illustrates. 
The peak and trough gas prices since privatisation have been f4.97 per therin (16/12/97) and 
minus L14.65 per therm (15/03/97), despite being traded within reasonable margins based upon 
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seasonality and the forward curve. For example, up to September 1997, a year strip of 1997/8 
traded at approximately 18 pence per therm (as quoted by the BSGM Heren index). Within this, 
seasonality factors increased the winter period to approximately 21 pence per therm and reduced 
the summer period to around 14 pence per therm. However, the 16 th December 1997 spike resulted 
in losses of millions of pounds and at least one company going bankrupt. This spike was due to a 
combination of random events (predominantly those on Transco's flexibility mechanism) but did 
not coincide with the coldest day of the year or with any major system or terminal problems. In this 
environment, it can be seen that day-to-day energy prices (both gas and electricity) do have a 
highly random and unpredictable element based upon specific daily events and the responses to 
those events. 
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SECTION 11. The Contribution of Green & Newbery. 
ZL The Supply Function Approach to Eiectrichy Generation. 
The established work of Green & Newbery (199 1), Green (1992), and Newbery (1992) relies heavily 
on that of Klemperer & Meyer, which established the existence of supply function equilibrium in 
oligopoly. Commencing from a position of unknown demand, an initial assumption of duopolistic 
generators is made, each of which submits their own supply functions independently and without 
knowledge of the function of the other. As demand becomes known, the spot price equates supply 
with demand, and in the event that there is no equilibrium, the firms receive nothing. The model 
contains provisions to incorporate reasonable variations in demand. Based upon these assumptions, 
the model is constructed as follows. 
Utilising the load demand curve to represent electricity demand (i. e. those occasions where demand 
exceeds a given level), this schedule is seen as predictable and given by D(pl) where I is "time" (the 
number of hours in which demand exceeds D) and p is the spot price. (In order to ensure consistency 
with Klemperer & Meyer, it is in fact defined as the spot price minus the marginal cost of supplying an 
infinitesimal amount, thereby shifting the origin with the consequence that the marginal cost schedule 
intersects the origin). 
It is assumed that, for all (pl): 
- 00 < Dp < 0, Dpp:! ý 0, Dp, ý0 
The net demand faced by firm i at time t, while the other fj has a supply schedule of (p) is "m S, (? (PI) 
- 
Y(p). The effective generation cost of producing q are C(q) where the marginal cost of generation is 
C(q). 
Both firms submit their supply functions simultaneously to the despatcher, who then determines the 
equilibrium price output combination to equate demand to supply at each moment and to set the 
lowest price, p(t) where: 
S' (p (t)) (p(t)), where j#i 
if such a price exists. 
Provided that the profit maximising price-output combinations can be represented by the supply 
function qj = S(p) and with assumptions on costs and demand, at any t, the choice of qj implies a 
particular value ofp, which yields a profit maximising solution solved with respect top. This solution 
is given by: 
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jr, = pq, - C(q) 
to yield: 
n, (p) ý p. [D(p, t) - q, (p)] - C[D(p, t) - q, (p)] (La) 
where i: #j. This results in the first-order condition: 
This produces a symmetric situation where qe=", where: 
dq q, , -, -/ -ý 
+D 
ap p-(, (q) 1 -11 1 -1, 
dq 
liý q+ Dp 
dp p- C'(q) 
.. i (1. b) 
(1. c) 
The second derivative of firm A profit becomes: 
d2 7ri 
= 2(Dp - 
dq j)-Ci-(D _ 
dqj 
)2 + (p - Ci, )(Dpp -d2 
qj 
d2P dp dp 2 r dp 
Provided that both qj and qf satisfy (Lb), this becomes: 
(Dp - 
dqj) 
(I +_ Ci, 
dqj) 
_ Cr (Dp - 
dqj 
)2 _ 
dqj 
dp dp dp dp 
(1. d) 
As this is negative, this confirr-ns the local optimality of supply schedules, thus satistiing (Lb) and 
therefore the symmetric case (l. c). This will yield a Nash equilibriurn in supply functions. 
The behaviour of the differential equation that characterises the symmetric supply function 
equilibrium prompts ftirther analysis. Considering points (qp) such that: 
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C(q) <p< C(q) -" Dp 
then at such points: 
0< dqldp oo 
(Le) 
and the trajectory of the differential equation through this point has a well-defined positive directional 
slope. It can be seen that all such trajectories pass through the origin, where they all possess the same 
slope. It is then necessary to consider the stationaries whose equations defime the upper and lower 
limits in (Le). 
If the equation p= C'(q) is considered, then this clearly represents the inverse supply schedule of a 
competitive firm, and along this schedule: 
dqldp = oo , dpldq =0 
Any trajectory that intersects the lower stationary reaches it with a horizontal slope, and upon crossing 
the stationary it will have a negative slope. If the trajectory reaches the upper stationary, its slope will 
be: 
dqldp ý0, dpldq = co 
where it will cross the stationary vertically and bend back. These conclusions are simplified somewhat 
by the recognition that the upper stationary is the Courriot schedule, and the lower stationary the 
Bertrarid schedule. Therefore, the options for equilibrium range between the perfectly competitive and 
the monopolistic. The profit maximising choice ofp satisfles the condition: 
q, + [p - C'(q, )] D, ý 
or: 
q 
Dp 
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In order to progress further, suppose marginal costs are constant, i. e. C(q) = 0, and that demand at 
time I is Q(p, l) = a(t) - bp, and therefore Dp = -b. If this is true, (I. c) becomes: 
dqldp = (qlp) -b 
which can be solved to yield: 
q=Ap-bplnp 
for some constant of integration A, which will depend upon boundary conditions (e. g. where supply 
meets the Cournot schedule). It can also be shown that in the presence of capacity constraints (as 
measured through a shadow price, where each firm cannot supply beyond an upper limit, k), the range 
of potential equilibrium will be narrowed, as shown below. 
If neither firm can supply beyond q=k. At iV = k, the optimal response of firm i is the Coumot 
solution: 
q, ý-Dp(P-C-P) , M_O , qj_k , y(k-q, 
)=O 
where the mu is the shadow price of the capacity constraint. It is then shown (through graphical 
analysis) that the overall effect of capacity constraints is to narrow the range of potential equilibrium. 
The extreme case of this is a unique equilibrium point at the intersection of maximum demand with 
Cournot supply at full capacity. 
In the event that demand is also capacity constrained at the Coumot price, then these factors will also 
imply uniqueness. Indeed, if the supply schedules bid did not vary daily, and if there were some 
chance that demand was capacity constrained on the day of highest demand, then the unique 
equilibrium of the intersection of the capacity constraint and the Cournot schedule would hold at all 
points in time. The analysis may be successfully modified to fit the case of the UK electricity supply 
industry, namely that of asymmetric fums. 
In this case, the differential equations (Lb), exist for the two companies and give first order conditions 
for the local profit maximising supply schedules with an asymmetric duopoly, for which the second 
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order conditions are also satisfied. Let the capacities of the two different fuTns be ki, k2, k2 < ki. Let 
P be the price at which the smaller firm is on its Cournot schedule with full capacity, then it follows 
that: 
C'(k2) - 
k 
Dp(P*, 0) 
The Cournot schedule of the larger firm, qi(p is given by: 
p* = C'(ql) - 
q, 
Dp (P*, 0) 
which, if combined with the ffill capacity output of the smaller firm, is less than maximum demand at 
this price, namely: 
q, (p*) + k2< D(p*, 0, 
then in one equilibrium pair of supply strategies, the smaller firm will reach full capacity at that point 
where its supply function intersects the Coumot equilibrium vertically (at p), while the larger firm 
reaches its Courriot equilibrium at the same price. They are also the highest defined such pair, making 
the equilibrium price strategies are uniquely defined. 
In the event that maximum demand at this price is less than twice the capacity of the smaller firTn, i. e. 
D(p . 0) < A2, neither firm will reach its capacity constraint, resulting in a range of potential 
equilibrium. 
It is possible to solve this system for the most profitable pair of supply functions in the short run, or in 
the longer run, it is possible to take account of the threat of entry, as in Newbery (1991). Further, 
Green & Newbery (1991) calibrate cost functions for each of the duopolists and solved for the 
symmetric and asymmetric duopolies. It is shown that the differences between the two types at 
industry level are small. In the asymmetric case, the larger firm (National Power) gains more from an 
increase in price and, as a consequence, choose a steeper supply function - relative to marginal cost - 
than in the symmetric case. This gives the smaller firm (Powergen) a less elastic residual demand and 
a greater incentive to increase its own prices. The effects of these events combine to make the industry 
supply schedule steeper. 
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It is also discovered that Powergen does better than its larger rival, by virtue of its submission of a 
steeper supply function relative to marginal cost than that of Powergen, as it has the greater influence 
in keeping prices high. Although National Power has the larger output, its greater surplus is offset by 
its higher fixed costs. In the asymmetric case, lower output is sold at a higher price, with industry 
operating costs are raised for any level of output since the stations will not operate in the merit order. 
In order to apply these theoretical constructions into a functioning model, electricity demand and 
generating cost information were gathered, and a series of simplifying assumptions made to facilitate 
analysis. Firstly, demand is measured over "typical" winter and summer days, thereby removing peaks 
and troughs. Secondly, the cost functions are based on "adjusted" output, not actual output as a means 
of adjusting for the observed fact that not all plant in service at all times, Prices are adjusted from 
marginal cost pricing to profit maximising higher-price combinations, and outcomes simulated. 
Due to the nature of the assumptions made, the prices estimated do not vary as much as actual pool 
prices, in addition to start-up costs being omitted. The incentives for generators to raise price increases 
as the percentage of their plant in operation increases, and due to the fact that demand peaks are 
omitted/smoothed. There is the possibility of the exclusion of those occasions in which the exercise of 
market power has the greatest (negative) impact. However, the authors maintain the belief that the 
averaging process has not understated the potential for monopoly exploitation. 
The results of these empirical studies are as follows. In the event that generators can disregard the 
possibility of new entrants and regulatory action, then the potential exists for large deadweight welfare 
losses and correspondingly high profits. By favouring structural reform over direct pricing controls, it 
is shown that an appropriate response is to establish five equal sized firms, although it is unclear 
whether or not entry can provide the appropriate dynamics, i. e. limiting incentives to collusion. The 
relationships between entry and industry structure are examined more fully in Newbery (1991), by 
examining consumer welfare, industry profits, and the competitive structure in the industry. 
As capacity is divided between more firms, profits will initially rise, until the industry becomes more 
competitive, resulting in competitive supply functions. In the extreme, one of two situations will 
occur. Prices will fall until entry is no longer attractive, and therefore fin-ther competition will lower 
total profits, or an equilibrium will be achieved with prices reaching a level where the industry is at an 
optimal structure where the maximum demand reaches the capacity constraint at a certain number of 
firms. However, a more competitive supply industry is more damaging to consumers if there is entry, 
as they pay more at the peak when demand is high than they save from paying an off-peak price when 
demand is low. In the absence of changes to the average price, they are unambiguously worse off, 
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despite gaining the benefits associated with the stability of price synonymous with a more 
concentrated industrial structure. The existing producers would prefer a more concentrated structure 
comparable to that that exists at present, because although consurner welfare would be higher, industry 
profits would be lower. Tberefore, entry is seen as deleterious to the incumbent generators. 
ZZ The rok of the contract market -a summary. 
Green & Newbery (1992), Bolle (1992) and von der Fehr & Harbord (1992) all indicated the 
possibility that the duopolistic generators possessed the ability to raise prices in the pool well above 
marginal cost, although this was not the situation observed in the pool in the period after privatisation. 
It is therefore theorised that this was the consequence of the high degree of contract cover. This is 
because if the pool price out-tumed above the price stated in the contracts (the strike price), then the 
generators would have to repay the difference to the RECs. By contrast, if the pool price were below 
ffie strike price, the reverse would be true. As a consequence, generators would have very little 
incentive to raise prices as long as their output was covered by contract, 
The theoretical reasoning for this behaviour is established in Green (1992). This work, based upon 
spot-forward market interactions, showed that when the majority of the output of the two dominant 
generators is covered by forward contracts, then they have a lower incentive to raise prices. The 
authors note that this is consistent with the low (or rather the lower than anticipated) prices in the pool 
in the first two years after privatisation. By the same logic, it is concluded that as the degree of 
contract cover begins to fall then the incentive for lower prices will decline and the generators may 
increase their bid prices submitted to the pool. This was observed in March 1991 and March 1993 
when the vesting contracts expired and the generators sold more output to the pool at higher prices. 
The key empirical work related to the existence of contracts for differences is Heh & Powell (1992), 
and Gray & Hehn & Powell (1995) supported by the theoretical conclusions of Anderson (1990), 
Klemperer & Meyer (1991), and Powell (1993). Anderson's contribution concerns the interactions of 
the spot and forward markets when the spot market is imperfectly competitive; Klemperer & Meyer 
establish supply function equilibrium in oligopolistic industries; and Powell integrates the two 
approaches and adapts them to the post-privatisation electricity industry. Heim & Powell's empirical 
study utilised a cointegrating regression between pool purchase prices and the level of electricity 
demand, inserting a dummy variable which changed value on the day of the actual break-up of the 
contracts (22nd March 1991). It was determined a positive significant disruption to prices occurred, 
implying that the event itself led to an increase in the level of pool prices. 
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SECTION 111. Conclusions. 
The objective of this chapter has been to introduce the theoretical foundation for the empirical studies 
that are presented in the following chapters. The Folk Tbeorem as presented gives a convincing 
explanation as to why generators should fear the threat of regulation and how - if they believe the 
threat to be credible - they will modify their prices accordingly. This aspect of the analysis was 
developed ftirther in Section 1.2 by an examining of the different components of prices, and showing 
that the probability of the game ending will influence generators' bid prices through a reduction in 
their price-cost mark-up. The analysis also indicated two points to be noted for the econometrics. 
Firstly, in presenting the different components of pool prices, it was shown that there was considerable 
inter-day and intra-day uncertainty in prices that implied that forecasting could prove difficult. This is 
an obvious conclusion considering that the commodity in question is electricity, however it was noted 
that the variable components of prices could - in any given half-hour - outweigh the permanent 
component of prices resulting in prices being reduced to a combination of volatile and potentially 
random variables. Secondly, the price distribution would be unlikely to be normally distributed due to 
the clustering of prices caused by common factors occurring over time and the probability for 
anomalous prices. 
Furthermore, while the Folk Theorem successfully captures the dynamic, repeated nature of the pool, 
it does not capture the price-quantity bidding strategy. This is successfully addressed by Green & 
Newbery's (1992) application of Klemperer & Meyer's (1989) supply function oligopoly model. 
However, as it is based around a one-shot game with no learning process, this model does not capture 
the dynamics of the pool as well as the Folk Theorem. Ultimately, the role of this chapter is as an 
introduction to the empirical analysis contained in the following chapters. It is to these analyses that 
attention is now turned. 
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SECTION I- The Organisation of the Chai)ter. 
In order to determine how the behaviour of generators is determined within the context of the 
relationship with the regulator, a series of important events within the industry have been collected and 
will be analysed. These events generally take the form of regulatory announcements, although there 
are certain important exceptions. The key regulatory announcements are those concerning the 
commencement and the publishing of pool price reviews, threats of MMC references for the two main 
generators (National Power and Powergen) and agreements reached between the regulator and the 
generators. 
It is hypothesised that the generators will lower their bid prices following the announcement of a price 
review. Because it is National Power and Powergen that set prices most of the time within the pool, 
and it is generally their conduct which is the most cause for regulatory concern, one would anticipate 
that prices would fall after a price review was announced. Although the review would doubtless be 
based upon the generators' behaviour prior to the actual announcement, it is logical to conclude that 
the generators would not wish to prejudice the regulatory outcome by setting high prices. Therefore, 
either as a show of good faith or out of concern for their future, the generators should submit lower 
prices to the pool. The conclusions of the reviews are generally associated with a tightening of the 
regulatory structure, be it in the form of direct price controls, or an agreement between the generators 
and the regulator. This should also lead to a decline in prices detectable by a negative dummy. 
The same rationale exists in the face of a possible reference to the MMC, which has been threatened 
as a consequence of pool price reviews. If carried out, and if the outcome had a deleterious effect 
upon the generators, it could lead to restrictive price caps, enforced plant sales, or break up the 
offending companies to generate a competitive structure. The goal of this analysis will be to ascertain 
whether there was any response from the generators as a consequence of these announcements. These 
hypotheses will be tested by a variety of econometric techniques which it is anticipated will permit the 
detection of the events outlined. (For the theoretical basis for these hypotheses, see Chapter IV). 
First, section 11 will contain analyses determining the existence of structural breaks in electricity prices 
over the period October 1990 to November 1995. These will be compared with a list of important 
events within the pool in order to determine whether the breaks coincide with the events themselves. 
Secondly, in order to determine whether these events are responsible for the structural breaks, a 
sequence of dummy variable regressions will be performed in order to ascertain whether the dummies 
represent any of the events which it is anticipated will influence pool prices. 
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Section III will comprises a fin-ther analysis of generator behaviour by determining the importance (or 
lack thereof) of the threat of an MMC reference for National Power and Powergen by means of an 
analysis of uplift levels. In the absence of appropriate figures on system marginal price for electricity, 
the level of uplift represents the second best means of determining how generators have altered their 
bids into the electricity pool. Section IV contains additional investigations into the relationships 
between uplift and electricity demand and uplift and pool prices. Section V concludes. All of the 
results of these analyses are contained in the appendices. 
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SECTION 11 - Regulation and Pool Prices. 
2. L Data selection and initial ntelhodologv. 
In order to begin the analysis into the influence of regulation on prices, the following equation must be 
estimated: 
1. Pool price analysis 
A ppp, =a +Plr +PIPPPI-I+ P2 A PPPI-I+ P3 A PPPI-2*+"*+Ut (1.1) 
This is an autoregressive process with all variables in this and all subsequent equations in natural logs, 
with PPP representing the pool purchase price for electricity (E/MWh), and tau a time trend. (See 
below for fta-ther details). This equation and subsequent forms are based in part upon those of Helm & 
Powell (1992. PPP is shown to be an autoregressive process of order nine (see below) and this 
equation is constructed with this fact in mind. 
A series of equations using a two-month time frame were integrated with blocks using a four-month 
time frame in an attempt to detect the existence of structural break within the four month period. The 
format was chosen as appropriate to test for stationarity, as well as being appropriate given the 
dynamic nature of the pool and the nature of trends in electricity pool prices. This shows that pool 
prices tend to follow a standard process and trend from day to day and week to week. 
The data set comprises 1887 observations, showing daily average pool prices and electricity demand 
levels, averaged from 48 half-hourly observations per day' over the period Ist October 1990 to 30th 
November 1995. This data has been obtained from the National Grid Company's Energy Settlements 
and Services Division, an institution that supplies information on the electricity pool for commercial 
use. The data exists in half-hourly observations as this is the format upon which the electricity pool 
fimctions in the UK electricity supply industry. 
The pool purchase price is measured in JUMWh (pounds per megawatt hour) and is the standard 
means of displaying price. The pool purchase price (PPP) is the price paid to generators for energy 
produced and is determined by the system marginal price (SMP), the loss of load probability (LOLP) 
and the value of lost load (VOLL). These variables combine to form the pool price as detailed 
previously. 
The first requirement for these analyses is that the variables in use must be tested for stationarity and 
I Changes to and from British Summer Time in March and October alter the number of half-hourly observations 
to 46 and 50 respectively on the date of the changes. 
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the potential existence of trends in the data. To that end, the three variables in question (PPP, uplift 
and demand) were all tested utilising the standard Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests for the presence of unit roots with and without the existence of a trend. It was seen that all 
three variables successfully passed these tests both with and without the trend present. 
However, although the three variables passed the DF and ADF tests, the other means of assessing the 
presence of stationarity were not passed. Primarily, the autocorrelation function (ACF) of each 
variable indicated non-stationarity, as did the Box-Pierce statistics. The mixed results for stationarity 
are surprising: as it implies that no permanent component is present in prices - despite the analysis 
presented in Chapter IV. However, it is possible that - as outlined in Chapter IV, that the combination 
of the different components of pool prices have generated a data series that can be viewed as random 
over time - despite the inherent seasonality of prices. 
Further analyses were required to assess the data for the presence of trends using the DF and ADF F- 
tests (for fiill details of results, see appendix). fn the case of pool prices and demand, the data 
indicated the existence of a deterministic trend. However, further analysis showed the trend coefficient 
to be statistically insignificant, thus removing any complications. However, although the uplift data 
indicated the same results, the trend parameter was significant in this case, indicating the existence of 
a deterministic trend in the data. This trend was removed by creating a "de-trended" uplift variable in 
accordance with the Box-Jenkins methodology established by Schiller (American Economic Review, 
198 1) and later developed by Bulkley & Tonks (Economic Journal, 1990). Specifically, the trend is 
removed through regressing uplift on the trend parameter and subtracting the trend from both sides of 
the regression as follows: 
Ut = pr + Udr 
Where Ud, is the de-trended uplift variable that may be obtained by rearranging the equation above: 
Udt = Ut - pr 
It is this de-trended uplift variable that is used in all subsequent regressions. 
The relatively short-run time fi-ame chosen for this analysis was both to facilitate the econometric 
regressions as well as being grounded in an important underlying assumption, namely that not all 
changes in prices would be permanent. This assurnption is derived from the fact that while some 
events will generate permanent changes in prices: pool price reviews, price caps, contract break-ups - 
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others will simply result in transitory shocks: price spikes, threats of regulatory action, announcements 
of intentions to carry out regulatory reviews. 
Some Clarification is required for these statements. While it is logical to argue that the conclusions and 
recommendations of price reviews be incorporated by the generators into their decisions on bidding 
Plant - with the same being true of price caps and the break-up of contracts for differences - such 
events as the threat of a review may not. This is because while generators may adjust their prices in 
response to the threat of a review or an MMC reference, they are still making estimates as to the 
regulatoes final decision. When this decision is reached, the transitory change will then become 
permanent. This effectively results in two changes: an initial transitory change followed by a 
permanent change that may support or offset the transitory change. This is essentially based upon the 
asymmetry of information between the regulator and the generator -a process that works in both 
directions. One of the objectives of this analysis will be to ascertain whether these changes are 
instantaneous "step" changes, or whether they occur gradually over time. 
One can also argue that if the regulatory system is a repeated game with adversarial overtones, then - 
for example - any attempts by generators to manipulate prices would be countered by the regulator as 
soon as possible, given the regulator's information. For example, the price spikes that began in 
September 1991 led to the announcement of the first pool price review in early October, less than a 
month afterwards. The magnitude of these spikes was a source of considerable concern, with pool 
prices doubling on several occasions. Such prolonged price increases would logically lead to 
regulatory action given the regulator's desire to prevent manipulation of the marketplace by the 
generators to the detriment of consumer wefte. 
Similarly, if the regulator introduced (or stated the intention to introduce) new price controls in the 
context of a review or demanded an explanation of pricing behaviour from the generators, then there 
would doubtless be an immediate response to comply with the announcement. However, this would 
inevitably be followed by attempts by the generators to limit their exposure to the price controls by 
whatever means are possible within the confines of their licences. This continued action is logical 
given the assumed inherently adversarial relationship between the regulator and the regulated firms. 
An important point to note is that if generator revenues were largely determined by contracts, then any 
price decline following regulatory action could be viewed as a largely token gesture, as the generators 
revenues would be partially secure. 
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22 Selection of announcements. 
With the above considerations in mind, some of the most important events in the development of the 
pool have been chosen, predominantly relating to regulation. If these events are as important as has 
been theorised, then we would anticipate them to generate a structural break within the stream of pool 
prices, as given by the Chow test and/or the significance of the appropriate dummy variable. These 
dates have been derived from the Financial Times Index, Offer's official published chronology and its 
list of library publications (the list of publications and the chronology are updated every three months 
and are therefore highly reliable). Of course, there is the concern that the companies in the industry are 
made aware of announcements (notably the most important events) before they are released to the 
media. However, it is hoped that the three-day dummy event window should capture limit such 
possibilities. The dates are given with the event that is occurring, and the corresponding observation 
number of this event in the data sequence under examination. This information is shown in Table 1. 
In theory, the importance of the event will be reflected in the value of the coefficient of the dummy 
parameter and its corresponding significance (or lack thereoO. it is believed that these events are of 
sufficient importance to influence the operations of the electricity pool, as well as the electricity 
industry as a whole. The majority of these events concern the electricity generators, although some 
concern the RECs. It is the latter of these events - which occur in 1995, for which it is difficult to 
predict the effects upon the generators. 
Based upon the discussion made in the introduction concerning the effects of these announcements, it 
is logical to conclude that as one would anticipate a decline in prices, the dummy should possess a 
negative coefficient for events concerning either pricing controls or market structure and competition 
(price reviews, MMC threats). One would also expect a positive influence on prices (as shown by a 
positive dummy variable) for the analyses containing the break-up of the contracts for differences. 
The anticipated coefficients of the dummy variables for the non-REC events of 1995 require some 
justification. The negative coefficient assigned to the dummy to the decision to revise the distribution 
price controls should be self-explanatory. Of the remaining mergers and take-overs decisions, these 
have been assigned a negative coefficient as they involve either generators or, in the case of North 
West Water, another privatised industry. 
It is anticipated that the possibility of increased regulatory uncertainty concerning the reactions to 
these moves would make generators more cautious in their pool submissions as they represent vertical 
integration - with the obvious exception of North West Water. This move led to increased speculation 
about so-called "super-utilities", i. e. those with assets across different privatised utilities. This itself 
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led to speculation concerning the need for a suitable utilities commission -a body with the ability to 
police and regulate cross-industry operations and/or all of the privatised utilities. 
A further disruption is anticipated in the form of a structural break in early 1995 due to the closing for 
safety reasons of Nuclear Electric's Dungeness and Heysham reactors. '17his resulted in more expensive 
plants being called upon to generate - effectively shifting the industry's marginal cost schedule 
upwards. The unanticipated closw-e of these baseload facilities sent pool prices soaring, and it is 
expected that a structural break in pool prices should occur within the relevant period. 
Z3. Structural break resulls and the needfor dummy variables. 
Undertaking structural break analysis using the Chow test, the need to ensure that spurious results 
were not generated was apparent - especially in light of the inherent volatility of pool prices. As such, 
the tests were performed using a 1% significance level. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Table 2, which also includes structural break analysis on uplift and electricity demand. However, these 
results for price may be summarised as follows. 
There have been eleven structural breaks in electricity prices that are significant at the 1% level. These 
occurred in the following periods: 
I. June - September 1991 
2. August - November 1991 
3. April - July 1992 
4. October 1992 -January 1993 
5. February - May 1993 
6. August -November 1993 
7. June - September 1994 
8. October 1994 - January 1995 
9. February - May 1995 
10. April - July 1995 
11. June - September 1995 
Based upon the list of important regulatory announcements/external shocks detailed above, the 
following conclusions may be derived. The structural break in the period June - September 1991 
coincides with the beginning of the price spikes in September 1991. This event occurs within the 
timeframe of the August - November 1991 break - as does the announcement 
by the regulator to 
conduct the first pool price review. The structural break that occurs in April - July 1992 follows on 
from the announcement by the regulator of his possible intention to undertake an MMC reference. The 
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structural break in October 1992 - Januaiy 1993 coincides with the aimouncement and publication of 
the second pool price review in October 1992. 
The break of February - May 1993 coincides with the dissolution of the second set of vesting contracts 
in early April 1992. The structural break of August - November 1993 coincides with the 18th October 
announcement by the Major Energy Users' Council to Offer urging an MMC reference. This was 
followed on the 26th October by an announcement by the regulator that he intended to launch an 
investigation into power companies'profits. 
The two structural breaks of 1994 occur in a period of relative volatility of pool prices. This volatility 
can largely be attributed to the generators' difficulty adjusting to the February 1994 price cap and a 
series of price spikes. As anticipated, there is a structural break in early 1995 that can be attributed to 
the plant outages outlined above, with a potential secondary cause being February's threat of an MMC 
reference. The break of April - May 1995 coincides with the sale of the Golden Share and, more 
importantly, the revision of the distribution price controls. The break of June - July 1995 coincides 
with the increased merger activity of that period. 
Tberefore, on a superficial level, all of the structural breaks could have their foundations in either 
regulatory actions or perceived important exogenous shocks to the pool. Based upon an analysis of 
monthly percentage changes in monthly averages of PPP and uplift, all of these breaks appear to 
coincide with sharp percentage changes in prices or uplift, be they either positive or negative based 
upon the nature of the event. 
In order to eliminate the possibility that these breaks have occurred as a consequence of changes in 
demand, similar analyses were performed on demand (also an order nine process). There were a total 
of seven structural breaks in demand, as derived through the same Chow test and a similar equation 
for demand as for price. Of the seven demand breaks only three of them coincided with breaks in 
prices. However, it is theorised that although the phenomena may coincide, because the demand 
retums to its (approximately) similar behaviour after the shock, in most cases the level of prices does 
not -a theory supported by an analysis of the monthly changes in price and demand. Examples of this 
phenomenon appear to be the behaviour of pool prices following the announcement of a review. 
Specifically a sharp decline following the actual announcement of the review, followed by a steady 
progressive rise over the period of the review, followed by another sharp decline after the review has 
been published. A similar phenomenon occurs with the dissolution of CFDs between the RECs and 
the generators. On both occasions, the ending of the contracts has been met by an increase in pool 
prices over and above that implied by the level of demand, in the short run at least. 
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Clearly, this cannot be established as a causal linkage purely on the basis of a coincidence, although it 
does seem unlikely that, for example, such factors as system outages would come into play 
immediately after the break-up of contracts. This therefore implies some degree of linkage between 
regulatory action, contract dissolution and pool prices. 
Furthermore, the structural breaks in demand tend to be those based upon cyclical factors - the fact 
that demand is primarily determined by time trends makes it susceptible to structural breaks in 
shoulder months. T'herefore, there is not expected to be a causal link between the breaks in prices and 
those in demand, despite the (inelastic) relationship that exists between them. 
This supposition is supported by an analysis of the monthly changes in prices and demand. In general, 
it would be highly unlikely that price spikes of the size exhibited within the pool are caused by 
fluctuations in demand. This would only be the case if that increase in demand was totally unforeseen 
and led to such a sharp increase in the loss of load probability that the generating network could not 
withstand the increase without calling on more expensive plants to generate. 
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Table 1. 
Possible causes of structural breaks in grices. 
Date Event 
22/03/91 Break-up of first set of CFDs. 
09/09/91 Price spikes begin. 
03/10/91 First pool price review begins w/ MMC threat. 
20/12/91 First pool price review published. 
27/06/92 Generators threatened with MMC reference. 
08/10/92 Second pool price review launched. 
18/12/92 Second pool price review published. 
31/03/93 Break-up of second set of CFDs. 
24/05/93 Generators threatened with MMC reference. 
30/07/93 MMC reference and/or plant sales threatened. 
15/12/93 MMC reference unless price agreement made. 
11/02/94 NP and PG establish price agreement. 
19/12/94 Trafalgar House bids for Northern Electric. 
11/02/95 MMC reference threatened over plant sales 
06/03/95 Sale of Government's "Golden Share". 
07/03/95 Distribution price controls to be revised. 
13/07/95 Southern Electric bids for S. W. Electricity. 
25/07/95 Scottish Power bids for Manweb. 
31/07/95 Hanson bids for Eastern. 
10/09/95 North West Water bids for Norweb. 
21/09/95 Powergen bids for Midlands Electricity. 
02/10/95 National Power bids for Southern Electric. 
24/11/95 NP and PG bids referred to MMC. 
Obs. No. AnticiDate 
Sign 
173 1 Positive 
344 2 Positive 
368 3 Negative 
446 4 Negative 
636 5 Negative 
739 6 Negative 
810 7 Negative 
913 8 Positive 
966 9 Negative 
1034 10 Negative 
1172 11 Negative 
1230 12 Negative 
1541 13 Unknown 
1595 14 Negative 
1618 15 Unknown 
1619 16 Negative 
1747 17 Unknown 
1759 18 Negative 
1765 19 Unknown 
1806 20 Negative 
1817 21 Negative 
1828 22 Negative 
1881 23 Negative 
"Anticipated Sign" refers to the anticipated value of the dummy coefficient on the variable 
representing that event. To facilitate future reference, these events will hereafter be referred to as 
events I to 23 respectively. 
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Table 2: Structural break analysis of pool price, electricitv demand and uplift. 
I Obs. I Time Frame Chow statistic I Chow Statistic 
To T i PPP Uplift Crit cal Value (1 %) 
1-123 01-Oct-90 n-91 31-Ja 31- ja 0.41739 2.74767 2.05606 3.17 
62-182 01-Dec-90 31-Mar-91 31-ME I- 366 1.04175 3.17 
124-243 01-Feb-91 31-MaOl Ik 1.28224 3.17 
183-304 
W 
01-Apr-91 31-Jul-91 I III ý. -z 1.04217 JýIA2 3.17 
244-365 n_ ul-jun-91 JU-SCIP-91 3.17 
305 -426 01-Au -91 30 No 30-No%-91 N 3.17 
366-488 01_0ct _91 01-Oct-91 31_jal 31-Jan-92 
7 3.17 
427 548 -548 . I-Dec-91 0] 31-Mar-92 9-s3 1.5 11 (o)(43 3.17 
09 ; 489 - 609 09 0 I-Feb-92 0 j 31-Nfa%-92 1.0929, ; 8310 3.17 
549-670 p 01-Apr-92 I 31-Jul-9-1 3.17 
610-731 01-Jun-92 30-Sep-92 1.43131) 3.17 
671-792 01--Aug-92 30-No%-92 2.091,1 )0389 1 3.17 
732-854 01-Oct-92 31-Jan-93 2.42302 1.45017 1 3.17 
793-913 01-Dec-92 31-Nfar-93 1.08018 1.77696 3.17 
855-974 01-Feb-93 31---Nl-aN -93 
ý. 6-4109 12.60024l 3.17 
914-1035 01-Apr-93 31-Jul-93 2.05169 
-- 
1.115377 
--- -- 
1 1.4971 9 
-- 
3.17 
975-1096 01-Jun-93 30-Sep-93 0.34173 ý 2.54948 8 '16 
2.78826 3.17 1 
1 -1157 036 01-Aug-93 30-Noý -93 0.15721 1.86737 
3.17 
1097-1219 01-Oct-93 31-Jan-94 2.88- N 3.15745 5 L. 71057 3.17 
1158-1278 OI-Dec-93 31-Mar-94 0.99 15-1; 208 1.32914 1.2 5 
- - 
3.17 
1220-1339 
1279-1400 
OI-Feb-94 
01-Jun-94 
31-May-94 
30-Scp-94 
2.4i 07 
4.92324 
6 2.02180 801 0.6 
9.19657 3.1762M 
3.17 
3.17 
1340-1461 01-Aug-94 30-Nos, -94 0.56756 3.02925 
0.72192 3.17 
1401 -1522 01-Oct-9: 3 1 - Ja n 95 0.405-INO 
3.16476 1 3.17 
1462-1584 1 -Dec- 
i ý 
. 
ar-9 
-N" 2.64888 
0.82689 3.17 
1523-1643 01-Feb-95 )5 3 2.10668 31-Ma)-' -I--- 2.49039 3.17 
1585-1704 01-Apr-95 31-Jul-')-; 3A6123 
7 1 12.39839 2.26274 3.17 
1644-1765 01-Jun-95 30-Sep-95 3.75339 11 13197 3.17 
1705-1826 01-Aug-95 30-Nov-95 1.09712 2.33279 1 0.96733 3.17 
1766-1887 01-Oct-95 30-Nov-95 j 3.17 
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We now turn our attention to the use of dummy variables in order to ascertain whether the 
hypothesised causes of the structural breaks did in fact have their anticipated effects. 
2.4. Dummy regressions and their validby. 
In order to develop this analysis finther, the univariate price equation was re-structured to the 
following format: 
pppl ý ol +PI PPPI-I +P2 DUMMY, (1.2) 
In order to determine the optimal lag length, this equation was performed for each dummy variable 
with up to ten lags of the dependent variable. 
In order to determine the optimal nature of the price and uplift series, the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) were 
used. The optimal structure for the pool purchase price variable is one possessing nine lags. This result 
is mirrored in both the Schwarz criterion and in the PACF, and also in the log version of the price 
variable. This result was identical for the uplift data series. 
Retaining the variable structure, the dummy variable analysis was undertaken. The results are 
presented in full in Table 3, which shows the AIC and SIC values, the PACF t-ratio and the dummy 
variable's t-statistic. The results are summarised below. 
The majority of the dummy results continue to support a lag structure of nine iterations, with the 
optimal AIC and SIC values occurring at the eighth or ninth lag. The majority (two-thirds) of the 
dummy variables is insignificant in their anticipated sign. The dummies that are significant are as 
follows (with their event, anticipated sign and the level of significance required for the t- 
distribution): 
Dummy 1: Break-up of first set of CFDs; Positive; 10% 
Dummy 4: First pool price review published; Negative; 1% 
Dummy 7: Second pool price review published; Negative; 1% 
Dummy 8. Break-up of second set of CFDs; Positive; I% 
Dummy 14: MMC reference threatened over plant sales; Negative; 10%. 
Clearly, with the exception of the events pertaining to CFDs, all of the events are regulatory events. 
Those events concerning the financial markets produce results from which it is difficult to draw any 
certain conclusions, and these events will be disregarded until later chapters. 
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There may be lags in the dummy attaining significance, or the dummy may indeed attain significance 
prior to the public release of the information. This could be due to price inflexibility or speed or 
delays in assimilating the information and consequences of a certain event. 
A further complication, first presented in Glazer & MacMillan (1992), is that it is possible that the 
threat of regulatory action can actually lead to higher prices, based around the operation of an end 
game. If a regulated company is certain that a regulatory announcement will lead to tighter regulation, 
then that announcement may actually have the effect of increasing prices. This is because the regulated 
firm is convinced that the probability of tighter regulation is so high that they decide to charge high 
prices while they can. Here, the probability of tighter regulation is seen as an increasing function of 
the price-cost margin. 
Alternatively, if the probability of tighter regulation is low, then prices will fall. This analysis is 
extended by Kent (1993) to the case of a duopoly supply function equilibrium, in an effort to assess 
whether the ambiguity is still present in this case, which it is. Gray & Helm & Powell (1995) present 
an analysis of a collusive super-game in the presence of stochastic regulation, the conclusion of which 
is to remove the ambiguity and re-establish the conclusion that prices will fall as a consequence of a 
higher probability of regulation. 
The main complication with the ambiguous result of Glazer & MacMillan is that the regulated firm 
would not only have to be convinced that regulation would be tightened, but they would also have to 
be aware of the type of regulation which would be introduced. Increasing prices in the face of a 
regulatory threat when the ultimate conclusion of that threat is unknown would be quite risky - the 
regulator could take the regulated firm's actions as defiance of its authority, and proceed to punish 
them to an extent beyond the firm's own perceptions. 
There have been some unusual results obtained through the use of dummy variables in these 
regressions, most notably centring around the possibility of MMC references and the announcement of 
pool price reviews, with the latter often implying the possibility of the former. 
In order to determine the reasoning behind these outcomes, the analysis will examine the uplift 
component of pool prices. Because both uplift and system marginal price (SMP) are indicative of the 
cost of generating plant, it is assumed that they both show the same fluctuations in values. (SN4P is the 
cost of plant requested to generate, uplift effectively representing the cost of plant called in to maintain 
balance). In the absence of data on SMP, uplift should function as an adequate replacement. 
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Table 3. Determininiz the oDtimal IaE Ien0h. 
Section 3.1. Dummy regressionsfor the univariate price analyses. 
PPP: DI +ve I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise 1 -5.4875 7 
1-5.54323 
-5 53 705 
1 
-5 50446 
1 
-5 48076 
1-5 49472 1-5 4823 7 1-5 50990 1 -i 48175 
1-5.44960 
SSC: Minimise -5.408441 -5.43706 -5,40349 -5 34316 -5 29136 -5.27687 -5.23567 -5,23398 -5.176221 -5.11405 
PACF T-Ratio 1 6.44180 1 -2.97210 -1.58630 -0 04425 0.94777 2.13350 1.43250 -2.42420 -0.82736 0.61350 
Dummy T-Ratio 1 0.99807 1 1.3 7680 1.63400 1 1 t)0710 1.41510 1.14770 
1 1.00460 1.17210 1 -0.827361 1.12590 
1 
PPP: D2 
AIC: 
SSC: 
PACF 
Dummy 
PPP: D3 
AIC: 
SSC: 
PACF 
Dummy 
+vc 
Minimise 
Minimise 
T-Ratio 
T-Ratio 
-ve 
Minimise 
Minimise 
T-Ratio 
T-Ratio I 
mg La g b Li L 
3ý5-87! 3 8 
-3,50824 
5.81550 
0.651091 
Lag I 
-3 32 71 Q 
-3.24806 
7.70880 
-1,023401 
L Lag 2 
3,67652 
0 
, 
3, i 7034 
.3 
-3.52640 
1.09820 
Log 2 
-3,46430 
-3.35812 
4.22100 
-1 ý09750 
Lag 3 
3ý6 ý4ý3 5 
-3 1179 
-0.29606 
1.13110 
Lag 3 
-3 43328 
-3 29972 
-0.31241 
-1.08300 
Lag 41 Lag 5 
-3,61636 1-3.59007 
-3A5 507 1-3.40068 
-0 5895810.90569 
1 23010 10.995 ý6 
Lag 4 
-34o687 
-3 24558 
Oý77045 
1-1.12170 
Log 5 
-341247 
-3.22307 
1.92800 
-1.06810 
ý Lag 6 
-3,71786 
35 (0 00 0 
4ý03890 
0.06150 
Lag 6 
-3 49186 
-3.27400 
3.33870 
-1.01960 
Log 7 
.3 88241 
-3.63 5722, 
4: 
4.500t)O 
-0.79003 
Lag 7 
-3.60615 
-3.35946 
3.84050 
-1.44430 
Lag 81 Lag 9 
-3.972331-3 93662 
-3.69642 -3 63109 
-3,48040 -0 027461 
-0.171761-0.163561 
Lag 8 
-3 76239 
-3.48648 
-4.38060 
-1.12510 
Log 9 
-3.72686 
-3.42132 
0.12839 
-1.12240 
Lag 10 
-3ý93968 
2ý-0-41 , 
. 1.89200 
0.1 
Lag 10 
-3.78440 
-3.44886 
-2.96050 
-1.12070 
jPPP: D4 I -ve 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 
1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -4 1625 1 -4 33 156 -4 32112 
1-4.33708 847 - 744 -4.4258114.53784 -4.50488 -4 48816 
SSC: Minimise 4.08338 4.22539 -4 18,56 -4 17578 4.25907 4.219581 -4.17912 -4.26192 -4 1993i -4J5261 
PACF T-Ratio 7.40750 4.64120 -1.44970 2,17450 3.82380 
1 46370 1 1 15630 -3,79720 0.49896 -1.32960 
E 
ummy y Dummy T-Ratio -3.156101 -4 5121)() -A 77AII -3ý71810 -3.71900 -3.65640 
PPP: D5 -ve Lagl 
I Lag2 I Lsg3 I Lag4_ Lsg5 Lag 6 Lag 7 
1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -6 13 133 -6 10008 
1-6 06932 1-6.04700 -6.01855 -6.10839 -6,23702 
1-6.37429 1-636025 
-6.34182 
SSC: Minimise -6 Oi220 -5 9()390 -5.93576 -5.88570 -5.82916 -5.89054 -5,99032 -6.09837 -6.05472 -6.00628 
PACF T-Ratio 7 91 ', 8o 0.14441 0.35711 1 0.99129 0.66859 3.49890 4.03580 -4 13,61)(11 -1.40420 1.27230 
Dummy T-Ratio 1.20930 L16260 1.078501 0.87705 1 0.72248 0.02928 -0.62951 0.159441 0.46987 0.17500 
PPP: D6 -ve Lag I Lag 
2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lug 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Nlinimise -5 65481 -5 75968 -5.77658 -5 
77806 -5 75253 -5.79445 -5.94664 -5.96516 -5.9310() -5,90044 
4 
SSC: Nlinimise -5 57567 -5 65351 -5,64302 -5 
61677 -ý 
5(, 3 14 -5 57659 -5.69994 -S 08924 -5.62546 
0 -5.56490 0 
1 
PACF T-Ratio 5.10300 -3.76470 -2.19510 -1.81510 
0.85096 2.70490 4.34420 -2.23840 -0.36970 -0.72472 72 
. 
Dummy T-Ratio 2.80800 1 3.92340 4.53420 1 4.92000 4 W10 3.17070 
2.276201 2.60770 2.61890 0 2.67710 
PPP: D7 -ve Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 
1 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -6.23616 -6,3 1159 -0 293 14 -6 26146 -6,273 11 -6 3 1870 -6.38994 -6 
37710 -6.34324 -631984 
SSC: Minimise -6.15702 -6.20542 -6 1 ý958 -6 10016 -6.08372 -6 10084 -6,14324 -6,10118 -6.03771 -5.98430 
PACF T-Ratio 5.24260 -3.30890 -1.14810 -0.29177 2,07860 
2.77270 3.20130 -1.43020 -0.41232 -1.07820 
Dummy T-Ratio 4.04410 -5,13270 . 5.15670 -4.751701 -3.506401 -2ý46230, -1.655201 -1.907401 -1.94290. -2.110601 
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Table 3. Continued 
PPP: D8 Lag I I Lag 2 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 10 
AIC: Minimise -h04641 
1-6.05436 
-604068 
1-(, ý)lýý', 
I-ý98,70 1-ýý9i999 1--51)26o2 l-s8')100 1-ý8ý743 
-592036, )3( 
SSC: Minimise -5.96728 -51)4SIL) -51)1312 -5.85423 -5,79431 -5ý74214 -5.67932 -5.61514 -5.55190 -5.59081 )81 
1 
PACF T-Ratio 1922sO L9761U 1.53910 037599 0.35911 -0.97110 0.20343 -0.09665 0,43223 -3.14400 [ 
IDUMMY I T-Ratio 5.29320 4 05000 3 ý0470 3 3.28400 3.35690 
1 
3.29770 3.27930 
1 
3.22600 3,686 70 
PPP: D9 -ve Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 
1 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -5.65255 -ý (, -', 
4(, 8 -i 60416 -5 ý8335 -5 57049 
1-5 ý4098 -ý 62918 -ý 59576 -5 5603,7 -S 527ý7 
SSC: Minimise -5.57341 -ý. ý2850 -5.47060 -5.42205 
:: 5ý3=8110 -532312 -5.38169 -5.31984 -5.25484 -5.19202 
PACF T-Ratio 2 00100 -1.15370 -0.38352 -1.06330 -1.389401 0.63312 3.45250 0.47061 -0,17421 -0,56323 
Dummy T-Ratio -0.04427 -0 05863 1 -0 
056701 -0,03482ý -0,010411 -0.02851. -O. 123031 -0.139291 -0 123721 -0.077321 
PPP: DIO -VC Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 
1 Lag 4 I-Hag 5 L, g; Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
AIC: Minimise -ý 28540 -5 3,0471 -5 34185 -5 347ý 1 ', ýý00443 -530227 -5.50682 -548626 
SSC: Nlinimise -5.20627 -5.19853 -5.20829 -5.18(, 21 16104 10 -5]4441 -5.26012 -5.21034 
PACF T-Ratio 2.33100 -2,24880 -2.62230 -1.925 ', () 0 -11.85960 2,08440 4.24620 
1.15240 
IDummy T-Ratio -0.72264 -0,90546 -1 12210 -1,3334ol -1.56120 -1 25260 - - ----- 
PPP: Dl I -Ve Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 '4 11 Lag 5 Lag 5 Lag 
6 1 Lag 7 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 1 
- 
AIC: Minimise -4.72072 -4 70058 
1-4ý0453 
-4 64503, ý) , -4 (, 287i 5 '7 -4 (28 
1 
-4 63,04ý -4 60984 -4 60984 -4 6()()84 -4 i7610 -4.58533 454920 
SSC: Minimise 4.64159 -4 ý9440 -4.54097 4.48374 74 3 
1 
4.4 936 4 43936 
E 
4.41259 
k 
4.36314 436314 436314 -4.30018 -4.27980 -4213 -4.21365 65 1 
PACF T-Ratio 11 48660 1.05270 0.76021 0.545542 I 26700 1.833201 11 3070 1.13070 1 13070 -0.34664 -2.03400 _0 1 527 1 -0.15271 
Dummy T-Ratio -1.10220 -0 96601 -0 88402 070 -0,8 0070 _0 59605 -0.59605 -0.352 l9 -0 
09 O 20839 - 0.24855, -0.47743 _0 49082 -0,49082 
PPP: D]2 -ve Log I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 
6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -3 P5068 -3 92165 --3,90417 -3 87155 --', 
94913 -, Q0130 -3 87087 -3 95983 -3.96091 -3.9 1 14 
SSC: Minimise -3.87154 -3.81548 -3,77061 -3.7 025 -3.65974 -168344 -3.62417 -3.68392 -3.65537 -3ý59 
PACF T-Ratio 16.56150 0.49333 1.18220 -0.01510 1.00720 
2.88940 -0,61024 -3.46610 -1.83680 -0,64301 
. 
Dummy 
. 
T-Ratio -0.82941 -0 755661 -0,606301 -0.60013. -0,459801 -0,13988 -0,20806 -0.76639 -1.05940 -1.15670 
PPP: D13 Unknown Lag I I Lag 2 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -1 7i497 -1 78057 -1 78424 -1 75161 -1 74984 -1 97405 -1 
9641)5 -2.25521 -2,22_045 -2 1848S 
SSC: Minimisc -1.67584 -1.67440 -1.650681 -1.59033 -1.56044 -1.75620 -1,7182(, -1.97929 -1.91492 -1.84934 
PACF T-Ratio 9.77670 -2.38770 1.86870 -0.00422 1.73200 5.23220 
1,53580 -5.91490 -0.29246 -0.27113 
IDummy T-Ratio -0.61262 -0ý62966 -063566 -063228 -0.71394 -1.04950 -1.182601 -0.85814 -0.84518 -083199 
PPP: D14 -ve Lag I Log 2 Log 3 , 1g Lag 4 Lag 4 Log 5 Lag 
6 Ig6 La I Lag 7 
1 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 1 
AIC: Minimise -1 85653 -1 87240 87 -1 158 I, S3896 ' 9(' 1 838 -1 84094 -2 04111 -2 04 
111 -2 ()4111 -2 03 ý24 
1-2.29046 
-2,28404 -2 26030 
SSC: Minimise -1.77740 -1 76628 -1ý73802 -1.67767 1 67767 -1.65155 
M 
-1.82345 -1 K345 -1 81345 -1.78854 -2.01455 -1,97851 -1ý924761 
PACF T-Ratio 8.73850 -2.17060 1.7 4 390 001 14 . 
00114 1.83470 4 95360 . 
95360 1.62940 -5,53620 -1.63570 -1.06450 
Dummy T-Ratio 501 -2.58990 242840 -2.42840 -1.78560 -0 
1 _0 44216 -0.44216. 0.07122 -1.75250, -2.27790. -2.512601 
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Table 3. Continued. 
PPP: D15 Unknown j Logi I Lag2 I Lag3 I Lag4 I Lag5 I Lng6 I Lag7 I Lag8 I Lag9 I LagIO 
AIC: Nlinimise l-I 85645 -1 82955 
1-1 82805 1-1,80558 1-1 79612 1-1ý94991 1-2.144651-2.185631-2 16154 1-2.12994 
SSC: Minimisel -1,77731 -1 72,; S -1 69449 -1.64429 -1,60673 -1.73205 -1.89795 -1.90971 -1ý85601 -1.79439 
PACF T-Ratio 1 7.78720 -0.66984 1 72580 0.98468 1.50290 1 29 0 0 4.38050 4.86440 -2 08130 -1.02590 -0.65351 
, Dummy T-Ratio -0 64794 07 33,28 -0 46019 -0.29606 4953 -004953 
d 
0. 
ý0 
0.71161 1.72750 1 1,04310 0,79343 
IPPP: DI6 1 -ve 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 71 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 1 
JAIC: IMinimist 
-1.85683 
1-1 82979 1-1 82830 1-1.80579 1-1,79209 1-1.94823 1-2,138681-2.18210 1-2 15896 1-2.127811 
SSC: Nlinimise -1.777701 -1 72301 
1- 1 0474 1-1 ý644491 -1.602701 -1.730371 -1,891 QS 
1.1.906181 
-1 853421 -1.792271 
PACF T-Ratio 7.78150 -0.65308 1 72640 0.98243 1.49790 4.36290 4.81230 
1-2 72ý60 1 -1 066601 -0.68494 
Dummy T-Ratio -0.67695 
1 
-0 748431 -0 486041 -0,327801 -0.084771 0.61906 
1 1.55540 1 0.87385 1 0 62843 1 0.47? 74 
PPP: D17 IL! nkno, An 
l Lagl Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 j Lag 9 j Lag 10 
AIC: Nlinimist -3.39950 -3 39646 
1-3.39837 1-3.36575 1-3.33355 1-3.58731 1-3.58030 1-3 78511 1-3.83173 1-3.8o9911 
SSC: Minimise -3.32036 -, 21)029 -3 26491 -3.20445 -3.14416 -3.36945 -3.33361 -150919 -3.52620 -3.47437 
PACF T-Ratio 6.83830 -1.67410 1 82120 -0.00916 -0.30846 5.56 00 1.59980 -4.96 70 -2 77940 -1 ý 14370 
Dumm). T-Ratio -1.39470 -1.61710 -1.340801 -1.32530 -1,352501 -0ý51244 -0.339911 -0.83793 -1.285401 -1.51520 
PPP: D18 1 -ve 
I Lag 1 Lag 2 1 Lag 3 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 
1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise 1 -3.38268 -3 375 13 
1-3.38 15 7 -3 349051 -33 1602 
1-3.58597 1-3,582961 
-3 77760 
1-3.81383 
-3,78550 
SSC: Minimise -3.30355 -, 26896 -3ý24801 -3.1877ý1 -3.126621 -3.368111 -3,336271 -3.50168 
L-3. '-; 0829 -3 44996 
PACF T-Ratio 7.26670 -1.53340 1 94130 0.08723 
1 
-0.135661 5.74500 
1 11 71330 1 4.84750 -2. ý9170 -0.84784 
Dummy T-Ratio -0.52862 
1 
-0.71548 -0.410771 -0ý390181 -0.404291 0.371191 
; 
598381 0.117051 -0,16121 -0.30107 
PPP: D19 I Unknown I Lagl Lag 2 1 Lag 3 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 Lag 7 
1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: iMinimise l-3.29568 -3.28749 
1-3,29597 
-3.26338 
1-3.23OL6 1-3.49864 
-3.56262 
1-3,76216 1-3.80659 
-33.79201 9" 1 ') Ol 
SSC: Minimise -3.2165ý -, 18132 -3 16241 -3.10208 -3.04097 -3.28078 -3.31593 -3.48624 -3.50105 -3.456466 
PACF T-Ratio 7.09680 -1. Q230 1 99290 0.05921 -0.13506 5.72660 
3.08490 4.90470 00 -2 74 8 _I 40170 -1.40170 
Dummy T-Ratio 0,14126 0 w, oM 
1 
0 17414 0.17710 0.16831 
1 0.71166 1.20060 0.41992 0.03124 _0 10857 -0.10857 
PPP: D20 1 -ve 
I Lag I I Log 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 Lag 7 Log 8 
. 
Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: minimise -3.40115 
1-3.40065 1-3,40152 1-3ý36946 
-3.33660 -3.52939 -3.58192 -3.80146 -3.86116 -3 83603 
SSC: Minimise -3.32202 -3 29448 -3.26796 -3.20816 -3.14721 -3.311 3 -3.33522 -3.52554 -3.55563 -150048 
PACF T-Ratio 6.92280 -1.74710 1.79340 -0.22682 0.18341 4.86330 2.89040 -5.13650 -3,00240 -1 00380 
Dummy T-Ratio 0.19542 0 10694 
1 
0 10042 0,09694 
1 
0,09555 0.11379 0.01644 0.05073 0 09676 0 10192 1 
PPP: D21 -ve Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -2.82739 -2.84148 -2.86557 -2.83537 
1-2.80476 
-3.12065 -3.29659 
1-3.59165 
-3.61794 -3.59143 
SSC: Nfinimise -2.74826 -2.73531 -2,73201 -2 674071 -2.61536 -2.90279 -3.04989 -3.31573 -3.31241 -3.25 5 89 
PACF T-Ratio 6.91670 -2.12700 2.35440 -0.48007 
1 0.49312 6.23990 4.46110 -ý 90010 -2.39920 -0.94021 
Dummy , T-Ratio 0.87393 0.99479 0,85880 0.87471 0.85910 0.87867 1.14440 0 76243 
1 0.67834 0.64091 
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Table 3. Continued. 
PPP: D22 2 -ve 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise 'MI 1 -161488 
1-2.63602 1-2.67079 
-2.63824 
1-2,61795 1-2.95094 1-3.14202 1-3.47704 1-3ý47160 
-3.435851 
SSC: SSC. 
k 
Nfinimise N inim- e 
P 
l -2.535751 -2.529841 -2.5372, -2 47694 
1-2 42856 -2.73308 
1-2.89532 1-3.20112 1-3 16607 
- 
-3.10030 
PACF T-Ratio 
s 
T-Rat ( l 7 67940 -2.289801 2.57580 -0.08611 1 10520 6.41930 
1 4.82420 1 (, - 
; S3701 - -1,06300 -0,24444 
Du mm y T- a tio Rt i ) 1.147101 L27370T L09880 1 096'0 1 04130 0.983591 1182401 
i 
0432() 1 1 0,4310 1 1.03950 
PPP: D23 -ve v e 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lmg5 I Lag 61 Lag 71 Log 81 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 1 
AIC: Mini mise IiI 1 -2.48103 
1-2.503 17 1-2,5 164 5 -2,48937 
1-2ý48863 1-2.955611-3,282721-3.481661-3,45696 1-3420751 
SSC. - 
F 
Minimise III e -2.40190 -2.397001 -2,38289 -232807 -2.299241 -2.737751-3.036021-3.20.5741-3.15143 
1-3.085201 
PACF T-Ratio j 8.801601 -2.311901 111020 -0.72624 1.761401 
- 
7.7749016,329! 
E-4E')()SN()1-0.955901 
0.13 
atio T-R s tji o 1,13890 1 -0.15 7041-1.672401 -0.1: 
Section 3.2 Summary Table 
ReLyression Indicated Lae Leneth Dummy T-Statistic Level of sinificanc 
I Order 2 1.63400 10% 
2 Order 8 -0.17176 N/A 
3 Order 9 -1.12510 N/A 
4 Order 8 -3.71810 1% 
5 Order 8 0.15944 N/A 
6 Order 8 2.60770 1% 
7 Order 2 -5.15670 1% 
8 Order 1 5.29320 1% 
9 Order 1 -0.04427 N/A 
10 Order 7 -0.81367 N/A 
II Order 1 -1.10220 N/A 
12 Order 1 -0.82941 N/A 
13 Order 8 -0.85814 N/A 
14 Order 8 -1.75250 10% 
15 Order 8 1.04310 N/A 
16 Order 8 0.87385 N/A 
17 Order 9 -1.28540 N/A 
18 Order 9 -0.16121 N/A 
19 Order 9 0.03124 N/A 
20 Order 9 0.08676 N/A 
21 Order 9 0.67834 N/A 
22 Order 8 1.04320 N/A 
23 Order 8 -0.12161 N/A 
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Section 3.3. Determining the optimal tag lengthfor the data series. 
Section 3.3.1. Pool Purchase Price 
AIC: 
Lag II Lag 21 Lag Lag 51 Lag 61 Lag 71 Lag 81 Lag 91 Lag 10 1 
SSC: 
PACF (t) 
3.03040 3.02141 3.00250 2.98330 
3.03628 3.03024 3.01425 2.99805 
54.79010 -4.58720 6.32290 6.35710 
2.94060 2.75367 2.69686 2.55036 2.54665 2.54869 
2.95831 2.77436 2.72051 2.57699 2.57627 2.58130 
9.25570 19.74480 10.65940 -17.30660 -3.30860 0.02375 
Section 3.3.2. Upli 
FA -IC. 
SSC: 
PACF (t) 
Lag II Lag 21 Lag 31 Lag 41 Lag 51 Lag 61 Lag 71 Lag 81 Lag 91 Lag 10 
-0.71377 -0.73948 -0.76143 -0.77182 -0.84527 -0.97154 -0.98443 -1.02606 -1.0294 -1.02901 
-0.70788 -0.73065 -0.74964 -0.75708 -0.92756 -0.95087 -0.96078 -0.99943 -0.99978 -0.99640 
53.62900 -7.26980 6.76220 4.62770 12.13600 16.01610 5.23510 -9.06390 -3.13130 -1.61570 
Section 3.3.3. Demand 
AIC 
ssc 
PACF (t) 
Lag 11 Lag 21 Lag 31 Lag 4[ Lag 51 Lag 6TLag 7-TLag8 
1 Lag 91 Lag 10 1 
4.73349 4.78793 4.88386 4.88172 -5.00459 -5.49782 -5.66546 -6.04060 -6.04880 -6.04708 
-2.36136 -2.35718 -2.38187 -2.38838 -2.44617 -2.60332 -2.66548 -2.72402 -2.73009 -2.72558 
54.72850 -10.46210 13.91340 0.27318 15.80460 34.57190 18.57510 -29.20110 
4.40540 0.86220 
Therefore, all three series show indications of being a lag nine process. 
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SECTION III -., Upfift Analyses. 
3.1. The hnportance of upfift 
Uplift is the component of prices which separates pool purchase price (used for all analyses to date) 
and pool selling price, representing the cost of reserve and reactive power utilised to stabilise the pool. 
Uplift has been a cause for some concern from the regulator, and was itself the subject of a review in 
1992 (Report on Constrained-On Plant, Offer, October 1992). In addition, efforts were made to 
control uplift levels through the introduction in 1994 of the Uplift Management Incentive Scheme 
(UMIS). 
The UMIS was introduced as a result of the dichotomy inherent in NGC undertaking investment in the 
transmission network. The cost of any such investment would be met by the NGC, while the 
improvement in planning standards would lead to a reduction in uplift payments which would benefit 
electricity suppliers and their customers. In order to limit this problem, it became necessary to give the 
NGC an incentive to ensure an efficient system of transmission. This incentive was created in the form 
of UMIS. 
The scheme oversees the levels of those components of uplift over which NGC can exert some 
influence, i. e. operational outturn (the cost of transmission constraints) and ancillary services (reserve 
and reactive power). The NGC and those suppliers buying power from the pool established a target 
range for these components, which they termed incentivised uplift. In the event that incentivised uplift 
was less than L570 million during the year (which coincidentally was almost exactly the 1993-4 
outturn), the suppliers would repay NGC 30% of the saving, up to a level of JE25 million. Similarly, if 
incentivised uplift exceeded E587 million, the NGC would have to repay the suppliers 20% of the 
excess, up to a total of f 15 million. 
UMIS presented the NGC with a further incentive to limit the cost of operating the transmission 
network. For example, a considerable part of the cost of constraints is caused by the maintenance 
requirements of power relays and transmission circuits. To limit this cost, NGC increased the amount 
of overtime worked in the form of system upkeep in order to reduce the length of any outages and 
their corresponding constraints. NGC also managed to install equipment in order to fortify the network 
at those places where constrained running could be avoided. Indeed, over the year 1994-5 the system 
operated such that NGC received the maximum ; E25 million allowed under the system. This fact was 
primarily due to the low payments in February and March that came about as a consequence of Offer's 
27th January 1995 announcement, as referred to above. 
UMIS was extended into the first six months of the year 1995-6 before being phased out and replaced 
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by the Transmission Services Scheme (TSS), which is designed to be more precise in its operations. 
At the present time, the operational outturn component of uplift contains all the costs of differences 
between the actual generation levels and the unconstrained day-ahead schedule. Some of the 
discrepancies are due to transmission constraints, some result from errors in the NGC demand 
forecast, and some are caused by supply alterations when generators are unable to operate in the 
manner they predicted when the schedule was constructed. 
Under TSS, a revised unconstrained schedule is calculated utilising the actual level of demand 
observed on the day. Any differences between this revised schedule and the outturn generation should 
be as a consequence of transmission constraints, making the cost of these constraints equal to the 
difference between the ex-post unconstrained schedule and the out-turn generation cost. With the 
exact identification of these costs, NGC will now have a greater incentive to reduce them, with a 
resultant decline in the risk of being held accountable for those costs that they cannot effectively 
control. 
The scheme also includes an incentive scheme whereby NGC may reduce its transmission losses as 
the NGC must pay 20% of the cost of any losses beyond a set reference level at a price of E25/MWh, 
with a set total exposure of L2 million. As with UMIS, the scheme is symmetric, with NGC facing the 
prospect of receiving up to E2 million by reducing losses below the reference level, currently set to 
approximately 2% of demand. 
Uplift is indirectly determined via the loss of load probability: as demand increases (or supply falls) 
the loss of load probability will increase and the bid price of the marginal plant called upon to 
generate will increase. This will lead to an increase in SMP and the price of plant held in reserve to 
support the pool. Therefore, as the system marginal price increases, so will uplift through increased 
unscheduled availability payments. 
One assumption required for the subsequent analysis is that the loss of load probability is stable. This 
is not as heroic an assumption as it sounds, as the loss of load probability is a function of demand, 
which is a seasonal variable and therefore predictable. Therefore, if we assume stability in the loss of 
load probability, this rules out the possibility that uplift will fluctuate due to system outages or 
unanticipated increases in demand. This leaves the possibility that the value of uplift is changing due 
to the generators altering their bidding strategy consciously. The loss of load probability has typically 
remained stable in the time since privatisation, fluctuating mainly on the basis of system outages, 
leading to increased payments for the unscheduled availability component of uplift. 
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On the whole, uplift follows a similar trend to the pool purchase price, but there are certain notable 
exceptions. For example, there is not such a marked decrease in uplift (in percentage terms) which 
follows the decrease in prices as a consequence of the February 1994 undertaking by National Power 
and Powergen. However, there are some unusual changes as a consequence of other factors. For 
instance, on the 9th March 1993, OFFER informed National Power and Powergen of the conclusions 
of the report made by the Independent Assessors concerning the possibility of NP and PG closing 
some of their generating facilities. On the day after this announcement uplift payments began an 
upward shift of some magnitude, increasing 300% in four days. However, on the day of the 
dissolution of the second set of contracts for differences (31/03/93), uplift reached its highest levels 
for over six and a half months. In addition, it began an upward shift resulting in a sixty-five percent 
increase in uplift, a level at which they remained for approximately two months until an explanation 
was demanded by OFFER, at which time they began to fall. 
This fact lends credibility to the belief that the generators have the ability to manipulate uplift by their 
bidding strategy, as well as supporting the use of short-term analysis throughout this study. It is 
therefore theoretically possible that analysis of uplift may be used in the same manner as those for 
pool prices and demand, and that the same influences are felt through the increased bid prices and 
subsequent SMP. 
However, it may be appropriate to focus upon a ftuther sequence of regulatory announcements for 
analysis, namely the occasions on which National Power and Powergen have been threatened with a 
reference to the MMC. If, as has been theorised in several articles, the nature of the relationship 
between regulator and regulated flmis is analogous to a repeated game, then it may be possible to 
liken the possibility of an MMC reference to threats within a game. If this is the case, then the first 
time that a threat is made, it may be perceived as credible and will serve to bring the companies back 
into line with the objectives of the regulator. However, if the threat is repeated on several 
occasions without action, then the regulator may lose credibility in the use of this threat. 
National Power and Powergen set system marginal price and pool purchase price approximately 85% 
of the time, with the remainder being accounted for by the NGC's pumped storage businesses (PSB, 
later First Hydro). It is logical to expect that if National Power and Powergen are afraid of an MMC 
reference, then system marginal price and therefore uplift will fall. For example, on the first occasion 
that the DGES threatened an MMC reference, National Power and Powergen may have altered their 
bidding strategies in such a manner that reflected perceived competitive pricing. Having carried out 
the regulator's wishes, this threat then subsided. However, if the threat was repeatedly used without 
being carried out, then the fu7ns may have done little, if anything to alter their bidding strategies. 
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Alternatively, if the firms do not alter their bidding strategies based upon the threat of an MMC 
reference, then it may lead to more concerted attempts by the regulator to obtain their compliance. 
Section 3.2 Dummy varkbk analysis using uplift 
Carrying out this analysis is identical to that performed on pool prices, but with a prelffiiinary focus on 
N4MC references. In order to assess this hypothesis, the following equation was used: 
Ud =a+ PI UdI-I + P2 DUMMY, (1.3) 
Where Udt represents uplift as defined above (; E/MWh). In order to determine the optimal lag length, 
this equation was performed for each dummy variable with up to ten lags. 
In order to determine the optimal nature of the uplift series, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) were used. 
The optimal structure for uplift variable is one possessing nine lags. This result is mirrored in both the 
Schwarz criterion and in the PACF, and also in the log version of the price variable. 
In each case, the announcement of an MMC reference should produce a negative significant dummy 
variable. The events corresponding to MMC references are 3,5,9,10,11,14 and 23. The results of 
this analysis are shown in Table 4 and are summansed as follows: 
Dummy 3: First pool price review begins w/MMC threat; Negative 1% 
Dummy 4: First pool price review published: Negative I% 
Dummy 7: Second pool price review published; Negative I% 
Dummy 8: Break-up of second set of CFDs; Positive I% 
Dummy 9: Generators threatened with MMC reference; Positive I% 
Dummy 10: MMC reference and/or plant sales threatened; Negative 1% 
Dummy 11: MMC reference unless price agreement made; Negative I% 
Dummy 12: NP and PG establish price agreement; Positive 1% 
Dummy 14: MMC reference threatened over plant sales; Negative, 1% 
There are other, financial market events (FME) that also generate significant dummies (see table). 
Although this analysis is by no means conclusive, it does raise some important queries. If the nature of 
the pool can be likened to a repeated game between generators, the possibility of an MMc reference 
can be Rened to a credible threat - as the threat was made and not carried out, it lost credibility. 
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Once again, the diagnostic performance was mixed (see appendix). However, in order to further 
develop the results of the pool price analysis, the remaining events were examined by dummy 
variables with the uplift data set. The equation structure was the same univariate fonnat as utilised for 
the analyses of the MMC threats, with die actual results displayed in Table 4. 
Of the results presented in Table 4, the majority are consistent with the relevant hypotheses. The most 
surprising of these are the events that were previously considered to have little or no influence on 
prices. It is clear that of those financial market events, for which a negative coefficient was 
anticipated, the results appear to be consistent with this hypothesis. This is unusual, as it was assumed 
up to this point that certain events would not affect the electricity pool. However, it is possible that 
these events can and do influence uplift but not prices. 
To conclude this analysis, the structural break analyses of Section 11 were repeated for uplift (using an 
equation similar to 2.1. - uplift is also an order nine process, see above), with the conclusions 
presented in Table 2, and summarised as follows. There have been six structural breaks in uplift 
levels, which occurred in the following time periods: 
1. June - September 1991 
2. August - November 1991 
3. April -July 1992 
4. December 1992 - March 1993 
5. June - September 1994 
6. June - September 1995 
Of these breaks, all but one coincide with a structural break in price, namely that of December 1992 - 
March 1993, with this period itself incorporating the publication of the second pool price review. 
Although the diagnostics for these analyses (see appendix) implied some difficulties, the results of this 
analysis do support those of the PPP analysis as a means of examining the behaviour of the 
participants of the industry. 
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Table 4. Determinin2 the optimal la2 lenuth for 
Section 4.1. Dummq variable regressions 
lift reeressions. U 
UPL: DI I +Ne [Lagl 1 Lag2 1 Lag3 j Lag4 Lag5 1 Lag6 1 Lag7 Lag 8 Lag 9 j Lag 10 
AIC: 1 Minimise 1 -2.84704 
1-2 83 043 , 
1-2 84200 1-2 81587 -2 81396 -2.84251 -182126 -178956 -2.77224 -2.73596 
SSC: Mininlise -2.76791 -' "242t) -2 70844 - ý65457 -162456 -2.62465 -2.57456 -2.5 
1364 -2.46671 -2 40041 
PACF T-Ratli(o) 5 823,40 -1.206101 -2 06930 
1 
0.78503 1 72900 2.44630 1.10410 -0.55317 A. 29220 410170 
DuminN, T-Raiio 0- 1(, lo 0 871 79 1 1.20330 E04640 1 0.74336 0.29168 0.08569 üý 16075 0.21289 0.22241 
UPL: D2 +%, e Lag I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Nlinimise 1 8096 1 1- 1 888 54 1-1 8064 1-1 84826 -1 86708 -2,02190 
1-2 12980 -2.25198 -2 22W -2,211 oI 
SSC: Miniinisel -1 73048 
1 
-1,78237 -1 73608 -1,68696 -1,67768 -1, -1.97606 -1,92412 -1 876,06 
PACF I T-Ratio 1 6.86340 1 -3,36240 
1 
1.12770 -1.03630 
1 
2.24040 4,39370 
1 
3,86060 -3.90980 -0.82407 -1ý28380 80 
j 
1.65410 1 35130 1 55750 0,97819 0,02011 474314 [-O. M58 0,02906 02025 o 
IUJPL: D3 1 -le 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1,89 3 1 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 1 
I AIC: I Minimise 1 60072 1 -1 -, i091 
1-1.7 1 S97 1-1 71480 1-1 70147 1-1 80646 1 -1 ý93 830 
1-2.00577 1-1 973 12 1-1.9S251 I 
SSC: Minimise 1.52158 -1 64474 -1.58531 -1.553iO -1,51208 -1.58860 -1.69160 -1.72985 -1 667ý8 -1,64696 
P-- ACF F T-Ratio 6.14840 4 39630 -0.03580 -1-65890 1.37340 
1 3.72110 4.07930 1 -3,13450 -0.52502 -2 04190 
Dummy I T-Ratio -2 47060 -3,09000 -3.06560 3.20780 -2,889101 -2.69780 -3.102901 -2 68950 -2 645601 -2.813201 
JUPL: D4 1 -ve 
1 Lag 1 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -2.118911 -2.116ýi 
l-208577 -2.05338 
1-110650 1-2.15715 1-2,136571 -2.21315 1-2.22452 1-2.19217 
SSC: Nlinimise -2.039781 -2.010-38 -1.95221 -1,89208 -1.91711 -1.93929 -1.88988 -1.93723 -] 
91899 -] 5662 
PACF T-Ratio 7.34980 1 -1.69380 -0 3,4957 0.14766 
1 
2.91130 2.86270 1 1.13220 -3 27830 -2.08320 -0.59929 
Dummy T-Ratio -2.71320 
1 
-3.044701 --, 03190 -2.94410 -2.76270 -2.495301 -148120 -2.311301 -2.37240 -2.40560 
I IIPL: D5 1 -ve 
I lAg I I Log 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -3.22707 1-3 29161 1-3.26596 1-3,2 242 
1.3.267261 
-3.27794 
1-3.25527 1-3.30132 1-3.28043 1-3.27336 
SSC: Nfinimise -3.14794 
1 
-3.185441 -3,132401 -3 09112 1 -3.077861 -1060091 -3.009ý8 
I 
-; 02540 
1 
-2.974901 -2.93781 
PACF T-Ratio 10.91070 1 3.12,20 1 0.78535 1 1.35320 1 2.15 100 1 2.05610 ] 1 04340 1 -2.77 60 
1 
-1 ý 159301 -1.62710 
1 
Dummy T-Ratio 0.08522 1 -0 352891 -0 4ý9791 -0.633691 -0.872421 -1.124401 -1.265101 -0.807701 -0.606991 -0.33Q85 
I UPUD6 1 -ve 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Nlinimise -3 10026 -, 07488 
1-3ý043ii 
-3.01231 -2.98357 -3 02395 -115084 -3.17221 -3 15996 -3.12357 
SSC: Minimise -3 14'Q4 
1 
-3.185441 -3 13240 -3.09112 -3.07786 -3.06008 -3,00858 -3 
02-540 -2 97490 -2.93781 
PACF T-Ratio 5.58270 1 -0.10517 
1 0,26366 0.36382 0.64752 
' 
2.67610 4.01310 -229810 -1.46220 -0-01391 
Dummy T-Ratio . 1.190501 -1.1861)01 -1 14340 -1,08380 
71 
. 
00650 -0.70025 -0.50001 -0.50519 -0.53561 -0.53278 
UPL: D7 1 -ve 
1 Lag 1 1 Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 La 5 La 6 ag 7 ý Lag 8 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Nlinimise l-3.24223 1-', 21141 1-3.185S5' 1 -; 15- 48 -3ý 15903 -3 13051 -3 
17026 -3 13524 -3 16960 -3 1 oý71 
SSC: Minirnise -3.16309 
1-3,10524 1-3.052291 
-2.99219 
1 
-2.96964 
0 
-2.91265 -2.92357 -185932 -186407 -2 830)6 - 
PACF T-Ratio 1 ]So 1 0.25098 1 I -0 7914 
l 
-0.15081 1. 0.70024 2.66140 
0.06214 2.55720 -1.715 
Durnrny T-Ratio -3.782-SO 
1 
-3 33 1801 ( ) -3 398 o( 0 -2,15090 -1 74370 
-0 
84-152 
-(1 
771ý 
I UPUD8 1 +ve Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 La 5 La 6 Lag 7 
1 La 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: INlinimise -3.78658 -3 7607', -3 73-131) -3,70364 -3 68948 -3,65568 -3ý62205 -3.59200 
1-3.56788 1-3,53876 
SSC: Nlinimise -3.70745 -3 65456 -3,59883 -3.54234 -3.50009 -3.43782 -3.37535 -3,316081 -3.262351 -3.20321 
PACF T-Ratio 91)ý; (), ) .. 
1 0.7421 3 0.59546 0.60866 
i 
1.34350 
i 1 
0.005 1 9 0.27266 0.674191 1,024701 -0.80781 
Dummy T-Ratio 2-322301 1.95550 1.67560 1.4808O 
i 
LL152ý90 
i 
0i ý1.127ý8 lnAU() AGAR171 
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Table 4: (Continued). 
JUPL: D9 I" -e T-LH--g--l- T Lag -2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
[AIC. Nfinimise l-3.82,516 1-3 813,14 1-3,78210 -3.75707 -3.72504 -3.69268 -3,66986 -164183 -161641 -158367 ISSC: Minimise 1 -3.74603 
1 
-, -0696 
1-3 64954 1 -3 59577 -3.53565 -3.474821 -3-423 16 -3.36591 -3.3 1088 -3.24812 IPACF 
_ _I-_Ratio 
ýS (=, 2l(, 5(, . 1.381801 0.307ý 
ý-O 85189 0.33035 0.36546 1.03800 -0,79836 0.96649 0.56889 IDummy T-Ratio 1 35330 1 2.57970 1 2 42660 1 2.54860 2.40230 2.29900 1 2.10720 2.16990 2.02030 1.94030 
UPUDI %, e I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 31 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
ý 
ýAIC . Nil I Minimise 1 -3.50324 
1-3. ý0065 1-3.49525 1-3.46290 1-3.43176 1-3.43068 1-3 39626 1-3 36120 1-3.32711 1-3.292381 
SSC: N, i Minjimise 1 -3.424101 -3.394481 -3.361691-3ý301601 -3 242361 -3 212R? 
1 
-3 149561 -3 ()Ri? R 1-1 A? 157 1 0 IPACF I T-Ratio 1 1041 5701 1.68630 1 1.61130 10.15555 1 -0.440201 1.75870 
1 0.02591 1 0.01123 1 -0.382061 0.38608 IDummy I T-Ratio 1 -2.699601 -2.256701 -2.015701-1.982701 -2.005701 -1.928901 -1.914901 -1.898201 -1.917701 -1.8A')]()I 
IJPL: Dl I I -, e 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 1 Lag 91 Lag 10 
AIC: Mi-imiýse l-3.27625 1-3ý26248 1-3,23841 1-3ý2ý310 1-322014 1-3ý223781-323160 1-3.20633 1-3.181901-3 15i78 
SSC: 
I 
Minimise -3.19712 -3 15631 -3.10485 -3 09180 3 03075 -3. ( Oi921-2.98490 
1-2ý930411 
-2,976371-2.82023 
PACF T-Ratio 4 3620o 1 -1.31740 -0 8781 ', -2 1448o 
1 0 15304 1 1,88390 11.99210 1 -0.946921 -1.0108010 95847 
I 
Dummy i4; 0201 -36ý100 -4.179701 -3859201 -3.174001-2.884101 -2.958401 -3,030901-2Qf---- 
IIJPL: DI2 1 -%e 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1Lg6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 Lag 91 Lag 10 
JAIC: I. Minimisc 1-3.35300 1' 2186 1-3 29021 1-3.26382 1-3.23694 1-3 ý22016 
1-3 25 750 1-3 22293 1-3ý N9491-3.18518 
SSC: Nlini misc -3.27386 21 s69 -3 15665 -3.10252 
1-3,04755 
-3,002301 -3.01081 -2 94701 -2,89395 
1-2.849641 
PACF I T-Ratio 4 1)5S Iu -0.184871 0 20118 -0.77038 0.77246 
1 1.26280 2.61640 
1 
0.20972 1 71.0545011.410301 
Dummy I T-Ratio 2.81690 1 2 7to9o 1 2 62750 2.72 140 2,47650 2.29670 2,12670 2.11050 1 2,11430 1106410 1 
IIIPI,: DI3 1 FNIE I Lag I IL g2 I Lag3 I Lag4 I Lag5 I Lag6 Lag 7 La g8 
1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Nlinimise 1 -0 80248 
1-0.91471 
-0.904 12 -0,89202 -0.90466 -1 20118 -1,29900 -1.573615 -1,54047 -1 53769 
SSC: Nlinimise -0,72335 -0.80854 -0 770ýt) 
ý 
-0 73072 -0.7 1526 -0,98332 -1.05231 -1.29773 -1,23493 -1.20215 
PACF T-Ratio 1 6,97630 1 -3.87220 1.44320 -1.40330 2.09980 6.03340 3.60660 
1 
-5 74760 -0.477921 -1.74440 
Dummy I T-Rafio 1 -1,037401 -13-33660 -1 209801 -1,30840 -1.22890 -1 31350 -1.556001 -1 35190 -1 349201 -1.36860 
JUPL: D14 1 -ve 
I Leg I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise 1 -0,63767 
1-0 73961 1-0 7 1670 1-0.70699 -0.69006 -0,973 19 -0.992 71 -1.23876 -1.22025 -1.21571 
SSC: Minimise -0.55854 -0.63343 -0 58314 -0.54 69 5 . . 
50066 -0.75533 -0.74601 -0.96284 -0.91472 -0.880171 
PACF T-Ratio 6.19830 1 -3.72120 0.939311 -1.48360 , 411 2418 1E0 [q 5.88910 2.25800 -5.435001 -1.24960 -1.69720 
Dummy T-Ratio -3.127101 4.36080 -3.523201 -3.84260 0 9? 0 6O -3.05 -1.29280 0 -0.59427 - .1 
2.34590 -2.64250 -3.0'7190 
JUPUD15 1 FNIE I Lag I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 1 
AIC: Minimise -0.77304 -0.79043 
1-0,81610 1-0,79028 1-0.81401 1-1.05627 1-1.131131 -1.21348 
1-1,20072 1-1.171941 
SSC: Minimise -0.69391 -0ý68426 
1-0.682541 
-0,628991 -0.624621 -0.838411 -0.884431 -0.937561 -0,895191 -0.836391 
PACF T-Ratio 7.35250 -2 21500 2- 7910 -0.80502 2.34670 5.43750 
1 3.25950 1 -1366901 -1.445601 -0.82498 
Dummy T-Ratio -0.91594_ -1.126301 -0.817261 -0.903991 -0.623701 -0.032821 
0.38717 1 -0.126731 -0.417401 -0.62862 
JUPUD16 1 
-ve 
I Lag I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -0,77489 -0.79305 
1-0818461 
-0.79308 
1-0ý81613 1-1.05684 1-1 12959 1-1.2150ý -1.202991 1,17424 
SSC: Minimise -0.69575 -0,686871 -0,68490 -0,631781 462673 -0.838981 -0.88289 -0.939161 -0.897461 -0.83870 
PACF T-Ratio 7.32010 -2,222401 2.38290 
1 
-0.830861 2.332301 5.420101 3.226001 -3.414401 -1.467001 -0.82631 
Dummy T-Ratio -1.01090 -1.217501 -0 94637 -1.041801 -0.767371 -0.232721 0.08735 
1 
-0.402431 -0.616251 -0.77533 
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Table 4: (Continued). 
UPL: D17 1 FME I Lagl I Lag2 I Lsg3 I Lag4 I Lag5 I Lag6 I Lag7 Lag 81 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: I Minimise l-2.0 j6j. 5':; Z71 ý3,03,618 
1-3.00555 1-2.97372 1-2,94062 1-2.99866 1-2 99100 1-2.95874 1 -2.94817 -2.969851 
SSC: I Mini mise 1 -2.986581 -2.93 0011 -2.871991 -2,81243 1 -2.751221 -2,780801 -2.744311 -2.682821-2.642641 -2.634301 
PACF I T-Ratio 1 6 10810 1 -0.439221 -0.369711 U7643 
1 0.084711 2,99090 1 -1.580501 0.50323 
1-1.513601 
-2. LO680 
q 
Dummy I T-Ratio 1 -2.183001 -2.214901 -2.235301 -2,151601 -2.097101 -1,579601 -1,827301 -1.706201-1 046301 , 2- 
ILJPL: DI8 1 -ve 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise 1-3.02734 1-2.99637 1-2.96503 1-2.93392 1-2.901341 -2.97229 
1-2.95630 1-2.92752 1-2.90870 1-2.91142 
SSC: Minimise -2.947541 -189020 -2.83147 -2.77262 -2.711951 -2.75443 -2.70961 -2.65160 -2.60316 -2.57588 
PACF T-Ratio 6 532iO -0.34113 -0,26521 0,37597 
1 
0.2440 7 
M 
-1.30750 0.75696 -1.23860 
M 
-1.88440 
M 
-Dummy 
T-Ratio -0 91181 -0 96283 -0.99334 -0,85996 4780181 -0,10974 -0.29194 -0.15463 -0.39901 - 0.771 94 
JUPUD19 1 VNIE I Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Nlinimise -2.96859 -2 93857 -2.91005 -2,88045 -2 84831 -2.2676 -2.89370 -185888 -2.82884 -2.82983 
s SSC: Nlinimise -2.88946 -2 83239 --2.77649 -2.71915 -2,65891 -2.70890 -2,64700 -2.58296 -2.52331 -2.49429 
PACF 1 T-Ratio 
- 
7 i(, O"(I - -0.37938 _0 -0.58277 
1 
0.53631 0.318141 3.32360 -0.355061 -0.14546 -0.71633 -1.84130 
LIM Y Dummy III -Ratio T 4) 2L)(181) -0 32229 _0 , ý2 -0,36352 163 -0.3 1203 -0.27573 0.12592 0,05994 1 0.02802 -0.12438 -0.51023 
UPUD20 1 
-%e 
I Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 - T-Lag 7 1 Lag 8 8 1 Lag 9 9 1 Lag 10 ag 10 La 
AIC. Nlinimise l-3.05894 1-3 02859 1-2.99804 1-19W3 -2,96216 -197474 -2.94 1-24 -2 90709 -2,973 18 -2 84985 
SSC: Minimise 
-2.97981 -2 92241 -2.86448 -2.80723 -2,77276 -2.75688 -269455 -263117 -2.56765 
M 
-2,51430 
PACF T-Ratio 7.279ý0 0.33377 038112 0,54304 
-- 
01 2.10120 -0.293481 -0.28476 O 
Dummy T-Ratio -1.84620 -1 75340 -1 65840 -1.57710 -1.4664O 
F1,45410 
-Is0 
4-83 () 040 
UPL: D21 1 -ve 
I Lag I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise 1-2.48478 -2 4i931 -2 44343 -2 41146 -2 41205 . 2.52188 -2.52148 -249954 -2.46406 -2 46951 
SSC: Nfinimise -2.40565 -2,353 14 -2 30987 -2.2iO16 -2.22265 -2.30402 -2.27478 -2.22362 -2.15852 -2.13397 
PACF T-Ratio 7.80260 -0.76577 1,2ý090 -0.24942 1.79760 
1 3.79010 1.78420 -1.09600 -0.14564 -1.95040 
Dummy T-Ratio -0.87167 -0.98420 -0,78763 -0.80939 -0.454581 0.159'- OA1534 0.21300 11 19111 
JUPUD22 1 
-ve Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 
1 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Minimise -2.07203 -2,08117 1-2 07229 1-2.04690 -2.08733 -2.25791 -2.2728ý -2.25946 -2.22413 
P2 4 L 4 
s SSC: Minimise -1.99290 -1.974991 -1,938731 -1,88560 -1.897941 -2.04005 -2ý026151 -ý9ý35 ý 8ý0 1 - 1 2 _I -1 . 8879 0 IPACF T-Ratio 8.43620 -2.00590 1 1.50040 0.82985 2.69030 1 4 59" 30 1i7.10 -5 1ý 01 iý 6 ! -11 61 -1.798601 
ummy Dummy T-Ratio 0.64738 () 504751 0 53196 -- )1 0.992401 
ItJPL: D23 1 -ve 
I Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: Nfinimise -1.87420 -1,8 8979 -1.85969 -L83358 -1,85940 -2.10052 -2.18773 -2.17996 -2.14684 -2.13877 
SSC: Minimise -1.79507 -1 78362 -1 72613 -1.67228 -1.67001 -1.88267 -1.94103 -1,90404 -1,84131 -1.80322 
PACF T-Ratio 8.41320 -2 16300 0.43343 0.78752 2,39070 5.42490 3 -14940 -1.58670 -0.48264 -1.59930 
Du-my T-Ratio 1.63040 1.82740 1 73530 1.54130 0.64733 0.12204 -0.12348 0.08122 0.13579 0.19007 
For the deten-nination of the optimal uplift lag (series nine) please see table 3 above. 
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Section 4.2 Summary Table 
Rearession 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Indicated Lau Leneth 
Order I 
Order 8 
Order 8 
Order I 
Order 2 
Order 2 
Order I 
Order I 
Order I 
Order I 
Order I 
Order 1 
Order 8 
Order 8 
Order 8 
Order 8 
Order 1 
Order I 
Order I 
Order I 
Order I 
Order 7 
Order 7 
DummV T-Statistic 
0.71610 
-0.10558 
-2.68850 
-2.71320 
-0.35289 
-1.18690 
-3.78250 
2.32230 
2.35330 
-2.69960 
-3.29450 
2.81690 
-1.35190 
-2.34590 
-0.12673 
-0.40243 
-2.18300 
-0.91182 
-0.29089 
-1.84620 
-0.87167 
1.40870 
-0.12348 
Level of sienificance 
N/A 
N/A 
1% 
1% 
N/A 
N/A 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
N/A 
1% 
N/A 
N/A 
5% 
N/A 
N/A 
10% 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
124 
SECTION IV - Broader EmOrical Analvses. 
4.1. The needfor broader analyses of uplift, poolprices and electricity demand 
It is hypothesised that there should be a positive relationship between pool prices and uplift levels as 
follows. Because pool prices are derived from the bid prices of plants submitted to the NGC for 
central despatch, then as pool prices increase, then the prices of plant held in reserve should also 
increase. This is because generators will attempt to get their least expensive plant into the merit order, 
and if the prices of this least expensive plant increase, then it follows that the price of their reserve 
plant must be higher also. 
A similar logic follows for the relationship between electricity demand and uplift levels. In the event 
of periods of high demand, then generators will be called upon to submit more plants to the merit 
order. These plants will generally represent generating units which would have previously been held in 
reserve, with these reserve plants being displaced by even more expensive plants to be held in reserve. 
Therefore, as demand increases, it is logical to anticipate that uplift will increase also via higher 
unscheduled availability payments, the other components of uplift assumed constant. 
An important supposition to be made here is that supply itself must be constant, or rather that baseload 
supply is to be held constant. Baseload power is comprised of (typically) nuclear capacity which 
operates twenty-four hours a day and which is required for the smooth running of the pool. If baseload 
plants are not submitted to the merit order, then more expensive plants will be called upon to operate 
and therefore both prices and uplift will increase. This will occur in a fairly predictable manner, with 
the best example being the behaviour of pool prices in early 1995 when simultaneous malfunctions at 
the Dungeness and Heysham reactors put these important nuclear stations out of operation. This was 
followed by an immediate and substantial increase in both pool prices and uplift, with the increases 
primarily brought about through increased loss of load probability leading to increased unscheduled 
availability payments. 
Determining the relationship between electricity demand and pool price is more difficult. The demand 
for electricity is typically seen as being inelastic, with the short-run price elasticity of demand 
possessing an approximate value of 0.15 (Taylor, 1975, Branch, 1993, Wolfram, 1995). In addition, 
the elasticity of demand for electricity typically changes depending upon the time of the year - demand 
becomes more sensitive to price in winter when demand is at its highest (Taylor, 1975, Branch, 1993, 
Wolfram, 1995). However, in order to assess the responsiveness of electricity demand to changes in 
prices, this assumes that consumers actually have the capability to observe prices, and to alter their 
power usage in response to these prices. This is typically not the case, as only large electricity users 
have these characteristics, and while it could be possible to undertake price-demand analyses for small 
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and large electricity users, the data set in use does not permit such an analysis. 
In order to perform analyses of these relationships, we must ensure that the variables in question are 
not non-stationary time series, which is determined by means of the Dickey-Fuller and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests. The format of regression used to verify the existence of stationarity in the relevant 
variables here (namely pool purchase price, electricity demand and uplift) is: 
1. Pool price analysis 
ppp, = a+ 00'r +PI PPPI-I + 02 A PPPI-I + P3 A PPPI-2 + "' + Ul 
2. Electricity demand analysis 
A EDt= a +Oo'r +OiED,. 1+02 A ED, -i+03A EA-2 
+-+ Ut 
3. Uplift analysis 
Ud, = a+ por + pUd, -, +p2 
A Udt-, + P3 A Ud,. 2+---Ut 
(1.4) 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
where all variables are in natural logs, with PPP the pool purchase price for electricity (f/MWh), UP 
representing uplift (VMWh) and ED representing electricity demand (MW) and the equations are 
structured (with regard to their lags) as discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
The derivation of pool purchase price and uplift has already been detailed. Electricity demand 
represents gross demand, defined as: "The total gross demand calculated to have been taken by all 
consumers in a settlement period. The metered readings are scaled up to allow for transmission losses 
to give the gross figure. " (Energy Settlements and Information Services Catalogue of Data Items, Issue 
No. 4,1 st October 1993). This is not total demand, which is the demand to be met by generating units 
based upon the demand forecasts derived by the GOAL computer algorithm. 
If the relationships are indeed as outlined previously, then there should be a positive relationship 
between pool price and uplift. Having already determined that the respective pairs of variables are 
stationary (see Section 2.1 for this result), a linear combination of them must be formed as follows: 
Ud, =a +A PPPt 
Ud, = 77 +4 ED, 
Of course any combination of stationary variables is, by definition, stationary. 
(It should be apparent that setting these equations equal to each other results in a price-demand 
relationship, which is analysed in the next chapter. ). 
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In the case of pool prices, the data is stationary as given by the aforementioned tests, but the sequence 
does exhibit serial correlation as well as evidence of ARCH process. In the case of demand, 
stationarity is again attained but this time without serial correlation, although there is again the 
existence of ARCH. In the case of uplift, stationarity was also achieved, but there was evidence of 
both serial correlation and an ARCH process. The regression of prices on uplift attained stationarity, 
as did the regression of demand on uplift, but both failed the diagnostics for serial correlation and 
ARCH. Therefore, the analyses on uplift and pool prices and uplift and demand may be undertaken, 
but with some reservations based on the diagnostic performance. 
Given that an increase in pool prices, with supply held constant, should lead to an increase in uplift 
levels for the reasons outlined above. Therefore, we should expect the slope coefficient in equation 
(1.7) to be greater than zero. Similarly, as demand increases, uplift should also increase: therefore, we 
should expect the slope parameter in equation (1.8) to have a coefficient greater than zero. These 
conclusions are relatively easy to establish, but what is a greater issue is the extent to which changes in 
uplift and demand and changes and uplift and prices are brought about. These questions may be 
answered by the following equations: 
Ud, ýao + Po PPA (1.7a) 
A Ud, =a, + PI ED, (1.8a) 
The first analysis consists of an examination of the value of the slope parameter of equation (1.7). 71iis 
coefficient on this parameter should be greater than zero, and indeed it is, as well as being statistically 
significant. The Wald test was used to test the restriction that this parameter was equal to unity -a 
hypothesis that was rejected. This is expected, as the uplift parameter should not have such a 
proportional relationship, based upon the following reasoning. Based upon the data estimated in the 
MMC reports undertaken into the National Power-Southern and Powergen-Midlands mergers 
(HMSO, 1996 a. and b. ) the following data can be noted. Utilising the data for new entrant costs of 
generating stations (CCGT generating facilities), a station with a 55% load factor (that which most 
approximates the UK electricity industry), the prices it submits should be f27.60MWh based upon a 
central cost estimate. This may be compared with the prices for a plant that bids on a much lower load 
factor, estimated at; E45.80MWh for a 25% load factor andf 91.90MWh for a 10% load factor. (All 
prices are stated in October 1995 prices). Given that those stations that influence uplift through high 
payments for unscheduled availability will have low load factors, it is unexpected that there should be 
an equi-proportional relationship between uplift and price. Given that the price for a plant with the 
25% load factor is 1.66 times that for the standard 55% load factor. However, as this is a price-to- 
price relationship, not the price-uplift relationship here, it is possible that there are dynamics at work 
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in the GOAL computer algoridim that can explain this result. 
Turning the analysis to the equation which estimates the relationship between electricity demand and 
uplift (1.8), based upon the difficulty in measuring the price-demand relationship for electricity, it is 
perhaps to be expected that there should be difficulty in estimating the uplift-demand relationship. The 
equation (1 -8) estimates this relationship, where the slope parameter is statistically insignificant and 
insignificant from zero, as defined by the Wald test. This implies a minimally responsive relationship 
or potentially non-existent relationship between uplift and demand. Given the lack of responsiveness 
of demand to price, this is not entirely unexpected. 
Further equations, (1.7a) and (1.8a), attempted to assess the relationship between changes in uplift and 
changes in price, and changes in uplift and changes in electricity demand. It is hoped that these 
equations should provide a clearer explanation of the relationships, as well as solving some of the 
diagnostic problems that existed in the examination of equations (1.7) and (1.8). 
The equation (1.7a) that shows the relationship between changes in price and changes in uplift 
indicates that there is an equi-proportional relationship between the two variables. Further 
manipulation of the equation (through the addition of lagged variables and the subsequent reduction of 
the equation's format) indicated that a form that passed the test for functional form was an equation 
that possesses seven uplift lags and one price lag. However, this form possessed severe serial 
correlation, which was partially removed through the addition of the parameter RESý which is the 
residuals of the regression (1.7) between uplift and price - effectively an error correction term. The 
optimal structure using the Akaike information Criterion was an equation possessing seven dependent 
variable lags and seven price lags in addition to the RES, variable. The Schwarz Information Criterion 
suggests an almost identical result: six uplift lags instead of seven. While there is a strong case for 
prices and uplift to be AR(7) series, the addition of the price component indicates the determining 
nature of prices on uplift levels. 
The analyses of equation (1.8a) which indicates the relationship between changes in uplift and 
changes in demand showed that the slope parameter had a coefficient value which was shown to be 
statistically insignificant from unity. This relationship is again difficult to interpret as it would depend 
upon the plants present in the merit order, although it is reassuring that a positive relationship does 
indeed exist between the two variables, unlike the case with equation (1.8). 
This equation fonnat also marginally failed the test for the correct functional form, although the 
diagnostics did indicate the existence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. Efrorts to create a 
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more accurate equation in terms of the diagnostic for functional form and other diagnostics, resulted in 
the equation being reduced back to an format near to its standard form. The revisions to this were the 
addition of an extra demand lag and an error correction variable given as the residuals from equation 
(1.7). This was due to the consistently poor diagnostic performance and the insignificance of the 
coefficients of the added parameters. The Akaike Information Criterion indicated a regression 
containing the error correction term, eight lags of the dependent variable and seven demand lags. By 
contrast, the Schwarz Information Criterion indicated an optimal regression structure of seven lags of 
the dependent variable and no demand lags. The key point to notice from this analysis is the lack of 
significance of the demand lags in determining the optimal regression structure, implying that demand 
does not have any strong statistical significance in determining uplift, despite the strong practical case 
for demand to have some influence on uplift. 
These results are summarised in the appendix. 
Section 4.2 Concluding comments on the dummy equations. 
There is clear evidence generated in these regressions that regulation has indeed influenced the prices 
witnessed in the pool. The tendency for regulatory announcements to reduce pool prices is hence a 
reasonable and valid hypothesis. In addition, having determined that uplift is indeed a valid proxy for 
system marginal price (SMP), there is evidence that regulation has influenced the bid prices of 
generators also. While it is undeniable that a true analysis of SMIP data would be a valuable addition 
to this research, the fact that the uplift regressions produce several significant dummies is of key 
importance. This is of note as the vast majority of significant dummies pertain to regulatory events in 
general and threats of MMC references in particular. 
The fact that the threat of an MMC reference does not consistently generate significant dummies is a 
point of note. Using the repeated game analogy established and developed in earlier sections, the 
possibility of an MMC reference is essentially a threat in a repeated game. Game theory establishes 
that if threats are made repeatedly and not acted upon then they may lose credibility - there is no 
reason why an MMC reference should be viewed as being any different. 
Given the consistent lack of significant NMC dummies in the pool price regressions following the 
first threatened reference, there is a case for advocating that from that point on actual policy and 
licence changes (through pool price reviews) would have impacted upon pool prices, but threats of 
action may not. Furthermore, the fact that uplift declined in response to subsequent threats when PPP 
did not may imply that bid prices deched while PPP levels (those prices which determined CFD 
payouts) held constant to ensure continued optimal revenue streams from CFDs. 
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As has been established, uplift levels may be used as a general replacement for the level at which 
prices are bid into the pool. The univariate uplift equations detected five out of the six occasions on 
which Offer threatened an MMC reference on the grounds of conduct. (The other was on the grounds 
of structure pertaining to vertical integration). It is possible that the system marginal price did respond 
to the threat of an MMC reference, but pool purchase price was not affected to as great and extent. 
That is, except for the first occasion when the threat was quite credible and it was too risky not to cut 
prices substantially. If this is the case, then the announcement of a possible MMC reference does little 
to benefit consumers, who see their prices as largely unaffected. It is the pool price reviews and 
related agreements that benefit consumers. With this in mind, the generators may modify their bid 
prices sufficiently enough to show good faith with the regulator, but they do not cut them in such a 
manner that they lose revenue from their operations. 
Based upon these considerations, it may be possible to develop this possibility utilising an interactive 
dummy variable to represent uplift levels at the time of threatened MMC references. This requires 
establishing a standard binary dummy variable and then linking it with uplift through multiplication. 
As a consequence, uplift will now take the value of either zero or itself on the day on which an MMC 
reference was threatened. These variables were used for the six conduct-related MMC references and 
performed using equations (1.2), (1.3), (1.7a), and (1.8a) in their original and extended form with up 
to ten lags of each independent regressor. However, there was little response and in no case was there 
a significant dummy in any optimal regression. Despite this, there was a proliferation of negative 
dummy coefficients in the regressions. The results are presented in full in the appendix. 
A final means of assessing these conclusions is an examination of uplift and pool price levels after a 
threatened MMC reference. In the case of the first threatened reference, both prices and uplift decline 
sharply after the announcement, while the second announcement results in a brief decline in prices 
which is soon reversed, but a more continued decline in uplift. The third event sees a minimal 
response from prices, with a brief but sharp decline in uplift. The fourth, fifth and sixth events both 
appear to have no discernible effect in prices, but they both lead to considerable, continued declines in 
uplift. The seventh event cannot be assessed due to the lack of data after the event itself 
Although this evidence does not claim to be conclusive, it does again raise questions about the 
generator responses to an MMC threat in terms of their bidding into the pool and how it affects pool 
prices. 
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SECTION V- Conclusions. 
This analysis has yielded some important insights into the behaviour of electricity prices since the 
industry was privatised in 1990. It appears that over the period under examination, there were a 
sequence of structural breaks in electricity prices. It is hypothesised that the breaks in prices were the 
consequence of regulatory announcements made in the industry. Clearly, the appearance of significant 
step-dummies on or around the dates in question does lend support to this hypothesis. Of the breaks in 
prices that have been identified, all but one occurs at the same time as an important regulatory 
announcement, or external system influence. The use of dummy variables within this analysis has also 
proven to be most successful and in the analysis of regulatory announcements, and it is therefore 
possible that other regulatory antiouncements and important exogenous shocks may be modelled in 
this way. 
The fin-ther extension of the analysis into uplift levels saw how generators may behave in response to 
the threat of an MMC reference. Although the use of uplift is by no means a perfect replacement for 
system marginal price, it does help to raise the issue and assist in its development. Following the 
extension of the uplift analysis to all of the events, finther analyses allowed the examination of the 
inter-relationships between important variables within the pool. These analyses were designed to 
support the univariate analyses and their conclusions, and although for the most part they did, some 
the results defied the univariate analyses. 
Ile next section again returned to focus upon the repeated threat of an MMC reference, this time by 
using an interactive dummy variable. The analysis was based upon the supposition that the generators 
may alter their uplift levels in response to an MMC reference (again utilised as a replacement for 
system marginal price) as a means of showing support for the regulator, but not pool prices (as a 
means of avoiding lost revenue). It appears as though uplift does indeed respond to MMC references, 
although not always to a statistically significant extent. Despite potentially mixed results, the 
conclusions were sufficient to at least lend credibility to this hypothesis. 
One of the main problems is the diagnostic test performance of the variables in the regressions, a 
factor that diminishes the usefulness of the results. However, the volatility associated with of pool 
prices means that they do not conform to the ideal statistical conditions required of data sets. 
The analysis that has been performed here should therefore be viewed as a precursor to fia-ther 
investigations into the pool and its operations. it is clear that the announcements made by the regulator 
do have an important influence on the way that the generators behave and thus how they bid their 
131 
stations into the pool. On a theoretical level, as detailed above, it may be logical to conclude that the 
pool be likened to a repeated game, and that threats and behaviour may be credible or not, as the case 
may be. This is apparent in the case of the analysis of MMC references, the dummy coefficient of 
which had less significance as the threat was made and not carried out. Clearly there is no proof to 
substantiate the results of this analysis, but there is some rationale for the linkages between regulatory 
announcements and the modifications to a bidding strategy. There is an equally strong rationale for the 
threat of an MMC reference, if not carried out, to become a weapon of limited, if any strength. 
The evidence has also indicated that events that take place in the financial markets do not seem to 
influence pool prices and uplift levels, unless they bring with them the possibility of tighter regulation. 
This conclusion will be analysed in a forthcoming chapter through the examination of the share prices 
of the two main generators, National Power and Powergen. 
It may therefore be concluded that this analysis has been established using both the theoretical 
observations on industry structure written to date, as well as being grounded on a solid empirical 
foundation. It would be highly improbable for a group of coincidences to explain the results presented 
here, despite the ceteris paribus assumption that has been implicit throughout. As a result, it may be 
stated that the contribution of this study is that is shows how electricity generators respond to the 
existence of regulation (actual or potential) and how it influences their objectives when the submit 
their offer prices to the pool. 
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Section I- Oboectives. 
L 1.7he role of thepool and the contract market 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the privatisation programme was the creation of the pool -a spot 
market for all bulk power transactions. With the exception of a small minority, all transactions must 
flow through the pool, which operates on a half-hourly basis by constructing a merit order of 
generating plants, functioning in the same manner as an auction system. However, despite aspirations 
that pool prices would remain at a stable, competitive level, these hopes were dashed by the realisation 
of the inherent price volatility, and by the generators and RECs signing contracts for differences 
(either forward or option contracts) which allowed them to hedge price fluctuations. Initially, 
companies had no choice in signing these contracts, as they were essentially forced upon them by the 
government to establish security to the nuclear and coal industries, with the actual contract strike 
prices being determined by the Horton IV pool price estimates. (For further details, see Chapter VIII). 
One of the fundamental aspects of financial markets theory is the possibility of a relationship between 
spot and forward prices. In the period following privatisation, there was considerable analysis of this 
linkage by Helm & Powell (1992), Green & Newbery (1992), and Powell (1993). It has been 
theorised that the break-up of the contracts for differences was responsible for price increases this 
break-up, and it was this linkage which was examined by Helm & Powell, whose work it is hoped will 
be developed ftu-ther by this analysis. 
LZ 7he structure of the chapter. 
First we will detail the actual nature of the contracts market, as well as the research that has already 
been carried out into the area of the pool and contract relationships. This will focus primarily on the 
work of Green & Newbery, and will integrate an analysis of Helm & Powell's 1992 study and its 
outcomes with elements of the preceding chapter. Secondly, we will detail the methodologies to be 
employed in the testing of the hypotheses concerning the break-up of the two sets of contracts. 
Thirdly, the results of these analyses and their implications will be presented, discussed, and 
developed finther. 
136 
Section II - Spot and Forward Prices in the Electricitv Industrv. 
ZL The role of contracisfor differences in the electrichy indushy. 
As detailed previously, the rationale behind the use of contracts for differences (CFDs) is that two 
parties enter into an agreement over the forward price of a commodity based upon the belief that the 
commodity's spot market price will fluctuate. The use of contracts for differences therefore allows the 
interested parties to hedge their risks of price changes. To consider a general example, suppose that 
we have a consumer who knows that he will require 1000 units of a commodity at some point in the 
future. The use of a CFD allows this consumer to reach an arrangement with a supplier, whereby both 
parties agree on the firture purchase price of this commodity. For example, the two parties could agree 
upon a CFD for 1000 units at a mutually agreed price (strike price) of fIOO per unit, payable on 
delivery at some future date. 
If the market price of the commodity on the future date is more than the strike price, the supplier pays 
the difference to the consumer on the 1000 units (in addition to the actual cash flows for the 
commodity itself). By contrast, if the market price is less than the strike price, the consumer pays the 
difference to the supplier. In this simple case, there is no upfront cash payment when the contract is 
agreed - the only cash flow on the contract is the difference once the actual price is known. This type 
of arrangement is known as a two-way CFD. For example, a generator and a REC could agree a strike 
price for electricity for a certain time period/group of periods, and operate in the described way 
depending upon whether the strike price was greater or less than the pool price. Alternatively, the 
generators and RECs could establish contracts to buy and sell electricity in advance at whatever the 
pool price happened to be at the time the contract was called. This arrangement would effectively be a 
simple forward contract. 
Two types of CFDs are av"able to hedge forward electricity prices. Firstly, the long term vesting 
contracts negotiated by the generators and the regional electricity companies (RECs). These covered a 
considerable proportion of annual electricity sales and operated for one to three years following 
privatisation. Secondly, the electricity forward agreement (EFA) market has been developed to allow 
participants to tailor their cover using two-way CFDs using what are generally perceived as being 
short-term agreements. In this market, Gerrard & National Intercommodities (GNI) Ltd. successfully 
bid for and obtained the franchise to operate the EFA market, and remained the only broker until 
1995-6. At this time Tradition Financial Services and Euro Brokers joined them. However, the EFA 
market will not be analysed at this stage (see Chapter VIII) - it is the market for contracts for 
differences that will be examined here. 
On a fundamental level, financial markets theory indicates that the spot price in a market for a storable 
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commodity is determined by the forward market price for that commodity. To be precise, the forward 
price for the delivery of a commodity at time period t+I will equal the expected spot price at time t 
provided that there is no uncertainty. In the case of the electricity industry, this means that the markets 
for electricity forward agreements (EFAs) and contracts for differences should lead the pool in terms 
of pricing. However, given that electricity is a non-storable commodity and there is considerable 
uncertainty, it is unclear precisely how valid this hypothesis is. (See Chapter VIII). 
Indeed, given that information on the spot price is readily available, whereas that on the strike prices 
of contracts for differences is not due to commercial sensitivity, a proxy is required for the strike price. 
Each of the interested parties in the electricity industry have their own estimates of prices, with the 
initial vesting contracts signed at the time of privatisation based on the Horton IV estimates. However, 
these estimates were well below the actual prices for the pool's first level of operation, which 
doubtless proved to be a contributing factor in the RECs decision to terminate some of the vesting 
contracts on 22nd March 199 1. This was followed on the 31 st March 1993 by the ending of the 
vesting contracts and their replacement with commercially negotiated contracts (see the preceding 
chapters). 
Before continuing, it is important to note how the RECs contracting strategies have changed since 
privatisation. Initially, the bulk of electricity traded in the pool was done so under contract - 
approximately 95%. As the degree of cover through vesting contracts decreased, this began to fall, 
even though some of the output was being replaced by commercially negotiated contracts. However, 
with the introduction of more independent power producers (IPPs) into the generating sector, 
increased uncertainty regarding pool prices, and the RECs concern regarding the large generators' 
market power and negotiating stance in the contract marketý contracted output continued to fall, to 
approximately 65% for in 1995/1996. Contract duration has also become an important issue as RECs 
attempt to combine flexibility and security of supply by holding a basket of contracts of different 
lengths. As a rule of thumb, the general classifications of contract duration are 15 years, 10 years, 2-6 
years, I year, and less than a year. 
2.1.1. Vertical integration and the contract market 
The issue of contract cover must be viewed from a different perspective when considering vertical 
integration, where a REC could fully contract its output with its affiliated generator. In the absence of 
vertical integration, such a move would be highly illogical for a risk averse REC, as it would be 
risking the possibility of exploitation by the generator. Indeed, even in the presence of vertical 
integration, such a move could be inadvisable on the grounds of fuel diversity representing an 
important part of a REC's contracting strategies (especially given the role of the Non-Fossil Fuel 
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Obligation). The issue of vertical integration became paramount in the electricity supply industry 
when some of the RECs sought modifications to their conditions on own-generation capacity, 
although such concerns were minimal compared to those voiced when generators attempted to take 
over RECs in 1995-6. 
With the approval of the Scottish Power bid for Manweb, it was perceived that vertical integration in 
the industry was permissible, and in doing so would reverse the process of de-integration established 
at privatisation. This attitude was strengthened ftuther when National Power and Powergen launched 
their bids for Southern and Midlands respectively. These bids were deemed inappropriate by the 
regulator but were approved by the MMC. However, the President of the Board of Trade later blocked 
them on the grounds that vertical integration was not suitable in the industry at that time. Such a 
statement led to concerns of ambiguity in the governments policy on vertical integration, especially 
following Eastern's acquisition of Powergen's divested plant, thus giving Eastern the potential to 
become a powerfW vertically integrated pool trader. 
The purchase of Manweb by Scottish Power brought with it changes to both companies PES licences 
with the purpose of preventing any operations detrimental to consumer interests. While it was 
admitted that the possibility of finther vertical integration could result in operations that could harm 
consumers, these concerns were waived by the MMC as insufficient to block the mergers. ne effects 
of vertical integration on the contract market are such that if the newly-integrated RECs contracted 
with their generating divisions, the residual (post-vertical integration) contract market would be 
thinner (i. e. would have fewer participants). In addition, it would be irrational for a generator to 
charge high prices to its REC division, making the key concern one governed by the economic 
purchasing condition of a REC's PES licence, and the degree of cost-passthrough allowed to 
consumers. 
22 The actual contract types available. 
Contracts and contract offers differ in form, and while some are relatively easy to compare, others 
require restrictive assumptions prior to any such comparison. The range of contracts is highly complex 
and contains several different prices and terms. in general, these concern the different forms of price 
indexation (e. g. inflation and fuel prices) and restrictions on when the contract can be called. It is also 
possible to include cost passthrough of transmission charges, or the sharing of benefits if pool prices 
are high, as well as restrictions on calling to a particular plant's availability. 
Contract comparisons and availability can be based on load factors, i. e. the percentage of total hours 
in a year that the contract covers. Baseload contracts feature prices based on an average of all contract 
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hours during a year (8760 hours, or 17560 half hour periods), while the call on lower load factors is 
concentrated towards peak periods. This makes lower load contracts more valuable, commanding a 
correspondingly higher price in the market. There are essentially three types of contracts: baseload 
RPI indexed contracts, as offered by Nuclear Electric; coal-fired sculpted load contracts (i. e. those 
contracts where capacity changes dependent upon demand) as offered by National Power and 
Powergen; and variable load contracts with indexed prices, as offered by the IPPs. (For further 
information on these types of contract, see Chapter VIII). 
In theory and in the presence of efficient markets, the estimated contract price should equal the 
subsequent pool price. However, there are several reasons why it may not, the most important being 
inaccuracies in the strike price estimates. This problem would have had to have been solved at the 
earliest possible stage. Assumptions regarding demand are made by the generators in constructing 
their original contract offers, typically assuming that peak electricity demand will rise at 1% per year, 
while the dynamic regulatory climate must also be considered. 
Given the potential of the contracts market and the EFA market, from a market power standpoint there 
are two possible fundamental reasons regarding the equality, or lack thereof, between the contracts' 
strike price and the pool price. If the estimated strike price is less than the out-turn pool price, then this 
could be due to generators attempting to keep prices low as a means of increasing their profits from 
the contracts. This is a highly probable outcome, given past research based upon the possibility of 
strategic trading in forward markets where the underlying spot market is imperfectly competitive. 
However, it may also be due to the fact that the market is inefficient due to the inherent demand and 
supply uncertainty. Alternatively, if the contract price does equal the pool price, then this could be 
based on a pre-meditated attempt to keep the pool price at some desired level. This ambiguity serves 
to damage any reliance on the efficiency hypothesis, as these two potential outcomes could be used to 
develop opposite inferences. 
23. Research into the contract market 
Despite the lack of considerable in-depth empirical research into the market for contracts for 
electricity, there are several key studies. Heim & Powell (1992) draws heavily on generator behaviour 
in the contract market as a means of explaining the conduct of the generators. There were two types of 
CFDs: one-way and two-way CFDs. (A one-way CFD with a low strike price becomes irrelevant as it 
will not be called). Ile nature of a two-way CFD serves to isolate generator revenue from pool prices, 
as the generators receive a pre-set price for their power. As explained, RECs benefit from hedging 
their risks to achieve a fixed price in their franchise markets while generators also receive premiums 
and gain added security, allowing them to hedge their investment costs. 
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REC contract portfolios as described above, were initially comprised of the vesting contracts. With the 
vast majority of electricity purchases covered by CFDs, it is almost impossible to ascertain generator 
revenue or the nature of generator incentives from an examination of pool prices. 
Utilising the work of Anderson (1991) and others, Powell (1993) successfully developed and adapted 
traditional financial market theory for the electricity industry. He concluded that, in the absence of 
collusion, the existence of forward or forward-type contracts increases the degree of competition 
within the pool. This is because the contracts represent an additional dimension of price competition, 
thereby pushing the market closer to a perfectly competitive structure. 
By contrast, it may also be concluded that contracts may also make collusive behaviour more likely, 
given that the structure of the industry is highly conducive to generator collusion. This is because the 
pool may, in game theoretic terms, be likened to a repeated game between imperfectly competitive 
dominant firms. However, CFDs may also be sold in such a manner that removes all incentives to 
depart from an agreed price with the generators selecting a desired price and utilising contracts to 
adapt their own incentives to maintain this level. This possibility increases the likelihood of strategic 
behaviour by generators within the marketplace. 
In the first year after vesting, with over 95% of total generator output covered by CFDs, generator 
revenue had effectively been made independent of the pool price. This allowed generators to 
manipulate the pool price to any desired level within the bounds of the regulatory fi-amework. Given 
the potential for considerable new entry in the post-vesting environment, the incumbent generators had 
a vested interest in keeping prices low, effectively operating a limit price strategy. As will be seen, 
pool prices after vesting were well below official estimates, and given that the pool price is the most 
important piece of information available for potential entrants, price manipulation to deter entry could 
be seen as both possible and beneficial, Clearly, it would be logical to expect high - not low - prices to 
encourage entry. As a consequence, one would anticipate that pool prices would remain high after 
entry and not decline, in order to sustain profits for new entrants. (This is standard oligopoly theory). 
Following on from his previous research, Green (1992) utilises the methodology established in Green 
& Newbery (1992) to examine behaviour in the contract market for duopolistic generators using 
Klemperer & Meyer's (1989) supply function approach to oligopoly. As has been shown, when 
contracts cover the majority of a generatoes output, there is an incentive to lower prices. 
When a generator sells electricity forward under a contract, it is effectively 'reserving' part of the spot 
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market for its own supplies, since it could sell that amount of electricity spot, but earn profits based 
upon the contract price. The 'residual', uncovered market will be smaller, and since the generator's 
optimal mark-up rises with their uncovered sales, the pool price will be lower. This reduces the 
generator's profits from the uncovered spot market. This is described as follows. 
If generators increase the degree of competition in the contract market regardless of their strategy in 
the pool (apart from the condition of a short-run equilibrium), this implies that the generators would 
not be able to raise the contract price by threatening restrictive pool practices. In undertaking to sell 
contracts, the generators move the residual demand curve in the pool inwards, and in doing so the 
equilibrium price and volume in the pool declines as the volume of output covered by contracts 
increases. Therefore, the pool has both increased its profits from the contract market while reducing 
them in the residual market. If the generator believes that its counterpart in the industry will attempt to 
"reserve" a high proportion of the market through contracts, then it must do likewise, despite the 
consequences of eroding the residual pool in which market power could have been exercised. 
With rational expectations, the price that the generator can obtain for its contracts will also be lower, 
but the extra sales that can be reserved by the contract will not often outweigh this effect. This means 
that for some parameter values, a generator would wish to sell contracts even if its rivals were not 
involved in the contract market. 
Because the rival will generally follow the same stance, both generators would sell electricity under 
contract, giving a lower pool price and a somewhat higher output than in the absence of contracts. 
However, for some parameter values, a generator would not wish to be the first to enter the contract 
market, because the act of reserving sales in the contract market will drive the price down in the 
residual pool to the extent that the profits would fall. 
If a generator expects its rival to base its contracting strategy on the price for which contracts can be 
sold, the analysis becomes more complex. If the generator increases its own sales in the contract 
market, its rival will typically sell fewer contracts as the price falls. This means that the residual pool 
does not shrink by the full amount of the generators extra sales, and so the price will not fall by as 
much, making additional contract sales more profitable than if the rival was not expected to respond. 
It is shown that in the limit the generator might expect its rival to aim to keep the contract price - and 
hence the total contract sales - constant, and expand or contract its own sales to offset any change in 
those of its rival. Under these conditions, the generator would want to reserve as large a part of the 
market as it could, since its rival would be expected to reserve the remainder, and so both generators 
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would end up fully contracted, and selling at marginal cost in the spot market. 
It was therefore concluded that the regulator should do as much as possible to encourage competition 
in the contract market and to encourage generators to sell electricity through both contracts and the 
pool. Although it is possible that the generators could refuse to participate in the contract market and 
earn large profits in the spot marketý it is unlikely that they would choose the highest prices that they 
are capable of achieving. If they did, they would effectively be inviting both new entry and regulatory 
intervention. The generators may wish to operate in a manner analogous to limit pricing, an objective 
that the contract market may help them to achieve if they behave competitively in the pool and if they 
have sold sufficient electricity forward. 
Such a possibility becomes important when considering the effects of entry. In the short run, because 
the residual demand curve facing the two generators is fixed, it could be hard for the generators to 
commit to entry deterrence, given the inherently dynamic price schedules. Facing a fixed demand 
curve in the medium term, they might be tempted to deviate from a limit pricing strategy to obtain 
higher short-run profits. If potential entrants were aware of this, they could enter until they had shifted 
the residual demand curve so far to the left that the generators were unable to obtain a price above the 
entrants' costs. 
However, few potential entrants have been willing to enter the generating sector without the security 
of long-term contracts and hence guaranteed pool revenues. This means that the residual demand 
curve in the contract market could be very elastic at the level of the entrants' average costs. The 
generators would be unable to obtain a higher price in the contract market, and if they did not sell 
many contracts (signalling a high pool price), then the RECs could buy additional contract cover from 
entrants, who could then come in with financial security, and force the pool price down. Since the 
limit price for entry is above the marginal running costs of almost all the generators' present capacity, 
they would want to sell as much as possible at that price. 
This would imply that they would do best to sell a large number of contracts, ensuring that pool price 
would equal the price which would exist in the absence of entry. Any attempts made by the generators 
to raise the price by selling fewer contracts would simply result in a lower market share at the limit 
price. Entry would force the price below this level and would be unprofitable until new capacity was 
required. This could well be an optimal outcome, giving prices at long run marginal cost, without 
incurring the costs of unnecessary entry. 
Lucas & Taylor (1993) successfully adapt their garne theoretic analysis of generator bidding strategies 
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to include the role of contracts in determining prices. In order to achieve these results, it is necessary 
to assume that there are two symmetric generators and that their bid (SMP) prices range between 
marginal cost and twice marginal cost. Within this environment, it is shown that generators' bidding 
strategy is determined by the degree of contract cover. 
Beginning with an elementary case both generators have contracts covering their output from 7000 
MW of capacity at a contract price of D1 /MWh, and there is a load (maximum demand) of 14000 
MW- It is also assumed that each generator has ten 1000 MW capacity plants, the output of which is 
submitted for central despatch. In this situation, a Nash equilibrium is seen to result with both 
generators bidding at marginal cost, with the corresponding system marginal price being equal to the 
marginal cost of generation, i. e. the marginal cost of the most expensive plant needed to meet demand. 
This is shown to be in sharp contrast to the result observed when contract cover is non-existent, as in 
the case of the existence of contracts there is now no incentive for generators to submit high bid prices 
to maintain profits. 
If the contract cover is reduced to 3000 MW, then generators lose their incentive to bid at marginal 
cost, although the contract cover still exerts an influence by limiting the generators' bid strategies. 
Further game simulations indicate that if one were to expect the generators to bid at marginal cost 
when demand exceeds the capacity of either individual generator, then the following criteria must be 
met. The amount of contract cover in the market must be greater than or equal to the difference 
between the total demand for electricity and the amount of power that can be supplied by one 
generator operating at full capacity. For example, with a 14000 MW load, the generators must face 
then at least 4000 MW of contract cover. 
T'his approach may be extended further to the case where generators have asymmetric contract cover. 
If we remain with the assumption of two generators, A and B, then if A had 7000 MW of its output 
covered by contract and generator B did not have any of its output covered by contract and retaining a 
14000 MW load, the following conclusion will occur. It is observed that Nash equilibrium are found 
for strategies [1,2] to [1.4,21, i. e. generator A bids from marginal cost to 1.4 times marginal cost, while 
generator B bids at twice marginal cost. This shows that generator A, with its high contract cover, bids 
low while generator B, which does not face any contract cover, bids the maximum allowable twice 
marginal cost. This results in a correspondingly different level of prices. 
Finally, the authors "tend their analysis to the case of an asymmetric game in plant distribution in 
order to more accurately present the system in the UK electricity supply industry at privatisation. It is 
assumed that generator A has twelve 1000 MW plants, all of which have their output covered under 
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contract, while generator B has eight 1000 MW plants, only one of which has its output covered by 
contract. Again, the price of contracts is set at L31/MWh. In this scenario, the result is a Nash 
equilibrium of [ 1,21, corresponding to generator A bidding at marginal cost and generator B bidding at 
the (maximum allowable) twice marginal cost. This clearly indicates the role that the contract market 
can have upon the bid prices set by generators for their plants. 
Despite the summary of the supply function approach detailed in Chapter IV, it is appropriate to 
examine this approach further, as well as the other theories put forward to explain the interactions of 
the pool and the electricity contract market. 
24. Alternative approaches to the contract market. 
The importance of the contract market in determining the spot price set in the pool by the generators is 
considerable (Helm & Powell, 1992). The models utilised to study the spot market competition are 
either the supply function model as shown above (Bolle, 1992 and Green & Newbery, 1992 applying 
Klemperer & Meyer, 1989) or the auction model (von der Fehr & Harbord, 1992). In modelling the 
pool as an auction, the highest quantity is bought from the bidder with the lowest price. If stochastic 
demand exceeds available capacity, the residual is purchased from that bidder with the highest price, 
with both generators being paid that price. It is shown that in equilibrium (potentially a mixed strategy 
equilibrium) price will exceed marginal cost unless demand is low, and that if a sufficient number of 
contracts are sold, the price-marginal cost mark-up will be lower. 
Each model has its own advantages and disadvantages, but the supply function model is more 
successful in its study of the role of multi-firm competition, while suffering from the drawback of 
multiple equilibrium. This drawback makes it difficult to assess the exact nature of the interaction 
between the spot market and the contract market. Further, the supply function equilibrium is 
independent of the shape of the demand distribution - only the support of the distribution matters. This 
implies that the equilibrium is identical regardless of the skewness of the distribution. Such an 
implication is too strong when capacity costs are positive, and as a consequence, it may therefore be 
unreasonable to expect generators to maintain spare capacity in the event of highly improbable 
demand booms. The majority of research has focused on the supply function model, and so that model 
will continue to be examined here. In addition, a variant on the supply function model will also be 
examined. Kwok (1996) establishes a new approach to the supply function model by trying to 
minimise its problems. 
The problems associated with the supply function model may be effectively eliminated by assuming a 
small positive capacity cost and ensuring that the generators choose their capacity prior to the 
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beginning of the spot market's operation. The generators' decisions are known to one another prior to 
the submission of their supply ftinctions. The fted cost can be justifled by the cost of keeping 
capacity available (spinning reserve), and it is also logical to assume common knowledge of capacity 
decisions, as announcements can be made which convey this information to competitors. 
As a consequence of this capacity decision, there is only two asymmetric equilibrium which are mirror 
images of one another. The firm that chooses a lower capacity level reaches its capacity limit before 
peak demand, and neither firm holds excess capacity. The size of the market now provides feedback 
effects on the equilibrium, and in a move similar to the Coumot equilibrium, the incumbents reduce 
their supply when the market shrinks. 
For reasons of expediency and simplicity, a single spot trading opportunity is assumed which 
eliminates the potential for strategic behaviour in the spot market, the possibility of adjustment costs in 
changing the level of output between successive trading periods, and the risk of regulatory 
intervention. It may therefore be possible to find some excess capacity equilibrium if the spot market 
trading frequency increases. 
As with the supply function approach, the contracts are restricted to being baseload contracts, with the 
additional assumption of certain demand and supply thus eliminating the strategic motives for selling 
forward. Despite the differences in the assumptions, the same conclusions are reached as in 
aforementioned studies, namely that selling more output forward can result in lower spot prices. In 
addition, by utilising Cournot competition in the forward market, it can be seen that strategic 
behaviour becomes an important motive in selling forward contracts. 
Green (1992) formulated the forward market competition with spot market competition in the form of 
supply function competition. The analysis also shows that the incumbent firms will not sell any 
contracts in equilibrium when the forward market is a Coumot market. Green has chosen a linear 
equilibrium function that is therefore independent of the maximum level of demand. As a 
consequence, the amount of output sold forward does not influence the behaviour of the firms in the 
uncovered market and therefore Stackleberg leadership cannot be achieved by selling forward. 
Kwok shows that the firms will reduce their uncovered output when the size of the uncovered market 
declines, as well as showing that the firm that has sold more contracts will produce less in the 
uncovered market. Such a firm will also choose the capacity competition equilibrium in which it does 
not compete in the uncovered market during periods of peak demand. Such a commitment is not 
present in those Cournot spot market models and constant marginal costs due to there being a unique 
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Cournot spot market equilibrium. It is also possible to expand the analysis to incorporate entry threats, 
in which case, the incumbent firms pre-empt entry by selling more contracts in order to maintain the 
contract price below the entry level. In addition, the entry threat weakens the links between the 
hedging position and the equilibrium capacity level, as there is a range of such equilibrium of hedging 
positions for the large and the small firm. The lower the entry price levels, the larger this range of 
potential equilibrium. 
Newbery (1993) analyses a similar situation under different assumptions. If incumbents commit to a 
post-entry equilibrium rather than offering long-term contracts, they can successfully maximise profits 
by choosing that supply function equilibrium which results in a time-averaged price below the entry 
price. Also, if incumbents sell long-term contracts and can co-ordinate their actions to reach the most 
profitable equilibrium in the uncovered market, then they always sell sufficient output to pre-empt 
entry. 
At this price, the equilibrium aggregate supply for the uncovered market in the model by Kwok is 
always lower than Newbery's, in addition to prices being more volatile. Given that prices and 
consumer welfare are both convex functions of demand, the equilibrium generated result in higher 
profits but lower consumer surplus than Newbery's model. The comparisons between these two 
approaches may be given as follows. 
Two finther models that use limit pricing are developed by Newbery. In the first model, he assurnes 
that incumbents do not sell any contracts and can commit to a post-entry supply schedule. By co- 
ordinating actions to reach the supply function equilibrium under which the time averaged spot price 
is just below the entry level, the incumbents pre-empt all potential entry. In the second model, he 
assumes that the incumbents choose the symmetric supply function equilibrium for the uncovered 
market that maximises the uncovered profit. The incumbents then pre-empt entry by selling enough 
contracts to drive the time averaged spot price just below the entry level. 
Kwok shows that, when the entry price is binding, the supply function model produces the highest 
industry profit and the lowest consumer surplus. This is best explained by the fact that the uncovered 
market equilibrium that results is the least competitive and, given the fact that the time-averaged price 
are identical across the models developed, the price spread across different periods of time is the 
largest. Given that profit is a convex function of demand, the higher profits over peak periods more 
than compensate for the lower profits over the lower demand periods. Indeed, when the entry price is 
low enough, there is an equilibrium in which the duopolistic generators A and B eam the same profit. 
This implies that there is an equilibrium in which both firms earn more than they do in Newbery's 
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models. Therefore, if the duopolists can choose between these games, they may prefer contract 
competition. 
Newbery also shows that capacity constraints can lead to a unique supply function equilibrium, and by 
manipulating these results to endogenise the capacity decision, the set of supply function equilibrium 
can be reduced to two asymmetric equilibrium which are mirror images of one another. This permits a 
study of the strategic interaction between spot and forward competition without the imposition of 
exogenous assumptions on the strategic effects of selling forward on spot market bidding. In 
equilibrium, it is shown that the smaller firm sells a larger proportion of its output forward, and in 
doing so not only induces its rival to reduce output as the size of the uncovered market shrinks, but it 
also facilitates collusion on the capacity decision. 
Extending the analysis to the threat of entry, it is seen that the threat will increase the range of 
equilibrium hedging positions. The duopolists are seen to find it highly profitable to deter entry by 
selling forward rather than by limit pricing. The implication of this is that prices are more variable 
when firms sell contracts to pre-empt entry. 
To conclude, it should be noted that there are general criticisms based around the entire usage of 
supply function equilibrium and its application to the electricity-generating sector. Firstly, Gray & 
Heim & Powell (1995) note that the supply function is assumed to be fixed throughout the day - an 
assumption which is partially correct as prices cannot be changed, although plant availability can, 
However, it has already been detailed above that changes in plant availability can influence prices, and 
therefore must influence the supply function. Secondly, the assumption of a single price does not fully 
encapsulate pool price and bid price dynamics. Finally, von der Fehr & Harbord (1993) maintain that 
the supply function view of equilibrium is inconsistent with the generators bidding discrete plant into 
the pool, and their conclusions are such that there may be no pure strategy equilibrium. 
It is therefore apparent that, despite the different approaches utilised, the contract market can play an 
important role in determining the incentives of generators bidding into the pool. Although the variants 
of these models that incorporate entry threats and excess capacity are valid, it is important to note the 
essential similarities between the types of models. It is inappropriate to say which is the correct 
approach to the contract marketý as each of the models has their respective merits and flaws, although 
the supply function model is most commonly used. 
Z 5. The ekaricity spolprice 
The half-hourly spot price for electricity depends, in its simplest form, upon electricity demand, 
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generation availability and costs, distribution network availability and losses. Electricity demand is 
seen as a stable variable determined by daily and seasonal factors, and may therefore be viewed as a 
constant. Generation availability and costs are seen as a far more important determinant of price than 
electricity demand, as sharp fluctuations in prices are generally caused by supply shocks, such as 
important plant malfunctioning rather than demand variations. Losses and availability on the 
transmission and distribution network are theoretically a stable function of the level of energy flowing 
through the system. (This is the theoretical approach to the determinants of the electricity spot price. 
For an examination of the determinants of the pool price, see the preceding chapter. ) 
In more specific terms, the price of electricity is a function of several variables that are not 
independent of one another. Firstly, fuel costs and maintenance costs, which may be classified as 
operating costs, representing one of the largest components of prices that is dependent upon the 
number of plants in operation and the amount of electricity generated. Secondly, another large 
component of prices are network losses, which depend both upon the amount of electricity generated, 
as they are an approximate quadratic function of the level of power flowing along transmission lines, 
as determined by physical laws. 
Thirdly, network quality of supply may be classified more accurately as network quality of supply and 
generation quality of supply. The former refers to the network's capacity to transmit energy, and the 
latter the proximity of actual generation to a critical level of generation. In the case of the pool, the 
latter refers to the loss of load probability, while the former is linked with the possibility of 
overloading a transmission line. Finally, there is revenue reconciliation, which is reliant upon the 
belief that the utility (NGC) must remain fmancially neutral within the boundaries of the regulatory 
process. 
2 6. Transac&ns ovaUabk to poolparticoaniL 
There are generally seen as being three types of transactions which may occur within the electricity 
marketplace: price-only transactions, price-quantity transactions and transactions based upon long 
term contracts. 
Price-only transactions allow the customer to purchase as much as desired at a specified price, 
essentially representing the system under which the pool operates (within the availability of power). 
Price-quantity transactions permit the customer to purchase a specified quantity at a specified price -a 
situation essentially similar to the long-term contracts but perhaps centred on a shorter-run 
perspective. As a consequence, these types of transactions may be likened to the electricity forward 
agreements. Long-term contracts are effectively Rxed-price, fLxed-quantity transactions between 
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parties and possess the characteristics of the vesting contracts and their commercially negotiated 
replacements. These tools must be balanced based upon the (conflicting) objectives of achieving the 
greatest benefits for the utility and customers. 
In undertaking these transactions, the costs faced involve the computation of prices and bills, the costs 
of communicating actual and anticipated prices to customers and the construction and installation of 
the hardware required for that task. Consumers also face the costs of purchasing the hardware 
themselves. 
The benefits relate to the criteria of efficiency and equity, and efforts should be made to minimise 
cross-subsidies to customers. On a similar note, consumers should be allowed freedom of choice and 
the right to determine their own behaviour patterns, and should be able to understand the nature and 
content of the transactions they have chosen. Both the consumer and the utility should experience 
benefits of control, operation and planning, with the utility's function being clear and the consumer's 
reaction being efficient. 
The role of forecasts in this system is pivotal, as the utility should be able to forecast future variations 
in consumer demand, while the customer should have a forecast of how prices will behave in the 
future. Clearly, the requirements of these forecasts and the extent to which they will prove useful 
depend upon the consumer. In the case of the UK electricity supply industry, consumers have been 
grouped into the following bands: those with annual demand greater than IMW, those with annual 
demand greater than I OOkW, and the residual fi-anchise customers, i. e. those with an annual demand of 
less than I OOM 
Similarly within this system, consumers must choose transactions based upon the limitations of the 
system and the technology at their disposal. In the case of price-only transactions, the utility quotes a 
fixed price for energy where that quote is valid for some specified period of time. As a consequence, 
the customer can buy any amount of electricity at this price. A price-only transaction would require 
determining the frequency with which prices are actually updated. 
Conceivably, the system could be one of continuous updates such as the existing pool system, but it is 
more probable that the pool is a system of daily updates, with the half-hourly prices published one day 
in advance. Indeed, it is more likely that the pool in fact represents a form of hybrid system, as the 
pool prices that are published represent expected and not actual pool prices. Actual pool prices will be 
made available during the day to those consumers with the capacity to receive diem. 
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The system price could also be determined by setting the price for some specific billing period, with 
that price valid for the subsequent bill. Alternatively, the system could be modified to encompass a 
billing period based upon a time-of-use resulting in different rates being charged based upon the time 
of day. A longer term approach shows the need to specify the length of the update cycle, i. e. the period 
for which the prices are actually valid, as well as the specific number of prices quoted. Consider the 
following example (Schweppe et al, 1988, pg. 59): 
Pk (t 1r). - Price for kth customer at hour t defined at hour T 
In the case of the pool, there are 48 half-hourly updates, although the prices fluctuate despite the fact 
that they have been specified in advance. This may be clarified by means of the following example. 
The price for the half-hour period 0330 to 0400 is specified at 10: 00 a. m. the preceding day based 
upon all available information at 10: 00 a. m. which is collected by the NGC and processed by the 
GOAL algorithm. in this case, I will equal 0330 hours and the tau coefficient will represent 10: 00 
a. m.. 
By means of mathematical manipulation, it can be shown that (Schweppe et al, 1988, pg. 59): 
p, (t IT)= E[Pk(0 IT] +Covariance Term 
Where the first term of this statement is the conditional expectation of the spot price based upon the 
available information set. The expectation of the spot price is subject to some uncertainty, as measured 
by the covariance term. It can be shown that this component of prices is dependent upon possible 
variations in prices and demand against those anticipated when calculating the prices in advance. As 
the covariance term essentially embodies uncertainty, it increases in magnitude the further into the 
future that forecasts are made. 
The importance of price-quantity transactions may be limited within the electricity marketplace. This 
is because as a market such as the pool contains thousands of consumers, each of whom has a unique 
usage pattem of electricity, the use of price control is more important than quantity control as a means 
of reducing the transactions costs and increasing benefits. 
However, there is still an important role for price-quantity transactions, as they can limit transactions 
costs. It is more likely that the price-only and price-quantity transactions will be combined to generate 
a means by which the utility may modify demand on a more fi-equent basis. This may allow the 
consumer to respond to system outages provided that the regulator itself has a fast and predictable 
consumer response. This therefore allows price-quantity transactions to represent a means by which 
the consumer pledges (contracts) to a level of electricity demand that the utility has the ability to 
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control, e. g. through supply interruptions. 
These types of contract imply that the greater control is in the hands of the generator, rather than the 
consumer. Indeed, specific contracts may give the utility control over specific appliances belonging to 
the consumer, such as air conditioning and water heating which may be activated or deactivated based 
upon power usage within the system as a whole. This method implies that the utility must have 
information on the power usage of the consumer and the value of energy to the consumer at different 
times of day. However, it is likely that most contracts of this form will contain an escape clause 
whereby the consumer can override the terms of the contract at the expense of some financial penalty, 
i. e. failure to interrupt (FTI) charges. 
Contracts (long-term and short-term) represent fixed-price, fixed-quantity transactions for specific 
future time intervals. Power will be supplied at the price specified in the contract for those time 
periods required by the contract. Given the uncertainties associated with the electricity price, it is most 
Rely that contracts are established as a means of limiting risk exposure through hedging pool price 
fluctuations. 
There are essentially two types of long-term contracts - futures contracts and options contracts. In the 
case of futures contracts, the utility does not necessarily have to be involved in the marketplace - it 
may simply allow a broker to conduct the transactions. Such a move would limit the utility's problems 
and remove the possibility of accusations that the utility was using its position to profit from the 
market. Electricity buyers (either final consumers or RECs) must choose the types of transactions they 
require and generators must choose the types of transactions they offer based upon the costs and 
benefits they experience as a consequence of their choices. 
In the case of options contracts, the buyer purchases the right to buy at a specific time up to a fixed 
amount of energy at a specific price. When that time arrives, the consumer either exercises that option 
if the spot price is greater than the strike price (the price specified in the contract), otherwise the 
consumer lets the option lapse and purchases the energy directly from the spot market. In the latter 
situation, even if the consumer refuses the option to buy the power, the generator has still received 
revenue from the initial option payment. 
In the case of price-only transactions, a consumer would desire this type of transaction possibly based 
upon the following criteria. Price-only transactions require a minimum of commercial negotiation and 
allow the consumer to purchase as much or as little as required. If consumers feel that they possess 
minimal bargaining power then this may dissuade them from establishing a contract, and relying on 
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price-only transactions. The choice of price-only transactions does permit greater flexibility but does 
increase the uncertainty faced by the consumer, as they now face price fluctuations and the risk of 
system outages. 
Generators may offer price-only transactions as a means of encouraging flexibility in the generating 
sector. Alternatively, the generator may lack the technical support or capacity to offer contracts, or 
they may merely seek to profit from the price fluctuations. in terms of price-quantity transactions and 
long-term contracts, the consumers gain the benefits of security of supply and price stability. It also 
represents a means by which the consumer may hedge against price fluctuations, as well as benefiting 
the consumees consumption/production processes. In the case of the generators, these contracts 
represent a means by which the generator can supply power "to order", while the secured payment 
fi7om option contracts reduces the generatoes uncertainty and may allow for investment decisions. 
The main problem with this system is that it relies upon the assumption of perfect competition within 
the marketplace. However, the asymmetric situation witnessed in the UK electricity supply industry 
has meant that the RECs may fear over-contracting their output. From a theoretical standpoint, in the 
case of a perfectly competitive system, increased risk of price fluctuations could well lead to increased 
hedging due to risk-aversion based around a desire to minimise exposure to price volatility. With 
RECs seeking to maintain exposure, this could place the generators in a position of dominance - not 
only do they have the potential to influence prices but they could also utilise the need for contracts to 
their advantage by establishing a monopoly position as the only sellers of contracts. 
This could mean that the forward market system in this country exhibits a fundamental bias in favour 
of the generators, a statement that completely discounts the fact that the contract market was 
essentially established to provide security for the domestic industry. It is indeed likely that such a 
statement is true, as the RECs have made their concerns regarding the contract market apparent to the 
regulator, and have sought to diversify away from National Power and Powergen. It is also true to 
state that because of their individual size in the contract market that the RECs do not have the same 
power as the larger generators, unless they were permitted to bargain collectively for contract terms. 
However, it is uncertain whether the generators would permit the regulator to tolerate such a 
monopsony situation in the market. 
Throughout this review of the literature on the contract market, the role of the contract market has 
become increasingly apparent. It is now appropriate to turn to the main empirical study that forms the 
basis of this chapter. 
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Section 1H - Assming the Validity of the Price-Demand Relationship. 
3. L The contribudon of Rehn & Poweli 
One of the most important studies into the effects that the contract market can have upon the pool is 
that of Helm & Powell (1992). By an analysis of pool prices from vesting until August 1991, it is 
shown that there was a large increase in prices without any apparent underlying structural foundation. 
The increase occurred on or around the 22 March 1991, coinciding with the dissolution of the first set 
of vesting contracts. Prior to this event, there had also been a close relationship between pool purchase 
prices (PPP) and electricity demand, which was severely disrupted after this event. 
Helm & Powell conclude that there was a structural break that distorted the price-demand relationship, 
which is determined to be a long-run relationship. Having determined that both PPP and demand 
exhibit stationarity, the authors proceed to examine whether or not there is a stable long-run 
relationship between the two variables. The initial test is indicative of some uncertainty, but a 
subsequent test that utilises a dummy variable possessing a value of zero until 22 March 1991 and a 
value of unity thereafter is more successful. In this latter test, there is very strong evidence of such a 
long-run relationship, and it is therefore concluded that there was a relationship between these two 
variables that was altered in late March 199 1. 
A subsequent approach utilises a dynamic model of PPP and demand with an error correction format. 
This model should, and does, illustrate the same conclusions as the initial test by utilising a lagged 
format for both variables and the dummy variable. An important point that was noted was the 
statistical significance of the dummy variable, indicating the change to the long-run relationship. The 
final approach used was that of general to specific modelling to develop a model with an error 
correction format. The durnmy variable retained its statistical significance in this model, and the error 
correction format was validated as accurate, despite some statistical problems. 
In order to ascertain the reasons behind these conclusions, bid data obtained from the NGC was 
studied as a means of estimating electricity supply curves for several time periods before and after 
April 1991. The conclusions derived from the supply schedules indicated that the curves had been 
shifted upwards and to the left. The only plausible reason for this is that the bids that comprise the 
supply function had been increased up to or beyond competitive levels. 
Gray, Hehn & Powell (1995) builds on the work of Helm & Powell (1992) by extending the data set 
to encompass the second set of contracts for differences, as well as several other regulatory 
announcements, some of which are the same as those used in this study. (T'he econometric 
methodology is the same as for Helm & Powell, 1992). In addition, the authors try to isolate how these 
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announcements affect the relationship between pool prices and demand by analysing how they change 
the pool price at different times of the day. Specifically, the basis of comparison is the weekly 
averages of the six EFA periods. The authors conclude that not only has the contract market exerted a 
significant influence on pool prices, but also that regulation has had a smaller than anticipated effect 
on prices. In addition, they conclude that the event that has had the single greatest influence on pool 
prices, prior to the 1994 price cap agreement is the first pool price review -a result consistent with 
those in the preceding chapter. 
3.2. Replicating the work of Hehn & Powell 
In analysing the possibility of a long-run change in the relationship between pool prices and demand, 
both variables in question should be stationary, as tested for by the Dickey-Fuller and the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests. This requires the analysis of equations of the form detailed for both pool prices 
(2.1) and demand (2.2). For details of all subsequent equations, see Table 1. (NB. All variables are in 
the equations are in natural logs): 
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) show the standard univariate analysis utilised in the preceding chapter for 
the testing of stationarity. (The tau coefficient represents a time trend. ) In the case of pool prices, the 
data is stationary according to both tests, but the sequence does exhibit serial correlation as well as 
mild indications of an ARCH process. In the case of demand, stationarity is again attained, and 
although there is no indication of serial correlation, there is again the existence of ARCH, which is 
more pronounced than in the pool price regression. 
In order to ascertain the nature of the price-demand relationship, one must regress prices on demand 
and analyse the residuals generated in order to see whether they are stationary. This requires the 
analysis of an equation possessing the static form (23). Stationarity is indeed present, but there is 
strong evidence of serial correlation and an ARCH process present in the residuals. Next a dummy 
variable was inserted in order to determine the impact of the break-up of the first set of vesting 
contracts. This dummy possessed the value of zero from the start of the observation set until 22nd 
March 1991, and the value of unity thereafter. This generates equation (2.4), the results of which 
indicate the existence of a highly significant dummy. Although the subsequent results exhibit 
stationarity, the existence of serial correlation and an ARCH process is again evident. 
A possible complicating factor in this analysis is that there is the risk of ambiguity in assessing 
whether the equation under examination in both the 1992 and 1995 papers (and therefore in this work) 
is a demand function or a supply function -a typical question of identification. 
Given the technicalities 
associated with electricity generation, the supply curve is typically fixed, while it is demand that 
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exhibits more short-term volatility. In the long run, the reverse is true. It is possible that over a longer- 
term time series that this point should be examined ftu-ther, and indeed one possible way of rectifying 
this ambiguity is through the use of an instrumental variable. The most logical choice would be to 
incorporate weather conditions (through temperature) into the analysis, as temperature is correlated 
with demand (Wolfi-an, 1995) but not supply. However, temperature may indeed influence supply, as 
generating plant maintenance is typically seasonal and occurs in the surruner. 2 
3.3. Incorporating the second set of contracts. 
The analysis was then performed with a second dummy variable inserted into the regression instead 
of the first. This dummy - representing the break up of the second set of contracts - has the value 
of zero from the beginning of the data set until 31" March 1993, and the value of unity thereafter. 
This generates a regression of the form (2.5). In examining the results from estimating this 
equation, it is seen that the dummy does attain significance, although the diagnostic results are 
again potentially problematic. Equation (2.6) containing both dummy variables was then estimated, 
with the first dummy attaining significance, but the second dummy does not. Stationarity was also 
generated within the data set, but serial correlation and ARCH are also present. The results are 
presented in depth in Table 2. 
As a footnote to this section of the analysis, structural break analysis was also attempted using the 
Chow test. However, despite the occurrence of structural breaks, the extremely poor diagnostic 
performance of these results limits their reliability. 
Next, following the methodology of Helm & Powell's paper, a dynamic model of pool prices and 
demand was performed, the basic model in equation (2.7). This model was tested, as was a model 
with five lags of the pool price variable, five lags of the demand variable and two lags of each 
dummy variable. The model was re-estimated along the lines presented in Table 3, with an 
increasing number of variations for each lag of each variable. This approach resulted in 450 
permutations of the same model with the basic format of equation (2.7). These models were 
evaluated using the Schwarz infon-nation criterion and the Akaike information criterion in order to 
derive the optimal model structure. The results are summarised in Table 3. 
The optimal models are the same for each of the respective information criteria: A30, i. e. five price 
lags, five demand lags and each dummy. However, neither dummy is significant, in contrast with 
the long-run relationship implied above. Throughout the model evaluation process, the increased 
2 This is one of the suggestions put forward by Andrew Powell 
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number of lags had a predominantly detrimental performance on the diagnostic results, with the 
simpler models tending to have better diagnostic performances. 
Finally, again in keeping with the work of Helm & Powell, a general-to-specific approach was 
utilised to develop a more simplified version of the relationship using equations (2.8), (2.9) and 
(2.10). In the case of the individual dummies, the first (2.8) attained significance, while the second 
(2.9) did not. Stationarity was also attained, although an ARCH process appeared to be in effect. 
These results were repeated in (2.10) with both dummies present. The results are presented further 
in Table 2. 
Variable deletion tests were performed on the regressions in order to determine the importance of the 
dummies. In the static regressions - as with the work of Hehn & Powell - the results indicated that the 
first dummy could not be eliminated when it was the only one present, while the second dummy could 
be deleted when it was not alone in the equation. There is a theoretical rationale for this outcome: the 
inter-relationships between the dummies could imply that the effects of the second dummy are 
overshadowed by the effects of the first. 
Alternatively, the second set of vesting contracts may have been smaller in magnitude and could have 
had a smaller effect. However, because the contracts that were terminated after the first year were 
fi-anchise market contracts and covered a smaller proportion of capacity than the second set, this 
cannot be the case. Alternatively, it could be argued that only the first break-up generated a response 
from the generators, although this is inconsistent with the results obtained from the dynamic analyses 
that clearly indicate the significance of the two dummies. In the dynamic equations, the variable 
deletion test on equation (2.10) showed that both dummies could not be deleted in the long-run, 
potentially implying that the long-term effects of the contract break-up have been negated by 
subsequent price declines. 
The underlying cause of the first break has already been examined in Heim & Powell's paper, and 
therefore there is little reason to repeat their findings. However, an analysis of the second break is 
necessary, and may be performed - in the absence of data on the loss of load probability (LOLP) - by 
using uplift levels. 
LOLP is typically stable in the absence of any severe system outages and generally fluctuates only 
marginally (see the previous chapter for finther information on uplift and the loss of load probability). 
Therefore, if the generators increase their bids to the pool, system marginal price (SMP, the cost of 
plant actually called upon to generate) will increase and therefore so will uplift (the cost of plant held 
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in reserve). In fact, it is the bids of National Power and Powergen with which we are concerned, as 
they are responsible for setting price in the pool approximately 85% of the time (the NGC's pumped 
storage businesses set price the remaining 15% of the time). 
At the time of the dissolution of the vesting contracts uplift increased by approximately sixty-five 
percentý and maintained this level for almost two months. Although it is possible that this was due to 
an increase in the loss of load probability, it is an extreme coincidence to assume that LOLP should 
increase at the same time as the vesting contracts expired. A fin-ther piece of evidence that supports the 
belief that the increase was due to the vesting contracts is an announcement from Offer: in response to 
the increase in pool prices and uplift levels since late March, the regulator demanded an explanation 
from the generators on the 24th May 1993. This led to an immediate and marked decrease in uplift 
levels and a corresponding decrease in prices. Rationally, if these increases were the consequence of 
LOLP, then they would not have declined so sharply in the face of a regulatory announcement. 
Although this evidence is by no means conclusive, it raises considerable questions as to the 
motivations of the generators. 
3.4. Incorporating regulatoty announcements into the Helm & Powell approach. 
To finther expand die use of the methodology of Heim & Powell and, as a means of integrating the 
structure of analysis fi-om the first empirical chapter, we will now use the pool purchase price-demand 
regression to examine the events established previously. In order to retain the structure utilised within 
the first empirical chapter, the short-run time frame adopted there will be used here also. This analysis 
will require the use of the same regression as for the dissolution of contracts for differences, but with 
each individual dummy variable being inserted into the equation as each of the events are analysed. 
6ppp, =a+, koED, +), iED,. i+)ý2PPP, -j+. ý3DUMAIY, -j+ut (2.11) 
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Table I. Eguations utflised to examine the pool price-demand relationshim 
APPPI ýa+ POT + PIPPPt-I + P2APPPI-I + 03APPPt-2 (2.1) 
AEA a+ yv-r + pEA-i + y2AEDt-j + y3AEDt-2 (2.2) 
PPPt a+ý, ED, (2.3) 
PPPt a+ AoEDt + XiDUMAffAt (2.4) 
PPPt a+ XoED, + XiDUMAffBt (2.5) 
PPPt a+ XoEDi +, kiDUMAffAi + X2DUMMYBt (2.6) 
APPPt =a+ Xor + XiED, + X2EA-i + X3PPPt-I (2.7) 
APPA =a+ Xor + XiEDt + X2EDt-i + X3PPPt-i + ý-4DUMMYAt-l (2.8) 
APPA =a+ An + XiED, + X2EDt-i +, k3PPPt-I +, k4DUMAffB, -, (2.9) 
APPA =a +XoT + bEDt + X2EA-i + ; L3PPPt-I + ), 4DUMMYAt-i + X5DUMMYBt-i 
(2.10) 
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Table 2. Dummy Variable Analvsis from Price-Demand Reeressions 
2.1. Static Pool Price-Demand Analyses. 
iI Regressor 
2.4 DUMMYA 
2.5 DUMMYB 
2.6 DUMMYA 
DUMMYB 
Dummy Sign 
Anticipated/ActuaýSignificant I Coefficient I Deletable 
Positive/Positive 
Positive/Positive 
Positive/Positive 
Positive/Positive 
2.2. Dynamic Pool Price-Demand Analyses. 
I Equation I Regressor 
2.8 DUMMYA* 
2.9 DUMMYB* 
2.10 DUMMYA* 
DUMMYB* 
Dummy Sign 
Yes 0.22741 
Yes 0.04394 
Yes 0.22607 
No 0.00232 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Anticipated/Actual I Significant I Coefficient I Deletable I 
Positive/Positive 
Positive/Positive 
Positive/Positive 
Positive/Positive 
Yes 0,035358 No 
No 0.014314 Yes 
Yes 0.044632 No 
Yes 0.027555 No 
. Indicates that dummies are lagged by one time period to retain Heim & Powell approach. 
For the format of the equations listed, see Table 1. 
For all of the regressions listed here, note the following information: 
I- The dummy variable values were as follows: 
Sample I- 173, DUMMYA =0 Sample 174 - 1887, DUMWA =I 
Sample I- 913, DUMMYB =0 Sample 914 - 1887, DUMMYB =I 
For equations (2.4), (2.5), (2.6): 
1887 observations were used for estimation from I to 1887. 
For equations (2.8), (2.9), (2.10): 
1886 observations were used for estimation from 2 to 1887. 
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Table 3. Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria Test Results. 
Section 3.1.1. A kaikeinformation Critera Test Results - Pall I 
A 
I 
2 
3 
FT 
5 
61 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
B CIDJEIFIG 
! ý-3.70453 -3.70242 -3.70039 -3.70300 -3.70090 -3.69887 -3.70145 
-3.98944 -3.98896 -3.98879 -3.98952 -3.98905 -3.98888 -3,98957 
-3.99023 -3.98975 -3.98954 -3.99032 -3.98984 -3.98962 -3.99032 
1 -3.99051 -3-99003 -3.98981 -3.99059 -3.99006 -3.98991 -3.99059 
-3.99066 -3.99017 -3.98996 -3.99073 -3.99021 -3.99068 -3.99374 
-3.99249 -3.99200 -3.99185 -3.99256 -3.99207 -3.99192 -3.99256 
-3.70366 -3.70156 -3.69950 -3.70214 -3.70004 -3.69797 -3.70056 
-3.98851 -3.98803 -3.98783 -3.98860 -3.98812 -3.98791 -3.98860 
-3.98879 -3.98831 -3.98810 -3.98888 -3.98840 -3.98819 -3.98888 
-3.98911 -3.98863 -3.98842 -3.98919 -3.98871 -3.98850 -3.98920 
-3.98925 -3.98877 -3.98856 -3.98933 -3.98885 -3.98864 -3.98934 
-3.99111 -3.99062 -3.99047 -3.99118 -3.99069 -3.99054 -3.99118 
-3.73176 -3.72963 -3.72756 -3.73024 -3.72811 -3.72603 -3.72841 1-4.01877 
-4.01827 -4.01807 -4.01887 -4.01838 -4.01817 -4.01862 
-4.01880 -4.01831 -4.01811 -4.01891 -4.01841 -4.01821 -4.01891 
-4.02681 -4.02632 -4.02615 -4.02697 -4.02648 -4.02631 -4.02697 
-4.02721 -4.02673 4.02655 -4.02736 4.02688 -4.02671 -4.02737 
-4.02982 -4.02933 -4.02924 -4.02995 -4.02946 -4.02937 -4.02996 
-3.74108 -3.73895 -3.73685 -3.73988 -3.73742 -3.73533 -3.73796 
-4.02880 -4.02831 -4.02809 -4.02926 -4.02842 -4.02820 -4.02891 
-4.02881 -4.02833 -4.02811 -4.02892 -4.02843 -4.02821 -4.02893 
-4.03975 -4.03926 -4.03907 -4.03992 -4.03943 -4.03925 -4.03993 
-4.04311 -4.04259 -4.04242 -4.04329 4.04278 -4.04260 -4.04332 
-4.04706 -4.04654 -4.04647 -4.04722 -4.04670 -4.04663 -4.04724 
-3.76911 -3.76697 -3.76488 -3.76756 -3.76542 -3.76333 -3.76595 
-4.05899 -4.05850 4.05830 -4.05908 -4.05859 -4.05839 -4.05909 
-4.05899 -4.05850 -4.05830 -4.05908 -4.05859 -4.05839 -4.05909 
-4.06882 -4.06833 -4.06817 -4.06893 -4.06845 -4.06829 -4.06897 
-4.07545 -4.07530 -4.07613 -4.07561 -4.07545 -4.07617 
-4.07769 -4.07745 -4.07838 -4.07786 -4.07762 -4.07842 
For information on codes, see Section 3.3. 
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Section 3.1.2 Akaike Information Critera Test Resufts- Part H 
ýI 
Tj 
3 
5 
IE 7 
9 
10 
11 
E L 13 
li4 
ý 15 
16 
17 
9 18 
19 
20 
Ei 
22 
E3 
24 
17ý 
26 
F2-77 
28 
a 30 
HH 
-1 
I I i I K LIMNIO 
-3.69934 -3.69727 -3.70608 -3.70612 -3.70609 -3.69589 -3.69587 -3.69585 
-3.98909 -3.98888 -3.98941 -3.98930 -3.98929 -3.98653 -3.98651 -3.98648 
-3.98984 -3.98963 -3.99021 -3.99009 -3.99005 -3.98712 -3.98997 -3.98706 
-3.99011 -3.98989 -3.99049 -3.99037 -3.99033 -3.98733 -3.98732 -3.98728 
-3.99622 -3.99004 -3.99064 -3.99052 -3.99047 -3.98745 -3.98743 -3.98739 
-3.99207 -3.99192 -3.99247 -3.99236 -3.99232 -3.98931 -3.98930 -3.98926 
-3.69845 -3.69638 -3.70522 -3.70526 -3.70520 -3.69508 -3.69507 -3.69503 
-3.98812 -3.98792 -3.98849 -3.98838 -3.98833 -3.98565 -3.98564 -3.98560 
-3.98840 -3.98820 -3.98877 -3.98866 -3.98861 -3.98580 -3.98578 -3.98574 
1 -3.98871 -3.98850 -3.98909 -3.98898 -3.98894 -3.98606 -3.98604 -3.98601 
-3-98885 -3.98864 -3.99111 -3.99109 -3.99098 -3.99093 -3.98806 -3.98804 
-3.99069 -3.99054 -3.99109 -3.99099 -3.99094 -3.98805 -3.98803 -3.98799 
-3.72620 -3.72346 -3.73334 -3.73338 -3.73332 -3.72348 -3.72347 -3.72344 
4.01805 4.01713 4.01875 4.01864 -4.01860 -4.01629 -4.01627 -4.01624 
4.01842 -4.01822 4.01879 4.01868 4.01864 4.01640 -4.01639 -4.01635 
-4.02648 -4.02631 4.02679 -4.02668 4.02665 4.02497 -4.02496 -4.02492 
4.02689 4.02671 4.02719 4.02707 -4.02704 -4.02525 -4.02523 -4.02520 
4.02947 -4.02938 -4.02980 4.02968 4.02966 -4.02786 -4.02785 -4.02781 
-3.73582 -3.73372 -3.74266 -3.74271 -3.74265 -3.73286 -3.73285 -3.73282 
4.02842 4.02821 4.02879 -4.02868 -4.02864 4.02641 -4.02639 -4.02636 
-4.02844 4.02822 4.02881 4.02869 -4.02865 4.02648 4.02646 4.02643 
-4.03944 -4.03926 4.03973 -4.03961 4.03958 -4.03806 -4.03805 -4.03802 
-4.04280 4.04262 4.04309 4.04299 4.04295 -4.04172 -4.04172 -4.04169 
-4.04671 4.04665 -4.04705 -4.04695 -4.04691 -4.04566 -4.04565 -4.04562 
-3.76381 -3.76171 -3.77071 -3.77077 -3.77071 -3.76119 -3.76118 -3.76116 
4.05860 -4.05840 -4.05898 -4.05889 -4.05885 4.05697 -4.05695 -4.05693 
4.05860 4,05840 -4.05898 4,05889 -4.05885 -4,05699 -4.05698 -4.05695 
4.06849 4.06833 -4.06880 4.06871 -4.06868 -4.06739 4.06738 -4.06735 
4.07564 4.07549 4.07596 -4.07588 -4.07584 -4,07495 -4.07494 -4.07491 
4.07790 4.07766 4.07819 4.07812 4.07807 -4.07731 -4.07730 -4.07728 
Objective: Minimise Akaike Information Criteria 
Optimal Regression: A30 
For information on codes, see Section 3.3. 
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Section 3-Z I-Schwarz Information Critera Test Results - Part I 
IIcID 
T-E IFIG -] 
-3.67741 -3.67235 -3.66737 -3.67294 -3.66799 -3.66290 -3.66846 
-3.98650 -3.98602 -3.98585 -3.98658 -3.98611 -3.98593 -3.98663 
-3.98729 -3.98681 -3.98660 -3.98738 -3.98689 -3.98668 -3.98738 
-3.98757 -3.98708 -3.98687 -3.98765 -3.98712 -3.98687 -3.98765 
-3.98772 -3.98723 -3.98702 -3.98779 -3.98727 -3.98774 -3.99080 
-3.98955 -3-98906 -3.98891 -3.98962 -3.98913 -3.98898 -3.98962 
-3.67383 -3.66878 -3.66377 -3.66938 -3.66432 -3.65931 -3.66486 
-3.98263 -3.98215 -3.98194 -3.98271 -3.98223 -3.98203 -3.98272 
-3.98291 -3.98243 -3.98222 -3.98300 -3.98252 -3.98230 -3.98300 
-3.98323 -3.98275 -3.98253 -3.98331 -3.98283 -3.98261 -3.98331 
-3.98337 -3.98289 -3.98267 -3.98345 -3.98297 -3.98275 -3.98345 
-3.98523 -3.98474 -3.98458 -3.98530 -3.98480 -3.98465 -3.98530 
-3.69903 -3.69393 -3.68889 -3.69456 -3.68946 -3.68440 -3.68977 
-4.00994 -4.00944 -4.00924 4.01004 4.00955 -4.00934 -4.00979 
-4.00997 -4.00948 4.00927 4.01008 -4.00958 -4.00937 -4.01008 
-4.01798 -4.01749 -4.01731 -4.01814 4.01765 -4.01747 -4.01814 
-4.01838 -4.01790 -4.01772 4.01854 -4.01805 -4.01787 -4.01854 
-4.02099 -4.02049 -4.02040 -4.02113 4.02063 -4.02054 -4.02113 
-3.70556 -3.70046 -3.69539 -3.70141 -3.69598 -3.69090 -3.69653 
4.01702 4.01653 4.01631 -4.01748 -4.01664 -4.01641 -4.01714 
-4.01704 -4.01655 -4.01632 -4.01715 -4.01665 -4.01643 -4.01716 
4.02797 -4.02748 -4.02729 4.02814 -4.02765 4.02746 -4.02815 
-4.03134 -4.03081 -4.03063 4.03152 4.03100 -4.03081 -4.03154 
-4.03529 -4.03476 -4.03469 4.03545 4.03492 -4.03485 -4.03547 
-3.73069 -3.72556 -3.72047 -3.72617 -3.72103 -3.71594 -3.72158 
-4.04426 -4.04377 -4.04357 -4.04435 -4.04386 -4.04366 -4.04436 
-4.04426 -4.04377 -4.04357 -4.04435 -4.04386 -4.04366 -4.04436 
-4.05409 4.05360 -4.05343 -4.05421 -4.05372 -4.05355 4.05425 
-4-06125 -4.06072 4.06056 -4.06141 -4.06088 -4.06072 -4.06144 
Elmom -4.06296 -4.06271 4.06366 4.06313 -4.06288 -4.06370 
For information on codes, see Section 3.3. 
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Section 3.21. Schwarz Information Crilera Test Results -Part H 
1 
E2 
3 
L4 
5 
16 ý 
17 ý 
L8L 
L9 
10 
LLI 
12 
ý 13 
14 
ý 15 
16 
Ll 7 
ý 18 
19 
z 
21 
22 
23 
24 
F2-57 
72-6ý 
27 
ý 28 
29 
30 
H 
1 -3.66339 
1 -3.98615 
ý -3.98690 
1 -3.98717 
-3.98913 
5 -3.99328 
-3.65980 
-3.98224 
-3.98252 
-3.98283 
1 -3.98297 
1 -3.98481 
-3.68459 
1-4.00922 
i -4.00959 
-4.01765 
-4.01806 
4.02064 
-3.69142 
-4.01664 
-4,01666 
4.02766 
- 4.03102 
-4.03493 
-3.71644 
-4.04387 
4.04387 
4.05376 
4.06091 
-4.06317 
I I i I LJAI I NJO 
-3.65836 -3.68189 -3.68194 -3.68190 -3.67168 -3.67167 -3.67164 
-3.98594 -3.98647 -3.98636 -3.98635 -3.98359 -3.98357 -3.98354 
-3.98669 -3.98727 -3.98715 -3.98711 -3.98418 -3.98703 -3.98412 
-3.98695 -3.98755 -3.98743 -3.98739 -3.98439 -3.98438 -3.98434 
-3.98710 -3.98770 -3.98758 -3.98753 -3.98451 -3.98449 -3.98445 
-3-98898 -3.98953 -3.98942 -3.98938 -3.98637 -3.98636 -3.98632 
-3.65477 -3.67832 -3.67836 -3.67830 -3.66817 -3.66815 -3.66812 
-3.98203 -3.98260 -3.98249 -3.98245 -3.97977 -3.97976 -3.97972 
-3-98231 -3.98289 -3.98277 -3.98273 -3.97992 -3.97990 -3.97986 
-3.98261 -3.98321 -3.98310 -3.98305 -3.98018 -3.98016 -3.98012 
-3.98275 -3.98523 -3.98521 -3.98509 -3.98505 -3.98218 -3,98216 
-3.98466 -3.98521 -3.98510 -3.98506 -3.98217 -3.98215 -3,98211 
-3.67888 -3.70355 -3.70360 -3.70354 -3.69368 -3.69367 -3.69364 
4.00830 -4.00992 4.00981 -4.00978 -4.00746 -4.00745 -4.00741 
4.00938 4.00996 4.00985 -4.00981 -4.00757 4.00756 -4.00753 
4.01748 4.01796 4.01785 4.01782 4.01614 -4.01613 -4.01610 
4.01788 4.01836 4.01824 4.01821 -4.01642 -4.01640 -4.01637 
4.02054 -4.02097 -4.02086 4.02083 4.01903 -4.01902 -4.01898 
-3.68634 -3.71010 -3.71015 -3.71009 -3.70030 -3.70028 -3.70025 
-4.01642 4.01702 4.01690 -4.01686 4.01463 -4.01462 -4.01458 
-4.01644 4.01703 4.01692 -4.01688 -4.01470 -4.01469 -4.01466 
-4.02747 -4.02795 -4.02784 -4.02781 -4.02629 -4.02628 -4.02625 
4.03083 4.03132 4.03121 4.03117 -4.02995 -4.02994 -4.02991 
4.03487 -4.03527 -4.03517 4.03513 -4.03388 -4.03388 -4.03385 
3.71134 -3.73526 -3.73532 -3.73526 -3.72575 -3.72573 -3.72571 
4.04367 4.04426 4.04416 -4.04412 -4.04224 -4.04223 -4.04220 
4.04367 4.04426 4.04417 -4.04413 -4.04227 -4.04225 -4.04223 
4.05359 4.05408 -4.05398 -4.05395 -4.05267 -4.05266 -4.05263 
4.06075 4.06124 4.06116 -4.06111 -4.06022 -4.06021 -4.06019 
-4.06292 -4.06347 -4.06339 -4.06335 4.06259 -4.06258 4.06256 
Objective: Minimise Schwarz Information Criteria 
Optimal Regression: A30 
For information on codes, see Section 3.3. 
I 
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Section 3.3. Codes usedfor Sections 3. L and 3.2. 
Part 1: Lefter Codes 
Dual dummy regressions 
Dl 
D1(-1) 
D2(-2) 
I D2(-I) D2(-2F D2 )7 
ABc 
DE 
G 
Single dummy regressions 
Dl 
Dl(-I) 
D2(-2) 
i 
K 
L 
D2 
D2(-I) 
D2(-2) 
m 
N 
0 
Part 11: Number Codes 
FP-RICE(-l) 
PRICE(-2) 
PRICE(-3) 
PRICE(4) 
PRICE(-5)1 
DEMANDIDEMAND(A) DEMAND(-2)IDEMAND(-3)IDEMAND(-4)IDEMAND(-5) 
123456 
789 10 11 12 
13 14 15 16 17 18 
19 20 21 22 23 24 
25 26 27 28 29 30 
For example, Regression A30 has both dummy variables, each without lags, and five lags each of the 
price and demand variables. 
165 
IS The resulft of the analyses. 
The first regression maintains the significance of the dummy representing the break-up of the first set 
of contracts for differences. Die presence of this dummy is again seen as valid by means of the 
variable deletion test. The second regression, representing the beginning of the price spikes, does not 
attain significance. This is not as expected, as one would have anticipated the size of the spikes to 
have disrupted the relationship between pool prices and demand. However, the dummy fails to attain 
significance and may be successful deleted. The third regression, representing the announcement of 
the first pool price review did manage to attain significance, and its presence was seen to be required 
by the variable deletion test. This is not surprising, given the importance of this event in the earlier 
analysis and Gray, Heim & Powell (1995). 
The fourth regression again generated a negative significant dummy, representing the publishing of the 
first pool price review. The variable deletion test again validated the presence of the dummy. The fifth 
dummy, representing a threat of an MMC reference for the generators, did not attain significance and 
its presence was again seen as unnecessary by the variable deletion test. The sixth dummy, that of the 
announcement of the second pool price review, also failed to attain significance and its presence was 
again rejected by the variable deletion test. 
The seventh regression, containing the dummy for the publishing of the second pool price review, did 
generated the anticipated negative significant dummy. The presence of the dummy was also required 
by the variable deletion test. Significance was also attained by the dummy for the eighth regression, 
that of the break-up of the second set of contracts for differences. The presence of the dummy variable 
was again seen as necessary, as given by the variable deletion test. The ninth regression, containing 
the dummy for another threat of an MMC reference failed to achieve significance, as for the previous 
MMC threat. 
The tenth and eleventh regressions, both of which represented further threats of MMC references, also 
failed to attain significance, and the presence of dummy variables in these regressions was not 
required. However, the twelfth regression - that of the price agreement between the regulator and the 
generators - did produce a negative significant dummy variable, and was accepted by the variable 
deletion test. The remaining regressions produced a similar response to that observed in the first 
empirical chapter, namely a series of insignificant dummies, with the exception of the February 1995 
MMC reference. This should not be surprising due to these events being largely financial events. 
This therefore leaves us with seven occasions on which a dwrimy variable gained significance as a 
consequence of some form of exogenous influence on the pool. The results are shown in Table 4 and 
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may be summarised as follows. 
- Dummy 1: Break-up of first set of CFDs 
- Dummy 3: First pool price review begins with MMC threat 
- Dummy 4: First pool price review published 
Dummy 7: Second pool price review published 
Dummy 8 Break-up of second set of CFDs 
Dummy 12: National Power and Powergen establish price agreement 
Dummy 14: NMC reference threatened over plant sales 
It should not be surprising that the break-up of the contracts for differences should generate positive 
significant dummies. This is because their significance over the entire three and a half-year period was 
already justified in the preceding section. The effect of the announcement of the first pool price review 
and with it the fint occasion on which the generators faced an MMC reference has already been 
detailed in the preceding chapter. The publishing of the first and second pool price reviews brought 
with them pricing restrictions for the generators, and therefore the dummies' significance is not 
entirely unexpected. The same logic is true of the establishment of the price agreement between the 
generators and the regulator. 
However, the key question linked to this section of the analysis still remains, as it did throughout the 
preceding chapter, namely the impact (or lack thereof) of the threat of an MMC reference. On the 
basis of this analysis, we could conclude that only the first occasion that an N4MC reference was 
threatened did it have any effect on the generators. This announcement led to a disruption of the 
relationship between pool prices and demand in such a manner that prices declined to the benefit of 
the consumer. However, all subsequent threats (with the exception of that in February 1995) did not 
have any effect on the pool purchase price-demand relationship because the generators did not believe 
that it would be carried out. This would be a logical conclusion based upon the view of credible and 
incredible threats dictated by game theory analysis. 
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Table 4. Additional Price-Demand Reeressions. 
DUMMY SIGN 
Event Anticipated/Actual Signiflean 
I Positive/Positive Yes 
2 Positive/Positive No 
3 Negative/Negative Yes 
4 Negative/Negative Yes 
5 Negative/Positive No 
6 Negative/Positive No 
7 Negative/Negative Yes 
8 Positive/Positive Yes 
9 Negative/Negative No 
10 Negative/Negative No 
II Negative/Negative No 
12 Negative/Negative Yes 
13 Unknown /Negative No 
14 Negative/Negative Yes 
15 Unknown /Negative No 
16 Negative/Negative No 
17 Unknown /Negative No 
18 Negative/Negative No 
19 Unknown /Positive No 
20 Negative/Negative No 
21 Negative/Negative No 
22 Negative/Positive No 
23 Negative/Positive No 
Coefficient "Deletable" 
0.0432070 No 
0.0026414 Yes 
-0.1503100 No 
-0.1106100 No 
0.0064264 Yes 
0.0089321 Yes 
-0.0449300 No 
0.0751560 No 
-0.0040639 Yes 
-0.0150070 Yes 
-0.0254490 Yes 
-0.0734350 No 
-0.0318250 Yes 
-0.1725000 No 
-0.0129170 Yes 
-0.0262490 Yes 
-0.0106210 Yes 
-0.0082587 Yes 
0.0012090 Yes 
-0.0231130 Yes 
-0.0436960 Yes 
0.0023674 Yes 
0.0882920 Yes 
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Section IV - Conclusions. 
This study revisits the work of Helm & Powell in their groundbreaking study on the nature of 
interactions between the two markets for electricity, with the conclusions reached here reinforcing 
their results. 
It is apparent that based upon the evidence, the market for electricity contracts serves an important 
Purpose, not only in the functioning of the electricity-generating sector, but also in the ffinctioning of 
the pool. Although the pool is subject to considerable regulation by Offer, there is no direct regulation 
of the market for contracts, but the same broad regulatory announcements and rulings as the pool 
doubtless affect it, However, based upon these analyses, it is clear that more interest should be taken 
in the contract market as it is apparent that it does play an important role in determining pool prices. 
The key results of this study are the same as those of Helm & Powell, with the only contradiction 
being the relative importance of the break-up of the first set of contracts. In their analysis, the dummy 
representing that event could not be successfully deleted, which is not the case here. However, this is 
by no means a flaw in their reasoning, and could be attributed to their smaller data set. Unfortunately, 
in addition to this analysis supporting the conclusions of Helm & Powell, it also bears some of its 
flaws: namely the poor diagnostic performance which those authors determined could affect the 
reliability of their results. 
The success of the analysis to show the impact of contracts on the pool has also been supported by the 
results of the additional studies that show how the events selected for the previous chapter influence 
the price-demand relationship. This is in the case of both the standard and the non-standard 
relationships. The diagnostic performance of the regressions is not ideal, but autocorrelation in prices 
is due to the inevitability of pool price trends, while non-normality of residuals is due to the fact that 
the price distribution will be both skewed and truncated. 
The vesting contracts themselves were established in three blocks. QUICS (Qualifying Industrial 
Customers' Scheme) that were nuclear backed and were dropped after one year; capacity 
compensation contracts that were designed to give National Power and Powergen incentives to close 
plant, and were therefore often plant specific; and the coal-backed CFDs designed to provide 
compensation to British Coal. It is possible that prices rose in the years after the contract dissolution 
as contract premia fell away and generators had to maintain profits. However, the CFDs themselves 
remain important transitional arrangements in the privatisation process. 
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It is possible that a full study of the contract market could be undertaken, were the required empirical 
data available. However, as long as the electricity companies demand commercial sensitivity of their 
contract information, such an analysis cannot be carried out. This is unfortunately a problem that will 
not be rectified until the regulator ensures disclosure of contract information firom all parties in 
question. However, it is theoretically possible to establish general estimates of the strike prices of 
contracts, as based upon information published to date by Offer, the generators, and the RECs. 
Specifically, the fourth empirical chapter (Chapter VIII) will contain analyses based upon a data set 
that has been created to proxy the strike prices of the vesting contracts. This was achieved by the 
manipulation of the Horton W estimates to establish a data set that corresponds to the pool price 
observations for the analysis period in question. This work will be contrasted with an empirical 
evaluation of the American electricity contract market using actual electricity forecast prices and the 
relevant spot prices for both peak and off-peak periods. It is hoped therefore, that subsequent analyses 
in this work will allow the determination of the nature (if any) of the interrelationships between the 
spot and forward markets for electricity. 
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Section I- Regulation and share returns. 
1.1. The effects of regukifion on retums. 
As noted above, it is hypothesised that regulation will have an impact on the share returns of a 
regulated company. However, there are three fi7arneworks that can be used to interpret the nature of 
regulation (Antoniou, Batty & Pescetto, 1995). Firstly, the public interest theory of regulation, under 
which regulation exists to counter potential detrimental consequences of the conduct of privatised 
utilities: the existence of monopoly power and the potential for externalities in supply. The former 
arises as a consequence of the fact that privatised utilities are typically large companies with 
considerable market power in an industry with few viable competitors. Such a structure often arises 
from economies of scale and/or scope, and with die possibility of monopoly power, underproduction 
and higher prices compared to a similar firm in a less concentrated market structure. The latter case of 
supply externalities could also be seen as consistent with underproduction vis-A-vis the socially 
optimal output level. In this case, regulation is aimed at restricting the exploitation of consumers and 
the exertion of the company's power. As such, regulation should result in a decline in the share price(s) 
of the regulated company (ies). 
Secondly, the regulatory capture hypothesis (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976,1984; Posner, 1974) 
argues that "it is in the private interest of a vote-maximising government to allow regulatory 
programmes to reflect the interests of powerful electoral groups, usually associated with industry 
interests, " (Dnes & Seaton, 1995, pg. 3). Capture occurs when the regulator effectively becomes the 
firm's advocate - intentionally or not. For example, if the incumbent could persuade the regulator that 
it would be appropriate to restrict entry, then the incumbent would be allowed to maintain its position 
in the industry, which could result in the exploitation of consumers. Alternatively, the regulator could 
be persuaded to institute a price control system that allowed the firm to maintain high prices and 
profits. In either case, regulation helps the incumbent firm(s) to retain monopoly power, and 
potentially to harm consumers. Regulatory decisions would then ultimately influence share prices. 
Finally, regulators could be operating in an attempt to maximise their own utility at the expense of 
both consumers and producers. In this case, regulators' objectives could be to increase their power and 
prove their worth. In such an environment, regulatory activity would be based around the need to be 
seen as useful rather than economic and social considerations. In this environment, regulation would 
influence share prices. 
1.2 Studies into regulation and share returns. 
Financial markets studies into the effects of regulation are quite common, with Schwert (1981) and 
Binder (I 985a) providing notable early examples of these. Schwert (198 1) notes that stock price data 
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are highly useful in assessing the effects of regulation on companies when compared to other types of 
data, such as accounting data. Stock price data are seen as being more accurate than accounting data, 
and typically provide a higher number of observations with greater frequency. However, Binder 
(1985a) notes that regulatory event studies are prone to some additional difficulty, vis-a-vis standard 
event studies. 
Firstly, unlike events such as the announcement of economic indicators, it is not always apparent 
exactly when expectations of regulation change. While there is a defined release date of the 
announcement from the regulator, the companies in the industry are typically made aware of an event 
prior to its relme. 
Secondly, it is not always the case that regulatory announcements have distinct positive or negative 
effects. Specifically, the effects of the same event may be asymmetric across a group of firms: some 
may gain and others may lose (see below). 
As noted in the introduction, these types of studies have been most commonly performed using US 
data. A brief summary of such studies is provided in the next section, with the subsequent section 
examining UK studies. 
1.2.1. American studies -A briefoverview. 
A range of models has been utilised to assess the impact of regulation on share returns for US 
companies. Schwert (1980) provides a detailed summary of such studies that rely upon such methods 
as the efficient markets hypothesis, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and cross-sectional 
models. As US regulatory structures have focused upon rates of return, many studies have relied upon 
examinations of the cost of capital and a comparison between the rate of return for regulated 
companies and the rate of return for either unregulated companies or the market as a whole. Such 
studies have relied upon a mixture of accounting and stock price information, and a variety of 
different methods, although the market model is one of the most common techniques. This can be 
attributed to its simplicity, yet its capacity to show clearly whether the profitability (returns) of an 
individual company exceed the market average (see below). 
In order to examine how different forms of regulation affect firms' profitability, Stigler & Friedland 
(1962) tested for the presence of abnormal returns in the shares of twenty electric utilities in thirty-two 
US states, each of which regulated electricity prices directly between 1907 and 1920. This involved 
estimating the returns to common stocks as a means of examining the impact of regulatory change. 
The results of the study indicated that there was no difference between the regulated and unregulated 
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utilities, implying that the regulation had no effect on the regulated companies. However, Schwert 
(1980) argues that this could be a false result as the averaging process used over the thirteen-year 
period could have masked the consequences of the event itself 
One of the most notable examples of a study that assesses how regulation affects different firms at 
different times utilises litigation as its basis. Ellert (1975) uses anti-trust legislation and violations over 
the period 1953-1971, incorporating the actions of the Justice Department, the Federal Trade 
Commission and private parties. Through an examination of the date on which the complaint was 
registered, the date of the initial decision, and the completion of a settlement, it is concluded that the 
actions of the Justice Department have the greatest impact on the offending firms. Schwert (1977) 
examines the effects of the actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on New York 
and American Stock Exchange membership prices. As membership is in the form of a seat on the 
exchanges, the price of these seats should be determined by the profitability of the activities in the 
exchanges. Schwert determines that the seat prices on both exchanges fell sharply in March 1934 - 
corresponding with the occasion on which the 1934 Securities and Exchanges Act was debated in 
Congress. It is also noted that seat prices on the New York exchange fell sharply when the SEC 
enforced reduced brokerage commissions on the exchange over the period 1968-1975. 
Finally, in assessing the asymmetric nature of the effects of same announcement on different firms, 
Binder (I 985a) notes that the 1973 and 1974 deregulation of the brokerage and railroad industries was 
both welcomed and objected to by different sections of the same industry. James (1982) shows that 
bank deregulation benefited wholesale banks, but banned commercial banks. Binder (I 985a) assesses 
the impact of a series of twenty regulatory announcements across different industries using both 
monthly and daily event windows. The industries under examination are railroad, electric utilities, 
banking, telecommunications, airlines, motor vehicles, gas, pharmaceuticals and textiles. Of the 
twenty events, twelve concerns either prices and/or entry, three are concerned with environmental 
issues, and one nationalised an industry. Although the events were chosen based upon the fact that 
they had been used previous studies and had been shown to exert an influence in those studies, the 
results generated by Binder (1985a) are somewhat mixed and are attributed to the difficulties 
associated with determining the timing of that event. 
A more recent study is Teets (1992) in which the relationship between unexpected earnings and 
abnormal returns is assessed for a series of regulated electric utilities and a random sample of non- 
regulated firms. This article stresses the role of information flows on expectations through the analysis 
of rate of return regulation and the extent of the regulatory lag. It is argued that while competition 
could compete away excess returns for non-regulated firms in a relatively short period of time, the 
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extent of regulatory lag serves to benefit regulated companies - in essence, the regulators effectively 
Protect the companies under their jurisdiction from changes in the industry. Through the identification 
of a series of non-regulated firms based upon a previous study (Brown, Hagerman, Griffin & 
Zmijewski, 1987), and their comparison with the results for a group of regulated electricity utilities 
through the market model, it is concluded that the results are consistent with the author's hypothesis 
that the regulators serve to insulate firms from changes in their environment. 
1.2 2. UK studies -A briefoverview. 
The history of investor-owned regulated utilities is more widespread in the US than in the UK, 
although this summary indicates the broad nature of the studies that have been undertaken. However, 
there are two studies of note in relation to this work: Dries & Seaton (1995), and Antoniou, Batty & 
Pescetto (1995). The former article examines the behaviour of the share prices of the twelve Regional 
Electricity Companies (RECs) in response to sixty-seven events - both regulatory and non-regulatory - 
using a variant of the market model. As the market model requires an index against which to base the 
analysis of the companys share returns - with the event itself present as a dummy variable, the authors 
deem the Financial Times I 00-Share Index as the most appropriate market index. (They do, however, 
make some modifications to it in order to compare the retums of the RECs against those of 
telecommunications companies). In addition, through experimentation, they determine that the most 
appropriate dummy event window for the analysis is -1 to +2 days around the event. The authors 
conclude that regulatory events most commonly produce significant dummies, e. g. DGES 
announcements on prices, the announcement and/or publication of price reviews, and the threat of an 
MMC reference. This result is attributed to the continued, active use of regulation and the lack of 
regulatory capture. However, the main objective of this study is an attempt to prove or disprove the 
existence of capture -a result which is disproved, as the RECs are seen to exhibit share returns not 
dissimilar to those of the FT-100. It should also be noted that of the sixty-seven events, twenty-two 
produce significant dummies at either the 5% or 10% level of significance: a rate of approximately 
one-third. 
Antoniou, Batty & Pescetto (1995) undertake a similar study, but their analysis focuses upon the post- 
privatisation telecommunications industry by examining the impact of a series of events upon the 
share price of BT. In addition to attempting to determine whether the events produce significant 
dummies within the extended market model (see below), they also examine whether the event creates 
greater volatility in share prices through the use of TOBIT maximum likehhood regression analysis. 
Here, the FT All Share Index is utilised as the base index for market returns, while there are a total of 
134 events, and the dummy variable window is three days (die day prior to, the day of, and the day 
after the event). Of these events, thirty-seven produce statistically significant dummy variables in the 
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market model (twenty-eight percent), thirty-two produce significant dummies to indicate greater 
volatility (twenty-four percent), with twenty-three events producing both (seventeen percent). The 
main conclusions noted from this study are that while certain announcements have influenced both 
returns and volatility, actually predicting the consequences of certain events is difficult. Furthermore, 
events, which produce either a decline in prices or greater competition, do not always have a negative 
influence on returns. 
L3. Objectives and the structure of the chapter. 
The ultimate objective of this analysis is to assess the impact of a series of announcements (both 
regulatory and non-regulatory) on the share prices and hence returns of National Power and 
Powergen, two companies chosen for their dominance of the electricity pool. Utilising these two 
companies permits an analysis of the broader consequences of the impact of certain events, both 
within the pool and in the perceptions of the profitability and risk of operating in the pool. 
Due to the continued focus upon regulatory announcements (broken down into "competition" and 
"price" events, as discussed below), the following hypothesis may be stated. As the release of a new 
announcement from the regulator is typically concerned with the prospect of tighter or wider-ranging 
regulation, then such an announcement will lead to a decline in share returns, producing a negative 
coefficient on the dummy variable representing that event. 
Although the majority of the events (two-thirds) under examination are regulatory, the remaining 
events are those that could have led to regulatory intervention (such as pool price rises); or could have 
led to greater uncertainty in the industry (mergers and take-overs of RECs). Alternatively, they could 
have an expected outcome based upon financial markets theory (generators' attempts to take over 
RECs should produce a certain response based upon the announcement effect). As such, it is 
hypothesised that the majority of events should produce results indicative of regulation influencing 
generators' share returns. 
As the events may be grouped, it is possible to use these groupings to examine whether a certain type 
of event has a specific effect consistent across the group. if this is valid, it may enable a classification 
through which a limited degree of forecasting may be possible. The use of the market model is such 
that the analysis does not test for changes in the perceptions of risk associated with the generators' 
shares after an announcement, but rather the absolute changes in returns following an announcement, 
Due to the closeness of some of the events, and the need to prevent overlapping of the analysis 
periods, a fifty-day analysis window was used. This was necessary because to ignore the problem 
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would result in considerable difficulty in interpreting the results, as well as ultimately limiting their 
usefulness. The choice of a fifty-day analysis period is based upon the assumption that regulatory 
announcements will have a transitory, not a permanent effect on share returns. Of course, this is not to 
say that all regulatory events are only transitory in their impact, as it is possible that events could lead 
to the expectation of tighter regulation for the foreseeable future. 
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SECTION 11 - Data Selection and MethodoloF_rv. 
Z I. The market model. 
The share price of a particular company should vary with the amount of information available about, 
and the expectations associated with, that company and the economy as a whole. In the case of this 
analysis, we are concerned only with information pertaining to the company itself, the industry in 
which that company operates, and the regulation of that industry. Given the assumption of an 
information set, changes in the share price are dictated by changes in the contents of that information 
set. It is in this way that the dummy variables are used in this model - they capture the release of new 
information and its incorporation into that information set. 
The market model itself takes the following basic form: 
Ra =a+ bR., + u, (3.1) 
& is the return (first difference of share price) on asset i at time t, R., is the return on market index m 
at time 1, and u, is the normally, independently distributed disturbance term. All variables in this and 
subsequent equations are in logs. 
In examining the performance of the two companies, i will refer to NP and PG (in different 
estimations, of course), and m will refer to the FT- 100. 
The market model therefore states that the return on a particular asset is some percentage of the return 
on the market as a whole (the parameter, b). If this parameter is greater than unity, then the return on 
the asset varies more than that on the market as a whole, with the reverse being true if the parameter is 
less than unity. 
In order to assess how a particular event influences the parameters of the equation, one may insert a 
dummy variable to represent the event and ascertain whether the resulting coefficient was significant 
over the required time period. As with the previous chapters, the dummy retains the value of zero until 
the event, and the value of unity thereafter and is used to assess the existence of abnormal movements 
in the variables in question: a positive durnmy indicating an increase in share returns, with the reverse 
being true for a negative dummy. nis produces the equation: 
R,, =a+ bR., +7 DUUMY, + u, (3.2) 
where DUMMY, represents the dummy variable, and i and m as noted above. This is the equation that 
will be used in this analysis. It should be noted that the market model (or a variant of it) has been used 
extensively to assess the impact of events on share returns in a range of studies since its introduction in 
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Fama et al ( 1969), and has subsequently become the most widely accepted tool of analysis. 
2.2. Announcement selection and dalm 
The announcements and events used in this study are primarily those from Offer, while others take the 
form of important events which have led to regulatory announcements (break-up of contracts for 
differences, price spikes), and others are events which could influence the structure of the industry 
(mergers and take-overs announcements). It is therefore assumed that these events all exhibited some 
form of informational content that could influence the share prices of NP and PG. There are a total of 
thirty-six events, full details of which are given in Table 1. 
In general, it is possible to establish groups of events around the following headings. Firstly, events 
which relate to the pool, which are events one, two, fifteen and nineteen. 7hese events are those 
which influence the general level of pool prices, but which have not occurred as a consequence of 
regulation. In fact these are events that would typically have induced regulatory intervention. 
Secondly, threatened and actual MMC references, which are events three, seven, sixteen, 
seventeen, eighteen, twenty-six and thirty-five. These events concern the possibility of increased 
competition within the pool, and may therefore be classed as "competition" events. Thirdly, 
announcement and publication of pool price reviews, price agreements and other regulatory 
announcements, which are events four, five, six, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, 
twenty, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-eight and thirty-six. (Although event three also 
belongs in this category, it is more appropriate for this analysis to include it in the second sub- 
heading. ) These events concern the pricing behaviour of the generators, and may be classified as 
V, price" events. The distinction between "competition" events and "price" events is that the former 
would typically influence the structure of the industry, while the latter would influence the conduct of 
those firms: in the industry. It is these two groups of events that may be classed as regulatory events. 
The remaining analysis is concerned solely with the financial markets and therefore should be 
classified as "shares/tAe-overs and mergers" events. These are events twenty-four, twenty-five, 
twenty-seven, twenty-nine, thirty, thirty-one, thirty-two, thirty-three and thirty-four. Based upon these 
classifications, it can be seen that there are twenty-four regulatory events (two-thirds of the total). It is 
hoped that the groupings may make analysing the results more convenient. 
The data set is comprised of the following variables. The share prices for NP and PG were obtained 
from their floatation in March 1991 through to late March 1996. In keeping with Dnes & Seaton 
(1995), and to allow a comparison between this study and their work, the FT-100 Index is used as the 
Proxy for the return on the market as a whole. The data set contained a total of 1316 daily (i. e. 
180 
weekday) observations from II th March 1991 to 25th March 1996. 
As is consistent with the work present in the previous chapters, all efforts have been made to prevent 
the analysis periods for the event dummies from overlapping. This has led to the need for estimations 
undertaken over a fifty-day analysis period, which (for the most part) restricts the potential for the 
events to overlap. This is to allow the equivalent of one business month's of observations on either 
side of the event, which is useful due to the nature of regulatory announcements and the inherent 
possibility for noise in undertaking stock market analyses. Specifically, an initial announcement is 
made by the regulator that is typically followed by an additional announcement that either provides 
more information on, or clarifies the regulator's intentions. A narrower analysis period may not 
capture the full consequences of an event, while a longer period will result in considerable 
overlapping of analysis periods when examining many of the latter events, a problem which is 
minimised by the period chosen. (The analysis period should not be confused with the dummy event 
window, discussed below). 
It was necessary to determine the most appropriate dummy window for the analyses. Based upon a 
system of examination utilising the R2 statistics and the residual sum of squares from each equation (as 
in Dries & Seaton, 1995), it was discovered that the dummy window used should be -1 to +2 
observations around the event itself This was based upon variations in the event window from -5 to 
+5 observations around the event. (It should be noted that the most viable alternatives to the chosen 
window were -1 to +1 and -5 to +5. The latter was dismissed as it risked the prospect of excessive 
noise around the events, and the former was dismissed as it presumed that the market adjusted 
immediately and completely to an event. However, given that regulatory announcements are often in 
the form of an initial announcement followed by an additional press release or report, this could imply 
a two-stage announcement for some events. For example, an event could produce an initial reaction, 
then a subsequent additional reaction if the initial reaction was excessive or insufficient, as given by 
any additional information. However, for completeness the results of these regressions are presented 
in full in the appendix, ) 
For MI results on the coefficients and their diagnostic test results, see appendix. However, it should 
be noted that the majority of regressions failed no diagnostics, although among the regressions that did 
fail tests, the most common failure was the test for normality due to skenwess and truncation of the 
distribution. The test results presented are those generated by White's heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors -a method used to enhance the results. The results are presented in Tables 2 (National 
Power) and 3 (Powergen), indicating the event represented by the dummy, the parameter, its 
corresponding t-statistic, and whether it is significant at the 5% and 10% levels, again in keeping with 
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Dnes & Seaton (1995). 
Z3. Results of the market model 
In examining the results, it can be seen that of the thirty-six events, nine (twenty-five percent) produce 
significant dummy variables for National Power, and eleven (thirty-one percent) produce significant 
dummy variables for Powergen. (Significance at either the 5% or 10% levels). The significant events 
for National Power are one, five, sixteen, twenty-four, twenty-nine, thirty-three, thirty-four, thirty-five, 
and thirty-six. Of these events, four are regulatory in nature. Event five represents the publication of a 
series of electricity price controls developed as a consequence of the first pool price review. The 
review itself contained proposals for the control of prices through the conditions on the re-submission 
of generating plants -a move which took place as a consequence of Powergen's practice of altering its 
Plant availability to benefit from increased capacity payments. Event sixteen was the first of three 
occasions in 1993 that the generators were threatened with an MMC reference (the other occasions 
being in July and December of that year). However, as these other occasions did not produce 
significant dummies, the issue of credibility (covered in the first empirical chapter) could again be 
seen as relevant. 
Event d1irty-five is the occasion on which the two generators were referred to the MMC for their 
attempts to take over one of the RECs. It is not surprising therefore that the potential for new and more 
restrictive regulation should lead to a decline in share returns. The final significant regulatory event 
for National Power was event thirty-six: the DGES comments on the price undertaking that had been 
enforced since early 1994. This followed comments made earlier in the year regarding the 
restrictiveness and applicability of the price cap, and continued the DGES' attempts at tighter 
regulation for the generators. 
Before examining the results for Powergen, it should be noted that there are five events that are 
significant for both companies, two of which are regulatory: events five, twenty-four, twenty-nine, 
thirty-three and thirty-five. As such, there is no need to re-examine these events for Powergen. Event 
four is significant for Powergen, but not for National Power. However, as this event was the first pool 
price review which began as a consequence of Powergen's strategy of manipulating the capacity 
payments system, it is not unexpected that this event would influence Powergen more than National 
Power. Event twenty-two (proposed break-up of Nuclear Electric) was an event which could be 
expected to lead to greater competition in the industry. As Powergen was the second largest generator 
in the industry at the time of the industry, it is possible that this event could have been accompanied by 
perceptions Powergen's position becoming untenable as a consequence of greater competition. 
Similarly, event twenty-three would have also led to greater competition - specifically in the non- 
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baseload part of the electricity generation market. Event twenty-five could be seen as leading to 
increased uncertainty regarding tile regulatory future of the industry as the prospects of mergers and 
take-overs became uncertain. 
What is equally important in interpreting these regulatory events is the fact that all of their dummy 
coefficients (National Power and Powergen alike) are negative, implying that each of them was 
viewed with the prospect of tighter regulation. Further of the regulatory events for both companies, 
approximately seventy-five percent of them produce negative durnmies. 
Events thirty-three and thirty-four generated negative significant dummies for National Power, while 
event thirty-three was significant only for Powergen. These dummies are consistent with the 
announcement efFect associated with merger and take-over intentions: the share price of the acquiring 
firm declines while that of the target firm increases. 
In assessing the results in terms of their groupings, it is clear that there is no apparent pattern to the 
results. The only pattern which does result is in the case of regulatory announcements, where the 
dummies do tend to exhibit negative coefficients, implying a decline in returns, attributable to 
perceptions of tighter regulation. Given these results, it was deemed appropriate to perform a 
regression that combined all of the dummy variables into one variable in a regression that would be 
performed over the entire 1316 observation analysis period. This required the creation of an additional 
dummy variable that utilised the values of all of the regulatory dummies. The results of this regression 
are again shown in Table 2. Although the diagnostic test results were not as encouraging as for the 
pervious, individual dummy regressions (both regressions failed the tests for serial correlation and 
normality), it can be seen that the regulatory events as a whole produced statistically significant 
dummies for both companies. This implies that the actions of the regulator have led to a decline in the 
share returns of the companies. 
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Table 1. Events utilised for study of financial data. 
ý Lo. Date Event Obs. Obs. Ranffe 
1 22/03/91 Break-up of first set of CFDs. 10 1-50 
2 09/09/91 Price spikes begin. 131 105-155 
3(R) 03/10/91 First pool price review begins w/ MMC threat. 149 125-175 
4(R) 20/12/91 First pool price review published. 205 180-230 
5(R) 06/02/92 Electricity price controls published. 239 215-265 
6(R) 16/06/92 DGES to examine excessive electricity profits. 332 305-355 
AR) 27/06/92 Generators threatened with MMC reference. 340 315-365 
8(R) 20/07/92 OXERA suggests regulatory changes. 356 330-380 
9(R) 28/07/92 DGES to probe power price rises. 362 335-385 
1 O(R) 08/10/92 Second pool price review launched. 414 390-440 
11 (R) 26/10/92 Commons to revise sale of generators. 426 400450 
12(R) 18/12/92 Second pool price review published. 465 440-490 
13(R) 24/02/93 DGES seeking additional power over generators. 515 490-540 
14(R) 10/03/93 DGES tells generators to sell surplus plants. 523 500-550 
15 31/03/93 Break-up of second set of CFDs. 538 515-565 
16(R) 24/05/93 Generators threatened with MMC reference. 576 550-600 
17(R) 30/07/93 MMC reference and/or plant sales threatened. 625 600-650 
18(R) 15/12/93 MMC reference unless agreement made. 723 700-750 
19 06/01/94 Revised bidding system drives pool prices down. 739 715-765 
20(R) 11/02/94 NP and PG establish price agreement. 765 740-790 
21(R) 25/04/94 Reports indicate a tougher stance from DGES. 816 790-840 
22(R) 04/10/94 DGES to encourage break-up of Nuclear Electric 957 930-980 
23(R) 09/12/94 Generators warned on plant disposals. 980 955-1005 
24 19/12/94 Trafalgar House bids for Northern Electric. 986 960-1010 
25(R) 26/01/95 DGES'unsympathetic on Trafalgar House move. 1014 990-1040 
26(R) 11/02/95 MMC reference threatened over plant sales. 1025 1000-1050 
27 06/03/95 Sale of Government's 40% electricity holding. 1041 1015-1065 
28(R) 07/03/95 Distribution price controls to be revised. 1042 1015-1065 
29 13107/95 Southern Electric bids for S. W. Electricity. 1134 1110-1160 
30 25/07/95 Scottish Power bids for Manweb. 1142 1115-1165 
31 31/07/95 Hanson bids for Eastern. 1146 1120-1170 
32 10/09/95 North West Water bids for Norweb. 1176 1150-1200 
33 21109195 Powergen bids for Midlands Electricity. 1184 1160-1210 
34 02/10/95 National Power bids for Southern Electric. 1191 1165-1215 
35(R) 23/11/95 NP and PG's REC bids to face MMC reference. 1229 1205-1255 
36(R) 12/12/95 DGES' statement on price undertakings 1242 1215-1265 
For future reference, these events will be referred to as events I through 36 respectively. 
(R) indicates that the event was regulatory in nature. 
Obs. range represents the observation range used for the market model. 
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Table 2. Market Model Dummy Variable Analyses - National Power. 
Event Coefficient Stan. Error T-RatiolProb] Sig.: 5% Sig.: 10% 
1 -0.011744 0.005623 -2.08880[. 042) Yes Yes 
2 -0.003290 0.002564 -1.28340[. 206] No No 
3 -0.002990 0.003712 -0.80556[. 424] No No 
4 -0.004310 0.003999 -1.07800[. 286] No No 
5 -0.010538 0.003864 -2.72730[. 0091 Yes Yes 
6 -0.002611 0.003998 -0.65304[. 517] No No 
7 0.002130 0.003703 0.57524[. 568] No No 
8 -0.002624 0.006612 -0.39688[. 693] No No 
9 -0.006487 0.012378 -0.52404[. 604J No No 
10 0.003935 0.007107 0.55367[. 582] No No 
11 0.000903 0.004928 0.18333[. 9551 No No 
12 -0.006960 0.008635 -0.80596[. 424] No No 
13 -0-001807 0.003219 -0.56133[. 577] No No 
14 -0.003214 0.005713 -0.56253[. 5761 No No 
15 0.007073 0.006650 1.06360[. 293] No No 
16 -0.007207 0.003942 -1.82810[. 074] No Yes 
17 -0.002687 0.009321 -0.28831[. 774] No No 
18 0.007004 0.005787 1.21040[. 232] No No 
19 0.002783 0.006544 0.42532[. 673] No No 
20 0.015897 0.012308 1.29160[. 2031 No No 
21 -0.003786 0.004314 -0.87767[. 3841 No No 
22 -0.001202 0.002142 -0.56104[. 577] No No 
23 -0.008619 0.008506 -1.01330[. 316] No No 
24 0.004723 0.002509 1.88250[. 066] No Yes 
25 -0.000606 0.001516 -0.39990[. 691) No No 
26 -0.007194 0.008972 -0.80181[. 427] No No 
27 0.000214 0.003770 0.05668[. 9551 No No 
28 -0.009946 0.009315 -1.06770[. 291] No No 
29 0.006085 0.003065 1.98570[. 0531 Yes Yes 
30 -0.000688 0.005392 -0.12765[. 899] No No 
31 -0-000271 0.002618 -0.10364[. 918] No No 
32 0.000354 0.006803 0.05199[. 959] No No 
33 -0.004890 0.002033 -2.40470[. 020] Yes Yes 
34 -0.018273 0.005425 -3.36810[. 0011 Yes 
Yes 
35 -0.021618 0.004986 4.33560[. 0001 Yes 
Yes 
36 -0.008103 0.004068 -1.99210[. 0521 Yes 
Yes 
ALL -0.002939 0.001586 -1.85830[. 064] No 
Yes 
For more information on the events, see Table 1, Chapter 3. 
"ALL" is the dummy variable that integrates all of the regulatory events. 
Significance levels are based upon the 5% and 10% levels of significance. 
Results are those produced using Adjusted White's Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors. 
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Table 3. Market Model Dummy Variable Analyses - Powergen. 
Event Coefficien Stan. Erro T-Ratio[Probl Sig.: 5% Sig.: 10% 
1 -0.013055 0.008169 -1.59820[. 1171 No No 
2 0.002704 0.002605 1.03810[. 304] No No 
3 0.000593 0.004734 0.12518[. 9011 No No 
4 -0.003896 0.002342 -1.66390[. 103] No Yes 
5 -0.015311 0.005044 -3.03570[. 0041 Yes Yes 
6 -0.003319 0.003136 -1.05820[. 2951 No No 
7 0.005078 0.003440 1.47640[. 1461 No No 
8 -0.005883 0.007201 -0.81698[. 418] No No 
9 -0.006128 0.012983 -0.47203[. 639] No No 
10 0.005597 0.006064 0.92308[. 361] No No 
11 -0-001416 0.004549 -0.31133[. 7571 No No 
12 -0.008932 0.007862 -1.13610[. 262) No No 
13 -0.001781 0.003427 -0.51964[. 606] No No 
14 -0.004185 0.006056 -0.69117[. 493] No No 
15 0.007188 0,008134 0.88366[. 381] No No 
16 -0.006748 0.004885 -1.38130[. 174] No No 
17 0.000483 0.006746 0.07166f. 943) No No 
18 0.006735 0,004395 1.53250[. 132) No No 
19 0.001695 0.004313 0.39306[. 696] No No 
20 0.010293 0.012062 0.85339[. 398] No No 
21 -0.002525 0.003954 -0.63865[. 526] No No 
22 -0.004443 0.002428 -1.82960[. 0741 No Yes 
23 -0.005015 0.002213 -2.26680[. 0281 Yes Yes 
24 0.012047 0.002895 4.16160[. 0001 Yes Yes 
25 -0.005997 0.002199 -2.72750[. 0091 Yes Yes 
26 -0.007124 0.009628 -0.73988[. 4631 No No 
27 -0.002897 0.003351 -0.86462[. 3921 No No 
28 -0.010860 0.009415 -1.15350[. 254] No No 
29 0.012909 0.001760 7.33300[. 000] Yes Yes 
30 -0-006478 0.002458 -2.63540[. 0111 Yes 
Yes 
31 -0.006463 0.001721 -3.75440[. 0001 Yes 
Yes 
32 -0.000033 0.004579 -0.00726[. 994] No No 
33 -0-006178 0.002613 -2.36420[. 022] Yes Yes 
34 -0.006951 0.006339 -1.09650[. 278] 
No No 
35 -0.023171 0.005556 -4.17080[. 000] Yes Yes 
36 -0.004083 0.002988 -1.36650[. 178) No No 
ALL -0.003635 0.001518 -2.39420[. 0171 Yes Yes 
For more information on the events, see Table 1, Chapter I 
"ALL" is the dummy variable that integrates all of the regulatory events. 
Significance levels are based upon the 5% and 10% levels of signiflcance. 
Results are those produced using Adjusted White's Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors. 
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SECTION III - Conclusions. 
This chapter has attempted to assess the potential for regulatory and non-regulatory events to influence 
share returns Specifically, it was hypothesised that regulatory events would induce a decline in share 
returns as the attractiveness of the companies to investors declined. The set of regressions utilising the 
market model indicated that this was indeed the case, although not all of the regressions generated 
Significance in the dummy variables used to represent the events themselves. Although it was hoped 
that there would be a pattern consistent across certain types of events, the only pattern that emerged 
was the negative coefficients on the regulatory dummies. The results are not consistent across the 
firms, although such an outcome is consistent with financial markets theory. 
Ultimately the issue at hand is one of credibility in the announcement, be it regulatory or otherwise. 
Generators will have better information than the stock market about their own industries, and will 
respond accordingly to the events of this study. Although the attitude of the market to an event can be 
inferred by the behaviour of returns, the analysis can be clouded due to difficulty in identifying 
precisely when the information concerning an event was actually released. The possibility of tighter 
regulation would bring with it a decline in shares, while generators might not respond to that 
Possibility until more information on the potential regulation became available. Therefore, the key 
factor becomes the flow of information, and how the announcements (or rather the possibility of 
announcements) affect the information sets of the generators and of investors upon which they base 
their decisions. 
Dries & Seaton (1995), showed that there was a high percentage of significant dummies, reflecting the 
impact of announcements on RECs. Comparing this study with that work, there are sixteen events 
which are present in both studies (that work focused upon REC-orientated announcements), of which 
eight are significant (at either 5% or 10%). Of these eight events, two also produce significant 
dummies in this study: events four and twenty-five. Although the number of events is not high, such a 
conclusion strengthens this study and reinforces the conclusions of Dnes & Seaton (1995). The main 
obvious reason for the differences in results is the fact that the companies under examination are 
different. Although the companies all belong to the electricity industry, it is Rely that the market has 
different perceptions of the risk associated with generation and supply and distribution, in addition to 
the different levels of competition which exist in the two different sectors of the industry. 
Dnes & Seaton (1995) were able to show the existence of a high percentage of significant dummies 
through the simple market model - an outcome which is consistent with that of this study, although 
their percentage of significant dummies is higher: approximately thirty-three percent to an average of 
twenty-eight percent (averaged across the two generators). However, this result is encouraging given 
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the high percentage of significant regulatory dummies. 
The main conclusions of this study are that both regulatory and non-regulatory events can influence 
the share prices of the electricity generators. Further, that many of these regulatory events appear to 
have exerted a negative influence on share prices. As such, these results are consistent with similar 
studies undertaken into regulated utilities. However, the mixed results in terms of the impact of 
regulatory and non-regulatory events do make it difficult to establish any classification as to whether 
certain types of events will have specific effects. 
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SECTION I- The role of the electricity forward contract market. 
1.1. A theoretical qpproach to the contract market. 
In order to finther examine the relationships within the contract market, consider the following 
algebraic approach (Powell, 1993, pp. 445-447). 
At vesting, the "initial portfolio" of contracts between the RECs and the generators were not in fact 
contracts for the purchase or sale of electricity - they were purely financial arrangements representing 
options and cash-settled futures contracts. 
"One-way" CFDs represent an arrangement equivalent to a portfolio of call options. In each half-hour 
that the pool purchase price (PPP) rises above the strike price (K), difference payments are made to 
the holders of such contracts to the surn of Q(PPP-K), where Q is the quantity covered by the contract. 
However, if PPP is below the strike price, no payment will be made. 
"Two-way" CFDs represent a system similar to a portfolio of put-call combinations. In this case, a 
payment is made, from the writer to the holder of the CFD, if the PPP is above the strike, but the 
Payment is reversed if the PPP is below the strike. The put and call combinations are written based 
upon the same capacity and a common strike price. The pay-off is then equivalent to a futures contract 
for each half-hour's contracted output, 
Formally, the pay-off may be expressed as: 
n 
f=o 
, 
(PPP - K) Pay - oo 2: 
t4 
(4. a) 
Given that there existed a combination of one-way and two-way contracts with a variety of indexation 
and other provisions, simplifications must be made. This involves assuming that the generators have 
sold some fraction of their output ahead on futures contracts, while retaining the sale of the remainder 
in the pool (this is clearly not a heroic assumption). It is also necessary to assume that the generators 
have constant marginal costs and are profit maximisers (the former of these assumptions may be 
contested). If this is the case, then the objective function for generator i may be given as: 
nGi ý PqGt - kqGi - XGi 
(P - f(; j) (4. b) 
where q is outputý x is the quantity of output sold forward, f is the strike (futures) price, k is marginal 
cost and p is price. 7lie subscripts G and i indicate generator i. Powell also assumes an inverse linear 
demand function with an additive, normally distributive error. As such, total demand at any price is 
uncertain and the inverse demand function is given in (4-c): 
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pýA-qG, -qG, +c where E is Ar(O , CF2) (4. c) 
Assuming that there are two privatised generators operating co-operatively, then they could be 
modelled as either quantity setters or price setters. If the quantity and strike price of the contracts are 
fixed, then the first order condition of (4. c) with respect to quantity is given as: 
I 
(A - xG) 2 
(4. d) 
where qG is the total output of both generators. This formulation is a positive function of the total 
number of futures contracts signed by the generators. In other words, the more two-way CFDs that 
have been signed by the generators, the greater will be output and the lower the expected price. 
If the two privatised generators are Coumot players, then the first order condition for generator i will 
be: 
qGi =I (A -k- qGi 
+ XG) 
2 
(4. e) 
This equation possesses the format of a standard Coumot reaction function, except that the quantity 
produced by generator i is a positive function of the number of fittures style contracts signed. 
Assuming cost symmetry between the generators, the solution to this game is: 
qGi 
I (A - 
k+ 
XGd 
3 
(4. f) 
with total industry output 2qG, in this case. The effect of increasing xGj is to push out the Coumot 
reaction fanctions, thus making total output a positive function and price a negative function of xG, 
The Cournot assumption requires that generators make only one quantity decision. The conclusion 
which may be derived is that whether the generators are assumed to be either Coumot players or 
colluding players, a higher degree of contracting implies that output will be higher and price lower 
than otherwise. This follows because as the degree of contracting increases, the less profitable it 
becomes for generators to reduce quantity and increase price. In essence therefore, the contract market 
serves to control the market power of the generators. 
1.2 The contract market in practice. 
This summary is based upon Green (I 996b) due to the lack of information on the contract market. 
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In the electricity industry, some larger customers buy their electricity with contracts linked directly to 
pool prices, but it is unlikely that National Power and Powergen would be willing to sell contracts of 
this type as they are interested primarily in direct sales as a means of hedging output. Based upon 
regulatory intervention, the generators' supply businesses (those divisions that sell electricity to 
consumers) were required to sign contracts guaranteeing non-discrimination between the generators' 
own supply businesses and other competitive supply businesses. The generators' prospectuses 
estimated their direct sales for 1990/1, from which point on Powergen published volume and revenue 
figures for its sales, while National Power published only its revenues. 
These contracts are referred to in the literature as the "coal CFDs", as they were electricity contracts 
which were met through the sale of electricity generated by coal-fired stations. In establishing the coal 
CFDs, (used to recover the excess cost of British coal against imported fuels) the generators used the 
cost of imported coal when calculating their marginal costs, with the coal CFDs containing lump-sum 
payments equal to the difference between the cost of British coal and the cost of imported coal. This 
meant that the price of these coal CFDs was not expected to be significantly above pool prices, and so 
the cost could not be passed on to any consumer who had the option of buying at pool prices (or from 
a supplier at pool prices). The 1990 coal contracts were therefore limited to the fi-anchise market, but 
covered most of the RECs requirements for this market. 
Offer (1992) states that National Power's contracts covered 44% of the RECs total needs (including 
non-franchise sales) in 1992/3, and Powergen's 26%. The RECs' prospectus indicate that the 
maximum level of cover in 1991/2 was the same as 1992/3 (i. e. the volumes covered should be the 
same), while the generators' prospectus indicated that almost all of the contracts from 1990/1 which 
continued into 1991/2 were for the franchise market. The volume of coal covered by the associated 
contracts with British Coal was lower in 1992/3 than in the first two years of privatisation, but this 
probably depended upon the generators predicted fuel needs, rather than reflecting a fall in the volume 
of the electricity contracts. 
A second set of fuel contracts was signed in March 1993 for the period until March 1998. The 
generators' annual reports have given the volume involved in 1993/4 and for the four years from 
1994/5. The amount of coal covered has fallen considerably: British Coal's sales fell from 65 million 
tonnes (1992/3), to 40 million (1993/4), and 30 million in the following years, together with small 
amounts from other mines. These figures largely reflect the failing demand for coal -a move that can 
be attributed to the increasing number of CCGT plants being opened and the industry's shift away 
from coal. The amount of electricity covered also fell sharply in 1993/4 as RECs used their own 
stations to meet their needs in the franchise market, and in 1994/5 as the franchise limit fell. 
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In 1990, the generators started with one-year short-term contracts sold to the RECs for non-franchise 
customers. These contracts, together with the coal contracts, covered almost all of their expected 
output. These large contracts were negotiated before most large consumers were presented with the 
opportunity to change suppliers, and most of them contained termination clauses which allowed the 
RECs to drop the contracts if they wished. In the event, National Power and Powergen took about one 
third of the non-franchise market in the first year, and the RECs dropped many of their contracts. 
At the same time, many large customers who had been paying low prices in the pre-privatisation 
period became recipients of subsidies in the first year after vesting to ensure that their prices did not 
rise in real terms. Nuclear Electric sold contracts to National Power and Powergen at low prices that 
were passed on to each customer's supplier, making the generators both buyers and sellers of 
contracts. 
In the years 1991/2 and 1992/3, the generators sold very few short-term one-year contracts, 
presumably preferring to undertake direct sales with the RECs, which have the prospect of greater 
Profits. Both generators sold one-year contracts in 1993/4, while the expansion of the non-franchise 
market in 1994/5 brought with it a greater demand for one-year contracts which was met by the 
generators. Of course, the generators were operating under the terms of the February 1994 price 
undertaking, and as unilaterally raising prices was out of the question, there was no incentive to be 
under-contracted over that period. In the years following vesting, the generators have covered almost 
all of their output with a combination of contracts and direct sales, whether such choices were 
voluntary or not. 
In examining the level of prices in the post-privatisation period, it is appropriate to look at output- 
weighted prices and demand-weighted prices. As National Power and Powergen sell the majority of 
their output at peak times, the output-weighted price is slightly above the demand-weighted price. 
However, the difference only becomes significant in 1994/5, potentially as a consequence of the price 
undertaking. 
The prices utilised in the initial series of coal contracts can be estimated utilising the Horton IV price 
estimates. The Horton IV estimates contain a subsidy for British Coal, which even when deducted 
means that they are above the forecasted pool prices. The estimates also noted the potential for excess 
capacity in the industry, the closure of which was expected to put pressure on prices to rise to a long- 
run equilibrium level by 1993. To that end, the prices contained a so-called "capacity premium" 
designed to take them closer to the long-run price level as a means of increasing the value of the 
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generating companies. 
The first year's pool prices were well below the Horton IV estimates as (presumably) generators 
attempted to capture market share than maintaining a spot price which influenced such a small 
proportion of their sales. By 1992/3, prices were higher but still at a level in excess of long-run costs - 
this should not be surprising as the excess capacity had yet to be eliminated. Prices appear to have 
risen above avoidable costs in 1993/4 in a move attributed to under-contracting. 
This reliance upon the contract market has served to provide a considerable degree of security to the 
electricity industry. However, Gray, Helm & Powell (1995) note that the degree of contract coverage 
and the role of the government in determining that situation have possibly damaged the short-term 
future of the industry. The ending of the vesting contracts in 1993 was greeted with a considerable 
degree of concern by British Coal, leading to the eventual closure of many of their mines, This led to 
the revised coal contracts for the years 1993-8. However, when these contracts expire, it is argued that 
because the majority of contracts in the industry were imposed (directly or indirectly) by the 
government, that this has served to stunt the growth of liquid, market-orientated contract negotiations. 
As a consequence, the government's concerns about the coal industry may have resulted in the 
industry facing a dilemma in 1998, when the coal contracts fmally expire, as there is no functioning 
contracts market which can replace contracts on the scale of the coal contracts. it is conceivable 
therefore that the continued growth in the trade in EFAs will continue. However, if the coal contracts 
are to be replaced by a market-based mechanism, then developments to that end will have to 
expedited. 
L3. The structure of the chapter. 
Having already several of these elements in the earlier chapters, it is not necessary to repeat this 
analysis in depth, although frequent references will be made to the preceding chapters. The objective 
of this analysis is to introduce empirical evaluations of the market for electricity contracts, examining 
the market for contracts for differences in England and Wales and the market for contracts in 
California. Section 11 introduces the data set used to approximate the strike prices of the contract for 
differences in England and Wales. Section III incorporates the empirical analyses performed using the 
forward prices. Section IV introduces the Californian electricity industry and the need for reform. 
Section V examines deregulation in California in comparison to that in England and Wales and also 
considers the Californian electricity forward trading arrangements. Section VI comprises the empirical 
analysis of Californian deregulation and section VII concludes. 
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SECTION 11 - Constructing-the Horton IV data set. 
2.1. The role of the Horton exthnazes. 
The Horton IV estimates are seen as the nearest approximation to the actual strike prices for the 
vesting contracts (Offer, Review of Economic Purchasing, 1992), and as such may be used to 
construct a synthetic contract load profile. In pursuing such an undertaking, one must consider the 
actual load factor (or load shape) of the contracts, i. e. the ratio of kwh consumed to the peak 
consumption, multiplied by the number of hours under examination - representing the percentage of 
hours in a year over which a contract operates. (Percentages are calculated based upon the 8760 hours 
in a year). 
Although baseload contracts (i. e. contracts covering an entire year, possessing a 100% load factor) 
were made available to the RECs, these are less valuable than contracts with a lower load factor, and 
thus have a lower contract price. Electricity consumption in England and Wales is around the 64% 
load factor mark while that in the franchise market is nearer to 52-54% because of sharper peaks in 
demand. The relative value of the contract prices is indicated in the appendix, which contains the 
Horton IV price estimates calculated by the Department of Energy in January 1990. 
The estimates were based on the following assumptions. Firstly, imported coal prices would increase 
by approximately 1% per year, and heavy fuel oil (HFO) prices would increase by approximately 3% 
per year, both in real terms. Secondly, the price of gas used for power generation would remain 
constant in real terms. Thirdly, the fossil fuel levy would be constant over the period under 
examination at 10.3%. 
As it was both impossible and inadvisable for a REC to establish full contract cover with a single 
generator, the RECs signed contracts at different load factors with different generators based upon 
individual needs. (Tbe contract load factors may be derived from the Horton IV estimates and are 
shown in the appendix) Given REC contracting strategies and government policy, each company's 
contract portfolio covered almost all of its expected market in the first year. 
Assuming the provision of sculpted contracts by the generators (i. e. tailored to meet the RECs'needs), 
or the construction of a sculpted load profile, it is possible to construct a load profile using the Horton 
IV PPP estimates (see appendix). Consequently, we may develop a similar approach to break down 
the observations into the standard half-hour forTnat used in the pool (see appendix), to which the 
following notes are referenced. 
2.2 Developing the Horton IV data sa 
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The Horton IV data set is - in the same manner as the pool purchase price (PPP) data set - based upon 
a series of daily averages. Given the importance of the half-hourly nature of the contract market, this 
represents a limitation of the validity of the subsequent analyses. However, computing restrictions 
precluded the use of over sixty thousand half-hourly observations. Despite this limitation, it is hoped 
that the daily averaging of the PPP data set will induce a certain degree of symmetry to the analysis. 
From the hourly nature of the number of observations given, conversion to the half-hourly format is 
easily obtained by doubling the number of observations allocated to each hour. From this, conversion 
from a half-hourly format to a daily format allows an examination of the days on which certain 
contracts will be called (as opposed to in which half-hourly periods), detailed as follows by ranking 
the data sets. The PPP and Horton IV data sets are ranked side-by-side in ascending order in a tabular 
format, establishing the highest PPP observation with the highest Horton IV observation, and so on. 
The PPP observations are then "marked" with their corresponding Horton IV observation, and the 
ranking process reversed to re-establish the PPP ordering, as well as establishing the correct Horton 
IV sequence. This creates a data set in which the highest PPP levels are assigned a certain number of 
contract periods, and so on to the lower priced time periods. In essence therefore, each PPP 
observation has been matched to the corresponding contract that would be called in the relevant time 
period, (assuming perfect foresight). Ibis is done on a year-by-year basis to create an overall annual 
distribution of PPP levels and Horton IV estimates, representing a data set that can be used to 
represent the strike prices of the vesting contracts. 
It should be noted that - had the use of the half-hourly forinat been feasible - the process would have 
been carried out in exactly the same manner. For example, the forty half-hour periods in which PPP 
was the highest would have been assigned the relevant contract prices, similarly with the next one- 
hundred-and-ninety-five highest observations, which would have been the forty-first to two-hundred- 
and-fifteenth observation, and so on. This would have created a more weighted data set, reflecting the 
nature of contract cover. However, as the PPP data set has had such variations eliminated by the use of 
daily averages, it is hoped that this will not impact excessively on the validity of the results. 
One may use this information to derive a data set representing the strike prices of contracts 
corresponding to the relevant pool prices. This requires an examination of prices over the appropriate 
period and their breakdown into this 'step' format. Given the approximate 55% load factor in the 
electricity industry, the Horton IV data set also possesses this characteristic. Each observation in the 
PPP data set may then be assigned a corresponding observation in the contract set, based on the 
following assumptions. Firstly, the Horton IV estimates represent the basis for the strike prices of the 
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vesting contracts and may be used as such. Secondly, the vesting contracts defined a sequence of 
timeslots between which generating cover was to be provided. Thirdly, all generators were willing and 
able to offer contracts based on 'firm' capacity, i. e. that which was certain to be supplied. Fourthly, 
demand profiles were derived from all available infon-nation, and there is no demand uncertainty. 
These assumptions may be examined in turn. In the case of the first assumption, the Horton estimates 
represent an appropriate proxy for the strike prices of contracts, as stated by Offer (1992). In the case 
of the second and third assumptions, all of the generators were willing to offer these types of sculpted 
contracts as the government at privatisation effectively forced it upon them. (The actual degree of firm 
capacity may have been affected by the success of Nuclear Electric). Regarding the fourth assumption, 
while there would be some demand uncertainty, one would anticipate it to be minimal. Indeed, one 
would not anticipate demand fluctuations to be responsible for sharp, brief changes in prices - these 
are generally the result of supply shocks, e. g. plant malfunctions and system outages. 
Given that the vesting contracts were only in operation firom March 1990 to March 1993, this restricts 
the analysis to this time period. However, it should be possible to use the Horton estimates post-March 
1993 for a general examination of the levels of commercially negotiated contracts. In addition, given 
that the first tranche of vesting contracts were partially dissolved in March 199 1, this may disrupt any 
relationships derived from this information. 
The role of CFD market on the level of pool prices was noted in Offer (1991), in which it was 
indicated that the generators believed that the vesting contracts were responsible for downward 
pressure on pool prices, particularly on the SMP, for the reasons below. 
Firstly, the degree of contract cover in the vesting contracts effectively exposed the generators to 
overcalling at peak times. This meant that the generators had contract cover in excess of their 
generation limits -a dangerous situation as contracts were made against 'firm' capacity. As a 
consequence, the generators were bidding their plant into the pool to guarantee generation in a way 
that exerted downward pressure on pool prices at peak times. 
Secondly, the computer algorithm that derives SMP interacted with plant dynamics to produce high 
SMPs relative to demand in some periods, This was a problem for generators if their contract cover 
was in excess of their generation capacity, in order to rectify this situation, the generators bid flexible 
plant into the pool with low or zero start-up prices. This effectively removed the possibility for sharp 
price spikes and a reduction in the overall level of pool prices. 
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Thirdly, the seasonal sculpting of the contracts reflected the anticipated output of fossil-fired plant. 
However, increased output from nuclear stations and the interconnectors reduced the operational 
requirements of low merit order plant. In the face of contractual commitments based on non-firin 
Plant, National Power was forced to increase its market share by reducing bid prices, causing a decline 
in SM[P. Finally, the increase in the level of baseload capacity (both fossil-fired and nuclear) following 
privatisation represents a key contributor to the reductions in the pool price. 
An additional implicit assumption is that the assumptions made in the construction of the Horton IV 
estimates concerning the rate of increase of ftiel prices and the level of the fossil fuel levy were all 
met. This was not the case. 
However, because there is no information on how the breakdown of these assumptions was to have 
affected the contracts, it is impossible to attempt to incorporate these violations without resorting to 
pure speculation. These matters would have doubtless been negotiated on an individual basis between 
the contract parties based upon the contracts themselves. It is in this regard that the analysis can be 
criticised - for using a potentially obsolete data set. However, the Horton IV estimates remained in 
force until March 1993 and therefore despite the criticisms which may be levelled at them, they 
remain a valuable tool for the analysis of the forward price for electricity until that time. 
It can therefore be concluded that if it is assumed that the Horton IV estimates were derived on 
assumptions regarding the expected level of demand and capacity, then it should be possible to 
construct an approximation of a sculpted contract schedule. The subsequent problem is the actual 
relationship to be measured using this data. One would anticipate some kind of a relationship to exist 
between pool prices and estimates of contract prices, but this relationship may well be weakened 
steadily over time with the continued expiration of the contracts. Tberefore, any regression of the two 
sets of prices should indicate the existence of a relationship between the two variables, but that any 
such relationship would weaken with time. 
By using the methodology outlined above, it has been possible to generate a data set that could be 
used to represent the Horton IV strike prices. The most appropriate adjustment which can be 
undertaken with these prices is their indexation in line with the retail price index as a means of 
reflecting the overall increase in fuel prices - one factor which have almost certainly been incorporated 
into the contractual arrangements. The indexation of these prices produces a data set that is seen as the 
Horton IV data set from this point onwards. The estimates have been raised by the annual rate of 
inflation (RPI) in March of each year, corresponding with annual contracting rounds. 
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SECTION III - EMDirical analysis of the contract market. 
3. L Introductory erVirical analysis. 
To perform an initial series of models, the use of a simple set of static equations has been adopted, 
each of which will attempt to show the relationship between pool prices and the strike prices of 
Horton W estimates. 
In theory, the Horton IV data set could be established until the year 1997/8, but as the vesting 
contracts based upon the Horton IV estimates expired at the end of March 1993, there is little basis for 
continuing the Horton IV data set beyond this point (observations 1-913). However, as it is an 
important part of this analysis to examine how the spot-forward price links were influenced by the 
break-up of the contracts in March 1993, the Horton set has been continued until March 1994 
(observations 1-1278). 
The confidential nature of the EFA market makes it impossible to establish a data set to represent the 
strike prices of the EFAs themselves. However, the EFA market will be referred to on several 
occasions as a basis for comparison vis-A-vis the Horton IV estimates. Examples of spot-forward 
analysis will be undertaken in subsequent sections by examining the US electricity markets. 
The pool purchase price data set, as mentioned above, represents a series of daily averages (standard 
arithmetic mean) estimated over the entire analysis period. Variables are measured in p/kWh. 
Having introduced the data sets, let us establish some of the hypotheses that will be tested. Firstly, it is 
hypothesised that the PPP-HIV relationship will be a poor one due to the problems resulting from the 
Horton IV estimates and the nature of the pool in the post-vesting period, as outlined above. This is 
compounded by the fact that the market for contracts based upon the Horton IV estimates met only 
once - at vesting. While the Horton IV estimates have been indexed corresponding to the annual rate 
of inflation (RPI), because the market for these contracts met only once, the Horton IV estimates will 
not have had the capacity to adapt to changes in the pool. As such, they will therefore not be as good 
an estimator. The hypothesis is based upon financial markets theory regarding the relationship 
between the spot and forward prices for a commodity, and may be outlined as follows. 
The models under examination in the first set of analyses concern a simple linear relationship between 
the PPP and the Horton IV estimate. In this relationship, the PPP is given as a function of the relevant 
forward price and a constant term. Basic financial markets theory dictates that if the forward price is 
an unbiased predictor of the spot price, the coefficient on the forward price will be unity and the 
intercept term will equal zero. 
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The models will be performed over each of their respective full analysis periods, as outlined above. 
Secondly, as the standard contracting round is on an annual basis, the models will also be run on an 
annual basis (as appropriate) over the period of I st April to 31 st March the following year. Finally, as 
contracting is an ongoing process throughout the year, an intermediate bi-monthly analysis period is 
also used. The format was chosen as appropriate given the dynamic nature of the pool and the nature 
of trends in electricity pool prices which shows that pool prices tend to follow a standard process and 
trend from day to day and week to week. 
Based upon the first hypodiesis detailed above, one would expect that the Horton IV estimates would 
exceed the pool prices. If 
PH, = H, - PPA 
If the hypothesis is valid, on average H, should exceed PPPj, Le.: 
I nTp 
Average PH, =- 1] (4.2) N 
PH, ýý' 0 
where "TP" indicates the test period of the analysis, as outlined above. Estimating equation (4.2) over 
the relevant periods, a summary of the results is provided as follows. While a standard technique 
would be to square the difference between the two variables, because this analysis rests upon the need 
to assess the potential for over- or under-estimation by the forward prices, the difference will not be 
squared in these examples. 
As can be seen in Table 1, for all of the individual estimates, the hypothesis is valid. Furthermore, 
because the majority of the results for the average of PH, are positive, this implies that the Horton IV 
estimates overestimate the pool price. It has already been noted that the fact that the pool prices were 
below the Horton IV estimates was a key factor in the RECs exercising their option to terminate in 
March 1991. 
In an attempt to ffirther evaluate the Horton IV data set, the set has been analysed with the pool price 
data set in an attempt to assess how the forward price performs as a predictor of the spot price. While 
the above models were rather rudimentary, more appropriate statistical technique of the Wald test on 
parameter restrictions is used in the next section. 
However, as an additional technique, dummy variables will also be used to assess the impact of the 
various events on the electricity spot and forward prices. The dummy variables representing what are 
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deemed to be twelve of the key events (both regulatory and non-regulatory) which occur over this 
analysis period, and have been selected due to their importance to the industry and the pool. In terms 
of anticipated dummy signs, the break-up of the vesting contracts (March 1991 and 1993) should have 
positive dummies, while events consistent with tighter regulation should exhibit negative dummies. 
The events are given in Table 2. This approach has been used with considerable success in Hehn & 
Powell (1992) and Gray, Helm & Powell (1996) to assess the impact of similar events on the 
relationship between pool prices and electricity demand. 
Unlike preceding studies however, the dummy equations are modelled based around the use of a 
short-term analysis window, which in this case is one hundred observations representing on average 
one month prior to and two months after the event. The use of this short window is based upon the 
observation that excessively high prices will result in regulatory intervention within approximately two 
months of the increase. As such, any excessive or unusual price shifts would be transitory in nature, 
and not permanent. This assumption is based around the hypothesis of the regulation of the electricity 
industry being characterised by a repeated adversarial game between the generators and the regulator. 
For example, if the regulator announces to the generators that he is considering an MMC reference, 
they will lower their prices so as to not prejudice the outcome of the regulator's decision. However, 
once the regulator has seen the decline in prices and has decided not to refer them to the MMC, then 
the generators may increase their prices back to the levels that they were at prior to the initial threat. 
Although all efforts were made to prevent the analysis periods from overlapping, this does occur to a 
certain extent, and it is therefore hoped that this will not contaminate the results. 
The equation used is: 
ppp, =a+ rh H, +V DUMMY, + u, (4.3) 
The "Dummy" variable present in these equations possesses the value of zero up until the event and 
the value of unity thereafter. 
An examination of the constant and gamma terms will be postponed for the moment, as the analysis 
turns to the dummy variable coefficients. One potential problem has been corrected for: the eighth 
event (the break-up of the second set of vesting contracts) coincides with an indexation adjustment. To 
that end, two versions of this analysis have been performed, both with and without the adjustment. 
A summary of the results is given as follows (see Table 3 for the full results), but the key point is that 
the Horton IV estimates are prone to producing significant dummies (significance is at the 5% level). 
There are nine significant dummies for the Horton models (events one through four inclusive, six, 
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seven. eight, adjusted event eight, and twelve), clearly indicating the potential for these types of events 
to influence the spot-forward relationship. It is to the specifies of this relationship that the analysis 
now turns. 
3.2. Assessing the vafidhy of the spolforward relationsho. 
Given the rather limited view that was taken of the restrictions which had to be imposed upon the 
equations used to model the relationships between the pool price of electricity and the forward prices, 
it is appropriate to introduce suitable statistical techniques to adequately test that relationship. In this 
section, the restrictions imposed upon these equations are directly assessed utilising the Wald test, 
which permits the simultaneous imposition of restrictions on the values of different parameters. With 
the analysis periods (full sample, annual and bi-monthly, to combine flexibility with the actual contract 
rounds) and the equations already examined, there are additional changes to the model which need to 
be examined. To assess these restrictions, the following equations are used: 
PPPt ý CtH + yH H, + u, (4.4) 
In examining the output of these regressions and their ability to meet the parameter restrictions, the 
results for the PPP-Horton IV regressions are disappointing. The parameter restrictions are not met on 
the extended (three and four year) sample periods, nor on the annual sample periods. Of the bi- 
monthly sample periods, the restrictions are valid on only two out of the twenty-one occasions (12/91 
to 01/92 and 02/94 to 03/94). Therefore, it can be seen that the Horton IV estimates are a consistently 
poor relation to the electricity pool price, with the restrictions imposed upon the model being accepted 
only twice. These occasions are probably due to coincidence rather than anything concerning the pool 
price itself Indeed, one could attribute the result to the regression itself, given that the CFDs are 
struck only once a year and that recent pool price behaviour probably has little, if any, impact on 
contracts. 
One possible explanation for the high number of rejected hypotheses is that as the volume of 
electricity covered by CFDs has declined, this has led to increased reliance on the short-term security 
supplied by EFAs, and the subsequent increase in EFA trading volumes. In other words, as the volume 
of trading in the EFA market has increased, there has been less reliance on the CFD market. While 
this is a valid statement, the fact that the Horton IV estimates have not been altered to reflect market 
trading in EFAs renders this assumption invalid. 
With respect to the standard spot-forward model mentioned above, a first difference version has also 
been estimated. Once again, if the relationship between the spot and forward prices is valid, the 
aforementioned restrictions on the intercept and slope parameters must hold. With these equations 
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estimated over the same time periods as the static models, the results are not encouraging, as the 
restrictions are not valid for any of the equations. it would appear as though the forward prices do not 
have any success at all in predicting changes in the spot price. it is possible, however, that this is due 
to the forward prices' inability to compensate for the inherent dynamics and volatility associated with 
the electricity pool prices. in the vast majority of these cases, the problem arises with the slope 
parameter, as the intercept term is almost consistently statistically insignificant. Finally, we refer back 
to the first series of dummy variable analyses and test the validity of the slope and intercept parameter 
restrictions. Utilising the dummy variable equation (4.3), the results are shown in Table 4. Once again, 
the Horton estimates yield consistently poor results. 
With the purpose of this investigation to examine the role of the electricity forward market, and the 
nature of the relationships between the electricity spot and forward markets. It has already been 
established that the electricity forward market plays an important role in determining pool prices, 
necessitating some kind of parallel regulatory structure for both the spot and forward markets. This is 
even more apparent when one considers the conclusion that the forward market helps to determine the 
pool price-setting ability of the generators. 
The empirical models undertaken have focused upon the market for CFDs, with the prices of these 
contracts being approximated by the Horton IV estimates. In the case of these estimates, the results are 
consistent with the observation of lower than anticipated prices in the early years of the pool's 
operation. Having established these results, attempts were made to assess the exact links between the 
spot and forward markets, through standard static spot/forward links, dynamic links, as well as the 
extension of the analysis to assess the role of regulation and other stimuli on the underlying 
relationships. These regressions led to the following conclusions. 
Firstly, it was formally established through the use of the Wald test that the Horton IV estimates were 
not a valid predictor of the pool price -a result consistent with the post-vesting behaviour of the 
RECs. Secondly, although the Horton IV estimates respond to the dummy variables to a considerable 
extent, their ability to predict the pool price is poor. This was doubtless one of the main reasons why 
the RECs were keen to be free of the vesting contracts as soon as possible. The implications of these 
conclusions are that, for the early years of the operation of the electricity pool, the market for CFDs 
produced poor predictions of the pool price. Although this is not surprising, the empirical foundation 
for this conclusion is dependent upon the validity of the Horton IV data set. As mentioned above, this 
remains the aspect of this analysis that is open to most criticism. However, given that to alter the 
Horton IV estimates beyond their RPI indexation would mean resorting to pure speculation, the result 
should still stand. 
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If this outcome is still valid, then in order to establish more adequate and efficient operations within 
the CFD market, then the market should adopt some of the characteristics of the EFA market, one of 
which must be greater standardisation of contracts compared to their present, more idiosyncratic 
nature. Of course, the main breakthrough to establishing efficiency and clarity in the market for 
contracts (EFAs and CFDs) would be the publication of actual contract prices and volumes in a more 
open (from a commercial standpoint) exchange. Such a market currently exists in the US where 
electricity futures contracts are traded openly on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). 
Although the volumes traded are small, it is anticipated that as deregulation increases in the US, the 
need for risk management will increase and with it the demand for contracts. It is to the American 
electricity industry that the analysis now turns with a case study of deregulation in California. This will 
provide a contrast to the system of deregulation in England and Wales, as well as showing how the 
English experience is being used as a model for deregulation in other countries. Furthermore, having 
obtained spot and forward price data for the Californian electricity markets, an additional series of 
empirical analyses can be undertaken to illustrate the role of the forward market to the developing 
system of deregulation in much the same way as the contract market in England and Wales influenced 
the industry. 
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Table I. Differences between electricity spot and forward prices. 
HYPOTHESIS: The Horton IV estimates will overpredict the pool purchase price. If the 
hypothesis is valid, (HIV-PPP) > 0. 
eriod Observations HIV-PPP 
Extended Sample Periods. 
10/90-03/94 1-1278 0.01725 
10/90-03/93 1-913 0.01550 
Annual Sample Periods. 
10/90-03/91 1-182 -0.01627 
04/91-03/92 183-548 0.00979 
04/92-03/93 549-913 0.03706 
04/93-03/94 914-1278 0.02163 
Bi-monthly Sample Periods. 
10/90-11/90 1-61 0.06474 
12/90-01/91 62-123 -0.02922 
02/91-03/91 124-182 -0.08642 
04/91-05/91 183-243 -0.03765 
06/91-07/91 244-304 0.00298 
08/91-09/91 305-365 0.04290 
10/91-11/91 366-426 0.02479 
12/91-01/92 427488 -0.00839 
02/92-03/92 489-548 0.03479 
04/92-05/92 549-609 0.21062 
06/92-07/92 610-670 -0.02649 
08/92-09/92 671-731 0.03094 
10/92-11/92 732-792 -0.06329 
12/92-01/93 793-854 0.05319 
02/93-03/93 855-913 0.01644 
04/93-05/93 914-974 0.01705 
06/93-07/93 975-1035 -0.01166 
08/93-09/93 1036-1096 0.04356 
10/93-11/93 1097-1157 0.00183 
12/93-01/94 1157-1219 0.08710 
02/94-03/94 1220-1278 -0.01023 
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Table 2. Events used for the dummv variable analvsis. 
Date Event Obs. No. Anticipated 
Coefficient 
22/03/91 Break-up of first set of CFDs. 173 1 Positive 
09/09/91 Price spikes begin. 344 2 Negative 
03/10/91 First pool price review starts w/MMC threat 368 3 Negative 
20/12/91 First pool price review published. 446 4 Negative 
27/06/92 MMC reference threatened. 636 5 Negative 
08/10/92 Second pool price review launched. 739 6 Negative 
18/12/92 Second pool price review published 810 7 Negative 
31/03/93 Break-up of second set of CFDs. 913 8 Positive 
24/05/93 MMC reference threatened. 966 9 Negative 
30/07/93 MMC reference and/or plant sales threatened 1034 10 Negative 
15/12/93 MMC reference unless price agreement made 1172 11 Negative 
11/02/94 NP and PG establish price agreement. 1230 12 Negative 
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Table 3. Dummv variable results: Horton IV/PPP analyses. 
Event Constant (C Slope (S) Dummv (D) Sig. (C. S. D). 
1 1.47600 0.49401 0.04158 S'S's. 
2 1.13010 0.62541 0.04195 S'S's. 
3 0.90101 0.73234 -0.05273 S'S's. 
4 1.27110 0.61896 -0.13078 S'S's. 
5 2.03730 0.35361 -0.00479 S, S, NS. 
6 2.16230 0.31139 0.01094 S'S's. 
7 2.22490 0.29624 -0.01094 S'S's. 
8 2.04980 0.34910 0.07575 S'S's. 
8* 2.07300 0.34910 0.08366 S'S's. 
9 2.33610 0.28436 -0.00483 S, S, NS. 
10 2.02150 0.37897 0.00119 S, S, NS. 
11 1.56190 0.52081 -0.01014 S, S, NS. 
12 0.71541 0.80562 -0.21505 S'S's. 
Significance is at the 5% level. 
* Indicates non-indexed Horton IV estimates. 
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Table 4. Restricted static dummy variable analysis. 
Parameter restrictions: Intercept term = 0, Slope coefflcient = 1. 
Critical value of Chi-squared distribution: Chi-squared (2) = 5.99. 
Null hypothesis HO: Parameter restrictions are valid. 
Alternative hypothesis H 1: Parameter restrictions are not valid. 
If calculated value < critical value, we accept HO and conclude that the parameter restrictions are 
valid. Therefore, the forward price is an accurate predictor of the spot price. 
Lf calculated value > critical value, we reject HO and conclude that the parameter restrictions are 
invalid. Therefore, the forward price is not an accurate predictor of the spot price. 
Dumm Observations 
1 150-250 
2 325-425 
3 350-450 
4 425-525 
5 600-700 
6 700-800 
7 775-875 
8 875-975 
8* 875-975 
9 925-1025 
10 1000-1100 
11 1150-1250 
12 1200-1278 
Calculated Value 
390.9397 
154.8934 
71.7739 
110.4391 
4480.8000 
2845.4000 
3600.4000 
2183.3000 
2397.7000 
2682.2000 
1311.8000 
215.5113 
56.5580 
AccevMeiect HO 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
* See Table 3. 
Significance is at the 5% level. 
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SECTION tV - The Californian Electricity Industry: The need for reform. 
4.1. The problemfaced by California and the needfor reforflL 
In examining the development of electricity deregulation in other countries, one of the most notable 
examples at present is the United States, notably the state of California, where considerable reforms 
have been undertaken in a way which parallels the changes made in England and Wales at vesting. As 
will be shown, there has already been deregulation in California, where (as with each US state) the 
state authorities can effectively choose their own stance vis-A-vis regulation, provided that such a 
stance does not breach federal regulations. In this section, the specific problems faced by the 
Californian industry will be outlined, along with their prospective reforms, the actual path of reform, 
and how the system contrasts with that in England and Wales. Further, deregulation in other US states 
will also be examined as a means by which to contrast the progress in California, as well as placing the 
reforms within the context of the wider US reforms. The Californian industry is undergoing change 
from a structure where system operations are the responsibility of vertically integrated utilities which 
own and control the majority of the state's generating assets, to a vertically separated industry based 
around competition. It should be apparent that with the creation of a pool (power exchange) in 
California, that the major empirical analyses carried out in the preceding chapters could easily be 
replicated with data from California, following the new system's transition period and a suitable period 
of operation. 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUQ examined several methods of alleviating the 
problems faced by both the industry and its consumers. Tbrough discussion with industry 
representatives, it was determined that the industry and its regulatory framework were in need of 
considerable reform. Although the revised stance for regulation was apparent, the extent to which 
industry restructuring should occur was less clear. The main problems faced by the Californian 
electricity industry were as follows. 
Firstly, it was believed that the existing regulatory framework was incompatible with the drive towards 
competition in the industry. This problem had been observed in other US states and, to a certain 
extent, was dealt with by the Energy Policy Act (EPA, 1992). Secondly, and a prime reason for 
reform, was that California's electricity prices were approximately 50% higher than the US average, 
and it was determined that a new regulatory and industrial framework was required to produce lower 
electricity prices. Thirdly, there was a need for the promotion of market forces and the establishment 
of market-based regulatory solutions. A common alternative to competition was litigation, which 
proved to be a highly unsatisfactory and protracted way of solving market problems. The CPUC 
promoted competitive solutions in line with the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA, 
1978), as well as undertaking more specific policies designed to improve competition. 
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In addition, there was concern that the industry was stagnating under proposals that encouraged the 
maintenance of the status quo rather than actually actively pursuing economic growth, greater 
competitiveness and new business opportunities. 
To that end, it was hoped that a new structure could be devised and implemented which would 
alleviate these problems, while also establishing a comprehensive, long-term solution to the problems 
facing the Californian electricity industry, and also provide a practical alternative to the litigation 
which dominated the industry. 
The Californian reforms had five basic objectives, which are detailed as follows (CPUC, 1994a and 
1994b). Firstly, that consumers be able to receive direct access to generators, marketers (wholesale 
electricity traders), brokers, and other service providers in the market for energy services. Secondly, 
that all consumers be able to receive the benefits associated with the increasingly competitive 
structure. Thirdly, that consumers have direct access to the most efficient and environmentally sound 
electricity services and service infi-astructure available. Fourthly, that the newly competitive electric 
services market provide a significant contribution to the state's economic growth, productivity, 
competitiveness, and job creation. Finally, that all customers have universal access to basic and 
affordable electric services that maintain the pace of innovation and change in the market for 
electricity as a whole. 
It was anticipated that consumers would be granted the following choices: to retain the services of the 
traditional vertically integrated regulated utility for their energy services; to contact directly with 
generators and other service providers to establish a tailored service portfolio; contract with energy 
service brokers, marketers, or other service providers to act on behalf of the consumer to establish 
their service provision. Therefore, the essence is that consumers be allowed choice through direct 
access, known as "retail wheeling". 
In order to achieve these goals, it was perceived that a wholesale market for electric services would 
have to be established, and that the appropriate institutional arrangements either be created from 
scratch or developed from their current levels. It was hoped that the policy of direct access combined 
with the pre-existing conditions of the EPA would expand the market and allow greater incentives for 
efficiency. The experience with wholesale power markets (such as the Western Systems Power Pool, 
see below) was such that not only was it hoped that consumers and producers would continue to 
benefit, but also that neither safety nor system reliability would be compromised, In addition, it was 
anticipated that the integration of electricity and telecommunications services would prove most 
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beneficial to competition, as the use of telecommunications to transmit price data to consumers was 
seen as vital to competition, as it had been in the Western Systems Power Pool (see below). 
Many of the institutional and contractual arrangements required for these reforms were already in 
place at the time these reforms were actually proposed. Interconnected distribution networks had 
already been established voluntarily, enhancing wholesale electricity transactions and aiding the 
development of contractual arrangements and financial instruments. 
These arrangements were largely a consequence of the Western System Co-ordinating Council 
(WSCQ, which not only has improved the degree of reliability provided by utilities, but it has also 
increased trade between members to the benefit of both members and their consumers. Established in 
1991, the Western Systems Power Pool (the Pool) is another industry-created institution derived from 
the WSCC, which comprises twenty-two states, one Canadian province and sixty million consumers. 
This pool is centrally managed by a computer system located in Phoenix, Arizona, and relies on a 
sophisticated telecommunications-based computer system to allow its members to engage in short- 
term trades for energy, capacity, exchanges and transmission services, witnessing over one thousand 
monthly offers. The Pool allows members to engage in mutually beneficial transactions and make 
more efficient use of the West's generation and transmission infrastructure. 
The operation of the Pool was indicative of the stance taken in California, namely the importance of 
separating the ownership and operation of the different bodies within the industry. For example, as 
outlined below, the CPUC were keen to make the service operator independent from the pool operator 
in order to prevent discrimination and to facilitate the increasing transparency of information. This 
separation did not compromise the high degree of central co-ordination and control required for the 
successful operation of such a complex set of institutional arrangements as that required to deliver 
power to California and the west coast of the United States. In fact, the pre-existing arrangements 
were such that the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) viewed them as a stable enough 
foundation upon which to base their first futures contracts for electricity, with such arrangements 
allowing buyers and sellers to manage their risk, as well as promoting ftuther similar arrangements 
(see below). 
The WSCC Pool is not the only pool in the US, but ifs success, location and range make it a possible 
template for deregulation in California. However, the main concern apparent in California and other 
states was the need for vertical separation of ownership from use for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
not all of the power producers which operate in the broader industry are pool members. Therefore, 
those suppliers who are not pool members must face information and transaction costs that can 
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represent barriers to the use of the infrastructure. Secondly, these barriers may pose a threat to the 
successM expansion of the transmission system, as new members may be discouraged from joining 
the pool. Thirdly, those who seek to buy from the pool may face similar barriers as those seeking to 
supply into the pool. 
The EPA, which effectively severed the link between ownership and use addressed these concerns, 
and in doing so, Congress took a considerable step towards eliminating barriers to efficiency in power 
markets. The passage of the EPA served to create another industry-led institution comprised of a 
group of different firms - the regional transmission group (RTG) - which it was hoped would create an 
effective fortun in which to provide grid access. It is anticipated that at some point in the future, when 
the RTGs have grown in both size and efficiency, they will merge with the industry-led pools and 
reliability councils. This will result in an integrated market or set of markets for transmission in the 
Western United States (both inland and on the Pacific West Coast), thus increasing the system's 
efficiency. 
4.2 The path to reform and the new market structure 
The reforms examined by the cpuC represent a two-track approach. Firstly, in the areas of the 
industry that exhibited natural monopoly elements, or where market power existed, the existing cost- 
of-service regulation was to be replaced with alternatives that focused upon utility performance and 
incentives to efficiency. Secondly, in those areas where competition was a more appropriate means by 
which to organise the development, delivery and consumption of energy services, the existing 
regulation was to be replaced by market forces. These potentially competitive areas are generation, 
energy efficiency, power brokers, marketers, and other service providers. In order to achieve the first 
track, the utilities existing initiatives to performance-based regulation had to be strengthened, while 
the second necessitated revisions to the state's regulatory framework, which it is anticipated will be 
based around a long-term, staged implementation strategy (see below). 
4.2 1. The key elements of the reforms. 
In order to achieve the reforms, the following components were seen as necessary by the CPUC. 
Firstly, the direct access strategy would be based on two tracks: those consumers who wished to 
continue to receive their services from the vertically integrated company (these consumers are termed 
utility service or full service consumers), and those who wished to take advantage of the competitive 
generation market (direct access consumers). The main problem in introducing such a dual system was 
ensuring that the utilities not be able to shift costs between their direct access and utility service 
consumers, as cross-subsidisation could occur, However, it was anticipated that accounting barriers 
would be created which would prevent such behaviour, including the identification and fair allocation 
214 
of any uneconomic utility assets. 
Secondly, the utility would retain its traditional right to service only in the case of those consumers 
who did not choose to undertake direct access, thus continuing to receive bundled service firorn the 
utility. This classification would initially include all but the largest consumers in the first stage of the 
proposed strategy of deregulation, which is based around a five-year phase-in period (see below). The 
utility would continue to supply utility service consumers with the traditional bundled service 
(generation, energy efficiency, co-ordination and system control, transmission and distribution), would 
acquire generation and energy efficiency services firorn competitive markets and existing utility assets, 
and would retain the option to construct new generation facilities to meet the demands of these 
consumers. 
Thirdly, those consumers who wish to obtain direct access would have the right to acquire generation 
services directly from non-utility service providers. As such, the utility would lose its exclusive 
fi-anchise for these customers, necessitating modifications to the utility's mandate in order to allow it to 
compete in this sector. Although utilities would be allowed to compete in this sector, regulatory 
oversight would still be necessary with regard to the ownership of transmission assets in order to limit 
the potential exploitation of monopoly power. The utility would remain obligated to provide 
transmission and distribution services on a non-discriminatory basis to those direct access consumers 
requiring them after having secured their own non-utility generation services. 
Fourthly, the direct access classification would be voluntary, based upon the stages of eligibility to be 
introduced. Direct access is scheduled to begin on I st January 1998, with all consumers scheduled to 
be eligible for direct access by the beginning of 2003 (or five years after the start of the transitional 
period if the January 1998 start date is delayed). Eligibility is by no means a reason to undertake direct 
access as those consurners who are eligible for direct access but do not exercise this option will 
continue to receive a bundled, regulated service. 
Fifthly, the utility will remain the provider of last resort for all consumers. This means that those direct 
access consumers who wish to return to utility service status can do so, but only after providing the 
utility with notice of at least twelve months. A direct access consumer who has returned to utility 
service classification can go back to direct access, again only after an additional twelve-month notice 
period. Likewise, the utility itself is required to provide service to consumers wishing to return to the 
utility service system in less than twelve months. However, the utility is under no obligation to offer 
service to such customers at the tariffed rate. In contrast, the returning consumer must compensate the 
utility by an appropriate amount for the incremental costs incurred as a consequence of providing 
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service until the twelve-month period has expired. 
These conditions were seen as necessary to ensure that the utility has enough opportunity to plan its 
capacity such that it is capable of meeting demand, and preventing uneconomic decisions that could 
result if consumers were unrestricted in facing the choice between the utility service price and the 
competitive direct access price. If consumers were unrestricted, this could lead to constant changes 
between the two types of service, making it difficult for the utility to plan its decisions in such areas as 
investment in new generation facilities. 
Sbcthly, for direct access consumers, the CPUC will have the responsibility of ensuring non- 
discriminatory transmission, distribution and co-ordination and system control services. (Tbe utility 
service customers will continue to be protected through their integrated service package. ) While 
competition in the generation sector will provide a superior approach compared to regulation, 
transmission and distribution will still require regulatory oversight. 
Finally, the regulatory structure concerning resource procurement will be eliminated. This system 
establishes the amount of generating capacity (thus the output of these plants) that the utilities can 
subject to competitive auction. With the introduction of direct access, the system will be modified 
such that the risk associated with these services will be bome by the shareholders. This will be 
undertaken against a backdrop of regulatory oversight to prevent cross-subsidisation, while also 
altering the regulator's role to reflect the competition present in the market. 
4.2.2. Reforming the regulatory stance. 
The traditional regulatory compact is comprised of several key components (CPUC, 1994a and 
1994b). Firstly, the granting of monopoly franchise rights. Secondly, by allowing it to recover 
reasonable expenses and earn a fair rate of return on its investment, the utility's financial security is 
ensured. In return, the utility is subject to regulation by the CPUC under the state constitution and by 
statute. The CPUC must ensure that the utility provides a safe, reliable and reasonably priced service 
to all consumers within its monopoly franchise based upon the conditions of non-discrimination. 
Given the deregulation to date and the proposals outlined, it is also necessary that the regulatory 
system must adapt - specifically, regulation must be focused upon the establishment and 
encouragement of the competitive marketplace. 
In the first track of the reforms (from early 1996 to the start of 1998), performance-based regulation 
will be introduced, thus altering the regulatory compact along with the way in which reasonable rates 
of return are ensured. A bundled utility service package must remain a viable option for consumers, 
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especially for those who are seek to but are unable to take advantage of direct access. It is with this 
and other considerations in mind that the change in regulatory strategy has been proposed. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, electricity prices in California are as excessively high - performance- 
based regulation should provide better incentives for efficient operations, investment, and in turn 
lower prices. In addition, performance-based regulation is seen as a means by which the regulation 
may be simplified in the long run. Secondly, given that performance-based regulation will not alter the 
industry firanchise to any great extent the system's safety, service and reliability should remain at their 
traditionally high levels. Thirdly, the regulatory reforms should generate an opportunity to cam returns 
that will be at least the same as under cost-of-service regulation. Finally, performance-based 
regulation should allow utilities to make a smooth transition from the existing regulatory-based 
structure to the planned consumer-orientated structure. 
In the second track of reforms (1998 to 2003, and beyond), competition will replace regulation. Based 
around the recent history of California's investor- and public-owned utilities (CPUC, 1993), the extent 
of competition in generation is apparent. 7his is the domain where direct access will be introduced in 
stages, but it will necessitate adjustments to the regulatory compact in order to ensure that utility 
service consumers are not exploited either during or after the second transitional phase. Furthermore, 
regulation will still need to exist in those areas where competition is not feasible. In addition, areas 
such as ratemaking and investment criteria will require reform. 
The EPA grants the Federal Energy Regulator), Commission (FERC) complete discretion in granting 
and determining the appropriate arrangements regarding access, which it is hoped will be improved by 
the new regulatory stance. In addition, the State of California (through the CPUQ will retain 
jurisdiction over the siting of new power plants and retail franchise issues, as given in the EPA. In 
order to facilitate transmission access, FERC has indicated a desire to see a greater number of RTGs, 
provided that consumer interests are guaranteed. 
It is therefore apparent, that the degree of regulatory restructuring will be considerable. It is now 
appropriate to examine the industrial changes that will be undertaken as a consequence of this 
programme. 
4.2.3. The new market structure. 
By I st January 1998 at the latest, there will be an independent service operator (ISO), a competitive 
wholesale power pool (Power Exchange), and a customer choice of service options. Each of these 
areas will be examined in tum, but first it is necessary to investigate more general issues. Firstly, the 
217 
role of the utility in the newly restructured industry must be to provide a safe, reliable, non- 
discriminatory service to all electricity consumers. Secondly, it must also provide energy from the 
power exchange to all consumers who do not choose direct access or are not eligible for direct access 
(utility service customers). Finally, it must provide service under incentive ratemaking rather than 
cost-of-service raternaking for distribution and utility-owned generating assets. 
It is hoped that the new structure will address the problems of both vertical market power and 
horizontal market power: the former exists due to utilities controlling generation, transmission, and 
distribution; the latter exists because utilities control the majority of the generating capacity in the 
service territories. Vertical market power is expected to be removed by vertical separation - the 
creation of both the ISO and the power exchange, and a commitment by the utilities to additional 
unbundling of their operations. 
Horizontal market power exists as the utilities control the majority of the generating facilities in their 
service areas. Horizontal market power is expected to be reduced by performance-based regulation as 
a means of preventing cross-subsidisation of inefficient generating units that would not be competitive 
in the Power Exchange. Performance-based regulation is based around the use of established 
benchmarks, with rewards or penalties being given to the firm based upon whether those benchmarks 
were exceeded or not met. In this situation, cross-subsidisation would preclude returning the full value 
of efficient generating facilities to consumers. Furthermore, market power will also be restricted by 
plant sales, with both Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and Southern California Edison Company 
(SCE) committing to divest 50% of their fossil fuel generating assets. 
Vertical market power would typically result from a single utility owning generation, transmission and 
distribution, and the abuse of this kind of power could occur if, for example, system operators gave 
priority to their affiliated generating units in transmission and distribution. The ability to limit the 
market power of companies in transmission will be based upon the successful establishment and 
operation of comparable and non-discriminatory open access tariffs. The potential for such 
manipulation should be successfully eliminated through isolation of transmission control in the ISO, 
and the establishment of an independent dispatch ordering system. 
Horizontal market power can occur in the presence of significant barriers to entry or few market 
participants, and is reflected in an ability to influence prices. In the case of the electricity industry, this 
will focus upon generation. There is considerable concern in California regarding the extent of market 
concentration in generation, notably in the ownership and control of generating plant. As in the UK, 
the role of mid-merit generating plant, which typically influences prices, and that ownership of this 
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particular type of plant could be more important than overall generation concentration. A firm that 
owned such generating capacity could control the marginal price for generation. 
In addition to mid-merit plants, some generating units could be located in relative proximity to the 
transmission system, thus giving generators the possibility of abasing market power if the system 
becomes heavily loaded (see below). Some areas, which may be identified by the transmission system 
after restructuring, may not be prone to the immediate entry of lower priced competitors due to there 
being insufficient transmission capacity. It is therefore a concern that the sale of such units with the 
potential to influence prices to companies other than investor-owned utilities will not decrease the 
potential for market power or the possibility of its abuse. It is hoped that the divestiture plans will 
eliminate these concerns. 
Public purpose programs are also addressed under the reforms. Such programmes are those based 
upon social objectives. These include renewable resource generation, discounts for low-income 
households, certain minority groups, energy efficiency, and promoting resource diversity. These 
arrangements are unlikely to be changed in the immediate term from the pre-existing conditions, but 
some modifications will focus upon the role of electric utilities as the providers of these services. 
The new system will incorporate a renewable energy-purchasing requirement through a certain 
percentage of generation from renewable resources. It will adopt a surcharge to fund public goods 
(research, development and demonstration, energy efficiency and demand side management 
programs), as well as a separate surcharge to provide low-income assistance and efficiency services. 
Finally, the costs associated with RD&D for regulated functions and other programmes will continue 
to be collected as part of the regulated rates. 
Finally, the role of the CPUC must be confirmed. In the system, the CPUC will monitor the market in 
order to detect if and when there are deviations from its ultimate goals, and will intervene if and when 
it is perceived necessary. It will increase the importance of and the emphasis on consumer protection, 
and will ensure that the safety and reliability of electric services are maintained. 
4.2.4. The independent service operator (ISO). 
This body will be responsible for the control and operation of the state's transmission system, and 
must undertake the following responsibilities. Firstly, it must provide non-discriminatory, open 
transmission access for wholesale and retail power sales. Secondly, it must co-ordinate the scheduling 
of despatch of power from all sources and balance the system load on a real-time basis, As such, it 
must also efficiently manage transmission congestion. Finally, it must maintain system reliability, 
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recover the cost of ancillary services, and provide information on such areas as transmission 
constraints, load distribution and Me losses. 
Most importantly, the ISO must be structured such that it is independent of both the utilities and the 
power exchange. It will not own the transmission system (that will remain the responsibility of the 
utilities), but will make all operating decisions regarding the system. Its independence from generation 
should remove the potential for discriminatory transmission access. 'This system and the operators 
must be approved by the FERC, as well as its ownership status, i. e. Private Corporation, non-profit 
making organisation, governmental organisation, etc. 
The ISO will co-ordinate day-ahead scheduling and balancing for all uses of the transmission grid, 
accepting nominations from market participants for both the day-ahead schedule and the hourly 
balancing transactions. The nominations from the power exchange will include the tentative dispatch, 
the locations of the generation and loads, and the associated bids for generation and loads. The 
bilateral nominations must include the amount and timing of deliveries, along with the source and 
destination for power transmission. The ISO will also accept bids for increments and decrements of 
nominated inputs or outputs that would be required to redispatch the system if the need arose. In co- 
ordinating demand and supply bids, the ISO must maintain quality, reliability and security of supply, 
and manage transmission constraints and system congestion. As in the pre-reform scenario, 
transmission services will continue to be regulated, but the ISO's structure will be modified along the 
above guidelines. 
4.2.5. The power exchange. 
The power exchange will provide a market for power based around a series of published hourly or 
half-hourly prices, and will be a competitive wholesale power pool. All power producers will have the 
right to compete within the pool based upon transparent bidding rules. The pool will match supply 
bids made by generators with demand bids for power from utilities, power marketers and other service 
providers. These bids will be ranked on a least cost basis, and the power delivery schedule that is 
created will be submitted to the ISO. As the prices are published, the prices will allow customers to 
make efficient purchasing decisions and adjust their consumption accordingly. 
The power exchange will be separate and independent from the ISO and will not be permitted to 
possess any generating plant, or to have any financial interest in any source of generation. As with the 
ISO, it must be approved by the FERC, and its ownership status verified. In terms of actual 
participation, municipalities, independent power producers, out-of-state producers, and public utilities 
can all participate. (It should be noted that out-of-state producers can only compete in the power 
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exchange on conditions of reciprocal access to their pools if and when they are established). All 
purchasing from and selling through the power exchange will be voluntary, but during the five-year 
transition period, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), and Southern 
California Edison Company (SCE) must commit to the following conditions. Firstly, that they are 
required to purchase all of their energy used to meet the demands of utility service customers from the 
power exchange. Secondly, they are required to bid into the power exchange until such time as the 
generating plants undergo market valuation (i. e. through sale or other means), and a potential change 
of ownership under the divestiture plans outlined above. The reason why a change of ownership is not 
guaranteed is that the generator may bid for its own plant and become its eventual owner - subject to 
certain conditions. As such, these companies will remain under regulatory control in addition to being 
subjected to market disciplines. 
The CPUC places important emphasis on the role of transparent price signals and their benefits to 
consumers and producers alike. It is believed that this information will send the most reliable signals 
with respect to the need for additional generating units, as well as the need for cost-cutting steps to 
keep existing units competitive. 
The power exchange will be a daily auction system, with the exchange's operators receiving bids for 
generators stating the minimum price for which suppliers would be willing to dispatch a certain 
amount of power in hourly or half-hourly increments. The exchange must then match these generation 
bids with demand bids submitted by utilities, brokers, marketers, or other entities operating on behalf 
of end consumers. This will result in a series of market-clearing prices for electricity throughout the 
day. As determined by the ISO, the exchange will then determine a dispatch schedule for the 
generators based upon these prices and the bids, and then based upon this schedule, the ISO will 
integrate the schedule nominations based on direct access contracts. 
The market-clearing locational prices will be obtained from the ISO as part of the integration and co- 
ordination of the alternative nominations and bids. Every winning generation bidder will be paid the 
market-clearing price at its location, with that price consistent with both the bid and the supply and 
demand equilibrium. The exchange will average the locational clearing prices, with end use customers 
served by the exchange receiving that price. The net payments to the power exchange will be allocated 
through the ISO to pay for transmission losses or as congestion payments. 
4.2.6 Customer choice 
The principle of direct access is that retail consumers will be allowed the choice of arranging the 
purchase of electricity directly from non-utility generators. This system will be introduced with an 
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initial twelve-month phase commencing no later than I st January 1998, and will include all consumer 
classes. In the absence of technological barriers, all consumers will be eligible for direct access after 
the initial introductory period, but in the event that technical barriers do exist, then a phase-in schedule 
has been developed. Such barriers would typically concern the ability with which consumers could 
monitor the price of electricity on an hourly/half-hourly basis, and therefore depend upon the 
introduction and installation of appropriate metering technology. All consumers will have the option 
of participating in each phase, if not directly then through intermediaries. For example, third-party 
intermediaries could purchase unbundled electricity and then bundle it with other energy services for 
resale to consumers. Such an aggregation could include the loads of multiple consumers or a 
consurnees load at several individual sites. If customers wish to exercise their option to become direct 
access consumers, then they must inform their distribution utility. 
Alternatively, the distribution utilities could offer real-time rates for power, which would mean that the 
tariffed electric service would be referenced to the real-time price in the power exchange. Such an 
option would allow consumers to redirect their power usage to lower-cost periods, thus reducing their 
bills. It would also discourage unnecessary investment in generation, and encourage efficient energy 
usage. Finally, it would allow those consumers who do not choose real-time rates to be billed based 
upon average cost, as they are at present. 
Finally, the customer could arrange contracts for differences that would allow for the hedging of risks 
associated with price volatility. In these arrangements, the consumer would pay the contract price 
rather than the (spot) power exchange price. (See the earlier chapters on UK contracting arrangements 
for more details). 
It is expected that even those consumers who do nothing in the face of this deregulation will still 
benefit. The full benefits of wholesale competition will be achieved through the price reductions seen 
as a result of the power exchange, and in the presence of real-time or time-of-use meters, customers 
should be able to optimise their energy usage to take advantage of the lower-priced off-peak rates. 
With the power exchange operating state-wide power dispatch and price competition on an hourly or 
half-hourly basis, efficiency will be increased, while the limits on cross-subsidisation imposed by 
performance-based regulation should reduce prices. 
Direct access will benefit small and large consumers in different ways. The rates paid by small 
consumers receiving utility service will be capped at their I st January 1996 nominal levels beginning 
Ist January 1998, and will remain capped for seven years - this will result in a 23% real decrease 
based on the assumption of 3% inflation. With direct access beginning in 1998 for a cross-section of 
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consumers, it is anticipated that it will then be extended to all consumers no later than the five-year 
phase-in (as discussed above). The proposed schedule is as follows: 8MW or greater in 1998; 2MW 
in 1999; 5OOkW in 2000; lOOkW in 2001; 50kW in 2002; and the remaining consumers in 2003. 
Large consumers should experience the same benefits as small users in terms of expected wholesale 
price reductions, as well as receiving the same right to direct access. In order to encourage efficient 
energy usage on an hourly or half-hourly basis, real-time meters will be required for those largest users 
with demand greater than 20kW to ensure that the proper price signals are responded to. Finally, large 
consumers will receive finmediate access to contracts for differences taking into account the contract 
volume and the time that the contract is called. 
4.2.7. Transition costs. 
Unfortunately, the adjustment process to a more competitive environment brings with it costs of 
adjustment resulting obligations which become uneconomic in the new competitive structure. These 
are typically in one of three forms: an above market proportion of undepreciated generation asset 
fixed costs; the costs of generation contracts in the face of uneconomic prices (similar to the "take-or- 
pay" contracts of British Gas); and other unavoidable generation-related costs. 
These costs will be calculated based upon the commitment that by 2003, all non-nuclear generating 
assets will be held out for either sale or appraisal. If the market value of the asset is less than its book 
value (i. e. the asset's original cost minus depreciation and deferred taxes), the difference will increase 
transition costs. Likewise, if the market value is greater than the book value, the difference will reduce 
transition costs. In the case of contracts, the costs will be estimated based upon a comparison of the 
ongoing contract cost with the power exchange price. 
In the case of nuclear assets, the following scheme has been established. There are two nuclear power 
stations in California: San Onofre (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations, SONGS), which is 
owned by SCE (80% ownership share, as well as being the plant's operator) and SDG&E (20% 
ownership share) and Diablo Canyon, which is owned and operated by PG&E. In addition, SCE owns 
approximately 16% of the Palo Verde nuclear generating facility in Arizona. The CPUC has 
established an alternative approach for SONGS Units 2 and 3 to that stated above. This approach sets 
the price of electricity equal to a forecast of prices in 2003. For Palo Verde, Edison has been ordered 
to submit an alternative proposal based on that for San Onofire. Finally, PG&E has been instructed to 
submit an alternative proposal for Diablo Canyon, such that rates are not increased above their levels 
on I st January 1996, and are decreased to market levels by 2003. 
It is expected that all consumers of the investor-owned utilities will pay their share of the transition 
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costs. They will be collected in a non-bypassable charge, called the Competition Transition Charge 
(CTC), which will be collected until 2005. The options for collecting the charge were from 
distribution, on meters, or as a general levy (such as the fossil fuel levy in the UK). The option chosen 
was to add the charge to the bills of consumers in proportion to their consumption of electricity - the 
surcharge being reported separately in an "unbundled" bill. Utilities must recover all transition costs, 
but will earn a reduced return on equity for uneconomic assets. Finally, the rates for bundled electric 
service will not increase beyond their I st January 1996 levels. 
Transition costs will also arise as a consequence of a plant being unsuccessful in its bid to supply 
power through the exchange, as it will have no opportunity to recover its fixed costs. Even if a plant 
were to be successful in getting its bid into the exchange, transition costs will also accrue if the 
market-clearing price is insufficient to allow the company to recover its plant's fixed costs. 
As is seen in the overview of deregulation in other US states, transition costs (or stranded costs) 
remain a considerable problem to be overcome, and it is unlikely that deregulation will have the 
support of all in the industry until solutions are proposed. 
4.2.8. Concluding comments on the reforms. 
While extent to which these reforms will prove successful is uncertain, the commitment to reform of 
some kind is apparent. The CPUC has built in several methods by which - if need be - the reforms can 
be adjusted based upon delays or technical factors, as well as allowing companies the right of appeal. 
The reforms listed here have concentrated on some areas (the ISO and the power exchange) at the 
expense of others (public purpose programmes), but it is apparent that the restructuring which has 
been proposed in California is unlike anything observed in the US, and its main notable comparison is 
with the deregulation of the electricity supply industry in England and Wales. 
While the deregulation of the electricity supply industry in England and Wales has been well- 
documented in the previous chapters, a summary of the main points to date of deregulation in 
California is provided in Table 5, while an overview of the main aspects of the planned deregulation 
required by the start date is provided in Table 6. 
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SECTION V- Dere2ulation in California and forward tradine. 
5.1. Comparisons between the Californian and English systems. 
It should be apparent from a description of the Californian system that it is highly similar to the system 
in England and Wales. From a basic standpoint: vertical separation; competitive generation; 
independent transmission network and competition in supply, it would be logical to conclude that the 
English system has possibly been used as a model. The similarities should be obvious: the NGC and 
the ISO (although the NGC does own the transmission system); the pool and the power exchange; 
progressive competition in supply phased in over a number of years based on electricity demand; and 
competition in generation. Given this, what should perhaps be noted more than the similarities 
between the systems are their differences. 
Firstly, the Californian power exchange is voluntary - running the risk that it could be a "shallow" pool 
- but the largest companies in the state's industry - San Diego, Pacific and Edison - must bid a certain 
percentage of their power sales through the power exchange for at least the five year introductory 
period. While this is potentially a source of concern, the problems will probably not materialise. The 
three companies could choose to abandon the power exchange after the initial period, but it is logical 
to expect that as the utility service customers make the transition to direct access, at least some of 
them will continue to be served through the power exchange. 
In addition, there is the concern that no other generator will seek to join the exchange, and the three 
companies will dominate the exchange. However, there are two reasons why this should not be the 
case: firstly, out-of-state generators already transmit power to California and will not abandon their 
market shares, and secondly Pacific and Edison have been instructed to divest 50% of their fossil fiiel 
capacity, which should prevent them from exploiting the exchange. In addition, if the Californian 
reforms are matched in other states, then a series of state exchanges could develop, along with the 
potential for competition between pools. 
A potential problem arises in terms of market share, as outlined by Perl (1996) in determining the 
geographical scope of the relevant market, This is a highly difficult undertaking in the context of the 
electricity industry as one must first predict the operations of the transmission system. When 
transmission links are not heavily loaded, the geographical scope of a market could be considerable, 
indicating a low concentration ratio. However, in the case of high loads on transmission wires, the 
network could become full in certain areas, thus granting certain companies effective regional 
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monopolies. Even if transmission lines are not full, a single utility may possess considerable market 
power because a certain proportion of the demand in an area must be met locally in order to ensure 
stability. Such local stability constraints are an additional problem and may have to be addressed in 
much the same way as baseload and non-baseload power in England and Wales. As such, Uls 
proposals for the New England region represent an advancement in solving these problems. 
Secondly, the independent ownership of the ISO is comparable to the NGC, but the key point is that 
the ISO is not permitted to hold generating assets. Of course, the NGC was allowed to own the 
pumped storage businesses until late 1995 before the regulator determined that it was inappropriate 
given the NGC's role as the pool operator to encourage competition in generation whilst owning 
generation assets. 
Thirdly, allowing individual consumers to contract directly with generators on a large scale is akin to 
the (all but rejected) principle of trading outside the pool. In establishing contracts for differences 
between themselves and the generators, consumers run the risk of having their asymmetric bargaining 
position exploited. However, it is hoped that the regulatory system will prevent such an occurrence. A 
further issue that has been left to the market is the terms and prices of contracts for differences - if this 
remains the case then the contract market will be far from transparent and the risk of price 
discrimination could arise. 
Finally, there is the fact that in the power exchange, the market clearing price is calculated based upon 
both supply schedules and demand bids, unlike the pool's supply bids only. It is logical to conclude 
that, ceteris paribus, the prices in the power exchange should exhibit less instability than those in the 
pool, due to the latter using only an estimate of demand in the construction of the system marginal 
price. 
An additional point should be made concerning the actual reason for the reforms. While deregulation 
has been common in the United States electricity industry for some time, the Californian proposals 
went beyond those laid down in federal statutes at the time of their initial proposal. The goal for 
deregulation and privatisation in England and Wales could be described as being highly politically 
motivated but also based upon economic criteria. In California, the level of electricity prices are such 
that competition is expected to bring price declines which will result in a more competitive situation in 
terms of prices and consumer welfare. Therefore, one could argue that economic concerns dominate 
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the Californian motives for deregulation. 
To conclude, it should be noted that as with privatisation in England and Wales, the Californians are 
facing a set of similar problems: modiýting the vertically integrated structure; how to prevent market 
power abuses; how to ensure competition in generation; how to operate a new regulatory system; how 
to ensure low prices; and how to meet the costs of reform. The UK government approached these 
problems in the ways outlined in the previous chapters, while the Californians have chosen the ways 
detailed in the preceding sections. The UK has mixed results in achieving its objectives, and it will 
take at least until the end of the five-year phase-in period until it can be ascertained how successful the 
Californian approach has been. 
5.2 Electrichyfutures trading in the United States. 
As the examination of the spot and forward/futures markets has formed an important part of this 
thesis, it is appropriate to briefly examine the state of progress in the futures market for electricity in 
the US, which is - as mentioned - based upon the California state market. 
Electricity futures trading began on NYMEX in March 1996, based on two contracts, both of which 
have West Coast delivery points. The first is the California-Oregon border (COB) contract, which 
directs power to northern California, the second is the Palo Verde contract, which dispatches power 
from the Arizona facility to southern California. Both contracts possess a standard format: they call for 
the delivery of 736MW of power over a one month time period at a flow rate of 2MW per hour during 
the course of 16 peak hours (determined by the contract parties). Delivery is specified to occur over 
twenty-three business days within a month (there are suitable arrangements in the absence of twenty- 
three business days). Eighteen consecutive months are listed on the exchange, and as discussed, the 
California area was chosen due to the high degree of trading already being carried out there. 
The establishment of the futures market in the electricity has been buoyed by the success of the gas 
futures market, which was introduced some years earlier. Electricity ftitures trading during April 1996 
saw approximately one thousand contracts per day, in what was seen to be a relatively stable market, 
or at least a market more stable, given electricity price volatility. This fact may be attributed to the 
relatively low trading liquidity in the market, as contract trading has yet to develop to the same extent 
as the successful NYWX gas futures market. 
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The adoption by NYMEX of electricity futures contracts was not without its difficulties. The 
continued deregulation of the industry has altered perceptions of electricity from a highly regulated 
industry to one that could satisfactorily support futures trading. The spread of competition is perceived 
as being conducive to futures trading for the following reasons. Firstly, competition should lead to 
lower prices as new suppliers join the industry, with lower prices and more firms making futures 
hedging a viable option. Secondly, increased competition reveals the existence of old inefficiencies, 
which must be eliminated in an attempt to cut costs - again leading to lower prices. Thirdly, a short- 
term market develops which increases reliance upon short-term contracts and a shift from longer-term 
contracts. All of these factors result in an increased variability in prices relative to the standard, 
regulated utility. NYMEX perceived that all of these changes were being undertaken with such pace in 
California that the state would be a suitable choice for the development of electricity futures. 
In the first month of trading, the COB contract volume was three times that of the Palo Verde volume, 
a fact which may be attributed to the high volume of pre-existing Califomia-Oregon trade in the 
Western Systems Power Pool, making it easier for traders to follow the COB prices. The balance of 
contract trades has been greeted with some surprise, as the COB contract is determined primarily 
through the capacity of hydroelectric generating facilities. The amount of electricity produced would 
be inherently influenced by the weather, and rainfall in particular. The water flow will affect the 
amount of electricity produced, and therefore the cost to the hydroelectric facilities, who consequently 
influence the price of the COB contracts. These facts introduce considerýble potential for uncertainty 
into the contract price. 
There is some concern that the Palo Verde contract may eventually cease trading unless it attracts 
greater interest. However, it is possible that such a move could paradoxically benefit the futures 
market, as the trading of two contracts lowers the liquidity in both markets. As such, a unified market 
could have greater liquidity as a whole. 
Of the trades in the market, it is believed that approximately half are being undertaken by speculators 
or floor traders, and the remaining half by power marketers. At present, the utilities themselves and 
large electricity users would seem to be shying away from trading. Of the approximate 150 power 
marketers in the US, it is believed that some two dozen are trading electricity futures on NYMEX, and 
these are typically the largest of the marketers, such as Houston's Enron Power Marketing, Duke/Louis 
Dreyfus of Connecticut, and the Natural Gas Clearinghouse affiliate, Electric Clearinghouse. 
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The American power marketers tend to be either created by finance houses (e. g. Morgan Stanley), or 
are divisions of natural gas shippers (e. g. Enron), or are affiliates of generation companies (e. g. AES 
Power) or utilities (e. g. Brooklyn Union Gas), or are completely independent companies (e. g. New 
York City's NAEC). Power marketers take a physical position on electricity and then use the fiitures 
contracts to hedge their exposure to this position. Although they do not necessarily deliver power to 
the COB or Palo Verde, the contracts offer the ultimate objective of risk management - hence their 
attractiveness (for example, through spread trading - see the earlier chapters on UK EFA trading 
arrangements). 
It is also highly likely that the limited trading in filtures will be increased as a consequence of the 
FERC's orders of 24th April 1996. These orders (Order No. 888 and 889) require electric utilities to 
offer non-discriminatory access to their transmission lines to power marketers (No. 888) and to share 
information regarding available transmission capacity (No. 889). These orders could well have the 
same effect on the electricity industry as similar orders issued years earlier had upon the gas industry: 
it will be much easier to buy and sell electricity in the marketplace for delivery to consumers with 
direct access. It is possible that the direct access system will bring the utilities into the futures market 
on a much larger scale, as the utilities will have to establish new rules in the absence of the stability 
associated with the existing cost-pass through regime, be willing to accept greater price risk, and 
therefore participate actively in the futures market. 
Indeed, it is anticipated that a new filtures contract may develop some time during 1997. This contract, 
unlike the existing arrangements, will have an East Coast delivery point, possibly within the 
Pemsylvania/Jersey/Matyland areas. If this is achieved, it could represent the start of the 
"regionalisation" proposed by the EPA, thus facilitating competition and the possibility for further 
regulatory reforms. It is also anticipated that as the spread of direct access continues, and consumers 
become able to choose their own power supplier, then new hedging instruments will develop to meet 
this new type of electricity demand. 
Tbis flourishing, open system of forward markets in the US is in sharp contrast to the market in the 
UK. Despite the volume of electricity traded under contract in the UK, the lack of transparency in the 
market due to the commercial sensitivity of contract prices is probably hindering the development of 
the market itself With there being a limited number of non-electricity company players in the forward 
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market (the brokers), it is unlikely that this will be rectified due to the following problems. 
Firstly, the operation of the pool is seen as too complex by some companies, with the contract market's 
limited transparency possibly limiting entry: as discussed previously, many IPP generators will only 
enter the industry with the backing of long-term contracts. Secondly, the market power of National 
Power and Powergen is discouraging entry as companies do not wish to be at the mercy of firms who 
have the ability to determine pool prices. Finally, the system of regulation is prone to such a degree of 
uncertainty (especially after the DGES's decision to revise the distribution price controls) that the 
market is seen as too unstable for trade. The main potential way in which these problems could be 
overcome is in April 1998 with the final stage of competition in domestic markets is opened up 
through direct access. This event will increase the potential size of the contract market, and hopefully 
the pursuit of new customers also. (These aspects have been discussed in the earlier chapters on UK 
deregulation). 
It can therefore be said that although the US may be behind the UK in electricity deregulation, the US 
is well ahead of the UK in electricity futures trading, and perhaps the US system of standardising 
contracts (a system long-called for in the UK) could represent the way forward. 
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SECTION VI - Empirical analysis of the COB contract market. 
6.1. Introducing the data set. 
By researching the available resources of the Energy Online Internet Pages (www. energyonline. com), 
it was possible to access data on the prices at which the electricity contracts for the Califomia-Oregon 
border system trade. The data consisted of actual and forecasted non-firm peak and off-peak prices for 
contracts ($/MWh) and was available on a daily frequency over the period September 1995 to 
October 1996 and was obtained from the web site's Energy Database. 
It is appropriate to clarify these terms fijrther. The California-Oregon border prices represent the 
average of the electricity (dollars per megawatt hour) sold at the California-Nevada border and the 
Nevada-Oregon border. Non-fmn supply represents electricity sold along these routes that is subject 
to interruption at any time. Peak hours represent the period from 0600 hours to 2200 hours, Monday 
to Saturday, and off-peak hours represent the period from 2200 hours to 0600 hours, Monday to 
Saturday, and all day Sunday. These classifications introduce problems for the analysis. As the 
objective is to compare the actual and forecasted prices over the analysis period, in the absence of 
weekend observations for peak prices an adequate comparison would not be possible. Further, off- 
peak days are also the seasonal holidays (e. g. Christmas and New Year) and public holidays (e. g. 
Thanksgiving and Independence Day). Further, there are absences in certain data sets and not in 
others, and the computer program in use cannot estimate regressions if there are gaps in the data sets. 
This problem has been solved by generating an observation for the data set by taking an average of the 
two observations on either side of the absent day. While this is open to contention, it represents the 
most appropriate way of providing for the missing observations. 
The forecasts for prices are those undertaken by LGC Consulting, a California-based energy 
consulting company based in Los Altos which has been employed by the CPUC to undertake a 
recently published study (October 1996) into the consequences of the Californian path to reform. 
6.2 The empirical analysis of the spot-forward relationship. 
Using the data, it is possible to undertake regressions that attempt to ascertain whether the forecasts of 
peak and off-peak electricity prices correspond to their actual values, This is undertaken by a simple 
regression that measures the actual value as a ftinction of the forecasted value and a constant term: 
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Pi, t =ao+ 2L Pift + u, (4.5) 
The superscripts a andf correspond to the actual and forecasted prices respectively, i represents peak 
and off-peak prices, and u, is the normally and independently distributed term. If it is assumed that the 
LCG forecasts represent the price at which COB trades were undertaken, this becomes a simple means 
of assessing the spot-forward relationship present in the COB contracts. As dictated by financial 
markets theory, the forward price is an accurate predictor of the spot price when the constant term 
(alpha) equals zero, and the intercept term (lambda) equals zero. This relationship may be tested by 
means of the Wald test for linear and non-linear restrictions, with equation (4.5) estimated over the 
full sample period (427 observations) and over each individual month. The results of these models are 
presented in Table 7. 
To surnmarise the contents of the table, it can be seen that the off-peak forecast of the price is more 
accurate than the peak estimate. Although the results are the same for both sets of regressions in terms 
of the number of months (the test is valid on five occasions), the off-peak forecasts are a statistically 
valid estimate of the actual price when assessed over the entire fourteen month period. The most likely 
explanation for this outcome is that the peak estimates cannot ftilly predict the volatility associated 
with peak energy consumption and therefore peak energy prices. At face value, it cannot be said that 
the results for the off-peak regressions are any improvement. However, the fact that the result for the 
entire period indicates that the restrictions are valid lends credibility to this conclusion. 
A less restrictive restriction was also applied to the regression results. This assumed that the slope 
parameter was equal to unity, but that there was no restriction on the value of the intercept term. This 
assumption allows there to be drift between the actual and forecast values, but that the trend of the 
actual and forecast values is the same for both variables. The results are presented in Table 8. To 
summarise however, it can be seen that in the case of peak contracts, the restriction is valid in seven 
out of the fourteen months, but is not valid over the period as a whole. For the off-peak contracts, the 
restriction is valid for six out of the fourteen months and for the period as a whole. It is the latter of 
these results which allow the conclusion that the off-peak forecast prices continue to remain the more 
accurate estimate of the actual prices. The fact that the restriction is accepted on more occasions than 
when both restrictions are in use implies that the constant term does represent a drift on at least some 
occasions. 
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One final test to determine which of the two forecasts is the most accurate may be undertaken by 
assessing the mean difference between the actual and forecasted values over each of the test periods. 
Consider the following: 
pa ý Pif u, -E, (4.6) 
where & represents a forecast error and a, f and i are as previously, and all variables are in logs. 
Rearranging the equation to place the forecast error on its own then taking the average over each of 
the test periods yields: 
Average E, =I 
nTp 
-ZE, N it, 
(4.7) 
where "TP" indicates the test period of the analysis that - in this case - will be the full sample and the 
monthly periods outlined above. Although a common technique is to take the square of the forecast 
error, this will not be undertaken in this case as it will remove all negative signs and thus the capacity 
to assess the existence of an over- or under-prediction. The results are presented in Table 9. 
To summarise, in the full test period both forecasts underpredict the actual values, although the off- 
peak prediction does so to a lesser extent. On a monthly basis, the peak estimates underpredict in nine 
out of fourteen months, and the off-peak in seven out of fourteen months. In assessing the differences 
in the errors between the peak and off-peak forecasts, the absolute peak forecast error exceeds the 
absolute off-peak error in eight out of the fourteen months and for the analysis period as a whole. This 
continues to support the result that the off-peak forecasts are more accurate than the peak forecasts. 
One additional piece of information that would benefit this analysis is the use of trading volumes. 
However, it is known that since their introduction, trading in COB electricity futures has been at a rate 
of between thirty and two hundred and fifty contracts per day. This contrasts with the approximately 
twenty thousand natural gas futures contracts traded daily. The disparity has been attributed to the fact 
that the electricity industry is in the early stages of deregulation, and that trading volumes will increase 
as deregulation progresses. Although strip trading was introduced by NYMEX in September 1996 to 
encourage liquidity, the highest quantity of COB contracts traded in a single day is at present nine 
hundred and fifty-five (05/12/96), although trading in Palo Verde contracts remains well below that of 
COB contracts. Again, it is anticipated that as deregulation continues, contract demand will increase. 
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Table 7. Wald test results for peak and off-peak COB contract prices. 
7.1. Peak analvses. 
Test statistic 
8.6522 
39.5060 
20.7406 
7.6657 
5.5833 
25.7695 
3.6072 
20.4128 
38.9951 
2.7145 
3.4470 
11.4413 
10.3221 
4.7893 
26.1645 
AcceDt/Med HO' 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Accept 
Reject 
Accept 
Reject 
Reject 
Accept 
Accept 
Reject 
Reject 
Accept 
Reject 
Time veriod 
Sep-95 - Oct-96 
Sep-95 
Oct-95 
Nov-95 
Dec-95 
Jan-96 
Feb-96 
Mar-96 
Apr-96 
May-96 
Jun-96 
Jul-96 
Aug-96 
Sep-96 
Oct-96 
Observations 
1427 
1-30 
31-61 
62-91 
92-122 
123-153 
154-182 
183-213 
214-243 
244-274 
275-304 
305-355 
335-366 
367-396 
397427 
7.2. Off-peak analyses. 
Time Deriod 
Sep-95 - Oct-96 
Sep-95 
Oct-95 
Nov-95 
Dec-95 
Jan-96 
Feb-96 
Mar-96 
Apr-96 
May-96 
Jun-96 
Jul-96 
Aug-96 
Sep-96 
Oct-96 
Observations 
1-427 
1-30 
31-61 
62-91 
92-122 
123-153 
154-182 
183-213 
214-243 
244-274 
275-304 
305-355 
335-366 
367-396 
397427 
Test statistic AccevOR-dect HO' 
2.2523 Accept 
78.4909 Reject 
0,4878 Accept 
17.4181 Reject 
32.6693 Reject 
4.7733 Accept 
9.1815 Reject 
7.3544 Reject 
4.8652 Accept 
3.7817 Accept 
19.0543 Reject 
12.4646 Reject 
33.0575 Reject 
8.8204 Reject 
2.5669 Accept 
Wald test 5% critical value is C. S. (2) = 5.99. The null hypothesis is accepted if the calculated value of 
the Wald test is less than the critical value. 
I HO: Restrictions on the equation's parameters (intercept and slope coefficients) are valid and 
therefore that the forecasted price is an accurate predictor of the actual price. H 1: Restrictions are not 
valid and therefore that the forecasted price is not a valid predictor of the actual price. 
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Table 8. Revised Wald test results for peak and off-peak COB contract prices. 
8.1. Peak analvses. 
Time veriod Observations 
Sep-95 - Oct-96 1-427 
Sep-95 1-30 
Oct-95 31-61 
Nov-95 62-91 
Dec-95 92-122 
Jan-96 123-153 
Feb-96 154-182 
Mar-96 183-213 
Apr-96 214-243 
May-96 244-274 
Jun-96 275-304 
Jul-96 305-355 
Aug-96 335-366 
Sep-96 367-396 
Oct-96 397-427 
8.1. Off-peak analvses. 
Time Deriod 
Sep-95 - Oct-96 
Sep-95 
Oct-95 
Nov-95 
Dec-95 
Jan-96 
Feb-96 
Mar-96 
Apr-96 
May-96 
Jun-96 
Jul-96 
Aug-96 
Sep-96 
Oct-96 
Observations 
1-427 
1-30 
31-61 
62-91 
92-122 
123-153 
154-182 
183-213 
214-243 
244-274 
275-304 
305-355 
335-366 
367-396 
397-427 
Test statistic AcceDt/Re*ect HO' 
4.26090 Reject 
33.45660 Reject 
18.14400 Reject 
6.53040 Reject 
5.55870 Reject 
1.59340 Accept 
1.17240 Accept 
7.52620 Reject 
37.06620 Reject 
0.37613 Accept 
3.44160 Accept 
0.07403 Accept 
10.25760 Reject 
2.64820 Accept 
0.32484 Accept 
Test statistic Accept/Re'ect HO' 
2.21430 Accept 
55.32450 Rej ect 
0.15312 Accept 
10.95820 Reject 
26.91370 Reject 
2.47920 Accept 
0.16749 Accept 
6.83120 Reject 
1.48310 Accept 
1.94530 Accept 
19.04390 Reject 
5.45300 Reject 
29.18990 Reject 
8.74900 Reject 
0.02943 Accept 
Wald test 5% critical value is C. S. (I) = 3.84. The null hypothesis is accepted if the calculated value of 
the Wald test is less than the critical value. 
I HO: Restrictions on the equation's parameter (slope coefficient) are valid and therefore that the 
forecasted price is an accurate predictor of the actual price. HI: Restrictions are not valid and 
therefore that the forecasted price is not a valid predictor of the actual price. 
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Table 9. Differences between actual and forecast values. 
PEAK OFF-PEAK 
Period Observations Actual-Forecast Actual-Forecast 
Sep-95 - Oct-96 1-427 0.19203 0.04530 
Sep-95 1-30 0.56517 0.86367 
Oct-95 31-61 -0.24435 -0.05516 
Nov-95 62-91 -0.27517 -0.47017 
Dec-95 92-122 0.05645 -0.29613 
Jan-96 123-153 0.58306 0.14806 
Feb-96 154-182 -0.50448 -0.41724 
Mar-96 183-213 0.43194 0.09226 
Apr-96 214-243 0.15065 -0.12677 
May-96 244-274 -0.24433 -0.22417 
Jun-96 275-304 0.01550 0.02400 
Jul-96 305-355 0.98694 1.01660 
Aug-96 335-366 -0.07677 -0.43290 
Sep-96 367-396 0.32017 0.11833 
Oct-96 397-427 0.86000 0.37677 
If the number in the "Actual-Forecast" column is positive, the forecast underpredicts the actual 
value. 
If the number in the "Actual-Forecast" column is negative, the forecast overpredicts the actual 
value. 
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SECTION VII - Conclusions. 
The analysis of the electricity forward market in England and Wales indicated the importance of the 
contract market and its relationship with the spot market. However, in the absence of actual forward 
prices, it was necessary to create a synthetic data set to represent the forward prices. The resultant 
empirical analysis indicated a poor relationship between the electricity spot and forward markets -a 
result consistent with the divergence between the pool price and the anticipated pool prices that had 
been used as the basis for the contracts themselves. However, to a certain extent, it cannot be 
determined whether this result is attributable to the data set or the circumstances in the industry post- 
vesting. 
This is not the case in the analysis of the Californian electricity spot and forward markets, where it is 
possible to undertake regressions using actual forecast prices which can be used as the basis for an 
empirical analysis of peak and off-peak electricity spot and forward prices. These regressions indicate 
that both the peak and off-peak forecasts are valid predictors of the spot price, but that the off-peak 
forecasts tend to produce closer relationships to the spot price. This result is seen as being attributable 
to the stability of off-peak prices in comparison to peak prices. It is therefore worthwhile to consider 
whether or not the analyses that have formed the backbone of this thesis could be repeated utilising 
data from California. 
It is clear from the development of deregulation in California that a competitive power exchange could 
well operate there in much the same manner as the pool. While it is difficult to ascertain precisely how 
successful the deregulation will be or whether the timetable will be met, a clear commitment to 
deregulation is apparent. The type of deregulation chosen was influenced by that in England and 
Wales, and it should be noted that with sufficient time to observe the development of the power 
exchange, analyses similar to those which occupy the main body of this thesis should also be possible. 
Indeed, in the presence of data on the strike prices of contracts for differences, such a study could well 
build considerably upon some elements of this thesis. 
What is clear, both from the Californian experience, and from the experience of other US states and 
indeed other countries, is that electricity deregulation is becoming an important part of the industry. 
Indeed, the Californian experience requires to a great extent on deregulation in the gas and 
telecommunications industries for its success (to ensure competition in fuel supplies and the quick and 
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efficient delivery of price information), just as the UK experience relied heavily on gas and the 
reforms that made widespread CCGT generation possible. These structures show the importance of an 
integrated approach to utility deregulation. 
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CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSIONS. 
The work of this thesis is a hybrid of market price analysis associated with financial economics, and 
regulatory economics. The common thread is an investigation of the impact of regulation on different 
facets of prices in the industry: the spot market, the contract market and the stock market. 
Clearly, the work undertaken would have been impossible if not for the extensive changes to the 
electricity industry in England and Wales at privatisation - and particularly the introduction of the 
pool. The key aspect of deregulation in England and Wales was the vertical separation of the industry 
that occurred at privatisation. In addition, the continued (and indeed continuing) efforts to introduce 
competition into both generation and distribution illustrate the importance of restricting the extent of 
both horizontal and vertical market power in the revised industrial structure. Competition in 
generation should have been fostered by the creation of the electricity pool and the encouragement of 
new entrants, but with competition not taking hold direct regulatory action was used in the form of the 
price reviews, price caps and ultimately the forced sale of plant by National Power and Powergen. 
Similarly the continued spread of competition in distribution will culminate in the introduction of full 
domestic competition in 1998 - or as soon as is feasible thereafter. Within the overall framework of 
the industry, the regulator must operate within the terms of his mandate - which broadly states that he 
must ensure competition, protect consumers' interests and encourage low prices. 
The spread of competition and deregulation in electricity is not restricted to England and Wales, as the 
overview of deregulation in California indicates. Electricity deregulation is gathering pace in the 
United States, with a federal mandate introduced in July 1996 committing all states to the deregulation 
of their utilities by the end of the year 2000. The ultimate objective in the American system is the 
attainment of full domestic competition. It is hoped that simultaneous deregulation at state level would 
lead to agreements between utilities across states and multi-state electricity pools (similar agreements 
already exist in some areas of the US), leading to a vast, competitive nation-wide energy market. 
A possibly more ambitious programme was that put forward at the European Union summit in 
Florence in June 1996, where it was agreed that the EUs electricity market would be opened to 
competition. This deregulation will be a progressive adjustment to competition, with the actual 
agreement itself having taken eight years to be established, after the customary disagreements and re- 
writes associated with major EU decisions. If successful, the deregulation will produce competition on 
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a parallel to that of the UK, with the largest electricity users having the possibility of contracting with 
other suppliers in other countries for their power. 
These examples indicate the scope for electricity deregulation world-wide, and are a measure of the 
role that the UK's experience has played (and will continue to play) as a model for deregulation, as 
well as of the advantage that English companies will have as experienced participants in a competitive 
energy marketplace. With the development of pool-based electricity trading in many industrial nations 
(the United States is the most pertinent example), there is the possibility to repeat the research 
undertaken here utilising data from the appropriate countries. It was the creation of the pool that 
revolutionised the electricity industry in England and Wales - it also provided the data that underlie 
the analysis undertaken here, which consists of five separate studies. 
Chapter IV introduced the theoretical basis for the empirical analysis that was to follow. Through an 
evaluation of the Folk Theorem and the Supply Function approach to oligopoly, the game theoretic 
modelling of the pool was introduced. It was shown that regulation could indeed influence the price 
bid by generators into the pool through variations in the probability of the game ending. 
The goal of the first study (Chapter V) was to assess the impact of regulation on the electricity pool 
price as a means of assessing the impact of regulation on the generators' plant bidding strategy (actual 
bid data being unavailable). Through an evaluation of pool prices and uplift levels, it was determined 
that regulation has indeed influenced the strategy of the generators in the bidding of their plants. This 
result was reached through an evaluation of the impact of different regulatory events, with a key focus 
being on the effects of the threat of a reference to the MMC. In keeping with the game theory analysis, 
it was also indicated that if the day-to-day operation of the pool can be likened to a repeated 
adversarial game between the regulator and the firms under his jurisdiction. In this environment, a 
threat that might have been initially credible becomes incredible if it is made repeatedly and not 
carried out. 
The second study (Chapter VI) replicated and expanded upon the work of Helm & Powell (1992) in 
an attempt to analyse the evidence on the role of the electricity forward market and the inter-reactions 
between the forward market and the pool. Having established the existence of an inverse relationship 
between the volume of electricity output covered by contracts and the level of prices in the pool using 
the work of Green & Newbery (1992), it was concluded that if contract cover fell, pool prices should 
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rise. By modelling pool prices and electricity demand, it was shown that when the first and second set 
of major forward contracts expired in March 1991 and March 1993 respectively, pool prices rose 
significantly. As such, the expiration of these contracts represented an external shock that disrupted 
the relationship between price and demand - leading to an autonomous increase in pool prices. 
Further analysis was undertaken to assess the impact of regulatory and non-regulatory events on the 
price-demand relationship. The results of this analysis indicated that regulation could also disrupt the 
price-demand relationship - thus further supporting the results of the preceding chapter. Both the 
studies of Chapter V and VI support the Folk Theorem approach to generator bidding outlined in 
Chapter IV. 
The third study (Chapter VII) continued in a similar vein to the first two - by assessing the impact of 
regulation on the generators. However, rather than utilising pool prices as a proxy for generator 
responses, this chapter assessed the impact of regulation on the share prices of the two main privately- 
owned electricity generators, National Power and Powergen. These models were undertaken using the 
market model, the results of which indicated the (downward) irnpact that regulation has had upon the 
share prices of the aforementioned companies. With the market model an established tool for financial 
analysis, the successM application of it to this data set supports the hypothesis that the prospect of 
regulation will lead to a downturn in share returns as investors fear lower profits, prices, or some other 
form of control or intervention. 
The fourth study (Chapter VIII) revisited the ground of the second - the electricity contract market. 
However, rather than focusing upon the broad relationships between the spot and forward markets, the 
actual spot-forward market links were assessed through the relationship between the pool price and 
the price of the forward contracts that dominated the industry at privatisation. The price of these 
vesting contracts was proxied by the Horton IV estimates. The regression results indicated that the 
Horton IV estimates were poor estimators of actual pool prices as they consistently over-forecasted 
outtum daily prices, indicating the need for the RECs to exit from these contracts as soon as was 
feasible. The reasons behind this forecast inaccuracy are also presented in this study and also in the 
earlier sections. 
This analysis was then contrasted with the functioning market for forward contracts in California, in 
order to show how the deregulated electricity market is developing there and the extent to which the 
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experience of the UK is guiding deregulation overseas. This concluded with an assessment of the spot- 
forward relationships present in the market for electricity contracts on NYMEX, where it was shown 
that both the peak and off-peak prices of electricity can be seen to be consistent with the forecast 
values of these variables. This implies that there is some degree of efficiency in these markets. 
The study as a whole illustrates the pivotal role that regulation has to play in determining the 
behaviour of the participants of the electricity industry and, likewise, how the behaviour of the 
participating fmns determines the possibility of regulatory action. This proposition has been evaluated 
from a number of different angles and through the use of a number of different variables and 
relationships, all evaluated through the market analysis method. In addition, the study also shows the 
relevance of the inter-relationships between the electricity spot and forward markets and the 
importance of the latter in determining the level of prices in the former. Furthermore, the study also 
allempts to evaluate the prospects for the forward price to be an accurate predictor of the spot price 
and how the validation (or lack thereof) of this relationship can influence the industry participants' 
contracting strategy. Finally, the study also examines the broader issue of electricity deregulation on a 
world-wide scale through the case study of California as the state struggles to reach full domestic 
competition through the use of a model akin to that used in England and Wales. 
In the light of these results, one must consider the possibility of broadening the analysis to incorporate 
additional studies. Firstly, there were concerns voiced in the earlier chapters about the use of pool 
purchase price data, and how a more appropriate approach would be to use actual generator bid data 
to improve the models. Secondly, one could undertake a series of volatility studies using electricity 
price information similar to those performed using share prices. This would present a broader 
perspective on the analysis by allowing an evaluation of the full impact of regulation on share prices. 
Furthermore, one could revert to the use of the half-hourly data format for the analysis, although such 
a move might require modifications to the analysis to allow for the vast quantities of data in use. 
However, these suggestions are of a predominantly technical nature, and do not truly reflect the 
possibilities for an analysis of the nature of industry dynamics. 
A more challenging approach would be to undertake studies into the possibility of arbitrage between 
the electricity and gas markets, (as both industries now have their own functioning spot markets and as 
more companies have cross-utility interests) or the broader issue of electricity/gas linkages. 
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In the case of arbitrage, an electricity company could face the possibility of utilising its gas supply to 
power a CCGT generating plant, or it could sell that gas into the spot market. In this situation, there 
are many factors to consider: the impact on the gas and electricity spot markets as a result of the 
decision, the profitability associated with such a decision, the company's contractual commitments in 
each market, the existence (or lack) of interruptible contracts in each market, and the actual feasibility 
of such a move. 
This potential for such research is highlighted by the interruptions in gas supply which occurred in the 
1995/96 winter (Otgas, 1996). These events show the potential for arbitrage, as well as the need for 
greater collaboration and information exchange between NGC and the gas transportation network 
operator, TransCo. The situation may be summarised as follows. A certain percentage of gas is 
shipped to CCGT power stations on an interruptible supply basis, which allows TransCo to interrupt 
the supply via the relevant shipper. Similarly, the generator could choose to interrupt supply 
themselves and sell the gas through the spot market. In this situation, it would be the responsibility of 
both NGC and TransCo to manage these occurrences and determine the inforination requirements and 
the period of warning necessary to ensure the effective operation of such arbitrage arrangements. Gas 
and electricity deregulations have been closely related, and a study of the exact nature of the linkages 
could be a valuable addition to the field of energy analysis. 
An ideal situation would allow for an evaluation of the electricity contract market in England and 
Wales through an analysis of both contracts for differences and electricity forward agreements and the 
motives of the industry participants in developing their contracting strategies. However, such an 
analysis - while both revealing and of considerable value - is precluded by the lack of commercially 
available data. 
A final possible area of analysis is of an international nature. Firstly, the developing energy markets of 
the United States represent a wealth of possible areas of study. While each state must commit to full 
domestic electricity competition, each state legislature does have some freedom in determining the 
process of deregulation. This could allow for different approaches to deregulation, each with the same 
objective in mind, thus representing a tremendous opportunity to view different approaches to 
deregulation in action and the success (or lack thereof) of such approaches. In addition, one could 
examine the broader issue of inter-state relationships as larger organisations develop across state 
boundaries, as well as the continually developing electricity contract market(s) on the New York 
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Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). Secondly, there is the possibility of inter-country comparisons in a 
broad study of electricity deregulation worldwide. The possibility of a deregulated European energy 
market would add impetus to such a study, and could provide insights into the possibility of such an 
ambitious undertaking. 
This study evaluates the electricity-generating sector in England and Wales, focusing upon the impact 
of regulation and the role that it plays in determining the conduct of the generators themselves. As it is 
the generating sector which has (to date) been the most deregulated of the industry's sectors, this study 
should be seen as an attempt to interpret the behaviour of the generators as they have adapted to the 
pressures of the competition within their sector, and to the continuing transformation of the industry as 
a whole. 
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EPILOGUE - THE GAS MORATORIUM, THE 1998 ENERGY REVIEW AND THE END 
OFTHEPOOL?. 
Published in October 1998, the Labour Government's Energy Review mapped out the future of the 
coal and electricity sectors, as well as providing a lifeline to the British coal industry. 
The Government's Energy Review that was launched ahead of the break-up of the final contractual 
arrangements in 1998 was intended to outline the future for the coal industry and to resolve the 
issues generated by the moratorium on the construction of gas-fired power stations implemented 
some eighteen months earlier. 
With the ending of these contracts, a new wave of CCGT stations was becoming ever likely, and in 
order to preserve the short-term future of the coal industry, the government refused consents for 
any fiwther CCGT stations. 
The second dash for gas was effectively halted by the findings of the Energy Review bringing with 
it the promise of a more level playing field for coal generation in the electricity pool through 
abolishing the pool structure and replacing it with a system modelled on the gas trading 
arrangements. The review determined that the bid prices of coal stations were not reflective of their 
fuel costs, and as such gas generation has displaced coal generation in the baseload section of the 
load curve, despite the relative cheapness of coal. 
Although the government does intend a future for coal, it does not see a specific market share, nor 
does it determine for how long the moratorium on CCGTs will last. This is in contrast to the stance 
of the DTI, which has set a target of 10% of electricity to be produced through renewable energy 
sources by 2010. The adoption of a consumer-based marketplace will make it difficult to define 
market shares for specific fuels, but the strength of gas in the UK - on both environmental and cost 
grounds is hard to dismiss. 
Virtually all of the new demand for gas has come from the power sector, and the UK's gas surplus 
- despite the operation of the Bacton-Zeebrugge gas interconnector - will continue to fuel demand 
for CCGTs. 
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So where does this leave the electricity pool ? By using the gas market as a template, the 
government is aiming for a bilateral spot market in which all counterparties could conceivably 
trade their electricity requirements daily. Faced with the option of going long or short into the 
electricity spot market, larger players could exploit market power if transitional regulatory 
arrangements are not strong enough. 
Offer's proposals - approved by the Energy Minister John Battle - will lead to substantial changes 
in the sector. The pool will cease to exist, necessitating substantial changes to generation, 
transmission and supply licences. Virtually all industry documentation will have to be replaced or 
re-written, including - but not limited to - power purchase agreements and contracts for 
differences. The revised trading arrangements have an implementation date of April 2000 and will 
incorporate: 
- forwards and futures markets operating up to several years ahead; 
-a short-term bilateral market, giving players day-ahead and within-day opportunities to achieve 
their optimal contractual position; 
a within-day balancing market modelled on the Transco flexibility mechanism, which will 
allow NGC to balance the system and resolve transmission constraints through the sale and 
purchase of electricity; 
a settlement process that will allow NGC to recover these costs and charge those participants 
who are out of balance. 
If implemented as planned, these new structures will make any contracts dependent upon pool 
prices meaningless and hence will require renegotiation, a new reference point, or - if a new basis 
cannot be agreed - termination. In these circumstances, it is likely that new benchmarks will have 
to be established before April 2000 in order to prevent the multiple break-up of contracts, an over- 
reliance on litigation, or the intervention of any or all of NGC, Offer, or the MMC. 
Those companies with generating plant financed using CFDs may have serious cause for concern - 
depending upon whatever new benchmark is used. This may lead to project re-financing, or - in 
extreme cases - may put the project at risk. Furthennore, under the new arrangements, plant cannot 
be bid based upon a low price strategy, as there is no guarantee that it will produce continuous 
running and pool revenues. As such, contract cover will have to be accumulated; or else the 
generator will face the risk of imbalance charges and/or periods of prolonged inactivity, 
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Similarly, suppliers will have to manage their volume risk through imbalance charge exposure. 
This is likely to be in the form of purchase contracts similar to CFDs. However, such contracts 
would most likely be modified to allow participation in the short-term bilateral market and/or the 
balancing market. 
Therefore, the new contractual arrangements will radically alter the electricity pool and the roles of 
all of its participants. Whether this is to be seen as a good or bad event is debatable, as Offer's 
proposals were not met with enthusiasm by all of the industry's participants. What is clear is that 
by modelling the revised arrangements on the Transco flexibility mechanism and the on-the-day 
commodity market for gas, the continued leaming curve that privatisation and deregulation has 
been since its inception will continue. 
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APPENDIX 1: Variables' summarv statistics. 
Table 1. Summary StatisticE of Variables from Empirical Chapters I-4. 
Variabi Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
PPP (E/MWb)' 22.2274 7.3178 1887+ 
Demand (Gross Demand, MWh)1 15494.5000 2286.1000 1887+ 
Uplift (; E/Mwb)l 1.7849 1.1133 1887+ 
Horton IV estimate (non-indexed, f/MWh)2 20.8361 4.9612 1278* 
Horton IV estimate (indexed, "Wb)2 22.7377 5.7990 1278* 
FTSE 100-Share index 2959.2000 385.2376 1316# 
National Power share price 361.8761 111.1826 13164 
Powergen share price 394.6873 134.6354 1316# 
I Daily averaged observations based upon forty-eight half-hourly observations. 
2 See Chapter VII for details on the construction of the Horton IV set. 
+ 1887 daily observations based upon a data set from October 1990 to November 1995. 
. 1278 daily observations based upon a data set from October 1990 to March 1994. 
# 1316 weekday observations based upon a data set from 11/03/1991 to 26/03/1996. 
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CHAPTER V. APPENDIX 
Table 1: Data sequences used in structural break analysis. 
Section 1: Bi-Monthly blocks. 
Date Observations 
10/90 - 11/90 1-61 
12/90 - 01/91 62-123 
02/91 -03/91 124-182 
04/91 -05/91 182-243 
06/91 -07/91 244-304 
08/91 -09/91 305-365 
10/91 -11/91 366-426 
12/91 -01/92 427-488 
02/92 - 03/92 489-548 
04/92 - 05/92 549-609 
06/92 - 07/92 610-670 
08/92 - 09/92 671-731 
10/92 - 11/92 732-792 
12/92 - 01/93 793-854 
02/93 -03/93 855-913 
04/93 - 05/93 914-974 
06/93 - 07/93 975-1035 
08/93 - 09/93 1036- 1096 
10/93 - 11/93 1097- 1157 
12/93 - 01/94 1158-1219 
02/94 - 03/94 1220-1278 
04/94 - 05/94 1279- 1339 
06/94 - 07/94 1340-1400 
08/94 - 09/94 1401- 1461 
10/94 - 11/94 1462- 1522 
12/94 - 01/95 1523- 1584 
02/95 - 03/95 1585- 1643 
04/95 - 05/95 1644- 1704 
06/95 - 07/95 1705- 1765 
08/95 - 09/95 1766- 1826 
10/95 - 11/95 1827- 1887 
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Table 1: Data seguences used in structural break analysis. 
Section 2: Four-Monthly blocks. 
Dates Observations 
10/90 - 01/91 1-123 
12/90 - 03/91 62-182 
02/91 -05/91 124-243 
04/91 -07/91 183-304 
06/91 -09/91 244-365 
08/91 -11/91 305426 
10/91 - 01/92 366488 
12/91 - 03/92 427-548 
02/92 - 05/92 489-609 
04/92 - 07/92 549-670 
06/92 - 09/92 610-731 
08/92 - 11/92 671-792 
10/92 - 01/93 732-854 
12/93 - 03/93 793-913 
02/93 - 05/93 855-974 
04/93 - 07/93 914-1035 
06/93 - 09/93 975-1096 
08/93 - 11/93 1036- 1157 
10/93 - 01/94 1097- 1219 
12/93 - 03/94 1158- 1278 
02/94 - 05/94 1220- 1339 
04/94 - 07/94 1279- 1400 
06/94 - 09/94 1340- 1461 
08/94 - 11/94 1401- 1522 
10/94 - 01/95 1462- 1584 
12/94 - 03/95 1523- 1643 
02/95 - 05/95 1585- 1704 
04/95 - 07/95 1644- 1765 
06/95 - 09/95 1705- 1826 
08/95 - 11/95 1766- 1887 
258 
Table 2. Monthly levels of key variables w/structural breaks. 
Section 2.1. Monthly averages of key variables 
Month Uplift PPP Demand Month Uplift EPP Demand 
Oct-90 1.1743 16.4539 15225.30 
Nov-90 0.8408 17.2052 16965.50 
Dec-90 1.0947 18.3919 16988.90 
Jan-91 0.9676 19.3864 18228.50 
Feb-91 1.1846 21.0385 18750.20 
Mar-91 1.0853 19.8159 16163.40 
Apr-91 1.2195 20.6897 15332.20 
May-91 1.2536 20.2450 14093.10 
Jun-91 1.2318 20.9081 13701.20 
Jul-91 1.5939 18.9321 13052.90 
Aug-91 1.5290 18.6817 12694.10 
Sep-91 2.7861 23.4189 13674.40 
Oct-91 2.2667 20.8472 15383.00 
Nov-91 1.7285 21.7679 16898.10 
Dec-91 2.0912 25.0742 16908.80 
Jan-92 1.5267 20.9921 17823.00 
Feb-92 1.0579 18.9274 17445.80 
Mar-92 1.0073 19.0289 16576.40 
Apr-92 0.8891 19.7759 15194.50 
May-92 1.0107 20.9961 13304.20 
Jun-92 1.7202 23.4151 13372.50 
Jul-92 1.4147 23.8807 13207.20 
Aug-92 2.0375 22.8066 12883.50 
Sep-92 1.6137 22.7938 14152.60 
Oct-92 1.7999 23.9104 15759.00 
Nov-92 1.3932 24.5859 16825.30 
Dec-92 1.0169 23.2859 16904.60 
Jan-93 0.9585 21.9596 17397.50 
Feb-93 1.0185 22.5700 17441.10 
Mar-93 1.7067 23.6229 16612.90 
Apr-93 2.4266 25.8315 14910.90 
May-93 2.5439 26.2018 13703.00 
Jun-93 3.2973 26.5748 13126.50 
Jul-93 3.2318 25.7677 13251.40 
Aug-93 2.3304 25.5020 12953.70 
Sep-93 2.0003 25.2781 14362.10 
Oct-93 2.0466 25.6201 15850.20 
Nov-93 1.7540 26.6631 17635.00 
Dec-93 1.7870 24.7797 17062.50 
Jan-94 1.4772 24.8087 17609.30 
Feb-94 1.6115 21.4373 18123.20 
Mar-94 1.6165 14.7103 16736.80 
Apr-94 2.0330 24.0169 15490.00 
May-94 2.3205 19.7904 14157.90 
Jun-94 2.2163 21.8736 13717.80 
Jul-94 2.0888 20.6170 13370.20 
Aug-94 2.0843 18.0573 13424.00 
Sep-94 1.8741 16.9779 14635.00 
Oct-94 2,0191 23.8485 15633.50 
Nov-94 2.9076 30.5266 16724.70 
Dec-94 3.3525 34.0528 16881.40 
Jan-95 5.4406 50.9275 18272.30 
Feb-95 1.1518 13.9791 17882.50 
Mar-95 0.9366 12.0319 17625.00 
Apr-95 1.0941 17,4073 15267.70 
May-95 1.6880 20.6251 14531.10 
Jun-95 1.8548 20.2089 14243.00 
Jul-95 1.4769 16.4348 13822.10 
Aug-95 1.5634 18.4281 13879.10 
Sep-95 1.5419 17.8723 14700.80 
Oct-95 1,2528 17.2639 15531.70 
Nov-95 3.1625 33.4544 17452.20 
PPP and Uplift are measured in f/MWh- 
Demand is measured in MWh- 
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Section 2.2. Monthly percentage changes. 
Time period Eplift 
10/90-11/90 -28.40% 
11/90-12/90 30.20% 
12/90-01/91 * -11.64% 
01/91-02/91 22.47% 
02/91-03/91 * -8.38% 
03/91-04/91 12.37% 
04/91-05/91 2.80% 
05/91-06/91 -1,74% 
06/91-07/91 29.40% 
07/91-08/91 -4.07% 
08/91-09/91 * 82.22% 
09/91-10/91 -4.27% 
10/91-11/91 -23.74% 
11/91-12/91 20.98% 
12/91-01/92* -26.99% 
01/92-02/92 -30.71% 
02/92-03/92* -4.78% 
03/92-04/92 -11.73% 
04/92-05/92* 13.68% 
05/92-06/92 70.20% 
06/92-07/92* -17.76% 
07/92-08/92 44.02% 
08/92-09/92* -20.80% 
09/92-10/92 11.54% 
10/92-11/92 -22.60% 
11/92-12/92 -27.01% 
12/92-01/93 * -5.75% 
01/93-02/93 6.26% 
02/93-03/93 67.57% 
03/93-04/93* 42.18% 
ppp Demand Time t)eriod 
4.57% 11.43% 04/93-05/93 
6.90% 0.14% 05193-06193 
5.41% 7,30% 06/93-07/93 
8.55% 2.86% 07/93-08/93* 
-5.81% -13.80% 08/93-09/93 
4.41% -5.12% 09/93-10/93 
-2.15% -8.08% 10/93-11/93 
3.28% -2.78% 11/93-12/93 
-9.45% -4.73% 12/93-01/94* 
-1.32% -2.75% 01/94-02/94 
25.35% 7.72% 02/94-03/94 
-10.98% 12.49% 03/94-04/94 
4.42% 9.85% 04/94-05/94 
15.19% 0.06% 05/94-06/94 
-16.28% L. 4 -1'/o 
06/94-07/94 
-9.84% -2.12% 07/94-08/94 
0.54% -4.98% 08/94-09/94* 
3.93% -8.34% 09/94-10/94 
6.17% 12.44% 10/94-11/94* 
11.52% 0.51% 11/94-12/94 
2.02% -1.24% 12/94-01/95 * 
4.50% -2.45% 01/95-02/95 
-0.06% 9.85% 02/95-03/95* 
4.90% 11.35% 03/95-04/95 
2.83% 6.77% 04/95-05/95* 
-5.29% 0.47% 05195-06195 
-5.70% L9-2'/o 06/95-07/95 
2.78% 0.25% 07/95-08/95 
4.67% -4.75% 08/95-09/95 
9.35 -14.58 09/95-10/95* 
10/95-11/9 
! ýPlift PPP Demand 
4.83% 1.43% -8.10% 
29.62% 1.42% -4.21% 
-1.99% -3.04% 0.95% 
-27.89% -1.03% -2.25% 
-14.05% -0.88% 10.87% 
2.31% 1.35% 10.36% 
-14.30% 4.07% 11,26% 
1.88% -7.06% -3.25% 
-17.34% 0.12% 3.20% 
9.09% -13.59% 2.92% 
0.31% -31.39% -7.65% 
63,27% 25.77% -7.45% 
-17.60% 14.14% -8.60% 
10.53% -4.49% -3.11% 
-534% -5.75% 2.53% 
-12.42% -0.22% 0.40% 
-5.98% -10.08% 9.02% 
40.47% 7.74% 7.03% 
28.00% 44.00% 6.98% 
11,55% 15.30% 0.94% 
49,55% 62.28% 8.24% 
-72.55% -78.83% -2.13% 
-13.93% -18.68% -1.44% 
44.68% 16.82% -13.37% 
18.49% 54.28% -4.82% 
-2.02% 9.88% -1.98% 
-18.68% -20.37% -2.96% 
12.13% 5.86% 0.41% 
-3.02% -1.38% 5.92% 
-3.40% -18.75% 5.65% 
94.30% 152.43% 12.37% 
Those periods underlined are those when a structual break has occurred in both prices and demand. 
Those periods in bold are when a structural break has occurred in uplift. 
Those periods marked with an asterisk (') are those when a structural break has occurred in demand. 
Combinations of any of these three indicate that more than one of the variables exhibited a structural 
break as appropriate. 
PPP and Uplift are measured in; E/MWh. 
Demand is measured in MWh. 
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Table 3- Timeframes used for dummy anaivses. 
Regrmion -rvation Final Observation 
1 150 250 
2 325 425 
3 350 450 
4 425 525 
5 600 700 
6 700 800 
7 775 875 
8 875 975 
9 925 1025 
10 1000 1100 
11 1150 1250 
12 1250 1350 
13 1200 1300 
14 1500 1600 
15 1550 1650 
16 1575 1675 
17 1575 1675 
18 1700 1800 
19 1715 1815 
20 1750 1850 
21 1770 1870 
22 1778 1878 
23 1787 1887 
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Table 4: Diagnostic performance for the analysis of structural breaks in i)[iýces. 
Given the nature of the data in use, it would be highly unlikely to expect that all of the diagnostics 
would be passed in all of the regressions. In examining the price regressions it was determined that the 
most commonly failed diagnostic was the test for normality of residuals, failing in approximately 67% 
of all of the regressions. This result obviously limits the success derived from the Chow test, but it 
should be noted that almost all of the regressions performed using pool prices since this research 
began have had problems with normality. The test for functional form was failed in approximately 
55% of all cases, while the test for serial correlation was failed in only 6% of the regressions. The 
main problem for the approach utilised here is that the Chow test becomes invalid in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, any regressions which indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity must 
be viewed with a degree of suspicion. A total of 34% of the regressions failed the diagnostic for 
heteroscedasticity. These are given as follows: (by observation numbers and months respectively) 
305-365 (August-September 1991), 671-731 (August-September 1992), 62-182 (December 1990- 
March 1991), 244-365 (June-September 1991), 610-731 (June-September 1992), 671-792 (August- 
November 1992), 732-854 (October 1992-January 1993), 914-1035 (April-July 1993), 975-1096 
(June-September 1993), 1523-1584 (December 1994-January 1995). 1585-1643 (February-March 
1995), 1705-1765 (June-July 1995), 1827-1887 (October-November 1995). In addition, there is also a 
large proportion of analyses contained within the four-month blocks for which this diagnostic is 
invalid, namely 1401-1887 (August 1994 - November 1995). It is important to note that there is an 
eight month block (610-854, June 1991-January 1992) and a six-month block (914-1096, April- 
September 1993) for which this diagnostic is invalid. This result corresponds to a series of structural 
breaks occurring within these periods. 
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Table 5. 
Univariate price analyses with dummy variables. 
Regression 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
is 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Serial 
Correlation 
Functional 
I Form Normality H'Sced/Arch 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Fail/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Fail/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
Pass Fail Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Fail/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Fail Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Fail Fail Fail/Pass 
Pass Fail Fail Fail/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
These are the results for the oDtimally structured regressions. 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
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Table 6. 
Univariate uplift ansivses with dummv variables. 
Regression 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
is 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Serial ý Functional 
Correlation Form Nomudity I H'Sced/Arch 
Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail PasslPass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Fail/Pass 
Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Fail PasslPass 
Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
These are the results for the optimally structured regressions. 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
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Table 7. 
Diagnostic mrformance for the analvsis of structural breaks in unlift. 
Based upon the analyses performed on prices, one would anticipate a similar performance in the 
diagnostics for uplift levels. It was determined that the test for normality of residuals was the most 
commonly failed diagnostic, failing in 44% of all cases (the same disclaimer applies to this outcome 
as for prices). The test for functional form was failed in approximately 34% of all cases, while the test 
for serial correlation was failed in only 5% of all cases. The main problem in this analysis is again the 
existence of heteroscedasticity, which was failed in approximately 9% of all the regressions. These 
regressions are as follows: (by observation numbers and months respectively) 305-365 (August- 
September 1991, corresponding to the structural break), 855-913 (February-March 1993, 
corresponding to the structural break), 1036-1096 (August-September 1993, corresponding to the 
structural break), 1097-1157 (October-November 1993), 1158-1219 (December 1993-January 1994), 
244-365 (June-September 1991, corresponding with the structural break), 489-609 (February-May 
1992), 855-974 (February-May 1993, corresponding to the structural break), 975-1096 (June- 
September 1993, corresponding with the structural break), 1036-1157 (August-November 1993, 
corresponding with the structural break), 1097-1219 (October 1993-January 1994), and 1462-1584 
(October 1994 - January 1995). The same caution must be taken in assessing these results as for 
prices. 
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Table 8. 
Ui3lift-Price 2nd UPlift-Demand regressions. 
Uplift-Price regression (Equation 1.7) 
Slope coefficient: 1.2081 
Wald test: Null hypothesis: Slope coefficient I 
Alt. Hypothesis: Slope coefficient I 
Wald statistic: Chi-Squared (1): 47.3800 Chi-Squared (1) critical value: 3.84 
The null hypothesis is not valid and the coefficient is statistically significantly different from unity. 
Uplift-Demand regession (Eguation 1.8 
Slope coefficient: 0.011271 
Wald test: Null hypothesis: Slope coefficient =0 
Alt. Hypothesis: Slope coefficient: p, 0 
Wald statistic: Chi-Squared (1): 0.023232 Chi-Squared (1) critical value: 3.84 
The null hypothesis is valid and the coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
Revised Vj2lift-Price regression (Eguation 1.7a 
Slope coefficient: 1.1794 
Wald test: Null hypothesis: Slope coefficient I 
Alt. Hypothesis: Slope coefficient I 
Wald statistic: Chi-Squared (1): 29.0014 Chi-Squared (1) critical value: 3.84 
The null hypothesis is not valid and the coefficient is statistically significantly different from unity. 
Uplift-Demand rwession (Equation 1.8a) 
Slope coefficient: 1.05080 
Wald test: Null hypothesis: Slope coefficient I 
Alt. Hypothesis: Slope coefficient I 
Wald statistic: Chi-Squared (1): 0.50985 Chi-Squared (1) critical value: 3.84 
The null hypothesis is valid and the coefficient is not statistically significantly different from unity. 
All of these regressions failed all of their diagnostic tests, as did their optimal counterparts as 
determined by the Akaike Information and Schwarz Information Criteria (see D7 and 138). 
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Table 9: Optimal structure for extensive form uplift price relyession 
Section 1: Akaike Information Criterion. 
Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
01112 3 4 
PPP lags 
56 7 81 10 
-2 83' 5%3 2.83356 -2.83997 -2.84523 -2.85204 -2.85647 -2.90752 -2.92011 -2.91873 ' -2 , 91705 -2.91816 
-2ý8 .9 
-- 81; 67 
:2 
1462 -2.91821 -2.92458 -2.94144 -3.01364 -3.02550 -3.02402 
1-3.02226 1-3.02254 
-2 945 93 -2-98932 -3 00322 -3-00767 -3.01969 -3.02867 -3.11925 1 -3.12790 -3 12780 1 -3.12860 -3 12917 
-2.98883T-3.02850 -3.04889 -3.05287 -3.06092 
J-3.0131 
-3.17655 -3.18242 -3.18187 -3.18: 356 -3.18209 
1 11 
0 -3.24204 -3.24736 -3.24613 1 3.246971 4509 -3.05092 1-3.08961 -3.10588 -3.11430 1-3.11680 -3.12470 - -3.2,4509 
04 1 --- 
5t- 
ý5215 
-3.16179 
F-3.19454 
-3.20841 -3.21265 -3.21985 -3.22855 -3.3-5151 
1-3.35472 1-3.35418 1.3.35367 
-3.35215 
-322064 ' -3 29285 -3.32864 i -3.34739 -3.36474 -3.38524 -3.40213 -3.40676 -3.40575 -3.40554 -340451 
-3 22871 
ý 
-3.30136 -3.33641 -3.35508 
ý 
-3.37203 -3.39232 -3.40680 -3.40558 -3.40549 -3.40451 
-3.22828 -3.30037 -3.3M61 -3.35437 1_-3.37123 -3.39182 -3.40637 -3.40641 -3.40489 -3.40497 -3.40407 
-3.22687 -3.29958 -3.33ý90 -i355201 -3.37232 -3.39304 -3.40797 -3.40806 -3.40677 -3.41310 -3.41184 65 
-3. . 41545 -3.41572 -3.41447 -3.42216 -3.42085 -3.36222 -3.378 40527 -3 -3.22924 -3.30198 
-3. "34072 --5d 
The values for the eighth, ninth and tenth uplift lags are inadmissable as their coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
Section 2: Schwarz Information Criterion. 
F- PPP lags 
Uplift U. WS 0 1 23451617 
18F91 10 
J 
0 -2.82670 -2.82178 
ý 
-2.82523 - 
1 
-2.83137 -2.83282 1 -2.88090 -2.89051 -2.82753 
1-2.88614 -2.88146 -2.8795 
1 -2.86990 
F2.8W88 21 -2.900552ý -'Z. Vuuýz 
T 
-2.90546 1 -2.90095 -2.91483 -2.98405 2.99292 - -- -i 
ý 
-2.9884,; -- 
2 98369 -2.98097 I, -, I 
2 -2.93120 
7 2.97163 2.9 2! -2*98257 -2-98257 9 -, Y. "909 308668 -3-09234 
4 
-3.08925 , -3.08705 -3.08461 
3 -2.97115 -3.00786 3 2528 -3.528 -3-02528 -3.02628 14 1 . 3.0313-5 -343875 -3.14388 -3.14033 u .3 u -1 -3.13902 -3.13453 
4 -3.03029 -3.06601 
5 
3 7930 -3.7 3 -3-07930 
h 
-3.08475 
1-3.08476 
-3.08917 -3.203152 -3.20584 i -3.20160 -3.19944 -3.19454 
5 -3.13820 9 3.1679 17887 . 17887 -3 -3.1801 -3.18434 -3.1900-5 
1 -331000 ý ý -3 
310211 567 -3.30667 -3.30314 
1 
-3.29860 'w 
6 -3.19409 
1 
-3.26332 . 29613 _3 -3.29613 -3.31189 
1 -3.32625 3.3437 -3 35765 
Ow 
-3.35525 
1-3.35201 3.34797 
7 -3.19920 -3.26886 
1 -3.30093 -33MU 
T-3133056 
-3.34786 
1-3.35933 
-3.35619 
ý 
-3.35208 -3.34897 -3.34496 
8 -3 19580 3 26490 
1 
-3.29715 
1 
- 
-3.31293 -3 32679 J - -3.344P -3 
35591 3.35294 1 -3.34839 -3.34 5 1 34 Z 1 
- 9 3.19142 -3.26115 
1 
-3.29547 -3.3 1 Oý; -3: 
32 489 T-3.3424 0 4! l -3 
5451 3 
ý 
-3.35159 5 
1 
- 
73.347=27 
--- 
ý 
. 7 _i M6 05 71 
-3.19082 -3.26056 -3.29631 W -3.31481 . 3.32823 , -3.35184 59(__ -3.35 90O 
-5 
- 35625 5q . 351971 -3 
The values for the eighth, ninth and tenth uplift lags are inadmissable as their coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
In all cases, the less complex (i. e. possessing fewer lags) regressions had more success with their 
diagnostics, but the more elaborate forms had problems with all diagnostic testing, exhibiting serial 
correlation, non-normality and heteroscedasticity 
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Table 10: Optimal structure for extensive forry uplift demand regressions 
Section 1: Akaike Information Criterion. 
Demand lae 
U lift 1A s 01 213141516171819 1 10 
0 -2.45271 
f 
-2.45071 -2.45270 1 -2.45287 -2.45-5,48 2.45344 -2.47390 -2.47684 ý -2.4799; 1 -2.47850 1 -2.47749 
! 
-2.48175 -2.48956 -2 49043 ' -2.49144 -2.49431 -1 49779 -7 52640 -2.52762 -2.52910 
1-2-52858 1 -2.52785 
2 -2.62303 -2.62808 
ýý6ýýJ F; -- --2.62950 -2.63815 Z. 63 815 -2.63662 -2.63663 1 -2.63772 
t-2.640-2-1 ý 
-2 63 14 - 9 -2 
1-2. "022' - 3 7-88- 2.6 0 5 .2' - 2. 68513 8 -2.68299 -2.68988 1-_ 9 -2.692jý 
;. 
6 24 3 -2 -2.6895 1 -2.69025 1 9 -2 . 68903 9 -2 
ý69 
145 
4 -2.77807 77807 278337 
- 
r8337 
2.7 i ; -2.78352 . 
78-352 
-2.7 3 -2.78168 
1 
-78379 8 -2.77992 -2.78026 -2.78 305 -2.78168 8305 05 1 -2.78199 
5 -2ý9264FS -2.93166 -2-931 66 66 -2.92977 * 977 . 2-92977 -2 . 919 
1 
-2.919-F7 -292790 - .. 92790 -2.92926 -2 -2.92964 1 -2.93013 -2.93256 -2.93136 -2.93123 
6 -2.99483 -2.99.5i -2.99583 3 -2.9937ý47 -2.99377 -2.992 
1 
-2.9921 -9 
1-2.99017 
-9901ý -2.99185 -2.99262 -2.99453 -2.99660 -2 -. - 
99527 -2.99557 
7 - -2.99048 99 2.99332 2.99332 m 2.99616 6 
E 
-2.99616 -2 899 . 998 -3.00183 00183 -3.00465 3. -3.00748 -3.00679 -3.00871 -3.00922 8 
9 
-3.00901 
3.01023 1 - 
. 3.01127 
_3.01289 
-3.01127 
-3.01289 
_3.00930 
_3.01121 
-3.00930 
I 
-3.00930 
-3.01121 
ý . 00 
. . 00 
ý-3W781 
-3 7 
-3-00953 1. 
14 0 -3.00584 .9 584 
00755 -3.00755 
-3. __ 
30 3' 006 
100 -3.8 6 
-3.00635 
-3. Al 
-3 0565 -3.0085 13 00715 :3 
. 00833 -100766 -3.00999 
3 00766 
-3. 00940 TO 77d 
ý77- 
3.01746 1 _3.02010 -3.0201 02 0 _3.01865 85 .0 -3 865 0 -3 . -3.01781 
1 
. 01569 -3.01569 3. -3.01625 -3.01615 1 -3.01579 -3.01758 -3.01568 -3.01488 
The values for the eighth, ninth and tenth uplift lags are inadmissable as their coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
Section 2: Schwarz Information Criterion. 
F- Demand laws - - Uplift Lags I ýý 12131 ý4 516 17 1 10 1T 9 
0 -2-44388 -2.43893 1 -2.43796 -2.43517 -2.43481 1 -2.42979 -2.44728 t -2.4472 4 11 447 36 -2.442911 -2.43890 1 -2.46997 1 -2.47483 -2.47273 -2.47078 -2.47068 2.46568 -2.49680 - - 
4 
-2.4950 , 
ý 49 93 2 -2.49001 -2.48628 
2 -2.608 3 1 
r2.61039 
-2.60561 1-2.60587 -2.61155 -2.60704 -2.60407 1-2.602 6 1 - 
166 -2 6 60- 2, -I 
01 -15 - _j -2 
59565 
3 -2.66112 -2.66381 -2.66152 j -2.65641 -2. M031 
1 
-2.65648 -2.65396 
I. O 11 7 1 ý- 08 -2.5 89 2 
m- 
- 
;1 
5089 
- 
9 -2, -2ýý389 
4 -2.75743 '59 7 -2.7597 -2.75424 -2.74914 -2.74440 -2.74174 2.75694 
98 4 8 -2.73 
M2 85 -2.7 -2-73144, 
5 89 -2.90289 0 9051 -2.90023 : -2-89705 -2.89239 
1-2.89076 
ý2ýO 
90 
- 
10 
- 
-2.88814 1 -2.88562 -2.88504 
ý 8 -2-88094 -2.877M 
5 
7 
8 -2.96828 
111IM 
9 
ý 
. 
ý. 
9663 ý -2.96633 7 -2.95169 
1 -2.95037 -2.96127 -2.956 
j 
63 
-2.96083 -2.96068 -2.96052 -2.96036 
1-2.96019 ý 
-2.94814 
1 
-2.960011 
-2.94704 7 
-2-95631 
2.9461 
5ý46 
1 2.9461 
. 9566 -ý29566 
-2,94175 -2.94175 
-2.95219 
-2 9390 -2.93902 
-2.94%71 
8 2.97653 1 76 ý3 9 1 -2.97581 2.9MI -2.97094 -2.96636 -2.9614 -2M5885 
--2.95588 1 2.95217 7 . -2.95.201 -2 201 
S. 763 2,9476 .9 -2.9451 -2 45 
9 
.9 
; 
-2.97478 -2.97445 
z 5 
4 
-2.96978 1-2.96511 -2.96012 -2,96978 -2.95792 -2.95473 -2.95119 
1 
-2-9505 -29458 -2-9458 
- 
-2.942&4 -2 . 9428, 
1 
10 -2.979 -2 . (14 
: Lý19 9 .2 69 -2.96: 
5: 2: 78 -2.07414 1 -2.9704 
: 42:. ý424 =-296282 1 -2.9597 
1 
-2.95632 
1 
-2.95508. -2.95015 5015 -. 
94 2.94631 
The values for the eighth, ninth and tenth uplift lags are inadmissable as their coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
In all cases, the less complex (i. e. possessing fewer lags) regressions had more success with their 
diagnostics, but the more elaborate forms had problems with all diagnostic testing, exhibiting serial 
correlation, non-normality and heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 11: Interactive variable analvsis - Univariate pool price reeressions. 
[INSTDUMOI Lag 0 1 Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 61 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC; -3.3481 
1-3.4921 1-3.4613 1-3.4350 1-3.4408 1-3,5165 1-3.6199 1-3.7863 1-3.8475 1-317155 
-3.77541 
SSC- -12956 -3.4130 -3.3552 -3.3015 -3.2796 -3.3271 0 -3.4020 
1-3.5396 1-3.5716 
-3,4100 -3.4398 
Dummy'lr-Ratio -0.2264 0.9181 
1 
0.8868 
1 
0.9116 
1 
0.8274 
1 
0.4229 )] 0.3984 -0,4986 -0.4786 -0.8073 )0 -0.7185 
R-Bar 2 03722 0.4676 0.4 0.4599 0.4747 0.5238 0 0.5803 0.6529 0 6491 
. 
6777 0.6845 
INSTDUM02 
AIC. 
SSC: 
Dummy T-Ratio 
R-Bar 2 
Lag 0 
-5.5938 
-5.5413 
-0.2684 
-0.0094 
Lag 1 
-6.1249 
-6.0458 
-0.9079 
0.4188 
Lag 2 
-6.0956 
-5.9894 
-0.9569 
0.4141 
Lag 3 
-6.0676 
-5,9341 
-0.9981 
0.4104] 
Lag 41 Lag 5 
-6.0510 1 -6.0249 
-5.8897 1 -5.8355 
-1.0735 1 -1.0599 
0.4136 1 0.4116 
Lag 61 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
-6 1181 -6.2450 -6.3815 -6.3640 -6.3484 
-5ý9003 -5.9983 -6.10.15 -6.05 85 -6.0128 
-0.9549 
1 
-1.0664 
14 8274 1 -0 7522 
1 
-0.7843 
0.4762 1 0.5494 1 0.6161 1 0.6190 10 6116 
JINS'rl)tT, 1%103 I Log 0 Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 Log 7 1 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AW: -5.6463 
1-5.6"549 
-5.6372 
1 
-5.6069 
1 
-5.5868 -5.5746 -5 5446 -5.6317 -5.5992 -5.5638 -5.53 10 
SSC: 
J 
-5.5939 -ý, ý7ý7 -55311 -5.4733 -5.4255 -5.3952 -5,3269 -5.3850 
E53233 E 
-5.2583 5.1954 
Dummy T-Ratio 0,5366 0,4794 0.5039 0.5155 0.5747 0.6221 0.5843 0,5670 749 05 0.5749 0.5696 0.5578 
R-Bar 2 -0.0072 0.0220 0 0215 0.0170 
1 0.0191 Oý2923 0.0292 0,1250 0 11 0.1176 0,1081 0.1013 
JJNSTDtTN104 I Lag 0 1 Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lng 7 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: -5.2566 -5.2801) -ý 2982 -5.3335 -5.3371 -5 3349 -5.35-10 -5.5034 -5.4833 -5.4476 -5.4410 
SSC: -5.2042 -5.2017 -5ý 1921 -5,1999 -5.1758 -5,1455 -5 1351 -. 5.2 567 -5,2074 -5A420 
1 
-5.1054 
Dummy T-Ratio 0.5156 0.2736 0.4336 0.6692 0.8813 0.9736 0.833 ý 0, ý887 0 ý017 05147T O5165 
R-Bar 2 -0.0074 Oý0370 0,0735 
TO 1247 Oý 1470 0.1642 0 1980 0,3261 0 3288 0,3409 1 0,3339 
JINSTDUN105 I Lag 0 1 Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 71 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: -3,7568 -4.6796 -4.6969 -4,6691 -4,6391 -4 625ý 
A 6295 6295 -4.6097 45758 -4.5830 4.5466 
SSC: -3.7044 . 6005 -4 5907 -4.5345 -4.4778 -4.4361 -4.4117 
41 17 4.3630 -4.2998 4.2774 -4,2111 
Dummy 'Ir-Ratio 0.8283 1 0,8200 0 1998 0.2262 0.2262 0.2130 1 10 0.18810 1810 0.1757 0.1757 0 1238 Oý 1171 
R-Bar 2 A0032 1 0.6209 6 2-2 2 0.6212 0.6190 0,6224 9 6339 06339 06325 0.6303 . 
6303 0.6419 
. 
6419 
-0 
A1 '70 
INSTDUM06 Lag 0 1 Lag I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: -0.7106 -1 9001 -1 7801 -1.8209 -1.7953 -1,8210 -2 
0412 -2,0158 _-2.2576 -12291 
1-2.1918 
SSC: -0.6582 -1ý7210 -1.6740 -1.6874 -1.6341 -1.6316 - 
1.8233 -1,7891 -1.9817 - 
-1.9226 1.8563 
Dummy T-Ratio 1.3802 1.4204 1.3158 1.2781 1.2608 1.1247 0.4273 0.2424 
T 16 75 0.0894 1 
- 
0.0693 
- 
R-Bar 2 0.0090 0.6735 0.6739 0,6937 0.6926 0.7071 0.7704 0.7745 0.8237 
TO R? RR FD R? (), ) 
Regressions 01 through 06 refer to the relevant threats of an M MC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (optimal value is minimal). 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
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Table 12: Interactive variable analysis - Univariate uplift regressions. 
INSTDUMOI I Lag 0 1 Lag I I Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 1 Lai: 7 1 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: -1. ' 2630 ( -1.546 '5 
1-1 7092 -1.6775 
1-1.6694 
-1 6634 
1-1.7527 1-1.8600 1-1.9325 1 
-1 89941-1.8974 
1 
SSC: -1.2105,1 L 
# 
-1.46731 - 467 467ý 
ý 
-1.60311 -1.54391 -1.5081 -1.4740 -1.5348 -1.6133 -1.6566 -1.5939 -1.5618 
Dummy T-Ratio 30 C 872 0 7797 2 2801 23688 2.1260 1 A054 1.4040 0,5363 0.3244 0.0792 
R-Bar 21 0.0786 1 0,3204 0.4346 0.4289 0,4368 0.4461 0.5050 0.5658 0,6058 0.6024 0 61 15 
JINSTDUM02 I LagO I Lagl I Lag2 I Lag3 I Lag4 I Lag5 I Lag6 I Lag7 Lagg Lag! ) Laglo 
[mc: 
-2.4680 -3.2334 
1-3.2972 1-3.2720 1-3,2575 1-3.2682 1-3.2705 
-3.2430 -3.3021 -3.2858 -3.2824 
SSC: S( -2.4156 -3.1542 
1-3.19111 
-3ý13841 -3.09621 -3.07881 -3.05261-2.99631 -30262 -2.9803 -2.9469 
Dummyl'-Ratlo l D T tio IV T-Ratlo I 1.8734 0.7912 1 0.8204 1 0.8906 1 0.9434 1 0.9222 1 0. 533 0.9251 0.9630 ul ) 
R-BarLý 
L 
0.0245 0.5556 459 1 
1 
0.6489 1 
1 
0.6565 
INSTDUN103 1 Lag 0 1 Lag 1 1 Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: 1-3 0-3,1)1T -3.7728 
1 
-; 7497 
1-3.7258 1-3.6945 1-3.6686 1-3.63951 
-3ý6242 
1-15928 1-3.5741 1-3.5450 
SSC'- -2,9866 -3.6937 -3ý6436 -3.5923 -3.5332 -3.4792 -3.4216 -3.3775 -3,3169 -3.2686 -3.2095 
Dummy T-Ratio -0 7014 -0 5122 -0 5326 -0.5633 0.5851 -0.5429 -0.4396 -0.3623 -0.3669 
1 
-0.4325 
1 
-0.4966 
1 
R-Bar 2 -0.0051 0.1274 0 5265 0 5255 
1 0.5211 0.5195 1 0.5166 0.5206 1 0.51 2 0.5200 1 03181 
INSTDUN104 1 Lag 0 1 Lag 1 1 Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 5 1 Lag 61 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: -2.2479 -3.4363 -3 4524 -3.4554 -3.4236 -3.3912 -3.3935 -3,3593 -3 3247 -12894 -3 
2564 
SSC- -2.19ý5 -3.3571 -33462 -3.3218 -32623 -3.2018 -3.1756 -3.1126 -3.0488 -29839 -29209 
Dummy l'-Ratic 2 0432 06827 0.5361 0.3853 2 ' ý2 0.3483 
0.3483 1 0.4367 0" 507 0.4458 
R-Bar 2 0 0308 M107 1 0 72 14 1 ; . A ýig, 
1 A -7-)<IZ n 211 0.7189 
IINS'1'1)UJMD5 1 Lag 0 1 Lag 1 1 Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 1 Lag 15 Lag 6 1 Lag 7 1 Lag 8 1 Lag 9 Lag 10 
AIC: 1-2 S5A6 1-3.1895 1-3 U96 1-3 1276 1-3 1026 -3,1162 -11315 -3.1244 -3 1208 -3 01)18 -3 07.55 
ss(1: -3.1104 -3.0534 1 -2.9940 1 -2.9413 -2,9268 -19137 -2.8777 -18448 -2 7863 -2 7399 
Du my l'-Ratio 1.3246 1.1643 ------ 
L0040 0.7983 0.7621 OS163 0.8601 
R-Bar 21 0.0208 1 0,3139 1 03079 1 0.3009 1 02988 0 3275 03562 
r( 0 3937 03797 03 771 1 0.3827 
JINSTDUM06 1 Lag 0 Lag 1 1 Lag 2 1 Lag 3 1 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
1 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 1 Lag 10 
AIC: 10,1089 -0.5693 
1 
-0. ý818 -0.6167 0.5941 -0 6155 -0ý96171 -W9912 -1 1457 11 -1.1149 -1 
11 
SSC: 0 1613 -0.4902 -0.4756 -0.48311 -0.4228 -0.4261 -0.7439 -0.7446 -0.9045 
() -08401 () -0.7794 
Dummy l'-Ratio 1 6620 1.6293 
ý 
9 1.44 12 
# 
2 1.4474 1 1.4386 
- 
1.3920 0.7697 0.4374 0.1718 1 0 io) 54 0 a(1062 
R-Bar 2 0,0 17 3 O. 
ý5l 
15 7 0527 0.5537 5 490 n ý71R 0 7047 c -- -- - 5 0771 () 077 2 
Regressions 01 through 06 refer to the relevant threats of an MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (optimal value is minimal). 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
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Table 13: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-price regressions. 
Section 1: First MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift I'Ags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
S 
9 
10 
10; I I 2 3 I 
PPP logs 
4I 516 7 8 9J 
- 
-3.19677 1 -3 12_825 4' -3,19744 
"_-3.23167 J_-3.19904 -3.17393 -3.15047 ý -3.154,11 -3 , 11984 f -3.09i9O -3.0-5959 
-3.17755 -3.30506 -3.272(98 -3.3021; 11 
ý 
-3.28004 -3.25353 -3.24801 
1-3.43290 
-3.228171 -3.20IN7 -3.16951 
-3.16045 -3.29156 -3.43693 -3.52063 -3.49492 
1 
-3.45991 
1-3.48424 ý 
-3.46864 -3.44918 , -3.41233 -3.3SO82 
90 
91 -3 
-3.45776]11= .5- -3.18010 - -3.31432 -3 . 
40 14 -3.50447 -3.51010 . 48141 -3.455531 -3.41778 -3.37991 
J- T 
8. -5 3.46883 -3.29233 - -3.14690 
ý 
-3.44068 1 -3.53952 -3. '"522 - -3.47340 -3.44360 3.41NI3 3.37976 -3.34109 
-3 .41 690 -3 . -3 6921 
1 
-3.29199 -3.41690 -3 9341 -3.47395 -3.4-5787 
1-3.44997 1 -3.41647 1 -3.39446 -3.35439 
! 
-3.31502 -ý-41690 -3 4 
-3,42464 -3.39298 -3.35383 -3.31791) -3.5 -3.53527 -3.49N68 -3.48117 3.45131 3.21550 5770 . 47742 -3.1 
- ýAý 
. 
3.31023 -3.18765 -3.32590 
1-3.44231 
-3.4982 -3.46107 -3.44262 -3.41203 -3.41885 -3.39272 -3.158 
-3.17961 -3.306651 -3.42764 -3.47932 -3.4408 -3.42533 
1-3.3917 1-3.39233 -3.35219 -3.30978 -3.27174 -K IT. - 77 3.35158 -3.31 78 N/A N/AL -3 15216 -3 27105 -3.39067 -3.44195 3.40272 -3.387M -3.352 
-3 .34 -3.31017 N/A 6 -3.3113- -3.1 -3.35287 -3.40339 -3.36332 -3.3472 N/A N/A 
SIC: Schwarz Inforniation Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift Lao 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
S 
9 
10 
PIT lags 
012415 16 1_7 89 10 
2208 -3.06388 -3.07037 -3.0096ý 1174 3 1 3 ( -2.95608 290377 : 429 -2 1 27603S 
1 ý!! ý 
t 
(19362 I ' ý 
71 50 -3.11168 -3.11311 -3.06218 7 
:31 ý0713 :3 
-3.00683 2.972 737 
:2 
2: 8359ý '70 7"7 2 
-3.24823 3 02 -3.13026 -3.24753 , 8 9 
Mi 99 -3.17871 -3.13310 -3.08321 3.01551 - 
9 
__2 -2.95273 ý( :3) 
18 8 0 -3.12492 -3 23990 -3.299(11 -3.26,422 .0 -3.19894 1 -3.17455 - 
1 
-3.115 3.05872 -2.98969 n/7 1 u5 '1 -, 4, ! 0, )9 111 1 11 9 ý ' 
448 -3.19398 2' 3 O)7 -; 75 - 
9 ' -3.26660 -3.1 
9Z; 69 9 -3.133 9 3.33 -I 
U3 
-3.1 
C7 3 -1.04MV -2.99005 291996 2,1996 -9 84 4 8491 * 91 : 
q 
:3 :t 
. 29 2ý1 ! ; 136 
4-5 
3.08 178 -2.96880 
0 98 - 3.14M 
-3.17189 9 
8 F3 3.20381 
-3.19972 
-3.13840 
-3.13271 
-3 ., I 9 -3.0919(0) 
-3 . 084 -3.08436 
3.5316 
3.02323 
-2.9M39 
-2.96485 
-2.9 467 -2.86244 93467 -286244 
9 -2.90103 -2.82927 0 103 -2 2 27 9 
-2.79045 7)04. 
-2.76025 - 760 -5 
- 
, 
-2.91173 -3.02027 3 -3.10677 -3.13231 1) -3.06426 -3.01453 
1 -2.95224 1 -2.92690 9 1ý 9 -2.86815 -2.79393 82733 11 -2.71901 7 - 90 
-2.87408 -2.97110 0 - 8251 -3.066167 -3.0) .1 73 . 012 -3 0 -2.96553 -296 5 -2.89975 -2.86776 7)4-, -2.79454 4 
'-2.71856 7 -2 85 -2.64646 -264646 
90508 -2.81661 -2 0 I 
-2.83710 
--- 
-2.7526 
41 3ý6 
0 90 
-3.01386 2.9938ý6 1ý 6 
-2.924 2.94360 s 78 0416 
9 -2 . 94293 -2.94293 
-2.87136 
2. i -2.89562 
- -2.82269 
-2.82820 
. 2.75369 
1 -2.79393 
-2.71895 
-2.71956 7 956 
N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
r- PPP lags 
Uplift Lams 0111234 15 16 171819 10 
0 0.38846 ý 0.59122 1 0.65750 i 0.25002 1 0.23556 1 0.85904 10.23 l(ý() -0.25799 -0.35200 -0.17642 -0.16520 
1 0.44670 0.77812 0.09326 0.29941 0.24411 0.20023 - -- -- 0.27112 -0.22510 -0.53879 -0.3712) -0.34718 - 2 63im 1 o(ý-, 9--, 1.05020 
ýM) 
0.47545 -0.09074 -0.13444 
0 
'1 0.13604 - 
36t)4 1 -0.05595 -0.39396 -0.76636 .7 -0.80099 -0.773 12 12 
ý 
0.31741 1 741 : 0.66470 6647 647 0, -0.18797 0.11527 ý -0.10230 -0.1 
84 6 847 
- 
1 8476 : -0* 17 1166 
1 32309 -0. -0.63182 -0.66574 -0.65662 62 
4 0.31596 5705 0.57057 575 0 -0.21907 0.00202 j -0.25705 18 
L 
_O. 218üi 0 
j IM 5 -0.1 
W 2 ý8 -0.13719 
! 
-0.323471 524 o -0.71270 
1 -0. -, -0.07 10331 
ý 
5 0.28595 8 ý95 ý3 16 -0.53164 316 0 Ö. Ö0633 
' 
-0 24678 
, 
-0.21466 0.02013 13 0 020 13 0 02013 0 003181 -0 13507 1 -0.52471 : -0.52536 
! -0-5-. 11 
6 0.58023 8 023 
J 
0.87530 
i753 
8 7' 0.1 0.35096 ; 0.06787 0.08692 7 0.3071 0 .377 0 0717 1 
ý3 
. 48090 
ý 
0.25669 1 58 2695 ; -0.08889 -0. (163' -0.1 1 
7 0.29786 
j 
0.64288 A 0.41444 0.23141 0.03057 0.27841 F6.46842 
- 
0.68998 0.29764 0.24987 (). 2ýý168 
8 5 -0.35584 _ig 0.08-1519 -0.35973 -0.48817 -0.47683 -0.28379 
Ä091'53 0.1765 0.19535 0.17585 0.17497 
9 -0.13641 0.16148 -0.28982 -0.4035,1 -0.38957 -0.17108 0.23230 11.38641 
IDS IDS 
10 -0.14531 0.169-16 -0.30116 -0.41360 -0.40058 -0.18326 -0.01316 
1 0.20961 11), s' IDS- 11) s 
0 i 
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Table 13: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-price regressions. 
Section 2: Second MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift ags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0 j I I 2 F-3 --- I 4 
PPP lao 
I 5 I 6 7 1 10 
-3.07346 1-3.06739A 04 08-3.01618 -2.983881-2.96950! -2.93917'-2.904731-2.876981-2.84650 -2.83670 L. 20 -3.20568 3.20462 7642i-3.1431f'; -3.121571-3.08730ý-3.05281 
[-3.02660 
1 -2.99066 jý -2.99997'ý 
-3.19197 -3.18416 6313,3.12883 -3.106661-3.07217 -3.1 -3.00968 -2.97239'-2.976851 
-3.19ffi226 -3.18037ý- *_73 -3.15152 
ý-3.11665 
-3.09544 -3.06071 -3.9 -2.99321 -2.954841-2.95492 
-3.22209 i -3.200764 -3.18399 -3.157201-3.121711-3.10518 -3.06986 -3.03221 -3.00022 -2.96208 
j 
-2.95807 
-3.23307 ý -3 20726 ý -3.18559 -3.15685 -3.12 -3.10616 -3.06852 -3.03054 -2.99768 -2.959211-2. %2441 
-3.20805 1-3.18536 -3.16223 -3.13243 -3.09588 -3.07660 -3.03808 -2.99899 -2.96636 -2. 
ý2718[-i. 930831 
73 305862 -3.01974 -2.99 -3.21962 -3.18704 -3.15688 3.11964 -3 097a093 -2. 
ýii-5-4-r 2.95594ý 
os 3 -2.91525 N/A -3.22700 -3.19336 -3.15814 -3.12497 -3.699 -3.00408ý« 414 -!. 984001-2.95559 m NIA 
ýi 
i- 
-2.93337 N/A /. & . 964721 
-ý 
ýN/A 
-3 ' 20908 
1-3.17681 
-3.14131 3.10469 -3.06776'-3.04559 -3.6- 
9 
1 2. -99730 
-3.20484 
1-3.173671-3.14066 
-3.10358 -3.07151 -3.03879 -. -2ýý N/A N/A 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
F- PPP lag Uplift Lacs 101 2 13415)61718 191 10 
o 1-2.99433' -2.96122 1 -2.91152 1-2.85489 -2.79449 -2.75104 ' -2 161924,4471 -2 
62882 -2.57144 
' . 
-2-51095 -2.47073 
1 
-3.071106 uo 1) -3.00867 2.92530 -2.87488 
1-2.985703 4 -2.81138 -2.74728 -2,69105 -2.62469 -2 60316 2 2286 1-3.05841 -3.02286 43 2.225 -2.99225 1 -2.94527 2.88213 2.83074 _2 663 _2 66 -2 -2.76663 -2.70060 -2.64371 -2 57558 1-2.54877 - 
3 1-3 03097 2.99097 . 2.95087 i -2.90482, -2.84073 '2,7ý8991 -2.72516 -2.65799 -2.59640 1 -2.52676 -2.49512 - - 41 -3.03270 -2.98290 -2.93729 3 -2.70389 -2.63 40 -2.57214 -2.88128 -2.81618 1 -2.7696 5 2.502 9 2 - 
1-2.46612 
51 -3.01521 -2.96057 -2.90967 -2.78545 -2.74019 1 -2.67171 -2.60246 2 -2.85132 -2.53789 37 -2.46726 461 - -2.43787 
43787 
61 -2.96135 -2.90944 
M 
-2.85670 
0 0 -2.79689 -2 72991 -2.67979 -2.61000 -2.53920 f59 -2.47441 
2.47 1 -2 
460261 
-I -2.37318 - 
-2.9766 -2.91409 -2.85149 -2.790911 
9 -2.72283 -2.6696-54 -2.59883 j -2A227779 9 -2.46636 -2.46636 -2 . 3948 2.39488 8 -2.3472 2.36472 
-2.921461 146 -2 . 85782 -2.79217 -2 72816 81( 205890 -2 
M19 -245943 2 60429 
4413 
) -2.39 -239793 -2.9793 - 
r 
-. 23 . 32403 N/A 
4 -2.8735 -2.81084 -2.74449 -2.67661 
ý796 
-2 4 06 
ýý55364 1-2: ý8041 
0 
; ý6 
. 
34 -2.34215 -2. N/A N/A 
It qq 6 - 1 '1 -2 a - '77 -2712-57 -2 . 64374 -2.4396-5 -2.36421 ' 
I -2.5795-5 -2.51422 N ý12 
N/A N/A N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
ppp lags 
- 
u 0 --F 1121 -3 7 1819 10 
0.09531 ' 0.27928 0.32977 1 0.315415 1-0.29001 
- - 
i 0.32858 
1 
0.30158 0.29.522 0.27271 : 
'0.28183 0 36772 
1 '0 47861 0.57817 10.62198 0.62509 0.2 7499 
- * 
0 59303 ! * 0 57087 *' ý 0 56765 054289 ý 0 54247 0.67061 " 
78253 70145 0 21 0 435 
ý1 
5447016 /ZU 1 u. 78006 0 . 
; 
4762 0 - 72963 0 
1 
0.71961 
ý 
0.69558 
ý9139 
0.0.79506 ý u u. 
3 
. . . t -ý 0 0.40i 91 0.53441 ý 0.66848 10.75384 091 - -- 0.83469 
- 
- -- , 0.80255 
- 
0.78268 
- 
0.2 7714 10.74779 ý 
-- 
ý 
I 7ý 0 0.74301 1.84790 
- 
4 0.53641 0.63793 0»71469 077669 0 0.7705 
- 
0.73023 0.71029 0.70208 m 0.76469 0.67911 0. 67 7ý 
- 
5 0.41629 0.50507 0.57809 0.63728 0.63320 0.58756 0-58064 0.56914 
d54744 10.54089 0 6300)99 9 
1 
6 0.36557 0.46503 0.53668 0.59456 -0.21716 0.55511 0.55129 0.54321 
ý. 
-0.79439 0.51215 0.6005599 5 9 
7 0.46968 0.51070 0.54661 0.60561 0.60158 0.56771 0.56756, 0.55394 1 0*'; 2438 - 
0.51.650 0.60540 
- 
, 
8 0.50290 0.54292 0.. %432 0.63553 0.60526 1.18610 0.12335 -0.25755 ý 0.52924 0.43M6 N/A 
F ý 1 049862 0.55319 1 ' 0.57724 0.60400 
1 0.59918 0.56425 0.56472 U. - 15. - t -0.96038 
N/A N/A 
- 
1 0 0 45429] 0.518: 3: 6 -: '0.58570 0...; 78.; 2 0.55,508 0.55547 -0.22456 1 
LIOIS: 51653 N/A 
1 
N/A N/A 
272 
Table 13: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-price reuressions. 
Section 3: Third MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0 I 2 3 4 
PPP lap 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
-3.62703 ý -3.62194 ý -3.60321 1 -3.57211 1 -3.55118 1 -3.53609 1 -3.51139 ý -3.48327 ' -3.44697 -3.41113 
-3.61923 -3.59877 -3.59435 j -3.57767 _-3_. 
54674 -3.52508 1 -3.51038 
ý 
-3.48790 6130 -3.42421 -3.38757 
-3.63693 -3.60813 
1-3.59106 -3.54814 3.52939 
-- -F3.49171 
-3.4 139 1 -3.43411 -3.3 -3.57656 9 
[-3.51148 
-3 
-3.61105 -3.58112 -3.55981 -3.54260 -3.5_1368 
1_-3.49503 1-3.47670 1-3.45588 j 
-3.43593 _ -3.39831 -3.36289 
-3.61023 -3.57912 -3.55561 
1 
-3.52934-ý -3.49592 -3.4777; 
1-3.46243 
-3.44152 -3.42085 -3.383791 -3.35153 
-3.59621 -3.56496 -3.540941-"1362 -3.47756 -3.45255 -3.43791 -3.41949 -3.39907 -3.36141 -3.33148 1 
38 
-3.59738 
ý 
-3.56697 
1 
-3.54575 
1 
-3.51920 
1 
-3.482.50 : -3.4!; 022 
' -3.42606 ' -3-40996 -3 39420 ý -33 * 35676 1 -3.32731 
-3.56232 1 -3.5-3-130qýý 
ý-3.48241 
-3.44499 1ý -3.41196 -3.38683 --3--. -3-7-16-0- -3 
35384 . 31528 -3.28473 
-3.37749 -3.35298 
k3. 
*32'661 
-3.28879 NIA -3.5ý2393 1-3.50116 1-3.47516 -3.43758 -3.40504 i 
-3.53552 
ý 
-3.50045 
1 -3.47404 ý -3.44716 -3.40933 1 -3.37696 -3.35139 -3.32370 
-3.49899 [_-3.46325 1 --3-P60-4 
L -3.40794 1 -3.36931 1 -3.33622 1 -3.30985 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
oil 
PPP lags 
Uplift Lap, % 0 11213 1415167 
0 NEW= -3.52086 -3-48838 0, ........... -3.44191 -3.38272 
1 -3.33333 3 28939 3 231547 --*-- -3 17774 , 
'-3 111411 I, -3*04516 
t t -3. - . 46521 -3.43305 05 
- 
-3.38827 3.38827 
1 
-3.32888 1 -3.27838 -3.23446 -3.18237 
-- ý 
-3 3 
_ 
-3.12576 1 -3.05824 
I 
-2-99076 
2 . 3.50337 -3.44684 -3.40166 66 3.35871 -3.35871 ---- 
-3.30145 -3.25347 -3.20595 -3.15617 3 30145 
1 -3.1.0542 -3.03730 -2.97062 
3 -344975 -339173 -3.34195 34 95 ' -. 
3.29590 3.295 90 -3.2S776 -3.18949 -3.14116 -3.08991 3.23776 
T 1 -3-03912 -247023 -2.90309 
4 -3.4208-3; 36127 -3.30891 
t-ý 
- -3.25342 -3 . 19038 -3.19038 -3.14220 
1-3.09646 1 -3.04470 t 
1 -2.99276 -2. -2.85958 
M 
6 . 3.26502 -3.20809 1 ol -3.14201 ---- -3.08658 
-3.04109 
- 
-2.99140 1 -2.93928 -2.8 -2.80691 
-3.3 -50678 
--- 
-3.29105 -3.24022 -3.18365 -3 . 11W -3.11653 -3.05341 -2.99797 -2.950161 -2 _-2.90225 
-2.83220 -2.76965 
-3.28641 -3.225777 1 -3.17391 1 - . 11 3 081 -3.04818 -2.98388 
92704 -2.87965 * 87 -2A2932 -2.75763 -2.69351 
-3.25284 -3.18838 19 
1 
-3.35191 -3.07835 -3.00949 -2.94525 -2-88554 2.82942 -2 82 -_2.76895 -2.69757 
N/A 
-3.19998 -3.13,4 3T -3.0772,22 -3.01908 -2.954 -2.88501 -2 . 82682 -2.76604 6 -2.70252 
N/A N/A 
10 -3.1DO 2 -3. 066431 % -3.007% -2 .9 . 94814 -2 . 
87736 . 87736 -2.81166 -2 . 75220 -2.69065 
L N/A 1 N/A N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
F- PPP lags 
Uplift U, 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
2I3I4 L_ 6 
-3.28188 
7 
-3.293741 N/A I N/A 
N/A I N/A I N/A I 
8 9 10 
-0.28300 -0.29682 
ý 
-0.29900 -0.28069 
! -0.28455 -0.27794 -0.33031 -0.37967_1 -0.40836 -0.40180 -0.40106 
-0.27642 
-- 1- 0.27009 1--0.27-444 1 1.08620 1.36780 1.09450 3715 0.40619 1 -0.40-533 -0.28995 
1-0.29144 
691 6 
-0.39828 1 -0.39752 1 -0.38301 
,0 36411 ' -0 37561 '0 37336 
' -0 41863 ý -0.48455 1 -0.53801 -0.54422 ' -0 54 1---0-- m 
-0 -0.35168 ý -0.3952i 
11 
ýii( -0.3510iý . 
35276 ' 
-0.35042 
5- ; i237 0.511 0; -0.51868 
-0 -0.34988 
1 no 
Aml A lEel 1 -A AIAGA A Allju ARC-71 AR 11 -u. 3u luo 
-0.14734 
-0.10021 
-0-10043 
11 1 1,7, -fl 11119 
ý 
-fb 
17,201 1 -0-11248 ý -0.35713 1 -0.42494 1 -0.47364 ý -0.49616 , -0.48573 I r_-f ---------±---------- 
0.14781 -0.15 
1 
_I -0.22088 
ý- 
_0.27984 
1---0-. 325-84 ý -0.33898 ý -0.32687 1 096 -0.15606 
1 
-0.16279 
ý 
-0.18176 
0. i" ý -0.10188 
ý 
-0.10683 
1 
-0.11459 
j 
-0.13065 
1 -0.16772 ý -0.22826 j -0.27641 -0 29201 ' -0 27885 1 
N6 ý -0.16567 -Ö. 22559 ýý -0 
27310 01841 
1-0 
1 
-- 
-0.27615 ý-0.10296 -0.10908 
1 
-0.11724 _O. 
ä22 -. 0047 
-0.23465 1 -0.22904 -0.23033 -0.24020 
1 
-0.25395 
1-0.27335 1-0.29948 ý -0-32955 ý -0-34948 -0.37308 N/A 
-0.34992 
1 
-0.34406 
1 
-0.33177 ý -0r. 3402ir-O. 
iiý22 [ 
-0.38394 
1 
-0.42499 
ý -0. 
ZIZI 
-0.44625 N/A N/A 
-L -- -- 
N= 
-0.37026 -0.3i494 -0.35145 . 346617-0.36495 -0.43628 
ý -0.466,411 N/A 1 N/A 1A 
-- -- l4ý-Oý 
-0734d 6 -[-0.3ý94 -0 
/A 
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Table 13: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-price regressions. 
Section 4: Fourth MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (Optimal valtie is minimal). 
Uplift Lags 
0 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
oil 2 3 4 
PPP lag's 
5 6 7 
-3-34303 196 -3.29444 -3,27708 -3.27415 -3.24781 1-, - D9 -3.19007 -3.18282 -3.14777 -3.11686 _: 
3ý328 
- 
-3.33900 -3.31435 -3.32176 -3.30053 -3.27908 -3.24384 -3.23858 -3.20187 3.16849 -3.38748 3 . 
36 53 
-3.38038 -3.35087 -3.32680 -3.32385 
jý3 291 -3.28081 
ý 
-3.24509 1 -3.23332 1-3.19682 -3.16808 130 
-3.38323 -3.35129 1 -3.32446 -3.29952 1 -3.29916 -3.27617 -3.25 -3.21913 -3.20703 -3.16922 -3.14184 
1 0,0 
-3.35010 -3.31774 -3.29057 ' -3 26461 -326374 -3 23"3 -3.2 W -3.16961 -3.13095 3.10358 3 50 0, -*317 
tý , 
'1 
-3095 
-3 , 103; 58 
089- 
. 29668 
ý 
-3 
go 
- ý27063 
-3.09680 -3ý. 
ý3ý6412 
-3.33089 -3- -ý. 25169 -3.22864 -3.21423 -51 -3.16164 -3.12180 
-3.13836 -3.12508 3.09442 -3.05801 3.33078 -3.29742 -3.26260 Ir 1 -3.23907 -3.21985 -3.19284 -3.17741 
9 -3 . 2621 -3.29724 -3.26285 -3.22702 -3.202 9 
1. 
-3.16( -3.10033 -3.08446 -3.04302 -3*01595 193.18687 )20 314014 M 
-3.26163 -3.226,54 -3.18996 1 -3.16522 -3.14831 -3.12146 -3.10156 -3.06065 -3. (W371 -3.00119 N/A 
-3.23085 J-3.19428j -3.15687 
1-3.12910 1 
-3.11271 -3. OM33 . 06857 -3.02713ý ý. 01925 ý N/A N/A 
L-3.20025 1 -3.16319 ý -3.12576 -3.09901 -3.07877 1 -3.052741 -3.03735 -_2.99693 N/A N/A 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
oh 2 3 i 4 I 
PIT lags 
S I 6 
8 
8 I 
1 10 
9 7 
-3.26390 11 -3.21578 
ý -3.16088 ý -3.11579, ý -3.08475 1 -3.02995 
ý -2.97940 1- -2.91415 -2.87729 
-- +- -- -t a -3.23497 -3.17770 -3.12496 -3.10391 -3.05383 
-3.27776 1 -3.21908 
1 
-3.16148 -3.10894 1 -3.07715 
1 -3.02700 
-3.22193 1 -3.16190 -3.106601 -3.05282 -3.02324 1 -2.97064 
. 3.16070 -3.09988 -3.04387 -2.9 9 -2.95821 -2.90439 
-3.14627 -3.08419 -3.02076 
ý 
-2.96510 
- -2.86267 
-3.08408 -3.02150 
1--2.95706 1 
-2.90352 -2.85388 1-2.79602 1 
-2.81222 
-3.00316 
1 
-2.93830 
ý 
-2.90304 
ý 
-2.83590 
7 -2 -2.80001 -i97 
-2.9 ! 
ý582 
___53 -2 -2.74114 
-2.85316 -2.7 -2 -2.67116 
-2.81742 
ý 
-2.7_ - -2_ -2.62985 
-2.74933 -2.67856 -2.63313 -2.55985 
-2.68034 -2.60838 -2.55989 -2.48537 -3.02132 -2.95732ý-2.89147 -2.83702 -2.79005 -2.73212 
-2.95610 -2.890991 -2.82399 2.76840 1 -Z. 7ZUZZ I -L. 001()() 
238 2.89530 -2.82831 
J-2.76006 
-2.70102 
1-2.65292 1-2.59 
1 
-2.52818 -2.83428 
; 
-2.76638 
1 
-2.69767 
ý 
-2.639211 -2.58682 
-2.60961 , -2.53608 -2 * 48606 -2.40997 
-2.54401 -2.46948 -2.42803 N/A 
-2.47969L22.40571 N/A _ 
N/A 
N/A 
10 
-2.75089 
-2.77168 
-2.74ýý, 
-2.68205' 
-2.61163 
-2.57224 
-2.50035 
-2.42472 
N/A 
N LýA: - 
N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
Uplift Lal,, s 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ag ppp 1 ýs 
01111411671819 10 
0.84004 1.06660 1 0.89635 ý 0.09552 
1 -0.01317 -0.04465 -0.05235 -0.05301 -0.00183 1 -0.02108 , 0.06889 
0.01567 0.01476 ý 0.01542 
ý 
0.02287 ý -0.10904 
ý 
-0.15406 . -0.16297 -0.15774 
ý 
-0.10552 
1 
-0.64M8 ý -0.01806 
-0.08829 
r-0.082081 
-0- 
--- 
.9 
-- i 
-0.17911 
1 
-0.22608 1 -0.23454 ý -0.228411 -0.17544 
1 
-0.15879 
, 
. 08153 -0 
5326 -0.04824 
d -29931 
-0.14848 -0.14012 ý -0.26278 -0.30054 1 -0.31762 -0.13784ý--- 
A 0.31114 f-4.25930 ý -0.24418 -0.13042 48 -()* 1 ()l 2 
9. W071 -0.26388 ý -0.3005 0.31372 
f 
-0.26280 , -0.24813 ; -0.13262 27 -0.10426 -0. 
- 
48j-o- 
265 47216 4 -0.13619 
ý 
-0.12652 
0.06311 0.07021 il 0.05627 1 0.06014 -0.07087 -0.10468 -0.10256 
1 -0-10141 -0.05630 -0.04857 0.08662 
0.09143 
, 
0.10601 1 0.0921610.12569 
_ý -0.00345 
_L _j 
0.09210 
'1 
0.04419 ! 0.00390 0.14918 1 0.15501 1 0.13629 0.17381 
0.14600 0.15200 0.13499 j 0.17344 0.09141 ' 0.04533 1 0.00496 0.00697 '0 30570 0 03800 1 N/A 'N/A -N/A 
-0.70800 
1 0.14776 A 231 0.16804 0.08285 
j 0.03924 1 -0.01065 
ý 
-0.00639 0. 132317 
0.13905 ý 0.14341 0.11848 ýI 0.115 5 62 
ý 
0.07823 10.02782 1 -0,02 358 ý -0.0 1424 N/A N/A 
-0.06157 -0.05798 -0.05407 0.00814 0.01575 ý 0.14127 
0.00805 0.03179 0.04235 1 1 0.171D 
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Table 13: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-price re2ression& 
Section 5: Fifth MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criteriwi (Optimal value is minimal). 
PPP lags 
I lplift Lags 0 12ý 
ý3 4 15 67 18 191 10 
0 
m 
-3.21649 -3.21514 -3 18490 -3 15323 -3.16674 1 -3.15016 -3.11759 -3.08266 -3.04724 
1 
-3.01354 -2.98602 
1 i -3.23725 -3.34911 -3, . 31791 2; -3.28533 -3.29640 -331145 -3.28634 -3.21066 -3.2144_2 -3.18154 -3.15182 
2 -3.23535 -3.36251 -3.38032 8 3 3 0 -3.35596 55 -3.37324 -3.39532 -3.40006 -3.36711 -3.33058 -3.296141 -3.20416 
3 93 -3102 3301 
1,3 BO -3*34663 - . 
3466 -3.32587 -3.33873 -3.36177 -3.36831 -3.33799 -3.30 _ -3. _I 
ý 
-3.23366 
4 Z2274 -3.: 
ýi -i- -- 3 147 ilo 9 -3,33089 08 -3ý -3.31437 -3.30355 -- 
SIS 4 5 -3.33139 065 -3.30065 -3. 11 -3.19497 1 
5 -3- -3.43193 1 -3.42159 . 4215 -3.40197 -3. - 
37922 
- -3 - . 
34472 -3. -3- 
3880 -3 - . 
31283 -3.27859 _ _-3.25794_1 -3.21899 6 -3.32587 E! JCUM -3.43 5 . 4336 -3.40840 -3.38564 -3.34922 -3.31628 -3.28695 -32S400 -3 
23813 1 -3.19633 
7 -3.29321 -3.40406 
ý 98 
= 
-3.37273 3 05 -1.0 . 3980 -3.35022 -3.31306 -3.27891 -3.24705 ! -3.21356 -3.15365 
1 
8 -3.25853 -3.36831 1 
1 T-3.36131 
-3.33603 361 6 -3.31216 -3.27441 -3.23946 -3.20652 3 17292 -3.14535 N/A 
-3.24132 - 3.34810 . 18 -3ý34746 -3.31846 -3.28943 57 
:3 
. 14765 -3.25036 -3.21607 -3.183- N/A NIA 
-3.20827 98 
w131744 
-3.31669 -3.28461 -3.25368 -3.18100 -3.14.549 
N/A -3.21472 N/A N/A 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is niiiiiinal). 
I PPP lags --- -I - Uplift Lags 0 1 2 13 4 15 6 17 1 i I 91 10 
0 -3.13736 -3.10897 -3.05134 -2.99193 1 -2.97734 1 -2.93231 -2.87090 i 1 -2.80674 I -2 
74171 1 -2.67800 f -2-62001; I 
1 -3.13107 -3.15661 -3.091594 -3.078' 41 , -3.0647-5, -3.01042 -2.94513 
i 
-2.87887 -2.81557 -2.75,500 
2 -3.10179 -3.20121 3,19093 3! I 1N -3.12655 _55 -3.11940 . 
3.09452 1 -3-03157 57 1 -2.96461 2. 64til -1 
ý 
-2-89933 . 2.83607 
3 -3.04164 -3.14112 1 -3.12877 
ý ý 3.668 1 -3.05624 -3.03276 7202 
1 
-2.97202 -, 2.90461 2.1 ,i W61 .9 
4 
1 -2.83862 -2,6862 ,- - -2 -2.77387 
4 -3.03335 - - - -3.10161 
3.6fW19 -3.03845 T -2.99802 -2.99000 -2.96542 -2.90384 )384 35 . Z. 6 3586 F-2.83586 8 586 - -2 '76 -2.70302 -2 
5 -3.1 8 3 1 1 -3.18523 3,, 
ý45: 76ý7 A 644 3! ý9 09 'o - 
Z -3.04367 -2.97875 -2.94199 -2.88475 75 -1 - 
7 QJR79 7 QJR70 -2.81879 2 99 -2.76599 - -2.69442 
2 
6 -3.0 1 M -3.16334 
: 
5 -3.60728 -3.01967 -2.95241 -2.88820 1 
5 -2 . 
827715 '7 1 -22.762005 -2 - -2.71357 -2.63868 
7 -3.01729 -3.09853 -3.06250 76 -3 -2.95340 -2.88498 -2.81911 510 
f ,50 -2.75510 -. 900 -2.68w -2 -2.63868 6 -2,5 243 
8 -2.9 300 -3.03276 -2.99534 - 
39 
- . 
93922 -2.88407 - -2.81462 -2.74751 
19 '195 -2-68,195 5 15 -2.61526 
26 26 -2.55413 NA 1 
9 -2.9578 -2.98213 -2.95065, -2.89038 -2.82963 -2.75841 -2.69210 - 
ý92 -2.62592 592 -2.55643 -2.55643 -2 N/A N/A N 
10 -2.8 30 - -2.92063 -2.88861 _ _-2.82482 
-2.76173 _N/A 
N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
Uplift Lags 
0 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
PPP lags 
01112141516178191 10 
0.70956 
-19.74677 
ý 0.76845 0.73012 0.69571 ý 0.71389 j 0.71539 10 . 
70758 0.71002 , 0.74454 ý 0.71749 1 64 73 12 
0.64575 ' 0.6834-3 ý 0.65304 0.62187 0.59063 0.611446 0.62120 0.61856 0.61972 0.66476 0.63821 340.62 18 
0.6 i 
0.06 
.11 
-Z 
0* () 
7 
ýi 
)() 
0.074 
502 0 . 09743 
06 0.06 0.52830 0.54260 0.22502 0.09743 0.05106 613 -0.00659 -0.00250 0.00565 0.05 1- 630.03436 
0.074 
1 24 0.1 1304 
ý755 
(). 07 0.50 0.49563 0.21224 0.11304 0.05755 5 0.01082 1 0.02303 0 03622 0 08544 0 06791 
0.0262 0.47186 0.47375 ' 0.20499 0.08861 0.05724 0.07422 1 0.01018 0.02224 0 03867 
8 ()"4 
- -- ., -- 
2-0 
() 
0.45230 0.45624 0.25746 0.14850 0.12U240 0.11882 
1 0.05890 007807 10; 
ýý 
0.23564 0.22113 
8'7 (), 09 
_ý 
Oý07484 
ý88 
228 
0 
0.38684 0.38067 0.15911 0.07398 0.04723 LO. 04576 1 0.03355 
1 
Oý05i7] ý 0.085,48 0.22855 0.22787 684 u 
-- --- - 0. ffl37- () 0 -948 0.04152 0.0695 0.429408 0.38398 0.18027 0.10066 0.08102 6 -01 
0.22421 0.22360 
13 
- 
0.43730 0.36996 0.17441 0.087ý84 0.07267 0.06991 0.05472 1 0.03444 0.09010 
i25993 
N/A 
0* 224 
97 
515 
-g--144-J al 9 
10.17343 
0.54018 0.46697 0.26919 0.18697 0.16345 0.15935 0.1,0.1 
- 
2727 [0.17343 N/A N/A 
0.52833 0.45183 0.25316 0.18315 0.16119 0.15585 
-o-lý 
0.12513 1 N/A N/A N/A 
0.54018 
0.52833 
0.46697 
0.45183 
0.26919 
0.25316 
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Table 13: Interactive variable analvsis - Multivariate uplift-price regressions. 
Section 6: Sixth MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Inflormation Criterion (Optimal value is miiiinial). 
PPI, lugs 
Uplift Lags 0 11 121314 15 16171812 10 
o -1. Z4694 4 1, 1 5 89 -1.38430 -1.35169 1 -1.31938 1 -1.38432 1 -1.35229 1.422711 -11.3939,6 I. M76655 - , 1.36139 1 
1.42493 1 40 2 4 7 
+ý 
1.37008 -1.33689 -1.30361 
ý 
-1.3634-3- 
1-1.32867 1.39782 -1.37657 -1.33991 -I* 342122 
2 - . 41514 - . 39570 
1-1.39577 
-1.36197 -1.32873 
1-1.40147 1-1 
. 36622 -1.40592 -1.39498 -1.35585 -1.35190 
1 
3 -1.40503 -1.38124 
1 
-1.38837 
1-1.4 7 -1.37521 
1 
-1.45369 -1,41806 -1.44%1 -1.41847 -1.39125 -1.36346 0 16 
4 L3897' 7 -1,36819 -1.36795 -1.39229 -1.37639 . 46990 8 -t 0, -1.43485 -1.45287 -1.421 04 -1.38902 -1.3579 12 
5 
j 
7 7 1.6345' -1.60314 -1.63097 
f-1.623261-1.63600 
. 61 
- 17 -0 1 -1 58412 -1.52551 -1.510374 -1.5577, 112 -1.59456 
6 -I -1.60843 -1.57744 -1.60029 1.60397 4.59576 
- 1.58118 5 -1 9 55 1.54569 -1.55527 -1.51790 -1.48463 -1.46219 51791 21 . 51 
7 1 64901 - 
- 
11 615549 ' 
, 
. 1.63739 -1,64633 -1.61483 - 
;. -- 1.58655 1-1.54457 -1.50853 -1.47537 -1.44946 
- 44 6,44946 
8 , , . 639141 -1.61508 
rl. 
6H19 O 1.61890 - 1.61036 -1. -1.60101 
1 1 -1.58002 - - -1.54920 -1 . 
50921 -1.50117 -1.46385 N/A A : l9 : . 1.60713 -L-58151 
:::: S:: 4: 2 41: 58134 
4 
. 58342 -1.57722 
1 
-1. -1.56513 
1 
-1.54311 1311 4 1 -1.51314 -1.47248 -1.46095 
1 N/A N/A 
l 0 1.59048 ý ý97 go 6 790 -1.5 -1. 56016 -1. L-1.5427C 4 . 52290 191 19167 -1.49167 -1.45250 N/A N/A N/A 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
F- PPP lap's UpUft Lags 0121314 56 17819 10 
0 -1.3 781 1-1.30972 -1.25074 -1.19039 -1.12998 -1.16646 -1.10-560 -1.14679 -1.08843 -1.02210 -0.99542 
1 -1.31876 1.26891 -1.20878 -1 14750 -1.08575 -1.11674 -4 -1* 
052 75 I. OU992229 ý 1 29 U9ZZ9 11 (W1103 
- 
u u -0.997133599444 - -- 
U, -0.9445531 
2 -1.28158 0 1*2 
1 
-1.2063 -1.14411 LOS203 -1.12MI6 060 -1.069 -1.07037 37 1 070 07037 -1.01901 1*01901 01901 -0.95903 53 -0.95903 
f 
-0.959( -0,9 90 -0,92 -0.923N2 
3 91 - -1.24373 -1.1: 8 .11 
- 1 ms -1.16238 
-5 5 
-1.09929 -1.14815 ý -1.08251 
ý 
-1.08364 106 . 08364 6 02 
1 
-1.02165 15 1 0. %317 -0. %317 0,96 1 0 -0.90367 0*9 
4 1 5( -1.12125 -1.11637 1 -1.07085 -1.13435 -Lmm 1.05606 05606 
4 
99295 0.9929-5 9- 9! 
+ 
-0.2922 . 92922 -0 -0 9 9 -0.86597 
5 35( 
0 ý 
'1, -1.35505 -1.31773 -1.30046 - 1.24573 -1.18736 8 1., 16648 -16648 097% 1 097% -1 1.3356 -1.03356 5 - 91 -0.97917 
6 0 ol - 1 -1ý3 15 -1.29475 -1.26021 -1.23800 -1.18436 -1.11761 
ý 
-Ir5 Ln5ý _I -1.02594 1 -0.96006 0.9 1 -0.9(W53 5 
7 -1.39695 11 34348 -1.31994 -1.280 . 24058 -1.18674 
ý 
-1.12675 i-, 
1.05262 -0.98397 
4, 
-0.91771 
ý 
-0 85,824 1 
8 -1. 954 -1.25293 -1.21354 . 17293 1.12022 - 1.05725 
1 
-0.98465 -0.94351 -0.87262 N/A 
9 -1.27159 
1 
-1.21554 1.18661 -1.14914 0 . 10534 -1.5116 -0.98857 -0.91483 -0.96973 N/A N/A 
10 -1.22451 
F-1.16616ý 4.13982 -1,10036 . 05075 -0.99833 1-0.93402 -0.861281 N/A N/A N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10 
UpUft La 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0 11 
significance level, 1.645. 
PPP lags 
3 41516171$ 10 
0.51689 0,53426 0.53666 0.53419 0.52398 0.20019 0.24487 0.18726 0.09640 0.08073 0.38151 
0.61637 0.57974 0.58004 
, 
0.57331 0.56812 1 0.24633 
ý 0.2-"83 10.20125 i 0.06765 
11 
0.03207 0.03298 
0 68222 11.67453 0.67092 0.65890 0.32621 
Oý74473 0.75252 0.88555 0.87230 0.53983 
0.7! 
ýý MI 762 0.75647 0.89.561 0.97185 0.63934 
0 52 . 36452 0.34900 0.38562 
0.49913 0.60279 0.66556 
0.34182 ý 0.27439 ý 0.13727 1 -0.01.570 
ý 0.26316 
0.51410 0.44245 0.34216 0.16882 0.31093 
0.60118 0.52502 0.42385 0.27787 0.39753 
0.58767 0.51790 0.45092 0.30218 0.47911 
0.57621 0.51771 0.45039 0.30404 0.48(65 0.26891 -i 0.24548 0.30703 0.40390 0.52459 1 0.57883 
0.05758 10.00996 0.08012 1_0.170JU I tJ., Zy-i4tP ý U-345V5 
0.13918 10.10113 10.11872 10.25174 0,37271 
0.04382 ý 0.01779 ý 0.05030 10.15451 ý 0.28890 
Cj0.44106 
0.3372M 0.3459M 0.25426 0.10272 0.27550 
0.46965 ý 0.46467 10.48560 10.55135 1 0.41208 1 N/A 
0.38691 1 0.36393 1 0.38614 0.47584 1 
N/A 
NJA i N/A O-R5756 j 0.53244 10.58367 NIA i 
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Table 14: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-demand reeressions. 
Section 1: First MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Infon-nation Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
UpUft Lao 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Demand lags 
02131451617181 10 
_-2.23923 -2.21017,1 -2.19153 -2.10416. -2.13552 -2.11609 -2.08174 
ý -2.18620 -2.15199 11 569 ý -2.09701 
-2,21990 - 23698 -2.21168 -2.18763 -2.15874 -2.13571 1 -2.10068 -2.18M -2.115387 -2.11702 1 -2.09886 2.21380 
-22ý24351 -2.22094 038 -2.11468 
_ 2.1 13 
8955 
ig 68 -2i 
q9941 
-2...... 
1 
. 17105 21 2 _2 
61 _2 
1 2.14618 _2 
-2.19435 -2.17037 -2 15" 2 -2.12644 -2.11141 
f 
; 
0662 21 
13 00 . 181g7 21 )g 
-2 19730 1 -2 22411 -2.20766 -2.17526 -2.14833 -2.12958 -2.09319 -2.17105 -2.13324 -2.09658 1 -2.07426 z '411 19 
2.23215 i 2023 . 4443 _2 2 MW 64 
ja"4ý 73 'a. 4, _2 
I'lu *2 _2 lu 'Ll /. ý 1295 
-2.24757 -2.22356 -2.20230 -2.16522 -2.24443 -2.2 -2.16852 -2.15646 
665 1 
-2.2,2962 -0- 
-2 . -2.23967: -2.21478 -2.19280 -2.20233 -2.16650 -2.12873 -2.20662 -2. IS744 -2.12903 -2. tl6l5 
u 
20426 111 12 11615 
-2.22270 -2.22087 -2 MI -2.17055 2.16899 
1-2.13300 
-2.09661 -2.18187 -2.14188 -2.10329 -2.09271 69444 3 -2.1 89 ---- 
-I--- Fý 1-2.05731 2 -2.18862 -2.18525 -2.16297 -2.13373 -2.13 19 -2.09444 -2.0573 1 -2.14618 j -2.10529 2.666M -2.05289 
-2.16046 -2.14886 -2.12595 -2.09706 2.09346 -2 05610 1-2.01820 -2.1 527 -2.06353 
217 ý- 
ý2.01 
N/A 
-2.13728 -2.12616 -2.09282 -2.06254 -2. (6554 -2ýOý717 -1.98729 -2.07730 r-0 
4ý. 035ZO9 I N/A N/A 
-- ; 8; 56 -1. /A N/A 2.10033 -2A734 -2.03163 1.99450 -1.95383 -2 05803 /A 
I N/A 
-_ 
W3 7T 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift Lags 
o 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
qF. lJFI] 
*rn1IA 
1I- 
Deniand la 
N/A 
91-7170 Lýýý5 1 7 
N/A 
8 
-2.10400 1_-2.05797 ý -2.00287 ý4.94612 ý -1.89823 i -1.83505 ý -1.91028 ý -1.84636 ý -1.78015 ý -1.73104 
-2.2.342 -2 
ý-ý19968424 
-11.. 
9940188_ý 
-11. -ý88902 -1.82476 -2.04(ý- - 
833 -1.7 1.70204 11373 ,- 10 
-i_050M -1.8 -1.97917 -1.72962 -1 9535 -1.68332 
1,81 
-2. . 357 17 .7 SW Q 08024 -2 - 
ds 
-1 . 
03154 446,0914 
-2.03600 1 -2.03471 
1-1.98980 
-1.92856 -1.87242 -1.82404 : -1.75764 -1.91664 -1.7-3-6-4311 -1.66850 -1.61447 
-2.00087 
---F-1.9266 1 -1.86675 -1.79925 -1.85297 -1.77798 
1-1.70872 1 
--F664501 -2.04023 -2.049911 1.94764 
-1.98640 ; -1.99297 -1.94386 
ý -1.88727 1-1.86678 1 -1.800.53 1 -1.73191 -1.78813 j -1.70764 j -1.6 
--- --- -I ___ __ 
3708ý 
_-1.5915_9_ 
-1.97600 ý 4.94495 ý' -1.89323 
14.83500 1 -1.80302 ý -1.7 - 
3619 -1.66853 -1.72208 4.64993 1 -1-57872 -1.53506 
--I -. 
1.58072 1 -1.0851 -1.46167 -1-91270 -1.87972 -1.82742 
ý 
-1.76775 
E-ljý 1 
-1-66636 59752 -1 65423 
L- ýl ;7 
-1.81332 -1. 
-759 - 98-ý -1.7002 -1.66538 
ý 
-1 59631 -1.52625 
1 
-1.58071 -1.50588 -1.43094 N/A - -1.85492 
OT 
- 
t -1.80174 -1.76019 
1 -1.69601 1 -1.63445 ý -1.60575 -1.53522 1 -1. -!. 5ý9ý ý386 ----------- 
-1.73436 -1.69175 i -1.626MI -1.56755 1 -1.53968 1 -1.46993 1 -1.396171 -1.46680_L N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; IO'No significance level, 1.645. 
Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
011121314 
-1.84370 -1.84440 -1.64220 -1.57760 -1.54430 
-1.90350 -2-14360 -1.96130 1.89410 -1.85940 
-1.04510 
-0.99446 
-0.72864 
-1.58870 1.47 -1.54820 ý -1.47930 
- 1. Mau 1 . 1.35j4u 1 -I. Z! i"u I-I. zu4uu ý --l. 1000V 
-0.86083 
-0.80766 
-0.47001 
-0.37721 
-0.67577 j 
-0.89828 
-0.89049 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Deniand la f61718191 
10 
0ý -1.550.50 -1.80210 ý -1.79280 -1.75690 1 
-1.86100 -1.85110 -2.04130 -2 0395OU 1 99960 -1-83090 
-1.47040 1.46250 -1.66450 -1ý65j 1ý67060 -1.48290 
-1.142801 -1.13660, -1.37950 -1.36930 -1-39040 -1.33880 
-0.977611 -0.76577 
' 
-0.48969 
1-0.49748 1 
-0.49494 . -0.73452 -0.71889 -0.74406 -0.65348 
0.92246 0.74101 -0.45872 -0.47283 -0.4703S -0.71274 -0.69896 -0.72402 -0.63415 
-0.67548 0.51366 AWN 
j 
-6.37243 0.33182 -0.51524 -0.50360 -0.53134 -0.42171 
-0.67232 -0.70919 1 -0.53304 t -0.35047 -0.35691 
1 -0.30179 -0.31527 -0.30692 -0.333211 -0.27009 
-0.61766 -0.68444 1 -0.60-5,52 0.38020 -0.27213 -0.05523 -0.28-73-71 PWIA 1 -0*41816 -0.43142 - 
-0.94988 . 0.80; 59 -o. 
i-l95-,; 061137 -062058 -0.57128 -0.49896 1.07790 N/A 
62058 -0.50575 -0.38791 N/A N/Aý] -0.8_4165 -0.79913 -0.66918 -054933 -0* -1 - 
N/A 
10 
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Table 14: Interactive variable analvsis - Multivariate uplift-demand reeressions. 
Section 2: Second MMC reference. 
ATC: Akaike Information Criterimi (Optimal value is iiiiiiimal). 
Dentand lags 
Uplift Laws 01112131415 J__ýý7 181 
0 -3.08638 -3.09602 1 -3.07712 -3.04477 -3.01175 -2.98525' -2.97105 : -2.98069 -2.95134 -2.91742 -2.88142 
31 . 23722 -3.23429 -3.24024 -3.21177 -3.1780ý -114948 -3.13087 1 -3.11994 -3.08358 3.05355 -3.01609 
I Uplift Lags 
-3.21378 1 -J. 2174.3 -J. 19254 -J. I -ML5 -J. 
IZ? J. 5.5 -3.1U96-11 -3. u985j -3. (j6lsi 1 -J. (12752 -2.98906 
3 3.22WWj -3.21512 
ý 
-3.20607 -3.17937 -3.14447 -3.11638 -3.09752 -3.08490 -3 * 
04712 -3 , 
01409 -2.97651 
4 -3.27079 
t 
3.2-5312 
r3.23768 
-3.20390 -3.16856 "3 14244 -3.12128 -3.11206 -307354 -3.03878 -2. "915 
-3.05498 -3.01901 -2,97879 5 -3.2705 -. 87 
1 
-3.230581 -3.19574 -3.16184 -3 
ý 
13330 -3.10698 -3.09427 
6 -3.24047 -3.21604T---3.19883 -3. _6355 -3.12886 -3.09830 -3.07190 -3.06243 -3.02230 -2.98480 -2.943811 7 -3.25213 13 22520 3.19167 309868 3 07017 -3.02041 -3.0"34 -3.06029 -3.02095 -2ýM35 
8 -2.98589 -3.25690 -3.2225 
-ý'l Z26: 
0 Ul 743 - 3A 
Z8 3.0 ý54 -3.06550 -3.02454 /A 
- . 23918 -3.205'740 
I-wl 
17484 - 3 -3.13712 -3.10784 
1 -3.04773 -3.0"32 1-3.04371 
1-3.00115 N/A 
WIA '-alM 6 -3.10828 
1-3.07447 
-3.04388 
1-3.03647 N/ N/A NII/A -3.23502 
J--iiý1415--3.17674, I 
SIC: Schwarz lifformation Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Demand Jae 
Uplift Lags 0 1112 314_15161718191 10 
0 -3.00724 -2.98984 -2.94356 '-2.88348 -2.82235 , -2.76739 -2.72435 -2.70478 -2.64581 -2.58IN7 -2.51545 
1 
2 09019 
3 10073 : 
3.05248 
_ 
-3.07894 
-3.02803 
-3.02238 
-2.97468 
-2.96079 -2.90279 
-2.91155 
t 
. 2.85242 
-2.85495 
-2.80411 
-2.81441 
-2.76297 
--- 9 
-2.74803 
695i4 - 
-2. 
- 
-2-68758 -2.61928 
-2.63071 -2.56097 
-3.06570 
i 
. 0ý572 - 2572 -2.98821 - 2.93267 -2.86855 -2.81085 -2.76198 -2.71893 , -2.65031 
F2.58601 
-2.51672 
4 -3.08140 -3.003526 ; ; - 9098 , 
2.92798 2.86302 1 -2.80689 -2.751531 - -2.71525 2 64545 - -2L. 
57898 2 50720 : 
5 5 -305269 
i. 49 i gi i 98 i gi 988 18 2 95467 2 -2.89020 -2.82630 1 -2.76733 -2.710161 519 -2.6661 9 
159. 1 IZ ý 
2ý45422 
6 -2.99378 -2.94012 -2.89329 
81 -2.82800 -2.76289 1 -2.70148 
1-2-643 
- - -2-60264 -2.53035 -2.46024 -2.38616 7 -3.00958 -2.94659 . 2.88 
1 
6061 J-2.5 9 56061 282570 270187 1 -2.6420 -2.60739 - 
7,5 -2.53572 -2.46330 -2.38713 
8 
31 
2.95137 -2.88696 -2.82663 276 62 -2.70084 -2.6258 56659 
1-2 5 59 . 56659 . 
5093 
_-2.5 . 
5409 -2.46688 -2.39467 N/A 
1.46 
- -- - 9 -2.90364 , -2.83977 -2.77803 5197_; 
1.264805 1 -2.55578 -2.51975 -2 75 -2.48606 06 . 4860 2 40993 
N/A - N/A 1 
-2.86905 -2.8 -2.74865 -2 6 85 2.61633 -2.54990 1 -2.48622 1 -2 . 
44 525 
ý 
N/ ,A NIA 
I N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5% significance level, 1.96; 10% significance level, 1.645. 
UpUft Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0 
I 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
to 
Deman ags 1 
01 ý2 3141516ý7891 10 j 
-0.09934 1 -1.34230 ; -0.74538 -0.72708 10.19560 0.18530 
ý 0.17018 0.20187 0.20074 ' 0.10671 ý 
0.42156 0.43265 0.43057 0.444011 0 4f41; 18 0.08580 0.24276 0.39919 043076 0.45005 0.43868 
0.5ý171 0 0.54402 0.55662 0.55334 0. -54966 0.54746 0.25210 
ý. iýl; ý7 
0 0127 -ý. -56731- 
559311 
0.36265 0 0.62061 1 0.60667 0.59446 0.57931 0.59076 0.58729 0.58472 58, . 46331 
i. 561 0.58768 -0 - iýS 68 
0.5 6 
340 0.53903 0.52557 0.53691 0.53377 0.53177 0.53226 
04 isq 
0 
68 
2]ý6 
4 
0.34762 0.43513 
[0.52197 
1 0.54470 0.55 
u0 
0 
u` 
4 57 0.44750 0.462 0.25756 0.33122 0.41898 10.43820 1 (A6302 0.52 92 0.46013 0.45922 0.46051 
0.22609 0.30194 0.39008 0.41173 0.43620,0.43050 0.423181 0.42988 0.42735 0.42783 0.42949 
5 0.33330 0.36373 1 0.42267 1 0.46457 , 0.438 18 j 0.42942 
10.43050 ý 0.50480 : 0.0385 0.50296 1 0.50110 
u 0.36426 0.39134 0.43742 1--6.47125 10.46183 0.49650 0.49078 ý 0.51086 0.0862 0.. 50935 N/A N/A 
500 
1 
0 
0 
0.44-553 0.49837 0.35503 0.39226- 0.4.3715 ý-i-45462 0.48382 , 0.50285 0.13 
/A N/A 0A9837 N/A 
LO N 
-49837 
. 3664 
---- V6.44842 10.43945 0.50877 Q cm '16 L 0.51634 0.32649 i0-7 10.52625 _. 
50877 N/A N/A N/A 
0 i 
-0.09934 -1.34230 
IA 1 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 
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Table 14: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-demand regressions. 
Section 3: Third MIMIC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
112 
-3.61898 1 -3.58713 
-3.61141 -3.59077 1 -3.55849 
-3.62311 -3.59905 
1-3.56738 
-3.59565 -3.57010 
Demand la 
31415161718 
-3.59283 3.56865 -3.53682 -3.51837 -3.50367 -3.52666 
-3.56371 
-3.53717 
-3.5052 3.46855 -3.49389 
91 10 
-3.49099 -3.48216 
-3.45695 -3.44763 1 
-3.57748 , -3.55150 -3.51667 -3.49129 
: 
-3.47813 
1 
-3.49254 
ý 
-3.45503 -3.43308 1 
-3.53752 -3.55063 -3.52296 -3.48767 -3.46454 -_3.45395 
1 
-i. 47 04J -3.43S53 -3.40830 
-3.59276 ý -3.56707 -153278ý -3.54141 -3.51195 1 -3.47599 -3.44975 ý -3.43122 1 -3.457311 -3.41855 -3.39218 
-3.58132 -3.55265 -3.51792 1 -3.52007 -3.49056 -3.45361 427245 -3ý. 
41151 1-3.42802 1-3.38921 
-3.35976 
-3.58692 -3.55828 -3.522556 -3.53019 3.50497 
1 
-3.467! . 44380 -3-421559 - --3- 
,I. ýq 
05 
463. 
" 
-ý9 
3 -3.55186 -3.22257 -3.448617 -3.49325 -3.46822 -3.430- .47 -3-38694 -3.41888 -3.37714 . 33912 
8 11 3.49 -3-54541 -3.51910 3.482.11 -3.49524 347584 -3.43651 3.41103ý -3.3903]88 -3.42815 
1 
-3.38564 NVA 
9 
349 -3.37754 
1-3-41555 1 N/A N/A 
_-3. .; 
ý5179 
-3.4114( 9 
3.48709 1 -3.45533 1-3.422511 -3.43880 
1-3.41238 1-3.37143 1-3.35197 1-3.33548 1 N/A I N/A I N/A 
SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
-3.50523 
-3.48955 
-3.43435 -3.38070 
1 -3.31966 1 -3.30393 1 -3.24705 
-3.40337 -3.34921 3 28609 
ý4ýý9_j 
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Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Demand lazi 
1.645. 
IF2 1 
_3 
141.5 16171819 10 
-0.21227 -0.09385 -0.82767 -0.02870 0.01249 -0.002041 
0.01558 0.01386 1 -0.02215 -0.02967 -0.01394 
-0.2 O*g542 -0.07177 -0.01780 
0.01692 0.00108 0.01755 0.01506 -0 02018 -0 02 91 
t 
' 
-- .t- --- --3-O. 
(W808 1287 1- 
-o. 34518 -6.22914 _-0. _20280 
j -0.15330 ý -0.11703 
ý -0.14993 
4.09962 *ý 
-0.10818 i -0.1-2-577 
ý 
-0ý 12145 , -0.09300 
-0.30M3 -0.199iý -0.17734 [; -0.11644 
-6.08513 0.08875 
-- 
0.059-« -0.06258 -0.07124 -O. (M976 ý -0.515 25 
0.08149 -0.055481-0.058661-0.06712 -0.06232 -0.04278 -0. -0.16351 
1-0.10626 
-0.07780 
-0.0.07143 ý 0.08165 ' 0.03664 i 0.47634 i 0.05349 i -0.01422 
j 0.01%8 0.04700 , 
0.04329 
-0.04653 
10.03730 0.03803 0.07386 0.11816 ; 0.11059 0.14363 0.15186 0.11389 0.11025 0.11165 
0.76108 1 0.03706 , 0.03800 0.07317 0.11926 0' 11174 0.1401 
10.15332 0.11301 0.11009 ý 0.11118 
-0.117896 
ý 
-0.08255 0.07648 
* 
-0.04973 
1-0 00281 -0.00197 
ý 
0.0316 
-6--0.03819 
ý 
-0.00565 
1-0.00959 
ý 
N/A i 
-0.3( 4.20446 i -0.9153 -0.17529 - 
j11822 
-0.11815 -0.10663 -0.10523 -0.161631 N/A 1 N/A 
,11t-1---- 
-0.30042 ý -0.29112 -0.9 
93 -0.21005 
ý-0.15021 
-0.14903 -0.12417 1 -0.07557 j NJA 
L N/A 1 
Demand lap 
23141516718191 10 
-3.51281 -3.45357 -3.43153 
1 -3.3792.54 -3.31896 -3.27167 1 -3.22775, -3.22113 
1_-3.15544 -3.11619 
-3.45721 -3. 
Y9719 
-3.374321 -3.31931 -3.25852 -3.20944 -3.16301 
1-3.15835 ý 
-3.9098 3*05081 09 8 
. 12657 
-- - C5822 
-3A049 -3.43776 3.377991 -3.35962 -3.30480 -3.24076 -3.18576 -3.14259 -3 7 -3.9 
3, oq7f4:! 5 
-3.38070 3.31966 -3.30393 -3.24705 1 -3.18214 -3.12900 -3.08798 
--3.0-7722-ý 3.00745 -2.94850 
8 99 295876 -3.34921 -3.28609 -3.26549 -3.20642 -3.14044 -3.08378 -303440 -3.02922 '2.876 -2.90023 
-- 
-2.89726- -24W -146822 
- 
-2. -3.305-96 -3.24200 -3.21454 -3.15501 -3.08764 -3.0304 
726 
- -2.83519 t--!!? --I---i 178 1 -2.89222 -2.82301 -3.28236 1 -3.21703 -3.19464 1 
M-3-3.07115 
-3.01572 -2.96. "0 -2.965 8912-- 
-2.91704 
1 
-3.15063 -3.12728 
1-3.07141 -3.00239 1 -2.94597 -2.89499 2.89432 -2.81948 -2.74790 
-3.18355 -3.11614 
1-3.09843 * 
-3.04775 - -2 91908 -2 * 86931 -2-87049 -2 * 79442 N/A 
-3.13221 
1-3l.; 
-3.0-ý2 -2.99180 -2.91951 -ý. 86893 2.81988 2.82,432 N/A 
- 6& 489i 
4ý 43 _2.97901 99 . 97901 -2.92043 -2.8468 
N/A NGA -3.05852 
ý 
-2.99443 -2 7 -2.79431 - -2.74426ý 
N/A 
279 
Table 14: Interactive variable analvsis - Multivariate uplift-demand regressions. 
Section 4: Fourth MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
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SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is miuinial). 
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Table 14: Interactive variable analvsis - Multivariate uplift-demand regressions. 
Section 5: Fifth MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Infon-nation Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
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SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optimal value is minimal). 
Demand la gs 
Uplift Lags 0 1 2 13 14 5 16 17 18 19 1 10 
0 -2.86183 -2.80478 - -2 
77725 ' -2*72: 220 -2 70QI * -2.04569 
! -2.58243 1 -2.52089 1 -2.46734 -2.40155 1 -2.343-58 
I -2.8MI -2.82OC6 8 -;. 
78243 
-IMIS 
7029 
-2 -2.65407_ 
ý_-2.59104_ý 
-2.52576 -2.46653 -2.40071 - 
i 
-2.3390 
-3 
2 -2.86791 -2.83426 9 :9 -2.77962 -2.72736 -2.72580 -2.66569 -2.60111 1 -2.53509 1 -2.48460 -2.41626 -2. 
M68 
3 
M 
-2.81121 -2*78077 -2 72232 -2.66648 -2.66276 -2.60088 
1 -2.53530 -2.46823 
W3 
t 
ý 
-2.41642 -2.34709 -2.28. " 1 
4 -2.82376 - -- -2.79493 -- -2.72206 
-2.65832 -2.63326 --- 
-2.57372 
---- - 
-2.50623 -2.41 3784 
4 
-2.38292 - -2.31202 -2.25882 
11 
5 9 -2.86396 -2.82796 -- -2.7700 
1 
-- 
-2 70839 -. -2.66881 --- 
-2.61099 --- 
1 173 07 -2.54290 -2. _17307 . -2.42160 
-2 -2.295171 
6 -2.825641 
I 
- 2.76903 - 2.70330 -2.65317 -2.59919 -2.53114 -2.4590 
2 -2.41282 -2 -2.28814 
812(9 1 04 -2 -2ýý76044 
4ý02 
2 "2*7ý26 -2.63578 63 1 -2.58504 2585 O 4 -2.53155 2. ' -2.46299 -2.3910 6 
34033 2 -2. -2.2 352 . - 'I '7A7 74722 2 -2.69406 -2.63511 5 -2.56713 
2.5f ýij -2.51521 
ý 
2. -2.46111 -2.39096 -2.3176 
1 
2 
: 
2.26544 
- -- -2.1 
N 
9 
. 
-2 71953 67191 -2 -2.60565 I -2. 
ý53668 
2 _i. 485 
ý 
E 
. 
2. -48520-j 
T 
_2.4 -2.43950 
j 
-2.36610 -2.29218 
- 
-2- . 2275 N/A N/A ,. 
-2.65229 
. 
-2.60329 _0 
- 
-2.53582 
-: 
-2.46571 465 . 41292 _2_ -2.41292 
ý ;. 39666 -2. -2.29128 -2.21614 i N/A N/A N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5li) significance level, 1.96ý 10% significance level, 1.645. 1- 
Uklift Lags 
Demand Is 
261 .718191 
10 
--- ," --, " . "" 1ý , -Qýdl 
aKý. mil ý AýK141 In 'u. 1itic in Q11 
0.62381 
t 
0.5977S I O. MIN71 J U. 60U00 V. Dak) //11". ". ,-I ---, 1 --. 
1, , 
---, 
- 
ý0.5738 0.54666 0.4862-2 1 0.67860 
10.74190 0.56541 3 10.55756 1 0.55255 1 0.62968 
1 0.62881 
0.82382 
il 0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0.68449 ý 
ib alý;; ü 
ý 0.17407 ý 0.18312 10.17730 10.16652 10.26406 10.26537 j 0.32840 --7- 
:: l 
0.45475 10.33952 10.41749 10.45918 10.19394 1 0.19493_1_0.18566 10.17905 10.27331 ý 0.27785 ý 0.33845 
A 81 0ý319 5 23761TO. 23899 0.32101 i-1-8 55 : j. ýý1507- -il-6 
FO i 0. [*1 88 0.14786 
. M150 0.15 8 
0.1! 228 0.5 16 52 
FO, 2 
0 -10 
0.4 9KA. 31451 I 0.442MFO. To-335 10.25435 0.24770 
M62 16.34499 0.35072 0.43 0-5 4222i 0.25 
20 0.32561 0.25758 044 0.24274 0.35824 0.36532 4 57 0,39418 0 "25902 
0.0,59. 03824 )ý4i34 - VV92- 32 6. ' 29614 0.28792 0.38129 0.39000 
ý (0 
0.31774 0.24296 6. h6646 
10.38763 
0 i77 9 
_. _ 
45 0* 14 0, 
-8 
6TC 
5.99 0 27617 0.30929 0.30M5 0.2 4 i775 92 29149 0.37752 0.38770 
0 
0.32351 0.24259 0 37522 0.: ýi 0.2761 0 N/A 
1 0.34746 0.39826 0.39311 0.37775 N/A 
C 
ýC 
0.47377 0.38814 0.44827 0.45940 0.43022 N/A 746 c 3777 0* 43 2 
e010 
4 474 
4538 /A 
'7 
0.46839 0.38629 0.44567 0 . 45794 0.3,4538 
0.39856 0.39322 0.37863 N 
281 
Table 14: Interactive variable analysis - Multivariate uplift-demand regressions. 
Section 6: Sixth MMC reference. 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (Optirnal value is minimal). 
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SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion (Optinial value is inininial). 
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1 -0.76167 ' -0.71116 -0 6476 -0.6Ö4Ö3ý -0.53724 -0.47387 -0.40937 -0.34288 
4 ()8 -0.86347 
L6. ý-0.81509 
-0.82928 
1.0 765 16 1 -0.70231 
ý -0.64557 -0.60131 -0.53307 0 -0.46863 0.39929: -0.32852 
Mmt? 4193 -U. 974U7 9 -0.96678 -0.90159 -0.85987 
ý 4m459 
-0.75674 -0.68960 ý -0.62181 -0.55327 -0.47971 
6 -0.98420 -0.93393 1 -0.91977 -0.85371 , -0.80691 
: -0.77775 -0.72293 -0.65234 
, 0.58533 -0-5 1589 1 -0.44106 - 7 -1.02700 64871 -0.9 21 -0.95119 -0.884 ý2 
1-0.79424 '- 0.83160 ) * -0.72622 89 -0.66849 
1-0.542 
-0.61190 94 
ý 
-0.4 
1 
1 6670 
1 
8 - -0.898471 -0.88493 
1 
- -0.81676 -0. 
7 271 1-0.72361 -0.65421 7; 6, -0.59765 -0.53707 -0.46720 1 N/A 1 
9 -0.89963 
ý -0.835821 
-0.81688 -0.74738 -0.69252 -0.65222 -0.58136 ' -0.52402 -0.46084 N/A /A 
10 -0. 
M709 1 
-0.79307 
1 
-0.77836 
1 9 -0.70749 -0218 
1 
-0.59840 
j 
-0.525,7-5 -0 , 46175 
1 NIA 1 N/A 
+ 
N/A 
Dummy T-Ratio: 5116 significance level, I. W 10% Significance lcvcl, 1.645. 
Uplift Lags 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
N/A 
10 
0.11478 0.43700 ý 0.40418 , 
0.43745 0.44142 0.42778 0.53965 0.53630 0.51494 0.55244 0.62442 
0.26929 1 0.43512 0.40429 1 0.43620 0.44045 0.42689 0.538 0.53494 0.51351 1 0.55032 0.62364 
0.36436 0.41373 0.41737 0.39812 0.5175 0.51336 0.47742 0.40483 0.48763 0.51491 0.58285 
0.44542 0.42746 0 54200 0 53769 0.44965 0.53863 -6.431-64 -"-505 -6.44854 
10.52693 0.59286 
-- -0 
. 50560 
-6.46652 - 0.46162 0.54372 0.44428 10.44103 0.43301 0.39395 0.50939 0.48184 . 51817 _10 0.19303 ! 0.26663 10.19599 ý 0.19533 0.15667 , 0.16910 ý 0.19335 1 0.18781 1 0.16054 10.18522 ý 0.17982 
0.06473 11 0 14000 ' ü8965 0.08910 
' 0.06.562 1 0.05896 ý 0.13468 0.13313 0.09749 0.12337 i 0.13027 
-0.1032 600 -A -(). 11086 , -0.125811 -0.12385 
1 
-0.07967 1 -0.12394 -0.20658 -0.17661 -0.17830 
()0 9«4)2196 
i --- 
-0.07482 -0.05443 -0.1 -O. ION8. i -U. 1 IDUU 1 -U. 15: 013 ý -U. IUO?; O -u. zzu-s9 ý -0.18685 
-0.16507 1 -0.14990 1 -0.20039 1 -0.19418 -0.21181 -0.19264 1 -0.14127 -0.26634 1 -0.189U7 I .. - --- -t- --- ý- 0.04461 1 0.06401 1 0.03166 10.03083 ] -0.006X7 ý -0.00788 ý 0.03341 1 -0.09615 1_ N/A 
-0.76396 
ý 
-0.73158 
-0.86140 -0.82790 
-0.83746 0.80268 
-0.85909 1 -0.82047 
-0.12821 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
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Table 15: Rggression Results: Interactive variable analysis. 
Section 1: Univariate price analysis. 
Regression 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Serial Correlation 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Functional Form Normality HISced/Arch 
Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
Pass Pass Pass/P ss 
Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass Fail Fail/Pass 
Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
Section 2: Univariate uplift analysis. 
Regression 
11 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Serial Correlation 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Functional Form 
Fail Pass/Pass 
Pass/Pass 
Normalq H'S ced LA ELbý 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Section 3: Multivariate uplift-price analysis. 
LRegression 
F -, 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Serial Correlation 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Fail 
Pass 
Functional Form 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Pass 
Section 4: Multivariate uplift-demand analysis. 
Pass 
Pass 
Fail 
Fail 
Fail 
Normality 
Pass 
Pass 
Fail 
Fail 
Pass 
Fail 
Pass/Pass 
Pass/Pass 
Fail/Pass 
Pass/Pass 
H'Sced/Arch 
Pass/Pass 
Pass/Pass 
Pass/Pass 
Pass/Pass 
PasslPass 
Pass/Pass 
Regression Serial Correlation Functio al Form Normality H'Sced/Arch 
I Fail Pass Fail PasslPass 
2 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
3 Pass Pass 
7 F 
Pass Pass/Pass 
4 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
5 Pass Fail Fail Pass/Pass 
6 Pass P ass Fail Pass/Pass 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared 
Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
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Table 16: DF and ADF tests for the existgnce of stationarltv 
Pool Purchase Price (Log). 
Dickg--Fuller test for unit roots. 
1886 observations from 2 to 1887. 
Calculated value (without trend) -14.4835 Critical value -2.8636 
Calculated value (with trend) -14.4900 Critical value -3.4147 
AugLnented Micke -Fuller test for unit roots. 
1885 observations from 3 to 1887. 
Calculated value (without trend) -14,7661 Critical value -2.8636 
Calculated value (with trend) -14.7732 Critical value -3,4147 
Electricity Demand (Log). 
Unit root tests for residuals 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots. 
1886 observations from 2 to 1887. 
Calculated value (without trend) -15.0834 Critical value -2.8636 
Calculated value (with trend) -15.0792 Critical value -3.4147 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots. 
1885 observations from 3 to 1887. 
Calculated value (without trend) -18.0898 Critical value -2.8636 
Calculated value (with trend) -14.0850 Critical value -3.4147 
Uplift (Loa). 
Unit root tests for residuals 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots. 
1886 observations from 2 to 1887. 
Calculated value (without trend) -14.9705 Critical value -2.8636 
Calculated value (with trend) -15.6811 Critical value -3.4147 
AugMented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots. 
1885 observations from 3 to 1887. 
Calculated value (without trend) -14.5587 Critical value -2.8636 
Calculated value (with trend) -15.3364 Critical value -3.4147 
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Table 17: Assessine the existme of trends. 
Pool Purchase Price (Lop). 
Unrestricted Residual Sum of Squares: 50.6900 
Restricted Residual Sum of Squares: 56.5721 
DF F-test calculated value: 109.0980 
DF F-test critical value: 6.2500 
The significance of the coefficient on the parameter of the lagged dependent variable permits the 
utilisation of the standard t-test to conclude the analysis. This allows us to conclude that the pool 
purchase price data contains an insignificant deterministic trend. 
Note: of all the standard diagnostic tests, the only one passed by both the restricted and unrestricted 
models is that for ftinctional form. 
Electricity Demand (Logy). 
Unrestricted Residual Sum of Squares: 15.6266 
Restricted Residual Sum of Squares: 18.3438 
DF F-test calculated value: 163.5530 
DF F-test critical value: 6.2500 
The significance of the coefficient on the parameter of the lagged dependent variable permits the 
utilisation of the standard t-test to conclude the analysis. This allows us to conclude that the electricity 
demand data contains an insignificant deterministic trend. 
Note: both sets of regressions fail all of the standard diagnostic tests. 
Uplift (LoM. 
Unrestricted Residual Sum of Squares: 174.1268 
Restricted Residual Sum of Squares: 195.9006 
DF F-test calculated value: 117.5625 
DF F-test critical value: 6.2500 
The significance of the coefficient on the parameter of the lagged dependent variable permits the 
utilisation of the standard West to conclude the analysis. This allows us to conclude that the uplift data 
contains a significant deterministic trend. 
Note: both sets of regressions fail all of the standard diagnostic tests. 
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Table 18: Cointegration analysis 
In all cases, the validity of the null hypothesis in Step One of the Engle-Granger two-step procedure 
has been established: 
Section 1. PPP-Demand analyses. 
Stage 1: Critical value (CRDW, 5%) = 0.386 Critical value (CRDW, 10%) = 0.322 
Calculated value = 1.9804 
Staae 2: 
Critical value (5%) = 3.17 Critical value (10%) = 2.84 
Calculated value = -13.0975 
We may therefore conclude that PPP and demand are cointegrated. 
Section 2. Uplift-PPP analyses. 
Stage 1: Critical value (CRDW, 5%) = 0.386 Critical value (CRDW, 10%) = 0,322 
Calculated value = 1.9524 
Stage 2: Critical value (5016) = 3.17 Critical value (I O'Yo) = 2.84 
Calculated value =- 14.63 54 
We may therefore conclude that Uplift and PPP are cointegrated. 
Section 3. Uplift-Demand analyses. 
Stap-e 1: Critical value (CRDW, 5%) = 0.386 Critical value (CRDW, 10%) = 0.322 
Calculated value = 1.9524 
Stage 2: Critical value (5%) = 3.17 Critical value (10'/'o) = 2.84 
Calculated value =- 15.8342 
We may therefore conclude that Uplift and demand are cointegrated. 
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CHAPTER V1. APPENDIX. 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
Section 1. Pool purchase price. 
A PPPI =a+PI PPPI-I +P2A PPPI-I +A PPPI-2 + Ut 
Unit root tests for residuals 
1884 observations from 4 to 1887. 
DF test. 
Calculated value = -44.3999 Critical value = 4.4371 
ADF test. 
Calculated value = -31.9289 Critical value = -4.4371 
Section 2. Electricity demand. 
A ED, = a +Y1ED, -i+Y2AEDt-I+Y36ýEDt-2+UI 
Unit root tests for residuals 
1894 observations from 4 to 1887. 
DF test. 
Calculated value = -43.4579 Critical value = -3.3409 
ADF test. 
Calculated value = -34.0294 Critical value = -3.3409 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
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Table 2. PoOl Purchase price as a function of demand w/ dummv variable representinLy flrst set 
Of contracts. 
PPA ý cc + ý. o EA + Ai DUMWA + u, (2.4) 
DUMMYA possesses the value of zero from lst October 1990 to 22nd March 1991, and the 
value of one thereafter. 
1887 observations from I to 1887. 
Dummy Statistics 
Coefficient 
0.22741 
Standard Error 
0.020672 
Diagnostic Results 
T-Ratio [Prob. ] 
11.0007[. 0001 
S. C. R. F. F. N. R. H. S. ARCH Stat. 
Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
S. C. R. 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values), 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
Fail I Fail I Fail I Fail I Fail I Pass 
F. F. N. R. H. S. ARCH Stat. 
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Table 3. Pool purchase price as a function of demand w/ dummy variable rearesentine secon 
Set of contracts. 
PPA ý cl +Xo EA +XiD UMAfYB, (2.5) 
DUMMYB posmses the value of zero from Ist October 1990 to 31st March 1993, and the value 
of one thereafter. 
1887 observations from I to 1887. 
Dummy Statistics 
Coefficient 
0.04394 
Standard Error 
0.011988 
Diagnostic Results 
T-Ratio [Prob. ] 
3.6555[. 0001 
S. C. R. F. F. N. R. H. S. ARCH Stat. 
Fail 
I 
Fail 
I 
Fail Fail_ Fail 
] 
Pass 
S. C. R. 
Serial Correlation - Serial CorTelation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
Fail 
F. F. 
Fail 
N. R. 
Fail 
H. S. 
Fail 
ARCH 
Fail 
Stat. 
Pass 
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Table 4. Pool purchase price as a function of demand w/ both dummies present. 
ppp, =a +A o ED, +AiD UMA4YA +A 2D UMAffB, + U, 
1887 observations from I to 1887. 
Dummy Statistics 
Coefficient 
DUMMYA: 0.22067 
DUMMYB: 0.00232 
Diagnostic Results 
Standard Error 
0.021876 
1 0.012341 
T-Ratio [Prob. ] 
10.3343[. 0001 
0.18780[. 8511 
S. C. F. F. N. R. H. S. ARCH Stat 
Fail Fail 
I 
Fail 
I 
Fail 
I 
Fail 
S. C. R. 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
Fail 
F. F. 
Fail 
N. R. 
Fail 
H. S. 
Fail 
ARCH 
Fail 
Stat. 
Pass 
(2.6) 
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Table 5. The dynamic regression with the flrst dummy variable. 
APPP, =a +), or +AiED, +X2ED,. i +X3PPPI-I +X4DUMA4YA-i+u, (2-8) 
1886 observations from 2 to 1887. 
Dummy Statistics 
Coefricient 
0.03536 
Standard Error 
0.013472 
Diagnostic Results 
T-Ratio [Prob. ' 
2.62460[009jý 2.62460[. 009] 
I 
S. C. R. F. F. N. R. H. S. ARCH Stat. 
Pass Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
S. C. R. 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewmess and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
Pass 
F. F. 
Fail 
N. R. 
Fail 
H. S. 
Fail 
ARCH 
Fail 
stat. 
Pass 
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Table 6. Thedvuamic regression with the sgond dummy variable. 
A PPP, =a++ Xi ED, +)62 EA-i +; L3 PPPI-I + X4 DUMAIYB, -j 
+ u, (2.9) 
1886 observations from 2 to 1887. 
Dummy Statistics 
Coefficient 
ý 0.01431 1 
Standard Error 
0.012667 
Diagnostic Results 
T-Ratio_[Prob. ] 
1.13000[. 2591 
S. C. R- F. F. N. R. H. S. ARCH Stat. 
Pass Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
S. C. R- 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
Pass 
F. F. 
Fail 
N. R. 
Fail 
H. S. 
Fail 
ARCH 
Fail 
Stat. 
Pass 
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Table 7. The dvnamic regression with both dummies present. 
PPA ýa+, 4 'r +)Li EA+ ý, 2 ED, -j 
+ X3 PPA-j + X4 DUMAffA-j + X. 5 DUMAffB,. j + u, 
(2.10) 
1886 observations from 2 to 1886. 
Dummy Statistics 
Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio lProb. ] 
DUMMYA: 0.04463 0.014187 3.14600[. 000] 
DUMMYB: 0.02756 0.013220 2.06880[. 851] 
Diagnostic Results 
S. C. R. 
Pass 
F. F. 
Fail 
N. R. 
Fail 
H. S. 
Fail 
ARCH 
Fail 
Stat. 
Pass 
Serial Correlation - Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form - Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality - Nonnality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H'sced. - Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values). 
ARCH - Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
All regressions passed the relevant unit root tests for stationarity. 
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Table 8: Diap-nostic test results of additional price-demand regressions. 
Obs. Rang 
150-250 
325-425 
350-450 
425-525 
600-700 
700-800 
775-875 
875-975 
925-1025 
1000-1100 
1150-1250 
1200-1300 ý 
1500-1600 
1550-1650 
1575-1675 
1575-1675 
1700-1800 
1700-1800 
1715-1815 
1750-1850 
1770-1870 
1778-1878 
1787-1887 
S. C. R. 
F. F. 
N. R. 
H. S. 
ARCH 
Stat. 
V. D. T. 
Dummy I S. C. R. I F. F. I N. R. I H. S. I ARCH I Stat. I D. T. 
A Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass 
B Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
c Fail Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
D Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
E Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
F Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
* Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
* Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass 
I Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass Fail 
i Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Fail 
K Fail Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass Fail 
L Fail Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass Fail 
m Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
N Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
0 Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
P Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
Q Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
R Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
S Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
T Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
* Pass Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass Fail 
* Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
w Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail 
Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values) 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
Stationarity (Unit Root Tests for Residuals) 
Variable Deletion Test ("Pass" indicates that the variable cannot be deleted) 
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CHAPTER VII, APPENDIX. 
Table 1: Market Model Results -National Powe 
Event I. - Break up of first set of CFDs. 
Regressor I Coefficient I Standard Error I T-Ratio[irob 
CONSTANT 
DLFTSE 
DUMMVI 
0.00471 0.0046 1.0226[. 31 j 
2.7968(. 0081 
-2.0888[. 042j 
0.61328 
-0.01174 
Event 2: Price spikes begin. 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
DLFTSE 
DUMMY2 
Coefricient 
0.00158 
0.75639 
-0.00329 
0.21928 
0.00562 
Standard Error 
0.00156 
0.16083 
0.00256 
T-RatiolProb] 
1.0115[. 3171 
4.7030[. 0001 
-1-2834L206L 
Event 3: First nool nrice review be2ins with MMC threat. 
Fý Rr 
ýes Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probl 
0 ONST T c0NST! Aý 
ýNT 
0.00 027 0.0015 0.17885[. 8 9j 
L DLFTSE 1 0.55362 0.21264 
1 
2.6036[01L]ý 
0.00371 24) -0.80556[. 42 ) 
mvent 4. rjrst pooi price review puujjsneu. 
Regressor I Coefficient Standard Ei Irobl 
CONSTANT -0.00066 0.00155 -0.42717[. 671) 
DLFTSE 0.65929 0.11737 5.6172(. 0001 
DUMMY4 -0.00431 0.004 -1.0780[. 2961 
Event 5: Electricity price controls published. 
Regressor I Coefficient I Sýandard Error T-RatiolProb] 
CONSTANT -0.00034 0.00224 -0.15211[. 8803 
DLFTSE 1.0142 0.33758 3.0043[. 004] 
DUMMY5 -0.01054 0.00386 
Event 6: DGES to examine excessive electricity proflts. 
Regress r 
CONSTANT 
DLFTSE 
DUMMY6 
Coefficient 
0.00431 
0.69154 
-0.00261 
Standard Error I T-R'AtAio Prob) 
0.00191 1 2.2528[. 0291 
0.22089 :L3.1306[. 003] 
0.004 j -0.0ý. 517ý 
Event 7: Generators threatened with MMC reference. 
Regressor I Coefficient I Standard Error T-RatiolProbi 
CONSTANT 0.00136 0.0 232 0.58813[. 559] 
DLFTSE 0.33338 0.24901 1.3388[, 1871 
DUMMY7 0.00213 0.0037 1 0.57524L568 
295 
Event 8: OXers suggests reRulatory change 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 
DLFTSE 
DUMMYS 
Event 9: DGES to probe power price rises. 
T-RatiolProb) 
0.26398[. 793] 
1.7261[. 09 ] 
-0.39688[. 6931 
ýRegressor 
Coefficient Standard Error T-RatiolProbi 
CONSTANT 
5 E 
0.00139 0.00224 0.62265[. 5391 
DLFTSE 0.26261 0.24783 
D UMMY9 -nnnAAa 
0.00057 
0.39718 
-0.00262 
0.00214 
0.23011 
0.00661 
Event 10: Second pool price review launched. 
Regressor 
0.00024 F-0.0 03-J 9 
0.178 
Coefficlent Standard Error 
CONSTANT 
DLFTSE 
I DUMMY 0 
0.40937 
0.00394 0.00711 
T-RatiolProbf 
0.074597[. 941] 
2.2998[. 026] 
0.55367L582] 
Event 11: Commons to revise sale of generators. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.00053 0.00269 0.19 93[. 844] 
DLFTSE 0.58822 0.19103 3.0792[. 003] 
DUMMY11 0.0009 0.00493 0.18333[. 8551 
Event 12: Second pool price review published . 
Regressor I Coefficient I Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.00194 0.00204 0.95334[. 3451 
DLFTSE 0.93383 0.33692 2.7717[. 0081 
DUMMY12 -0.00696 0.00864 -0.80596[. 424) 
Event 13: DGES seeking additional power over gene ators. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-RatiolProbi 
CONSTANT 0.0035 0.00208 1,6825[. 099] 
DLFTSE 0.53623 0.29085 1.8437 071 0 
DUMMY13 -0.00181 0.00322 -0.561331[ 577 
Event 14; DGES tells generators to sell surplus plants. 
Regressor I Coefficient Standard ErrorTT-Ratio[Probl 
CONSTANT 0.00322 0.00179 1.8021[. 078] 
DLF]PSE 0.81862 0.25397 3.2233[. 0021 
DUMMY14 -0.00321 0.00571 -0.56253[. 576] 
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Event 15. of second set of CFDs. 
Regressor 
0.00024 0.00164 
0.22245 1 
Coefficient Standard Error 
L4ýONSTANT 
DLFTSE 
DUMMY15 
0.86321 
0.00707 
Event 16: Generators 
0.00665 
T-Ratio[Prob) 
0.14555[. 885) 
3.8805[. 000] 
1.0636[. 2931 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probj 
CONSTANT 
a 
0.00155 0.0017 0.91335[36ýjj 
DLFTSE 1.1498 0.25317 
DUMMYD n nn7) I 
Event 17: MMC reference and/or plant sales threatened. 
R- egresss r or T Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probj 
CONSTANT 
* 
-0.00061 0.00126 -0.48546[. 6301 
DLFTSE 0.76549 0.24886 
DUMMY17 -A An'740 
Event 18: MMC reference unless agreement made. 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
DLFrSE 
DUMMY18 I 
Coefficient 
ý- 0 0-0042 
1.4081 
0.007 
Standard Error 
0.00206 
0.32458 
0.00579 
T-RatiolProb] 
0.20648[. 837] 
4.3383[. 0001 
1.2104[. 2321 
Event 19: Rev ised bidding system drives poo prices down. 
Regressor lCoefficient I Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.00123 0.00234 0.52856[. 600] 
DLMPSE 1.2692 9 0.36284 =34ýET 0 0 1 1 
DUMMY19 0.00278 2j[. 31 6 7 0.00654 0.425 
Event 20. - NP and PG establish Price acreement. 
Regressor lCoefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Probj 
CONSTANT -0.00027 0.00213 -0.12577[, 900] 
DLFTSE 0.85607 0.21938 3.9021[. 000] 
DUMMY20 0.0159 0.01231 1.2916[. 2031 
Event 21: Reports indicate a tougher stance from DGES. 
Regressor lCoefricient Standard Error T-RatiolProb) 
CONSTANT -0.0005 0.00222 -0.22717[. 821] 
DLFTSE 0.88089 0.21135 4.1679[. 0001 
DUMMY21 -0.00379 0.00431 -0.87767[. 384] 
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Event 22: DGES to encourage break-up of Nuclear Electric. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probi 
CONSTANT 
5 k 
0.00088 0.0017 0.51589[60ý4 
DLFFSE 1.2103 0.18247 
DUMMY2 -n nn I) 
Event 23- Generators warned on Want disposals. 
[ýý Coefflcient Stan ard Err rI T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.00066 0,00134 0.49293f. 624) 
DLFTSE 0.90408 0.15434 5,8577[. 000 
1 
DUMMY23 -0.00862 -1.0133[. 316] 0.00851 
Event 24: Trafalgar House bids for Nortbern Electric 
Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Probl 
CONSTANT -0.00036 0.00148 -0.24627[. 8071 
DLFIPSE 0.84448 0.19961 4.2307[. 000] 
DUMMY24 0.00472 0.002 1 1.8825[. 066] 
Event 25: DGES unsvmi)athetic on Trafalaar House move. 
lRegressor lCoefricient I Standard Error 
ý T-RatiolProb] 
CONSTANT -0-00108 0.00122 -0.88878[. 379] 
DLFTSE 0.51556 0.16483 3.1279[. 0031 
DUMMY25 -0.00061 0.00152 
I Regressor iCoefficient I Standard Error r rror , rror T-Ratio(Probi 
CONSTANT -0.002 00 1 0.0014499 .0 
d 
-1.3465[. 184] 
DLFrSE 0.59595 O'l 0,193225 5 9 3.0838[. 003] 
DUMMY26 0.00021 0.0 7 7 0.00377 10.056682[. 955] 
Event 27: Sale of Government's 40% electricity holding. 
ýRegressor lCoefficient I Standard Error T-RatiolP 
CONSTANT -0.00194 O-Ojl3 
DLFTSE ý. -50jfl 0.2108- 2,40051.0 
DUMMY27 -0.00719 0.00897 -0.80181[. 
Event 28: Distribution Drice controls to be revised. 
Regressor lCoefficient I Standard Error T-RatiolProb) 
CONSTANT -0.00 1 94 0.0013 -1.4868 . 144 
DLFTSE 0.50551 0.21058 0 2,40051.020] 
DUMMY27 -0.00719 1 0.00897 -0 . 0181 0.80181[. 4271 
I Regressor Coefficient I Standard Error T-Ratio[Probl 
ICONSTANT 
-0.0017 
1 0.00123 -1.3854f. 1721 
DLFTSE 0.4919 0.20888 2.3549f. 0231 
DUMMY28 -0.00995 0 0.. 0 00932 -1.0677[. 2911 
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Event 29: Southern Electric bids for S. W. Electricity 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
DLFTSE 
DUMMY29 
Coefficient 
0.00028 
0.73399 
0.00609 
0.00138 
0.21309 
0.00306 
T-RatiolProb) 
0.20479[. 839] 
3.4445[. 001] 
1.9957[. 0531 
jLvent 30: Scottish Power b ids for Manweb. 
lRegressor lCoefficient Standard Error I T-RatiolProbi 
CONSTANT 0.0013 0.00135 0.96097[. 341] 
DLFTSE 0.76067 0.23076 3,2964[. 002 
1 
DUMMY30 -0.00069 
1 0.00539 -0.12765[. 8991 
Event 31: Hanson bids for Eastern. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Probj 
CONSTANT 
- 
0.00215 0.00116 1.8538[. 070] 
15LFT SE 
- 
0,82231 0.21199 3.8790[. 0001 
5UMMY31_ 
, -0.00027 
0.00262 -0.10364[. 9181 
Event 32: North West Water bids for Norweb. 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
DLFFSE 
DUMMY32 I 
Coefficient 
-0.00072 
0.72047 
0.00035 
0.00146 
0.21142 
0.0068 
T-RatiolProb) 
-0.49340[. 624) 
3.407 
. 00 1] §L_ 
0.051987[. 959] 
Event 33: Powenzen bids for Midlands Electricity. 
Regressor ýCoefflcient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
[CONST-ANT 
-0.00056 0.00152 -0.37044[. 713] . DLFTSE 0.63608 -0.20155 3.1560[. 003] 
-0.00489 0.00203 -2.4047[. 020) 
Event 34. - National Power bids for Southern Electric 
I Regressor lCoefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probl 
CONSTANT -0.0001 0.00123 
1-0.085103[. 
9 31 
, 
8 1 
DLFTSE 0.8575 0.1899 . 4.5155[. 000] 
DUMMY34 -0.01827 0.00543 _ -3.3681r. 0011 
Event 35: NP and PG's REC bids to face MMC reference. 
I Regressor 1COefficient Standard Error T-Ratiojftoýj] 
CONSTANT -0.00064 0.00147 
DLFTSE 1.1036 0.31726 3.4785[. 001] 
DUMMY35 -0.02162 0.00499 -4.3356[. 0001 
Standard Error 
Standard Error 
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Event 36: DGES' statement on Price undertakin-as. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[P ob] 
CONSTANT 
a 6 
-0.0024 0.00171 -1.4088[. 165) 
DLFTSE 1,0677 0.38815 
DUMMY36 -n nnQi 
_gvent 
A. All): Combined regulatory dummy (all events integrated). 
Regressor 
- 
Coefficient Standard Error 
I T-Ratio[Probj 
ZONSTANT 0.00072 0.00037 1.9475[. 0521 
DLFTSE 0.81437 0.05677 14.3459[. 0001 
DUMMYREG -0.00294 0.00159 -1.8538[. 064] 
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Tabie 2: Diagnostic test results: Market Model - National Power 
Regression Serial Correlation Functional Form Normality H'Sced/Arch 
I Pass Pass Fail 
_Pass/Pass 2 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
3 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
4 Fail Pass Pass 
-Pass/Pass 
5 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
6 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
7 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
8 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
9 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
10 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
11 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
12 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
13 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
14 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
15 Pass Fail Fail Pass/Pass 
16 Fail Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
17 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
18 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
19 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
20 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
21 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
22 Pass Fail Pass p Pass/Pass 
23 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
24 Pass Fail Pass Pass P P Pass/Pass 
25 Pass Pass Pass Fail/Pass 
26 P'. Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass I 
27 Pass Pass Pass 
j 
Fail/Fail 
28 Pass Pass Pass Fail/Fail - 
29 Pass Fail Pass p Pass/Pass 
30 Pass Fail__ Pass Pass/Pass 
31 Pass Fail 
- 
Pass Pass/Pass 
32 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
33 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
34 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
35 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
36 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
ALL Fail Pass Faii Pass/pass 
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Table 3: Market Model Results - Powergen. 
Event 1: Break up of first set of CFDs. 
! le ressor Coefficient ff f Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
Cor NSTANT 
E 
0.00538 0.00456 1.1790[. 2441 
D SE LFTSE 045 0.45352 0.21245 2.13A,, r f,,, Ql 
DUMMVI 
. 
01 0 -0.0 
Event 2: Price spikes begin, 
I !! ý e ressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probi z 
r NSTANT 0.00143 0.0013 1.0996[. 277] 
D Frs LFTSE 0.7409 0.20683 3.5822[-0011 
DUMMY2 0.0097 
Event 3: First Dool orice review be2ins with MMC threa 
Re ressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTAN 
I t 
-0.00025 0.00145 -0.17430[. 862) 
DLFTSE 0.60523 0.2386 2.5367[. 014 
DUMMY3 0.12518[. 9011 
Event 4: First pool price revi ew published. 
Re ressor Coefficient Standard Error I T-RatiolProb] 
UNSFANU I -0.00088 0.00151 -0.58078[. 5641 
DLFTSE 0.6119 0.12945 4,7268[. 0001 
DUMMY4 -0.0039 0.00234 -1,6639[. 1031 
Event 5: Electricity price controls published. 
Re ressor Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Probi I 
CONSTAN 0.00008 0.00246 10.032386[. 97411 
DLFTSE 
N 
0.91507 0.41306 2.2154[. 032 ý 
DU -A Al ; '1] 0.00504 -3.0357[. 004 3 
Event 6: DGES to examine excessive electricity prorits. 
Rearessor Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio Probf 
CONSTANT 0.00433 0.00194 2,2328[. 030] 
DLFTSE 0.76445 0.2507 3.0493[. 0041 
-F ---T DUMMY6 0,00332 0,00314 -1,0582[. 2951 
Event 7: Generators threatened with MMC reference. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 
- 
0.00 126 0.00229 0.5508 641 5 
R FFSE 0.30003 0.26824 
H 
1 185 . 269 1 
; 
DUMMY7 0. W08 0.00344 
E147% 
. 
146] 
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rývvut a: uxera suggests rM umory cnangge 
Regressor CoeMcient I Standard Error T-Ratio[Probj 
CONSTANT 
W 
0.00136 0.00197 0.69099[. 4931 
DLFTSE 0.21869 0.21446 1.0197[. 313L 
DUMMV8 -0.00588 0.0072 
1-0.81698[. 418] 
Event 9: DGES to mobe vower uice rises. 
Regressor Coefricient I Standard Error I T-RatiolProb] 
CONSTANT 0.00219 0.00162 13505[. 1831 
DLFTSE 0.27058 0.18444 1.4671[. 1491 
DUMMY9 -0.00613 0.01298 -0.47203[. 6391 
Event 10: Second vool vrice review launched. 
Regressor Coefficient 
I 
Standard Error 
I T-Ratio(Probj 
CONSTANT -0.00089 0.00309 -0,28896[. 774] 
DLFTSE 0.35048 0.17981 1.9492[. 057 
DUMMY10 0.0056 0.00606 0.92308[. 3613 
Event 11: Commons to revise sale of generators. 
lRegressor I Coefficient I Standard Error 
I T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT -0.00017 0.00282 -0.060104[. 952] 
DLFrSE 0.54957 0.21195 2.5929[. 013] 
DUMMYII -0.00142 0.00455 -0.31133[. 757] 
Event 12: Second pool price review published . 
I Regressor lCoefficient I Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.00218 0.002 . 281] 
DLFTSE 0.97096 0.33304 2.9154[. 005] 
DUMMY12 -0.00893 0.00786 -1.1361[. 262] 
Event 13: DGES seekine additional power over generators. 
Regressor lCoefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTAN 0.00295 0.0025 1.1800[. 244] 
DLFIPSE 0.4828 0.28321 O95 1 704ý 
DUMMY13 -0.00178 
ý 
0.00343 . 1 4j -0. 
ý51964[. 
6061 
Event 14: DGES tells eenerators to sell surplus plants. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error r rror T-RatiolProb] 
CONSTANT 0.0034 0.00214 1.5895[. 119] 
DLFTSE 0.67016 0.25714 2.6062[. 012] 
DUMMY14 -0.00419 0.00606 -0.69117[. 4931 
ýc- - 
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Event 15: Break-up of second set of CFDs. 
Regressor Coefficient I Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.00035 0.00191 0.18277[. 8561 
DLFTSE 0.64177 0.21309 3.0117[. 004] 
DUMMY15 0.00719 0.00813 0.88366[. 381) 
Event 16: Generators threatened with MMC reference. 
Regressor Coefficient I Standard Error I T-RatiolProbl 
CONSTANT 0.00226 0.00175 1.2868[. 2041 
DLFTSE 1.1489 0.2854 4.0255[. 000] 
DUMMY16 -0.00675 0.00489 -1.3813[. 174] 
Event 17: MMC reference and/or plant sales threatened. 
Regressor Coefflcient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT -0.00039 0.00125 -0.30791[. 759] 
DLFTSE 0.72631 0.21831 3.3270[. 002] 
DUMMY17 0.00048 0,00675 0.071660[. 943] 
Event 18: MMC reference unless aereement made. 
Regressor lCoefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probi 
CONSTANT 0.00077 0.00178 0.43088[. 668] 
DLFTSE 1.2277 0.2852 4.3046[. 000] 
DUMMY18 0.00673 0.00439 
Event 19: Revised bidding svstem drives pool prices down. 
[Regressor Coefficient I Standard Error 
I T-RatiolProb) 
CONSTANT 0.0018 0.00214 0.83927[. 405] 
DLF7rSE, 1.1271 0.32082 3.5132[. 001] 
DUMMY19 0.0017 0.00431 0.39306[. 696] 
vent 20: NP and PG establish orice sEreement. 
Regressor lCoefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.00096 0.00187 0.51465[. 609] 
DLFrSE 0.83424 0.19081 4.3722[. 000] 
DUMMY20 0.01029 0.01206 0.85339[. 398] 
nee from DGES. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error rd Error T-Ratio[Probl 
CONSTANT -0.00241 0.00238 0238 
2 
-1.0106[. 317] 
DLFTSE 0.8721 0.19278 4.5239[. 000] 
DUMMY21 -0.00253 ) 395 0.00395 0 -0.63865[. 5261 
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Event 22: DGES to encourage break-up of Nuclear Electric. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT -0.00007 0.00163 -0.041400[. 967] 
DLFTSE 1.0573 0.13828 7.6460[. 0001 
DUMMY22 -0.00444 0.00243 -1.8296[. 074] 
Event 23: Generators warned on plant disposals. 
Regressor Coefricient Standard Error I T-RatiolProb] 
CONSTANT -0.00022 0.00157 -0.14085[. 8891 
DLFTSE 1.0399 0.14147 7.3506[. 000] 
DUMMY23 -0.00502 0.00221 -2.2668[. 0281 
Event 24: Trafalear House bids for Northern Electric 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT -0.00123 0.00151 -0.81626L418L 
DLFTSE 0.67051 0.14525 4.6161[. 0001 
DUMMY24 0.01205 0.00289 4.1616[. 000] 
Event 25: DGE S unsympat hetic on Trafalgar House move. 
Regressor lCoefricient I Standard Error I T-Ratio[Probl 
CONSTANT -0.00085 0.00125 -0.67779[. 501] 
DLFTSE 0.32437 0.19127 1.6959[. 096] 
DUMMY25 ; -0.006 0.0022 -2.7275[. 009] 
Event 26: MMC reference threatened over plant sales. 
Regressor Coefflcient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT -0.00203 0.00158 -1.2862[. 205] 
DLFTSE 0.49209 0.23127 2.1278[. 039] 
DUMMY26 -0.0029 0.00335 -0.86462[. 39- 
Event 27: Sale of Government's 40% electricity holding. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Probj 
CONSTANT -0.00273 0.00137 -1.9977[. 0511 
DLFTSE 0.53991 0.22313 2.4198[. 019] 
DUMMY27 -0.00712 0.00963 -0.73988[. 463) 
Event 28: Distribution Drice controls to be revised. 
lRegressor Icoefficient 
ndardError Sta 'T-Ratio[Probl 
CONSTANT -0.00241 . 
00132 
n 
0 0.00132 -1.8275[. 0741 
DLF1rSE 0.51839 0.2225 0.2225 2.3298[. 024] 
DUMMY28 -0.01086 . 00942 0 0.00942 
1.1535[. 254] 
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Event 29: Southern Electric bids for S. W. Electrickv. 
Regressor COefrlciOnt Standard Error ý T-RatiolProbl 
EONSTANT 0.00133 0.00122 1.0916 .2 
0] 
_ 
67LFTSE 0.70913 0,20548 3.4511[. 001] 
DUMMY29 0.01291 0.00176 7.3330[. 0001 
Event 30: Scottish Power bids for Manweb. 
Regressor Coefflcient Standard Error ý T-RatiolProbi 
CONSTANT 0.00294 T00135 11781 1341 
DLFTSE 0.79645 0.20653 3.8563[. 0001 
DUMMY30 -0.00648 0.00246 -2.6354f. 0111 
Event 31: Hanson bids for Eastern. 
Regressor ýCoefficient Standard Error ý T-RatiolProbi 
C NSTANT 0.0027 0.00137 1.9781[. 054] 
DLFTSE 0.79253 0.2009 3.9450[. 0001 
DUMMY31 -0.00646 0.00172 -3.7544[. 000] 
Event 32: North West Water bids for Norweb. 
Regressor lCoefficient I Standard Error T-RatiolProbi 
CONSTANT - -0.000 11 0.00177 -0.064311[. 9491 
DLFTSE 0,78929 0.24129 3.2669[. 002] 
DUMMY32 
1 
-0.00003 0.00458 -0.0072572[. 994] 
Event 33: Powergen bids for Midlands Electricity. 
Regressor Coefficient ndardError 
I Sta T-RatiolProb) 
CONSTANT 0.00036 0.00178 
2 
0.00178 0.20440[. 839] 
DLFTSE 0.78619 0.22751 0.22751 3.4556[. 001] 
DUMMY33 -0.00618 000261 0.00261 -2.3642[. 0221 
Event 34: National Power bids for Southern Electric 
I Regressor lCoefficient or 
I Standard Err T " -RatiolProb) 
CONSTANT 1 -0,00042 
I 
0.00157 ()0 -0.26903[. 7891 
DLFTSE 0.80222 509 09 0.21509 3.7297[. 001] 
DUMMY34 -0.00695 0.00634 - 1.0965[. 2781 
Event 35: NP and PG's REC bids to face MMC reference. 
Regressor I Coefficient I Standard Error T-RatiolProb] 
CONSTANT 
. 
00018 0.00138 0.13151[. 896] 
DLFTSE 0.73636 0.28003 2.6296[. Oll] 
DUMMY35 -0.02317 0.00556 
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Event 36: DGES' statement on price undertakinas. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT -0.00256 0.00174 -1.4675[. 149] HFTSE 0.72899 0.36869 1.9772[. 054] 
DUMMY36 -0.00408 0.00299 -1.3665[. 178] 
Event (All): Combined regulatory dummy (all events integrated). 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
I 
T-RatiolProb) 
CONSTANT 0.00087 0,00037 2.3401[. 019] 
DLFTSE 0.75461 0.05785 13.0446[. 0 0] 
DUMMYREG -0.00364 0.00152 -2.3942[. 017] 
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Table 4: Diagnostic test results: Market Model - Powergen. 
Regression Serial Correlation Functional Form Normality H'Sced/Arch 
I Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
2 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
3 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
4 Pass Pass Pass Fail/Pass 
5 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
6 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
7 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
8 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
9 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
10 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
11 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
12 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
13 Pass Fail pass Pass/Pass 
14 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
15 Pass Fail Fail Pass/Pass 
16 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
17 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
18 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
19 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
20 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
21 Fail ss as Pa P Pas s Pass/Pass 
22 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
23 Pass Fail 
" 
Pass Pass/Pass 
24 Pass Fail Pass Pass/Pass 
25 Fail Pass Pass pall/pa. e 1 
26 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
27 Pass Pass Fail Fail/Pass 
28 Pass Pass Pass Fail/Fail 
29 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
30 Pass Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
31 Fail Pass Pass Pass/Pass 
32 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
33 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
34 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
35 Pass Pass Fail Pass/Pass 
36 Fail Pass Pass Pass/Fail 
ALL Fail Pass F il Pass/Pass 
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Table 5. Dummy results: +/- 1 observation. 
I National Power Powergen 
D mm u Coefficient IStandard Error IT-RatiolProbi l Coefficient IStandard Error IT-Ratio jProbj 
I 
A -0.01437 0.01767 
ý-0.8 1331[. 420) -0 0204 0.01753 1.163 70[. 25 1 
B 0.0 510.00619 0.80835[. 423] -0.00621 0.00518 -1.1982 - 
0[. 237] 
CC 0 . 00089 0.00604 0.1480ý 0.00466 0.00585 -0.79722[. 429)jj] 
D 0.00801 0.00662 1.20990[. 232] 1 0.0096 0.00613 1.56520[. 1241 
E -0.00283 0.00752 -0.37618[. 708] -0.00112 0.00737 -0.152101.8801 
F 0.02021 0.01221 1.65580[. 104] 1 0.01976 0.0109 1.81280[. 0761 
G -0.01014 1 0.00835 1-1.21380[. 23111 -0.00734 0.00859 
1-0.85496[. 397t 
H 0.01385 0.00648 2.13710[. 03811 0.01578 0.00763 2. M6MOL041_L 
1 -0.01093 0.0067 1.63160[. 109] -0.011 0.00697 - 1.57980[. 12 1] 
1 0.00786 0.00573 1 1.37340[. 176]1 0.00758 0.00533 1.42350[. 161) 
K 0.00956 0.00849 1.12630[. 266] 0.00403 0.00772 0.52200[. 604] 
L 0.01889 0.00804 2.34950[. 0231 0.01038 0.00769 1.35080[. 183] 
m 0.00334 0.00595 0.56221[. 5771 0.00283 0.00628 0.44964[. 655] 
N 0.00543 0.0055 0.98723[. 3281 0.00416 0.00602 0.69123[. 493) 
0 -0.00665 
1 0.00593 1 - 1.12250[. 2677]j_ -0.00336 0.00622 -0.54030[. 5911 
P 0.00116 1 0.00618 0.18821[. 8521 ý 0.00523 0.00638 0.81967[. 416) 
Q -0.00211 1 0.00536 -0.39381[. 695]1 -0.00785 1 0.00491 -1.59770[. 117] 
R 0.00099 0.00451 0.21944[. 827] -0.00566 
1 0.00536 1 -1.05530[. 297] 
s 0.00024 0.00442 0.05374[. 957] 0.00229 0.00533 0.42848[. 670] 
T -0.00026 0.00613 -0.04236[. 96611 -0.0074 0.00714 -1 03680[. 305] 
u -0.00649 0.00608 - 1.06730[. 292i 
1 
-0.00379 0.00712 -0.533 12[. 597) 
-V 
-0.00571 0,00699 -0.81701[. 419]1 -0.00361 0.00821 -0.43936[. 6631 
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Table 6. Dummv results: +/- 5 observations. 
National Power I Powergen 
Dummy Coefficient Standard Error I T-Ratiol Prob I I Coefficient Standard Error IT-Ratio I Prob 
A -0.00864 0.01019 1-0.84772[. 401 ] -- - - 
1 
__-O. 
O 1061 0.01015 -1.04520[. 301], 
B -0.00083 0-. 00-3-49---- 
ý-0-. 238 7 7 [. 812] j -0.010350 -, , j 
0.00290 -1.20790[. 233] 
c 0.00378 0.00346 6 1.09360[. 2801 
i 
286 - . 000425 -, . 0425 0.00336 1.26660[. 211] c 
D 0.00392 0.00371 1 1.05460[. 2971 1 *9 01,9 10.00436 0.00345 1.26200[. 21311 
E -0.00080 0.00427 12 7 -0.18758[. 852] 18 75 852 0* -0.00104 04 0.00418 -0.24787[. 805] 
F 0.00516 0.00718 8 18 0.7188 . 476] 
0.7 887[. 476 0.0 07 4 f 0 . 00640 1.11620[. 270] 
G 
F 
-0.00353 0.00477 477 0,00 -0.73900[. 464] -0 * 73 9()0 -0-73900 -0.00278 0.00488 -0.56891[. 5721 
H 0.00149 0.00389 0.38437[. 7021 0,38437 0.38437 -0.00194 . 00456 -0.42419[. 
6iji 
1 0.00936 0.00368 goo [. 014] 2539001 0.00758 0.00392 1.93080[. 059] 
-0.00352 0.00341 . 030001 
L 
1 -1.03000[. 308] -0.00064 0.00321 -0.19905[. 8431 
K 0.00621 0.00481 1.289001 1.28900[. 204 0.00809 0.00425 1.90430[. 063] 
L 0.00604 0.00474 1.272201 1.27220[. 209] 0.00531 0.00438 
_1.21130[. 
2321 
M 0.00392 0.00337 1.16220[. 251] 0.00769 0.00344 2.23920[. 030] 
N 0.00538 0.00308 1.74820[. 087] 0.00773 0.00327 2.36190[. 022) 
0 -0.00582 0.00333 -1.74600[. 087] -0.00409 0.00352 -1.16060[. 252] 
P -0.00613 0.00338 -1.81530[. 076] -0.00547 0.00354 -1.54650[. 129] 
0.00247 0.00305 0.80885[. 423] 0.00028 0.00288 0.09788[. 922] 
R -0.00028 0.00259 -0.10658[. 916] -0.00511 0.00302 -1.69020[. 0971 
-0.00116 0.00257 -0.45345[. 652] 0.00055 0.00311 _ 
0.17821[. 859] 
T -0.00136 0.00348 -0.39167[. 697] -0.00302 0.00408 -0.74046 . 4631, 
u -0.00904 0.00330 
1 
-2.74300[. 0091 -0.00780 
1 0.00397 -1.96350[. 056] 
1 
v -0.00638 0.00373 
1 
-1.71040[. 096] -0.00196 0.00451 -0.43487[. 666] 
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Table 7: National Power and Power2en, Dummy Window -1/+2 obs. 
Dummy 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
I National Power I Powergen 
R-Squared R-Bar-Squared R. S. S. R-Squared R-flar-Squared R. S. S. IIIIIII R-Squarcd I R-Bar-Squared 
0.040112 
0.264160 
0.130030 
0.264930 
0.214830 
0.155740 
0.041804 
0.068855 
0.085876 
0.065034 
0.116690 
0.077845 
0.147671 
0.171330 
0.228910 
0.258470 
0.159870 
0.367080 
0.275110 
0.258000 
0.187690 
0,484310 
0.359730 
0.305580 
0.135000 
0.161690 
0.189990 
0.225260 
0.265170 
0.244750 
0.365300 
0.160640 
0.168060 
0.357410 
0.361550 
0.194880 
-0.001022 
0.233500 
0.093786 
0.234310 
0.182110 
0.120570 
0.001879 
0.030057 
0.047788 
0.026077 
0,079882 
0,039422 
0.112684 
0.136800 
0.196780 
0.227570 
0.124860 
0.340710 
0.244910 
0.227090 
0.153840 
0.462820 
0.333050 
0.276650 
0.098959 
0.126760 
0.156240 
0.192980 
0.234550 
0.213290 
0.338860 
0.125660 
0.133400 
0.330630 
0.334950 
0.161330 
National Power 
R. S. S. 
0040440 
0.005105 
0.004855 
0.005208 
0.010554 
0.006959 
0.009034 
0.009806 
0.010353 
0.022877 
0,015699 
0.009066 
0.009405 
0.007062 
0.006245 
0.006173 
0.004286 
0.009702 
0.012259 
0.011042 
0.008849 
0.006101 
0.004844 
0.005147 
0.003212 
0.004468 
0.003891 
0.003722 
0.003766 
0.003949 
0.002749 
0.005043 
0.004757 
0.003643 
0.005175 
0.006800 
R-Squared I R-flar-Squared I R. S. S. 
0 03,073t, 
0.313760 
0.139430 
0.251240 
0.186600 
0.182440 
0.044069 
0.047235 
0.044515 
0.057102 
0,098692 
0.149540 
0.045495 
0.096913 
0.114480 
0.241930 
0.173270 
0.355910 
0,270560 
0.262640 
0.169720 
0.443950 
0,441420 
0.328930 
0.081042 
0.110490 
0.176520 
0.219030 
0.370760 
0.290010 
0.285890 
0.148650 
0 184390 
0.168190 
0.353490 
0.104110 
flowergen 
-0 o 11 40t) 
0.285170 
0.103580 
0.220040 
0.152710 
0.148370 
0.004238 
0.007536 
0.004703 
0.017814 
0.061137 
0.114110 
0.005724 
0,059284 
0.077580 
0.210340 
0.138830 
0.329070 
0.240170 
0.231920 
0.135130 
0.420780 
0.418140 
0.300970 
0.042752 
0.073428 
0.142210 
0.186490 
0.344540 
0.260420 
0.256140 
0.113180 
0.150400 
0.133530 
0.326550 
0.066780 
0.040313 
0.003576 
0.004643 
0.004806 
Oý012871 
0.007097 
OM8890 
0.008082 
0.008476 
0.020928 
0.016830 
0.009524 
0,012994 
0.009883 
0.008787 
0.006690 
0.003742 
0.007839 
0.009833 
0.008999 
0.009904 
0.005543 
0.005568 
0.004691 
0.003304 
0.005023 
0.004657 
0.004416 
0.002825 
0.003592 
0.003820 
0.006595 
0.006530 
0.005852 
0.004368 
0.006314 
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Table 8. National Power DummV variants. 
Durý 
3 
4 
7 
10 
12 
15 
16 
17 
18 
20 
24 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Nati onal Power A (- I /+ I obý,. ) 
R-Squared R-Bar-Squared 
0041966 0.000208 0.040366 
0263340 0.232650 0.005110 
0.125370 0.088926 0.004881 
0.257080 0.226130 0.005264 
0.043863 0.004024 0.009015 
0.063355 0.024328 0.022918 
0.135190 0.099156 0.009698 
0.211830 0.178990 0.006383 
0.275970 0.245800 0.006028 
0.186870 0.152990 0.004149 
0.372190 0.346030 0.009624 
0.257770 0.226840 0.011046 
0.304630 0.275650 0.005154 
Oý 165330 0.130550 0.004448 
0.246020 0.214600 0.003622 
0.177740 0.143480 0.003950 
0.255470 0.224450 0.003816 
0.266810 0.236260 0.003834 
0.365880 0.339460 0.002747 
0.163430 0.128570 0.005027 
0.160120 0.125120 0.004802 
0.241860 0,210270 0004298 
0.339560 0.312040 0.005353 
I Nati Dnal Power C (-51+5 obs 
R-Squarcd R-Bar-Squared 
0.043038 0.001431 0040317 
0.264010 0.233340 0.005106 
0.151520 0.116170 0,004735 
0.285030 0.255240 0.005066 
0.050312 0.010742 0.008954 
0.116330 0.079510 0.021622 
0.138810 0.102930 0.009657 
0,315060 0.286520 0.005547 
0.326290 0.298220 0.005609 
0.173190 0.138740 0.004218 
0.377150 0.351200 0.009548 
0.213910 0.181150 0.011698 
0.302640 0.273580 0.005169 
0.166350 0.131610 0.004443 
0.239280 0.207580 0.003654 
0.213330 0.180550 0.003779 
0.260500 0.229690 0.003790 
0.244620 0.213140 0.003950 
0,365390 0.338950 0.002749 
0.183470 0.149440 0.004906 
0.174980 Oý 1406 10 0.004717 
0.332380 0.304560 0.003785 
0.209170 0.176220 0.006410 
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I 
Table 9. Powergen Dummy variants. 
F-5----y R-Squared I R-Bar-Squared I R. S. S. 
0.043833 
0.308930 
0.145050 
0,244170 
0,044949 
0.052286 
0.141180 
0.102130 
0.261580 
0.206590 
0.346240 
0.249590 
0.322780 
0.105030 
0.209610 
0.191940 
0.347800 
0.300570 
0.274250 
0.149460 
0.173770 
0.144240 
0.367160 
Powergen A (-I/+ I obs. ) 
1 
3 
4 
7 
10 
12 
15 
16 
17 
18 
20 
24 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
0.002260 
0.280140 
0.109420 
0.212680 
0.005155 
0.012798 
0.105400 
0.064720 
0.230810 
0.173530 
0.319000 
0.218320 
0.294570 
0.067741 
0.176670 
0.158270 
0.320620 
0.271430 
0.244010 
0.114020 
0.139350 
0.108590 
0.340790 
0.039768 
0.003601 
0.004613 
0.004851 
0.008882 
0.021034 
0.009618 
0.008910 
0.006516 
0.003591 
0.007956 
0.009158 
0.004734 
0.005054 
0.004470 
0.004570 
0.002928 
0.003539 
0.003883 
0.006589 
0.006615 
0.006021 
0.004276 
Po"ergen C (-51+5 obs. ) 
R-Squared R-Bar-Sq 
0.038518 
0.323170 
0,141950 
0.263180 
0.047671 
0.095173 
0.138200 
0.168740 
0.279170 
0.173770 
0.388710 
0,241130 
0.279280 
0.113340 
0.206050 
0.175270 
0.310470 
0.319040 
0.299130 
0.148770 
0.232740 
0.220700 
0.087233 
-0.003286 
0,294970 
0.106200 
0.232480 
0.007990 
0.057472 
0.102290 
0.134110 
0,249140 
0.139350 
0.363240 
0.209510 
0.249250 
0.076393 
0.172970 
0.140900 
0,281740 
0.290660 
0.269920 
0.113300 
0.200770 
0.188230 
0.049201 
0.039989 
0.003527 
0.004630 
0,004729 
0.008857 
0.020083 
0.009651 
0.008249 
0.006361 
0.003739 
0.007439 
0.009261 
0.005038 
0.005007 
0.004490 
0.004664 
0.003096 
0.003445 
0.003749 
0.006594 
0.006143 
0.005483 
0.006167 
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Table la: Pool Purchase Price (PPP): Horton IV estimate (j)/kWh. 1989 monev values). 
20 hrs 
215 hrs 
1085 hrs 
2745 hrs 
4620 hrs 
6133 hrs 
[ 7443 hrs 
8435 hrs 
8760 hrs 
Average 
1990/111991/2 11992/3 11993/4 11994/5 11995/6 11996/7 
46.24 57.72 90.31 121.21 89.47 124.63 132.20 
3.39 3.55 3.89 4.92 3.86 5.07 5.15 
2.42 2.49 2.62 2.78 2.80 2.77 2.81 
2.27 2.36 2.45 2.60 2.64 2.60 2.68 
2.05 2.10 2.18 2.25 2.33 2.29 2.41 
1.84 1.89 1.98 2.03 2.09 2.02 2.15 
1.54 1.65 1.74 1.81 1.86 1.81 1.88 
1.31 1.36 1.44 1.57 1.64 1.59 1.62 
1.22 1.25 1.33 1.47 1.51 1.47 1.50 
2.20 2.32 2.55 2.80 2.69 2.83 2.94 
The sums in the table do not include the subsidies granted to British Coal. 
Table lb: Pool Purchase Price (PPP): Horton IV estimate (p/kWh, 1989 money values). 
1990/111991/2 11992/3 11993/4 11994/5 11995/6 11996/7 11997/8 
20 hrs 
215 hrs 
1085 hrs 
2745 hrs 
4620 hrs 
6133 hrs 
7443 hrs 
8435 hrs 
8760 hrs 
Average 
227.33 203.29 167.65 119.79 120.05 119.06 120.77 120.80 
3.39 3.55 3.89 4.92 3.86 5.07 5.15 3.90 
2.42 2.49 2.62 2.78 2.80 2.77 2.81 2.86 
2.27 2.36 2.45 2.60 2.64 2.60 2.68 2.69 
2.05 2.08 2.18 2.25 2.31 2.26 2.41 2.44 
1.84 1.89 1.97 2.03 2.08 2.02 2.14 2.17 
1.54 1.60 1.74 1.81 1.85 1.81 1.84 1.86 
1.31 1.36 1.44 1.57 1.63 1.58 1.60 1.63 
1.22 1.25 1.33 1.46 1.51 1.44 1.46 1.48 
2.89 2.86 2.84 2.79 2.80 2.80 2.89 2.87 
The sums in the table include the subsidies granted to British Coal. 
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Table 2a. Contract load factors. 
Time period Load Factor 
20 hrs 0.22831% 
215 hrs 2.45434% 
1085 hrs 12.38584% 
2745 hrs 31.38584% 
4620 hrs 52.73973% 
6133 hrs 70.01142% 
7443 hrs 84.96575% 
8435 hrs 96.28995% 
8760 hrs 100.00000% 
Table 2b. Synthetic load proffle derived from Horton IV estimates. 
Using the 1990/1 PSP estimates indicated above: 
The first 20 hrs of electricity cost 228.94 p/kwh 
The next 195 hrs of electricity cost 3.46 p/kwh 
The next 870 hrs of electricity cost 2.50 p/kwh 
The next 1660 hrs of electricity cost 2.35 p/kwh 
The next 1875 hrs of electricity cost 2.12 p/kwh 
The next 1513 hrs of electricity cost 1.93 p/kwh 
The next 13 10 hrs of electricity cost 1.63 p/kwh 
The next 992 hrs of electricity cost 1.31 p/kwh 
The last 325 hrs of electricity cost 1.22 p/kwh 
Table 2c. Load prortle established in half-hour format. 
The first 20 hrs of electricity represent 0.2283 1% of the year (40 half-hours) 
The next 195 hrs of electricity represent 1.1130 1% of the year (390 half-hours) 
The next 870 hrs of electricity represent 9.93151% of the year (1740 half-hours) 
The next 1660 hrs of electricity represent 18.94977% of the year (3320 half-hours) 
The next 1875 hrs of electricity represent 21.40411% of the year 
The next 1513 hrs of electricity represent 17.27169% of the year 
The next 13 10 hrs of electricity represent 14.95434% of the year (2620 half-hours) 
The next 992 hrs of electricity represent 11.43836% of the year (1984 half-hours) 
The last 325 hrs of electricity represent 3.71005% of the year (625 half-hours) 
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Table 3- Coefficient restlictions on Horton IV estimates and PPP levels (Static eguations). 
Parameter restrictions: Intercept term = 0, Slope coefficient = 1. 
Critical value of Chi-squared distribution: Chi-squared (2) = 5.99. 
HO: Restrictions valid 
H I: Restrictions invalid 
If calculated value < critical value, accept HO - parameter restrictions are valid. 
Therefore, the forward price is an accurate predictor of the spot price. 
If calculated value > critical value, reject HO - parameter restrictions are invalid. 
Therefore, the forward price is not an accurate predictor of the spot price. 
jDate Jservations I Calculated Value I Accept/Reject HO 
Extended periods. 
10/90-03/94 
10/90-03/93 
Annual results. 
Reject 
Reject 
1-1278 
1-913 
1313.8000 
1558.6000 
10/90-03/91 1-182 563.2172 Reject 
04/91-03/92 183-548 419.7655 Reject 
04/92-03/93 549-913 15420.0000 Reject 
04/93-03/94 914-1278 217.8029 Reject 
Bi-monthlv results. 
10/90-11/90 1- 61 396.7454 Reject 
12/90-01/91 62- 123 199.5379 Reject 
02/91-03/91 124-182 151.5493 Reject 
04/91-05/91 183-243 267.9557 Reject 
06/91-07/91 244-304 226.5947 Reject 
08/91-09/91 305-365 109.6296 Reject 
10/91-11/91 366-426 98.5794 Reject 
12/91-01/92 427-488 4.0015 Accept 
02/92-03/92 489-548 1566.8000 Reject 
04/92-05/92 549-609 3492.7000 Reject 
06/92-07/92 610-670 1468.6000 Reject 
08/92-09/92 671 -731 2700.3000 Reject 
10/92-11/92 732-792 2031.4000 Rej ect 
12/92-01/93 793-854 5321.3000 Reject 
02/93-03/93 855-913 2430.7000 Reject 
04/93-05/93 914- 974 1334.5000 Reject 
06/93-07/93 975- 1035 1783.7000 Reject 
08/93-09/93 1036- 1096 1083.1000 Reject 
10/93-11/93 1097- 1157 1830.7000 Reject 
12/93-01/94 1158- 1219 1400.9000 Reject 
02/94-03/94 1220- 1278 0.7025 Accept 
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Table 4- Diagnostic test results: Horton IV/PPP ansivsis. 
Obs. Range S. C. R. F. F. N. R. H. S. ARCH stat. 
Extended 
sample 
periods. 
1-1278 Fail Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass 
1-913 Fail Fail Fail Pass Fail Pass 
Annual 
results. 
1-182 Fail Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass 
183-548 Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
549-913 Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
914-1278 Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
Bi-monthly 
results. 
1-61. Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass 
62-121 Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass 
124-182 Fail Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass 
183-243 Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
244-304 Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass 
305-365 Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass 
366-426 Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass 
427488 Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
489-548 Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
549-609 Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail Fail 
610-670 Fail Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass 
671-731 Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass 
732-792 Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass 
793-8S4 Fail Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass 
855-913 Pass Fail Fail Pass Fail Pass 
914-974 Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass 
975-1035 Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
1036-1096 Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass 
1097-1157 Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass 
1158-1219 Fail Fail Fail Pass Fail Pass 
1220-1278 Fail Fail Pass Pass Fail Fail 
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Table 5- Coefficient restrictions on Horton IV/PPP levels (D-vnami 
equations). 
Parameter restrictions: Intercept term = 0, Slope coefficient = 1. 
Critical value of Chi-squared distribution: Chi-squared (2) = 5.99. 
HO: Parameter restrictions are valid, 
H 1: Parameter restrictions are not valid. 
lfcalculated value < critical value - accept HO, parameter restrictions valid. 
Therefore, the forward price is an accurate predictor of the spot price. 
If calculated value > critical value - reject HO, parameter restrictions invalid. 
Therefore, the forward price is not an accurate predictor of the spot price. 
Date 
Extended sample 
periods. 
10/90-03/94 
10/90-03/93 
Observations Calculated Value jAccept/Reject HO 
1-1278 3651.2000 Reject 
1-913 1330.4000 Reject 
Annual results. 
10/90-03/91 1-182 364.3951 Reject 
04/91-03/92 183-548 204.7218 Reject 
04/92-03/93 549-913 2288.2000 Rej ect 
04/93-03/94 914-1278 657.7891 Reject 
Bi-monthly results. 
10/90-11/90 1-61.180.9843 Reject 
12/90-01/91 62-121 60.2607 Reject 
02/91-03/91 124-182 181,4143 Reject 
04/91-05/91 183-243 52,0171 Reject 
06/91-07/91 244-304 61.3756 Reject 
08/91-09/91 305-365 20.7358 Reject 
10/91-11/91 366-426 23.6346 Reject 
12/91-01/92 427-488 45.1149 Reject 
02/92-03/92 489-548 158.9228 Reject 
04/92-05/92 549-609 1229.1000 Reject 
06/92-07/92 610-670 115.2681 Reject 
08/92-09/92 671-731 158.2681 Reject 
10/92-11/92 732-792 218.6782 Reject 
12/92-01/93 793-854 518.3131 Reject 
02/93-03/93 855-913 220.1533 Reject 
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Table 6- Dummy variable regression results. 
Event 1: Break-up of first set of CFDs (Observation 173). 
101 observations used for estimation from 150 to 250 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 1.47600 0.10214 14.4512[. 000] 
LHIVEIN 0.49008 0.03316 14.7790[. 000] 
DUMMYJ 0.04158 0.00970 4.2857[. 000] 
Event 2: Price spikes begin (Observation 344). 
101 observations used for estimation from 325 to 425 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 1.13010 0.09434 11.9797[. 000] 
LHIVEIN 0.62541 0.03106 20.1340[. 000) 
DUMMY2 0.04195 0.02073 2.0239[. 046] 
Event 3: First pool price review launched with MMC threat (Observation 368). 
101 observations used for estimation from 350 to 450 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.90101 0.10777 8.3602[. 0001 
LHIVEIN 0.73234 0.03376 21.6920[. 000) 
DUMMY3 -0.05273 0.02467 -2.1375[. 035] 
Event 4: First pool price review published (Observation 446). 
101 observations used for estimation from 425 to 525 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 1.27110 0.12872 9,8745[. 0001 
LHIVEIN 0.61896 0.03926 15.7672[. 000] 
DUMMY4 -0.13078 0.02243 -5.8317[. 000] 
Event 5: Generators threatened with MMC reference (Observation 636). 
101 observations used for estimation from 600 to 700 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.03730 0.03154 64.5842[. 000] 
LHIVEIN 0.35361 0.01028 34.3895[. 000] 
DUMMY5 -0.00479 0.00350 -1.3666[. 1751 
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Event 6: Second pool price review launched (Observation 739). 
101 observations used for estimation from 700 to 800 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio(Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.16230 0.04021 53,7834[. 000] 
LHIVEfN 0.31139 0.01293 24.0746[. 0001 
DUMMY6 0.01094 0.00554 1.9736[. 051] 
Event 7-. Second pool price review published (Observation 810). 
101 observations used for estimation from 775 to 875 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.22490 0.04131 53-8642[. 000] 
LHIVEIN 0.29624 0.01265 23.4117[. 000] 
DUMMY7 -0.01883 0.00511 -3.6850[. 0001 
Event 8: Break-up of second set of CFDs (Observation 913). 
101 observations used for estimation from 875 to 975 
Standard (indexed) Horton estimates. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio(Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.04980 0.04484 45.7185f. 000] 
LHIVEW 0.34910 0.01407 24.8058[. 0001 
DUMMY8 0.07675 0.00384 20.0095[. 000] 
Event 8: Break-up of second set of CFDs (Observation 913). 
101 observations used for estimation from 875 to 975 
Non-indexed Horton estimates. 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio(Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.07300 0.04390 47,2169[. 000] 
LHIVE 0,34910 0.01407 24.8058[. 000] 
DUMMY8 0.08366 0.00378 22.1370[. 000] 
Event 9: Generators threatened with MMC reference (Observation 966). 
101 observations used for estimation from 925 to 1025 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.33610 0.04555 51.2851[. 0001 
LHIVEIN 0.28436 0.01393 20.4092[. 000] 
DUMMY9 -0.00483 0.00517 -0.93444[. 
3521 
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Event 10: Offer threatens MMC reference and/or plant sales (Observation 1034). 
101 observations used for estimation from 1000 to 1100 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.02150 0,05584 36.2037[. 0001 
LHIVEIN 0.37897 0.01727 21-9498[. 000] 
DUMMY10 0.00119 0.00613 0.1943[. 8461 
Event 11: MMC reference threatened unless price agreement made (Observation 
1172). 
101 observations used for estimation from 1150 to 1250 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 1.56190 0.10890 14.3425[. 000] 
LHIVEIN 0.52081 0.03296 15.8001[. 000] 
DUMMY 11 -0.01014 0.01927 -0.5262[. 6001 
Event 12: NP and PG establish price agreement (Observation 1230). 
79 observations used for estimation from 1200 to 1278 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.71541 0.21491 3.3289[. 001] 
LHIVEIN 0.80562 0.07094 11.3571[. 000] 
DUMMY12 -0.21505 0,02867 -7.5001[. 0001 
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Table 7- Diagnostic test results. 
Horton IV/PPP analyses. 
Obs. Range 
Diagnostic tests. 
S. C. R. ] ---FN- F. F. R. H. S. ARCH Stat. 
150-250 Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass Pass 
325-425 Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
350-450 Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass 
425-525 Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
600-700 Fail Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass 
700-800 Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass 
775-875 Pass Pass Fail Fail Fail Pass 
875-975 Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass 
875-975* Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass 
925-1025 Pass Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass 
1000-1100 Fail Fail Fail Fail Pass Pass 
1150-1250 Fail Fail Fail Pass Fail Fail 
1200-1278 Fail Fail Pass Fail Fail Fail 
* Indicates non-indexed Horton estimates. 
S. C. R. Serial Correlation of Residuals (Lagrange-Multiplier test) 
F. F. Functional Form (Ramsey RESET) 
N. R. Normality of Residuals (Skewness and Kurtosis) 
H. S. Heteroscedasticity (Regression of Squared Residuals on Squared Fitted Values) 
ARCH Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
Stat. Stationarity (Unit Root Tests for Residuals) 
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Table 8- Restricted dumMv variable analysis. 
The restrictions and critical values are as previously stated. 
Table 8.1. Horton IV-PPP (Static). 
Dummy Observations Calculated Value 
DUMMY] 150-250 390.93970 
DUMMY2 325-425 154.89340 
DUMMY3 350-450 71,77390 
DUMMY4 425-525 110.43910 
DUMMY5 600-700 4480.80000 
DUMMY6 700-800 2845.40000 
DUMMY7 775-875 3600.40000 
DUMMYS 875-975 2183.30000 
DUMMY8* 875-975 2397.70000 
DUMMY9 925-1025 2682.20000 
DUMMY10 1000-1100 1311.80000 
DUMMY 11 1150-1250 215.51130 
DUMMY12 1200-1278 56.55800 
Table 8.2. Horton IV-PPP (Dynamic). 
Dummy Observations 
DUMMYI 
DUMMY2 
DUMMY3 
DUMMY4 
DUMMY5 
DUMMY6 
DUMMY7 
DUMMY8 
DUMMYS* 
DUMMY9 
DUMMY10 
DUMMY II 
DUMMY12 
150-250 
325-425 
350450 
425-525 
600-700 
700-800 
775-875 
875-975 
875-975 
925-1025 
1000-1100 
1150-1250 
1200-1278 
Calculated Value 
430440.90000 
62640,60000 
39530.30000 
111190.40000 
6207450.90000 
3242480.60000 
5024650.50000 
5128240.50000 
156.59000 
3646610.20000 
1820790.00000 
148560.90000 
103960.30000 
Accept/Reject HO 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Rej ect 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
Accept/Reject HO Coefficient Significant 
Reject 0.05261 Yes 
Reject 0.09485 Yes 
Reject -0.10560 Yes 
Reject -0.31493 Yes 
Reject -0.00422 No 
Reject 0.02167 Yes 
Reject -0.03387 Yes 
Reject 0.11558 Yes 
Reject 0.01907 No 
Reject -0.00602 No 
Reject -0.00095 No 
Reject -0.08855 Yes 
Reject -0.22992 Yes 
* Indicates non-indexed Horton estimates. 
Significance is at the 5% level. 
For further details of the events, see Table 1, Chapter JV (p. 123). 
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Table 9- Regression results: COB contract analysis. 
9.1: Peak results: Actual =f(Forecasted). 
September 1995 - October 1996: 427 observations used for estimation from I to 427 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.12251 0.054404 2.2519[. 025) 
LFNFP 0.95675 0.020954 45.6604[. 000] 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, NormaI4, ARCH. 
September 1995: 30 observations used for estimation from I to 30 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 2.1094 0.35878 5.8795[. 000] 
LFNFP 0.26338 0.12735 2.0681[. 048] 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, Normality 
October 1995: 31 observations used for estimation from 31 to 61 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 1.2412 0.29534 4.2024[. 000] 
LFNFP 0.52151 0.11233 4.6425[. 000] 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation. 
November 1995: 30 observations used for estimation from 62 to 91 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 0.57524 0.23247 2,4745[. 020] 
LFNFP 0.77318 0.08876 8.7109[. 000] 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, Normality. 
December 1995: 31 observations used for estimation from 92 to 122 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT 1.631 0.69429 2.3491[. 0261 
LFNFP 0.30859 0.29326 1.0523[. 3011 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Normality. 
January 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 123 to 153 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONSTANT -0.1765 0.17637 -1.0007[. 
325) 
LFNFP 1.091 0.072058 15.1400[. 000] 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation. 
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February 1996: 29 observations used for estimation from 154 to 182 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.22282 0.2508 
LFNFP 0.88897 0.10254 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Nomality. 
March 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 183 to 213 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.75585 0.25937 
LFNFP 0.68381 0.11526 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, Heteroscedasticity, ARCH. 
April 1996: 30 observations used for estimation from 214 to 243 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 3.0338 0.49637 
LFNFP -0.25201 0.20565 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Normality. 
May 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 244 to 274 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.43548 0.74663 
LFNFP 0.81186 0.30677 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Normality, Heteroscedasticity. 
June 1996: 30 observations used for estimation from 275 to 304 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.75427 0.4063 
LFNFP 0.69654 0.16358 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation. 
July 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 305 to 335 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.14998 0.33001 
LFNFP 0.96682 0.12196 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Nonnality. 
August 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 336 to 366 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 1.6889 0.52994 
LFNFP 0.4022 0.18665 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation. 
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September 1996: 30 observations used for estimation from 367 to 396 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.45874 0.40307 
LFNFP 0.84468 0.14304 
Diagnostic test results: Fail None. 
October 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 397 to 427 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT -0.20252 0.42905 
LFNFP 1,0825 0.14468 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, Normality, ARCH. 
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9.2 Off-Peak results: Actual =f(Forecasted). 
September 1995 - October 1996: 427 observations used for estimation from I to 427 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.061657 0.04291 
LFNFOP 0.97133 0.019264 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, Normality, Heteroscedasticity, 
September 1995: 30 observations used for estimation from 1 to 30 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 3.0486 0.40112 
LFNFOP -0.17474 0.15794 
Diagnostic test results: Fail None. 
October 1995: 31 observations used for estimation from 31 to 61 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.13512 0.36074 
LFNFOP 0.94303 0.1456 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Normality. 
November 1995: 30 observations used for estimation from 62 to 91 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.71658 0.22815 
LFNFOP 0.69316 0.09269 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation. 
December 1995: 31 observations used for estimation from 92 to 122 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 1.2417 0.24684 
LFNFOP 0.36552 0.1223 
Diagnostic test results: Fail None. 
January 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 123 to 153 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.51006 0.31335 
LFNFOP 0,76664 0.14821 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Normality. 
February 1996: 29 observations used for estimation from 154 to 182 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT -0.15232 0.20011 
LFNFOP 1.0421 0.10283 
Diagnostic test results: Fail None. 
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March 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 183 to 213 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.67784 0.25474 
LFNFOP 0.61805 0.14614 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Functional Form. 
April 1996: 30 observations used for estimation from 214 to 243 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.2114 0.18985 
LFNFOP 0.87696 0.10103 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Functional Form, Normality. 
May 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 244 to 274 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.53626 0.42072 
LFNFOP 0.67847 0.23053 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, ARCH. 
June 1996: 30 observations used for estimation from 275 to 304 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 1.9972 0.45956 
LFNFOP -0.074045 0.24612 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Normality. 
July 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 305 to 335 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 1.2809 0.50344 
LFNFOP 0.42074 0.24806 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Normality. 
August 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 336 to 366 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 2.2572 0.42445 
LFNFOP 0.092576 0.16796 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, ARCH. 
September 19%: 30 observations used for estimation from 367 to 396 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 2.4357 0.82197 
LFNFOP 0.071371 0.31395 
Diagnostic test results: Fail Serial Correlation, Normality, ARCH. 
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October 1996: 31 observations used for estimation from 397 to 427 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 0.10635 0.49791 
LFNFOP 0.96925 0.17925 
Diagnostic test results: Fail None. 
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